without such certificate, then the
officer is without any justification
for the seizure, and it is defini-
tively settled to be a tortious act.
If to an action of trespass in a
state court for a seizure, the sei- 6.
zing officer plead the fact of for-
feiture in his defence without
averring a lis pendens, or a con-
demnation, or an acquittal, with
a certificate of reasonable cause
of seizure, the plea is bad; for
it attempts to put in issue the
question of forfeiture in a state
court. Gelston v. Hoyt, 245. 313
2. The statute of 1794, ch. 50. s. 3.
prohibiting the fitting out any
ship, &c. for the service of any
foreign prince, &c, to cruise
against the subjects, &c. of any
other foreign prince, &c. does
not apply to any new govern-
ment, unless it has been ackow-
ledged by the Uhited States, or
by the government of the coun-
try to which such new govern-
ment previously belonged.
a plea setting up a forfeiture un-
der that statute in fitting out a
ship to cruise against such new
state, must aver such recognition,
or it is bad. Id.
328
3. A plea justifying a seizure under
the statute of 1794, ch. 50. need
not state the particular prince or
state by name, against whom the
ship was intended to cruse.
Id.
329
4. A plea justifying a seizure and
detention by virtue of the 7th
sec. of the statute of 1794, ch.
50. under the express instruc-
tion of the president, must aver
that the naval or military force
of the United States was em-
ployed for that purpose, and that
the seizor belonged to the force
so employ 1. id.
331
B. To trespass for taking and detain-
ing, and converting property, it 7.
is sufficient to plead a justifica-
reasonable cause of seizure, in
an instance cause, on farther
proof. The San Pedro,
3. An agreement of the parties en-
tered on the transcript, stating
the amount of damages to be ad-
judged to one of the parties upon
several alternatives, (the verdict
stating no alternative,) not e- 13.
garded by this court as a part of
the record brought up by the
writ of error; but a renire de no-
co awarded to have the damages
assessed by a jury in the court 14.
below. Lanusse v. Barker,
9. A conveyance by a plaintiff's les-
sor during the pendency of an ac-
tion of ejectment, can only ope-
rate upon his reversionary inte-
rest, and cannot extinguish the
prior lease. If the lease expire
during the pendency of a suit, the
plaintiff cannot recover his term 15.
at law, without having it en-
larged by the court, and can
proceed only for antecedent da-
mages. Robinson v. Campbell,
10. Note on the effect of an outstand-
ing title in a third person, in eject-
ment. Note a,
924
11. Libel for a forfeiture of goods
imported into the United States, 17.
and alleged to have been exported
from Bordeaux, in France, and
invoiced at a less sum than the
actual cost, at the place of expor-
lation, contrary to the 66th scc-
tion of the collection law, ch.
128. It appeared that the goods 18.
were originally shipped from
Liverpool, and were landed at
Bordeaux. Restitution decreed
upon the evidence as to the cost
of the goods at Bordeaux; the
form of the libel excluding all
inquiry as to their cost at Liver-
pool, the place where they were
originally shipped, and as to con-
tinuity of voyage.
States v. 150 Crates,
Where a neutral ship owner lends
his name to cover a fraud with
regard to the cargo, this circum-
stance will subject the ship to
condemnation. The Fortuna
236, 245
It is a relaxation of the rules of
the prize court, to allow time for
farther proof, in a case where
there has been a concealment of
material papers. Id.
This court has no jurisdiction
under the 25th section of the ju
diciary act of 1789, ch. 20. unless
the judgment or decree of the
state court be a final judgment
or decrce. A judgment, revers-
ing that of an inferior court, and
awarding a venire facias de novo,
is not a final judgment. Houston
v. Moore,
433
The captors are competent wit-
nesses upon an order for farther
proof, where the benefit of it is
extended to both parties. The
Anne,
435. 444
The captors are always compe-
tent witnesses, as to the circum-
stances of the capture, whether it
be joint, collusive, or within neu-
tral territory. Id.
444
Irregularities on the part of the
captors, originating from mere
mistake, or negligence, which
work no irreparable mischief, and
are consistent with good faith,
will not forfeit their right of
prize. Id.
448
Under the 6th section of the pa-
tent law of 1793, ch. 156. the
defendant pleaded the general
issue, and gave notice that he
would prove at the trial, that the
machine for the use of which,
without license, the suit was
brought, had been used previous
to the alleged invention of the
plaintiff, in several places which
were specified in the notice, or
in some of them, "and also, at
sundry other places in Pennsyl-
vania, Maryland, and elsewhere
in the United States." The de-
fendant, having given evidence
as to some of the places specifi-
ed, offered evidence as to others
not specified. Held, that this
evidence was admissible : but
that the powers of the court, in
such a case, are sufficient to pre-.
vent, and will be exercised to
prevent, the patentee from being
injured by surprise. Evans v. Ea
ton,
454.503
19. Testimony on the part of the
plaintiff, that the persons, of
whose prior use of the machine
the defendant had given evi- 5.
dence, had paid the plaintiff
for licences to use the machine,
ought not to be absolutely re-
jected, though entitled to very
little weight. Id.
505
20. The circuit courts have no pow-
er to set aside their decrees in
equity on motion, after the term
at which they are rendered.
meron v. M'Roberts,
may induce a suspicion that pa-
pers have been spoliated. But
even if it were proved that an
enemy master, carrying a cargo
chiefly hostile, had thrown pa-
pers overboard, a neutral claim-
ant, to whom no fraud is imputa-
ble, is not thereby precluded from
farther proof. Id
48
A blockade does not, according
to modern usage, extend to a neu-
tral vessel found in port, nor
prevent her coming out with the
cargo which was on board when
the blockade was instituted.
Olivera v. The Union Ins. Co.
194
Cases on the subject of licences
collected. Note a,
7. Relaxation of the rules of the
court in allowing farther proof in
a case of concealment of papers.
Id.
245
8 A neutral cargo found on board
an armed enemy's vessel is not
liable to condemnation as prize
of war. The Atalanta, 409. 415
A question of proprietary inte-
rest. Farther proof ordered. Id.
1. A bill of lading consigning the
goods to a neutral, but unaccom-
panied by an invoice or letter of
advice, is not sufficient evidence 10. It is not competent for a neutral
to entitle the claimant to restitu-
tion; but is sufficient to lay a
foundation for the introduction of
faither proof. The Friendschaft
2. The fact of invoices and letters of
advice not being found on board, 11.
consul, without the special au-
thority of his government, to in-
terpose a claim on account of the
violation of the territorial juris-
diction of his country. The
Anne,
435. 445
Quære, Whether such a claim can
be interposed, even by a public
minister, without the sanction of
the government in whose tribu-
nals the cause is pending? Id.
446
12. A capture made within neutral
territory is, as between the bel-
ligerents, rightfu!; and its validi-
ty can only be questioned by the
neutral state. Id.
447
13. If the captured ship commence
hostilities upon the captor with-
in neutral territory, she forfeits
the neutral protection, and the
capture is not an injury for which
redress can be sought from the
neutral sovereign. Id. 447
14. The district courts of the United
States have jurisdiction of ques-
tions of prize, and its incidents,
independent of the special pro-
visions of the prize act of the
26th June, 1812, ch. 430.
(CVII.) The Amiable Nancy,
5601 An American vessel was captured
by the enemy, and after condemn- 12. Law of Denmark and Sweden,
nation and sale to a subject of
the enemy, was recaptured by 13. Recaptures from pirates. Id. §9
an American privateer-Held,
that the original owner was not SPECIFIC PERFORMANC E
entitled to restitution on payment
of salvage, under the salvage See CHANCERY, 1.
act of the 3d March, 1800, ch.
14. and the prize act of 26th STATUTES OF TENNESSEE.
June, 1812, ch. 107. The Star,78
2. By the general maritime law, a
sentence of condemnation com-
pletely extinguishes the title of
the original proprietor. ld. 86
3. The British salvage acts reserve
the jus postliminii as to vessels of
British subjects, even after con-
demnation, unless they have
been after capture set forth as
ships of war. Id.
88
4. The statute of the 43d George.
III. ch. 160. sec. 39. has no
farther altered the previous Bri-
tish law, than to fix the salvage
at uniform stipulated rates, in-
stead of leaving it to depend upon
the length of time the recap-
tured ship was in the hands of
the enemy. Id.
88
5. Neither of the British statutes
extend to neutral property. Id.
6. The 5th section of the prize act
of 1812. ch. 107. does not re-
peal any of the provisions of the
salvage act of the 3d March,
1800, ch. 14. but is merely af-
firmative of the pre-existing law
Id.
89
7. By our law the rule of reciproci-
ty prevails upon the recapture of
of the property of friends. Id
91
8. Note on the laws of the different
maritimec ountries of Europe as
to recaptures and salvage, Note
93
9. Law of Great Britain. Id. 94
10. Law of France. 1.
95
11. Law of Spain, Portugal, and
Holland.
1. By the compact of 1802, settling
the boundary line between Vir-
ginia and Tennessee, and the
laws made in pursuance thereof,
it is declared that all claims and
titles to lands derived from Vir-
ginia, or North Carolina, or Ten-
nessce, which have fallen into
the respective states. shall re-
main as secure to the owners
thereof, as if derived from the
government within whose boun-
dary they have fallen, and shall
not be prejudiced or affected by
the establishment of the line.
Where the titles both of the
plaintiff and defendant in eject-
ment were derived under grant
from Virginia, to lands which
fell within the limits of Tennes-
see, it was held that a prior set-
tlement right thereto, which
would, in equity, give the party
a title, could not be asserted as
a sufficient title in an action of
ejectment brought in the circuit
court of Tennessee. Robinson v.
Campbell,
212
Although the state courts of Ten-
nessee have decided, that' under
their statutes, (declaring an elder
grant founded on a junior entry
to be void.) a junior patent
founded on a prior entry shall
prevail at law against a senior
patent founded on a junior en-
try; this doctrine has never been
extended beyond cases within
the express purview of the sta-
tute of Tennessee, and could
not apply to titles deriving all
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