journey, are baggage; in fact, baggage includes all articles of personal convenience not carried as merchandise. Sufficient money to defray travelling expenses is baggage, also a sacque, a muff, napkin-rings costumes to be used at a ball, wearing apparel in general. But goods carried for another are never baggage.

The liability of a carrier for ordinary baggage while in its possession for carriage as such is very different from the liability while the same baggage is in store with it. In the first place, it is an insurer and is liable to the same extent as a carrier of goods, in the latter it is liable only as a bailee for ordinary care, if a charge is made for the storage. If no charge is made, the carrier becomes a gratuitous bailee and is liable only for gross negligence. The liability of a carrier as an insurer of baggage delivered for transportation, extends to such reasonable time as may be necessary for obtaining a ticket, checking the baggage, etc., before the starting of the train, where the carrier has not consented to an earlier delivery, and prohibiting the checking of baggage earlier than thirty minutes before train-time is not an unreasonably short time and such a regulation on the part of the carrier is valid. If baggage is left before that time, the carrier is a gratuitous bailee and as such is only liable for gross negligence. Accordingly, the fact that a train left at 6 a. m. and the delivery of baggage then would be inconvenient, was held insufficient to show that delivery twelve hours before the train was to leave was necessary. A limitation of any kind on the back of a railroad ticket not brought to a passenger's attention is usually not binding, the card being considered to be a token merely and is not looked upon as a contract between the parties. While reasonable regulations regarding baggage are valid and must be complied with when known to a passenger, the latter is under no obligation to know the contents of written or printed notices posted in conspicuous places on the boat or train but if a reasonable regulation in regard to baggage has been brought to the knowledge of a passenger, his consent thereto is not necessary to make it binding.

CHAPTER XXII.

FIRE, LIFE, CASUALTY AND MARINE INSURANCE.

Introductory.-The contract of insurance is becoming more common every day, and many risks which formerly had to be borne by the individual, may now be insured against. The most common forms of insurance are 1) fire, 2) life, 3) casualty, 4) marine. These will be taken up separately.

SECTION I.

FIRE INSURANCE.

The contract.-Insurance on property is a contract by which one party, in consideration of a price paid to him adequate to the risk, becomes security for the other that he shall not suffer loss, prejudice or damage by the happening of the peril specified to certain things, to which they may be exposed. Insurance, except life insurance, is a contract of indemnity. The party undertaking to indemnify the assured is called the insurer or underwriter, while the party to be indemnified is called the insured or assured. The consideration is called the premium and the contract of insurance is called the policy.

A contract of insurance or a contract to insure may be oral, for under the statute of frauds it may be performed within one year. If a parol contract is made and a policy is contemplated, the contract is such as is contained in the usual fire insurance policy, which would be a "Standard" policy in this state. The minds of the parties must meet on the requisites which are necessary to establish an insurance contract. The general rule is, that to constitute a valid contract of insurance the minds of the parties must meet as to the premises insured, and the risk, as to the amount insured, as to the time the risk shall continue and as to the premium. The premium need not be paid in advance, if credit is given, but the terms must be definitely fixed. Thus, where the plaint

iff made an oral agreement to insure her property, with the agent of the defendant company, and the property was burned before the policy was delivered, the company was held liable. The agent bound the company, whatever may have been the limitation on his power as between himself and the company, unknown to the insured. And where in an action for a breach of an oral contract to insure, it was shown that the defendant company had a policy on the building in question, but before same expired, plaintiff went to defendant's agent, who agreed to renew the policy and the agent said that he would attend to it "right away" and plaintiff said his brother would pay the premium and the agent said "All right, any time," and thereafter, before the delivery of the renewal receipt or payment of the premium, the building was destroyed, it was held the company was liable.

No particular form of instrument was originally necessary to make a valid contract of insurance, but this resulted in intricate and absurd agreements made out on the part of the insurers, containing many conditions, exceptions, limitations, etc. and making it difficult for the insured to comply with the terms of the policy and recover thereon. This led to the passage of laws defining what shall be contained in a contract of insurance. In Wisconsin, we have a "Standard Fire Insurance Policy".

An insurer must comply with the regulations provided by law before doing business in this state. What is necessary, will depend on the class of insurance, whether a mutual or stock company, etc., the details of which need not be stated here. The regulations in regard to the filing of reports etc. must be substantially complied with. If the insurer is a foreign company, it must be duly authorized to do business in this state.

It may be stated that generally anyone capable of entering into an ordinary contract, may also enter into a contract of insurance. Thus, an infant cannot be held to his contract of insurance, as the same should have been made by his guardian. See the chapter on Contracts.

Representations.-Before writing insurance, companies usually require certain information regarding the risk, either orally or in writing. Such statements are usually representations or warranties and the distinction between these is important and must be borne in mind. A representation is a

statement incidental to the contract of insurance, relative to some fact having reference thereto, and upon the faith of which the contract is entered into. Strictly speaking, it is no part of the contract, but precedes the contract and is the inducement to it. It is sufficient if it be substantially true, and, unlike a warranty, it need only be true as to matters which are material to the risk-that is, as to those matters which might reasonably influence the insurer in taking or rejecting the risk, or in fixing the rate of premium therefor. A representation is material, when it is such as would probably have induced the insurer to take the risk, or to take it at a lower premium than he would have done had the representation not been made. An affirmative representation is one which affirms the existence of certain conditions at the time of making the contract, while a promissory representation is one which states that certain conditions shall exist after the contract is in effect.

In an application for insurance, the insured was asked, "Is there a watchman in the mill during the night?" "Is the mill left alone?" to which he replied, "No regular watchman, but one or two hands sleep in the mill at night”. The application stated that the answers should be special warranties and the policy provided that it was to be void if any false representations had been made regarding the risk. Held, the failure to continue the precaution of keeping one or two men in the mill at night defeated a recovery on the policy, the same being a promissory and continuing undertaking, which bound the insured to a substantial compliance with its terms from the time the policy was delivered; and this would be so whether the statement be a representation or a warranty, as there was a failure to comply with a promissory and continuing undertaking. When a representation is material to the risk and false, it avoids the contract. Whether it avoids the policy in whole or in part depends on circumstances. In a Wisconsin case the court held that a change in the title to one of several buildings covered by an insurance policy, such buildings being situated some distance from each other, did not render the policy void as to the other buildings, because of a clause in the policy to the effect that any change in the title to the insured property without the consent of the company should render the policy void. The policy was divisible according to the distinct risks covered by it. Insurance on a building and contents is indivisible.

In another Wisconsin case where there was insurance on a building and contents, with the risk distributed to the different species of property, the contract was held indivisible, and, under a general forfeiture clause, a circumstance barring a recovery for a loss on part of the property, was held to bar a recovery for any. The rule is, that a contract is indivisible if the breach of the contract, as to an item of the property affected, increases the risk on the whole.

When application for insurance is made in writing, oral warranties cannot be shown, as the whole agreement is deemed to have merged into the writing. A representation that certain conditions exist at the time the statement is made is not a warranty that they will continue to exist.

Concealment.-A concealment is the converse of a misrepresentation. It is "the intentional withholding by the insured from the insurer of facts material and prejudicial to the risk, which ought in good faith to have been made known." A suppression of the truth has the same effect as an expression of what is false, and the rule as to materiality and substantial compliance is the same, but an insurer must be understood as knowing matters of common information which are as much within his reach as in that of the assured and these need not be stated by the insured, unless he is questioned regarding them. To vitiate a policy on the ground of concealment, the fact concealed must be material to the risk, be prejudicial to the risk and generally such facts must be intentionally or fraudulently withheld. The English rule is that facts coming to the knowledge of the insured between the time of making the contract and executing the policy need not be disclosed, but our federal courts have held the contrary to be the law. Our supreme court has decided that there was no concealment where the building containing the property insured contained other property which increased the risk, no questions having been asked on that point, there being no fraud, and where no application was made and no questions asked, it was not a concealment to not disclose the existence of a mortgage on the premises, if there was no fraud or intention in doing so. A principal is responsible for the misrepresentation or concealment of his agent who is authorized to effect insurance.

Warranties.-A warranty is a stipulation contained in a policy or referred to therein upon the truth or performance of