more purposes are binding, but such covenants must not be in total restraint of trade, or they are void. But our supreme court has held that the words "to be used as cabinet warerooms" following a description of the premises do not imply a covenant on the part of the lessee not to use the premises for any other purpose. The lease should have contained restrictive words, as, "to be used for cabinet warerooms, and for no other purpose." The decision rests on the principle that the law will not raise an implied covenant in restraint of a beneficial use of property.

In the absence of express covenant, a tenant cannot demand a renewal of the lease. But no particular words are necessary to create such a covenant. Thus, if he has the privilege of re-renting or "a refusal on the premises for another term" this is sufficient. The law implies that the renewal shall be upon the same terms as the original lease, including that of rent, except the covenant to renew. A covenant "to renew" or "to extend" a lease, requires the making of a new lease, but where a lease was for a certain term, "with the privilege of four years more" by giving 90 days' notice before expiration of the original term, this was held an unconditional lease for the first period, and a conditional lease for the four years thereafter, and if the notice is given, the lessee holds for the additional term under the original lease and not under the notice. A covenant that the landlord may re-enter in case of a breach of covenant or non-payment of rent is binding. This is called a forfeiture. There may be express covenants regarding the manner of terminating the lease in case of sale of the premises, buying fixtures at the end of the term, etc.

Implied covenants are those which arise by construction of law from the employment of certain forms of expression showing that there was an intention to create the relation of landlord and tenant, as "grant," "lease," "demise," "let," etc. The tenant's liability on the implied covenants terminates with his relation as tenant to his landlord, as by an assignment of the lease and acceptance by another of the original tenant's lease, but the express covenants rest on contract and the tenant is liable on the same even though the relation of landlord and tenant has been terminated. In Wisconsin, there is an important qualification of the common law as to the implied covenants. Our statutes provide that no cove

nant shall be implied in any conveyance of real estate and that a lease for a term exceeding three years is a conveyance. The Supreme Court has therefore held that there are no implied covenants is a lease for a term exceeding three years. The following are the usual implied covenants:

Unless the lessee has entered into an express covenant not to assign or sublet his term, he may do so without the consent of the lessor, and a restriction against assignment does not prevent a subletting and vice versa. An assignment is effected when the entire term is disposed of. If a reversion is left in the original lessee, it is a subletting only.

There is an implied covenant for the quiet enjoyment of the premises, i. e., that the grantor had the right to convey and that he will protect the grantee from lawful interference by others in enjoying the demised premises. There is also an implied covenant to pay rent, but only so long as the tenant continues to use the premises. There is an implied covenant to use the premises in a husbandlike manner and to keep the buildings and other structures in repair. There is no implied covenant on the part of the lessor that the premises are in a tenantable condition, but there is an implied covenant that the lessor will give possession to the lessee at the commencement of the term. Implied covenants exist only in leases for less than three years.

Covenants running with the land.-When a covenant in a lease relates to the preservation, management or improvement of the land, it is said to be a "covenant running with the land," i. e., it passes to the assignees of the lessor and lessee. The usual covenants running with the land are those to pay rent, to repair, for quiet enjoyment, to insure, to pay assessments and taxes and to renew the lease. (See same subject in the chapter on Real Property.)

SECTION IV.

HOW TENANCIES ARE TERMINATED.

The relation of landlord and tenant may be terminated in various ways. The most common ways are, by eviction, surrender of the premises, forfeiture in case of breach of covenant, abandonment of the premises when there should have been continuous possession; by the expiration of the term of the lessor, as, for example, when a lease for a term of years by

a life tenant terminates with the death of the life tenant. When a greater and lesser estate pass into the ownership of the same person, they are said to merge and the lesser estate is extinguished. This applies to leases.

An eviction may be either actual or constructive. An actual eviction occurs when a tenant is actually ousted from his possession by the landlord or those acting under his authority, thus depriving the tenant of the use and occupation of the premises. Any act depriving the tenant of the use and occupation of the premises is sufficient. The eviction may be whole or partial. Thus, an order of the court appointing a receiver and requiring the tenant to deliver the premises to him, followed by such delivery, is an eviction of such tenant and it has been held that there was an eviction where a landlord purposely rendered a leased building unsafe and uninhabitable and unfit for the purpose for which it was leased, and compelled an abandonment of the premises. The following have also been held to constitute an eviction: When the landlord forbids an undertenant to pay rent to the lessee; excluding tenant from the watercloset which is part of the demised premises; fencing off part of the premises; where the landlord creates or permits the existence of a nuisance in or about the demised premises, as by renting rooms in the same building for immoral purposes, or where the landlord was guilty of habitually bringing lewd women into a building, a part of which were the demised premises.

But an actual expulsion is not necessary; there may be a constructive eviction, but in such a case there must be an actual abandonment of all or a part of the premises by the tenant. Any act on the part of the landlord which so interferes with the tenant's possession of the leased premises as to unfit them for the purposes for which they were leased and renders them uninhabitable for such purpose and compels the abandonment thereof, constitutes an eviction for which an action for such damages as are the natural and proximate consequences thereof will lie. After eviction, the tenant is not liable for rent, and if he has been evicted from only part of the premises, he is liable only to pay rent for that portion which he continues to occupy, as the consideration for the agreement to pay rent has in part failed. But where a landlord shows that he was required by a valid order and ordinance of the municipal authorities to perform the acts complained of

by the tenant, (for instance, filling up the street and sidewalk adjoining the demised premises) this would be a sufficient answer to a claim for damages on account of a partial eviction. Where there once has been an eviction, the rent will be suspended for the future, although the obstacle to the tenant's re-entry may be removed. A tenant is liable for rent due previous to the eviction, but rent is not payable in advance unless so provided for, and if the rent is not due at the time of the eviction, there will be no apportioning of the amount.

Surrender.-A surrender has been defined to be a yielding up of an estate for life or years to him who has the immediate estate in reversion or remainder, wherein the estate for life or years may merge by mutual agreement. Under our statute of frauds, the surrender of a lease for a term longer than one year, unless by act or operation of law, must be by deed or by a writing subscribed by the party surrendering the same or by his lawful agent thereunto authorized in writing. An oral surrender of such a lease is void, but an oral agreement to surrender, acted upon by an actual surrender and acceptance, is sufficient to cancel the lease. It has been held to be an effectual surrender when a lessor actually surrenders the possession of premises leased, before the expiration of the term, to the landlord, who accepts the premises and leases them to another. A surrender by agreement need have no particular form; the words "surrender and yield up" are usually used. Surrender by operation of law arises when the lessee actually surrenders possession of the premises to the lessor, who accepts the same and takes possession himself or leases them to another. There cannot be a surrender by operation of law if the tenant retains possession or control of the premises. Execution of a lease covering a part of the term of an older lease is a surrender by operation of law. A partner of the lessee of the leased premises but not a lessee himself or interested in the premises, cannot surrender them, but where a lease to two persons contained a stipulation for its surrender on certain conditions, each tenant was an agent of the other to make the surrender when the condition occurred. If made by two tenants as partners, it cannot be surrendered by one without the concurrence of the other, if he is reasonably accessible and can be consulted. It is a question for a jury to decide whether the acts of the landlord in hauling dirt

on the lot one to two feet deep and building a dock, after an offer by the tenant to surrender the lease, amounts to an actual surrender.

Forfeiture. The relation of landlord and tenant is such that if a tenant disputes, or disclaims to hold under, his landlord's title, by any positive act, the relation ceases and he thereby forfeits his term. Breach of a covenant in a lease does not work a forfeiture of the term unless there is a covenant in the lease giving the landlord the right to re-enter in case of a breach. Unless such a right is reserved, the landlord must resort to an action at law for damages. Thus, if A leases B a house to be used as a dwelling house only and for no other purpose, and B uses it for a shop, if the right to reenter for breach of covenant has been reserved, A can re-enter and B forfeits his term. If such right of re-entry has not been reserved, A must sue B for damages. Such forfeitures are common in cases of non-payment of rent or taxes, or where tenants have assigned or sublet contrary to agreement, etc. However, it must be remembered that a provision for re-entry for forfeiture can only be taken advantage of by the landlord or person under him. He may waive his right after knowledge of a breach of covenant by recognizing the continuance of the tenancy. Such a waiver would arise where he had subsequently received rent, or delayed unduly in enforcing his right. The courts of equity regard a clause for forfeiture merely as a security for rent and will or will not relieve against it according to circumstances. Where the agreement is simply for the payment of money (as rent) a forfeiture of land, chattels or money incurred by non-performance will be relieved against, unless the defaulting party by his inequitable conduct has debarred himself from such rerelief, or the special circumstances show that such relief should not be granted. And where the right to re-enter is reserved only for the breach of one covenant, breaches of the other covenants may be considered in determining whether relief against a forfeiture should be granted.

SECTION V.

NOTICE TO QUIT.

Where there has been a lease for a definite term, no notice to quit need be given, provided a new tenancy is not created thereafter, as by acceptance of rent. No notice is re