RULES,

the authority of Y. by B. to A., her husband. A., in GENERAL consequence of the imputation contained in the slander, refused to cohabit with B. It was held, that the defendants were not liable for the unauthorised repetition of the slander by B. to A., her husband (i). The speaker of a defamatory statement is not answerable for damage caused by the wrongful or illegal act of a third party, though this act may be committed in consequence of the slander. If, that is to say, X. makes a slanderous statement about A., and M. in consequence assaults A., or breaks a contract he has entered into with A., the assault or breach of contract will not be held to be caused by the slander uttered by X. (k). A person who utters a slander is, however, in many cases responsible for the results of its repetition by another. He is so, for example, "if the utterer should have authorised its repetition" (l).

The result is, that though the utterer and the repeater of a slanderous statement are each independently liable to be sued; yet when, for the maintenance of an action, it is requisite to prove that damage was caused to the plaintiff by the words complained of, it is in general easier to fix the repeater than the utterer of the slander with liability for the damage (m).

Injuries to property.-1. Real property, or land.-When Injuries to the act complained of is a trespass (n), there can in property. general be little difficulty in determining who is the wrongdoer (o).

(i) Parkins v. Scott, 1 H. & C. 153; 31 L. J. 331, Ex.

(k) Taylor v. Neri, Esp. 386; Vicars v. Wilcocks, 2 Smith, L. C., 6th ed., 487, 489; but compare Lynch v. Knight, 9 H. L. C. 577. (1) Parkins v. Scott, 31 L. J. 334, Ex., per Pollock, C.B.

(m) It is moreover possible that one of the parties may have uttered the slander under circumstances which made it a privileged communication, whilst the other may not be able to show that he is protected by any privilege, see Watkin v. Hall, L. R. 3 Q. B. 396; 37 L. J. 125, Q. B.

(n) See pp. 23, 24, ante.

(0) As to the liability of all persons who join in a trespass, see Rule 91.

Land.

EE

GENERAL

RULES.

Goods.

When the wrong complained of is an act which is injurious, because of the damage caused thereby, there may no doubt arise a question, as in other cases, whether the damage was caused by the act or omission of the defendant. He may, however, be responsible for damage for which he would not generally be perhaps considered the immediate cause. X. and Y., the defendants, who were drainage commissioners, were empowered to construct a cut with proper walls, &c., to keep out the waters of a tidal river, and also a culvert under the cut to carry off the drainage from the lands on the east, to the west of the cut, and were to keep the same at all times open. In consequence of the negligent construction of the gates, &c., the river flowed into the cut, and bursting its western bank flooded the adjoining lands. The plaintiff, and other owners of land on the east side of the cut, closed the lower end of the culvert and prevented the waters from overflowing their lands to any considerable extent; but the occupiers of the land on the west side re-opened it, and so let the waters through on to the plaintiff's land to a much greater extent. It was held that the commissioners were responsible for the entire damage thus caused to the plaintiff's land (r).

2. Personal property, or goods (s).-Any person who interferes with another's right to the possession of goods is liable to an action. If his interference does not amount to a deprivation of the rightful possessor's possession of the goods; if it is a mere taking of the goods from one place to another, the wrongdoer is guilty merely of a trespass (t). If, for example, a man who has no right to meddle with goods removes them from one place to another, an action may be maintained against him for the trespass; but he is not guilty of a conversion of them unless he removes the goods for the purpose of taking

(r) Collins v. Middle Level Commissioners, L. R. 4 C. P. 279. See further as to a defendant's liability for a nuisance, p. 422, post.

(s) See pp. 345-366, ante.

(t) See Burroughes v. Bayne, 29 L. J. 187, Ex., judgment of Martin, B.

them away from the plaintiff, or of exercising some dominion or control over them for the benefit of himself or of some other person (u). But if the wrongdoer keeps the goods of another person out of his hands, or sells, destroys, or pawns them, or, in short, claims to treat them in any way inconsistent with that other person's right to immediate possession, he is guilty of a conversion, and liable to an action of trover or detinue”(x).

GENERAL

RULES.

Trover (y).—As a conversion is an act actionable in Trover. itself, there is no need to consider, in determining who ought to be sued for it whether or not it has produced actual damage. But two points require notice.

amount to conversion.

1st. It may be hard to settle whether a given act Which acts amounts to a conversion, i. e., to a denial of the plaintiff's right to possess the goods. A. let a billiard-table to M., who assigned the goods in his house, and amongst them the billiard-table, by a bill of sale to X. X. took possession but did not remove the table. A. demanded the table. X. desired to see the writing by which it was let to M. Some negotiation took place as to this, and ultimately X.'s servant would not give up the table to A. when A. called for it, though X. had directed him to do So. The table was afterwards seized by M.'s landlord for rent, and A. brought an action of trover against X. (2). The majority of the court held, that there was evidence of a conversion of the billiard-table by X., but Bramwell, B., thought that there was not "an assertion of dominion inconsistent with the title of the plaintiff; that the whole

(u) Addison, Torts, 3rd ed., 309; Falke v. Fletcher, 34 L. J. 146, C. P.; Fouldes v. Willoughby, 8 M. & W. 551.

(x) Wilbraham v. Snow, 2 Wms. Saund. 47 k. The gist of trover is the conversion; the gist of detinue is the wrongful detainer of goods; trover is brought to recover damages for the conversion of the goods, whereas the object of detinue is to recover possession of the goods themselves. The distinction between the two (as to which, see Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296; 29 L. J. 185, Ex.) is of little importance for the present purpose.

(y) See pp. 345-366, ante.

(z) Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 296; 29 L. J. 185, Ex.

GENERAL
RULES.

affair was matter of discussion up to the time the plaintiff was informed the goods were at his service, and that so far as the defendant was concerned there clearly was no conversion" (a). X., a wharfinger, held wine of A.'s. Under a mistaken view as to the legal effect of an attachment, he refused to give up the wine to A. on demand, and asked for time for inquiry. A. sued X. in trover. The majority of the Court of Exchequer thought that there was, and Bramwell, B., that there was not, a conversion (b). The criterion of the existence of a conversion is whether the wrongdoer assumes to himself the right of disposing of another's goods. But what acts amount to such an assumption may often be a matter of dispute, and acts which would be a conversion if done by one person need not be so if done by another. Thus if X. takes and sells the goods of A., or keeps them from him, A. may treat him as a wrongdoer without any request to return the goods; but "it is a common learning that where the goods come into the defendant's possession by delivery or finding, the plaintiff must demand them, and the defendant refuse to deliver them up, in order to constitute à conversion (c). 2ndly. As everyone who interferes with another man's right to the possession of his goods is guilty of converis liable to sion; and, as no man can, as a general rule, give to another a better title to goods than he possesses himself (d), a series of persons may each be guilty of successive acts of conversion of the same goods, and each therefore be liable to an action of trover by the owner. X., for example, takes the goods of A., and Y. takes them from X. A. can sue either X. or Y. So if X. takes and sells the goods of A. to Y., and Y. sells them to Z., A. may sue X., Y., or Z. (e), "for a man is guilty

Each person who "converts"

be sued.

(a) Burroughes v. Bayne, 5 H. & N. 311, judgment of Bramwell, B. (b) Pillot v. Wilkinson, 32 L. J. 201, Ex; 2 H. & C. 72.

(c) Wilbraham v. Snow, 2 Wms. Saund. 47 i. So an act, which would be conversion in a master need not be so in his servant, see Chapter XVI.

(d) See, as to this rule and the exceptions to it, Benjamin, Sale, 4-16. (e) Cooper v. Willomatt, 1 C. B. 672; 14 L. J. 219, C. P.

of a conversion who takes my property from another who has no authority to dispose of it, for what is that but assisting that other in carrying his wrongful act into effect" (f). So, again, if goods are bailed to one man and he wrongfully sells them to another (g), an action lies not only against the bailee, but also against a bond fide purchaser (h); and the owner can sue an auctioneer (i), or a pawnbroker (j), who receives goods from a person who has no title to them, and sells them or refuses to give them up to the owner.

GENERAL

RULES.

Indirect injuries.-Though most of the wrongs referred Indirect injuries. to in this chapter have been acts, such as trespass, the publication of a libel, conversion, &c., which are actionable in themselves, a person may, it should be remarked, be injured in different ways, e. g., as well in person as in property, by acts such as negligence or fraud, which are actionable only because of the damage which they cause. In considering whether a given person can be sued, the points to be weighed are, first, whether the damage complained of be not mere damage without injury (k); and, secondly, whether the defendant be so connected with the damage, that he may be considered its cause.

liable for

use of land

A person is the cause, not only of his own direct acts Person and of the wrongs immediately arising from them, but also of wrongs which can be considered to be ultimately, or goods. and in the natural course of things, the effect of his conduct. A man, therefore, is the cause of injuries arising from the mode in which he uses land or goods. Hence,

(ƒ) McCombie v. Davies, 7 East, 5.

(g) See, as to the question how far a sale in all cases determines a bailment, pp. 363-366, ante.

(h) Cooper v. Willomatt, 1 C. B. 672; 14 L. J. 219, C. P.; Hardman v. Booth, 1 H. & C. 803; 32 L. J. 105, Ex.

(i) Grimshaw v. Atwell, 8 C. & P. 6.

(j) Packer v. Gillies, 2 Camp. 336. Compare Donald v. Suckling, L. R. 1 Q. B. 585.

(k) See pp. 28-41, ante. Actions for fraud and actions for malicious prosecution afford good examples of actions for indirect injuries, and of the sort of questions to which such actions give rise.