its line may, by special contract, protect itself against liability for loss not oc-
curring on its line. And such contract will be presumed from the fact that a
clause thus limiting the liability is to be found printed in the bill of lading,
even though the shipper's attention was not called to it, if it appears that he had
previously shipped like articles and taken like bills of lading. East Tenn., etc.,
R. R. Co. v. Brumley, 356.
27. The lien of a common carrier on goods transported depends on the con-
tract with the owner. Ordinarily the law implies such lien, and it will be held
that, in delivering goods to be carried, the owner assents to the condition that
the carrier may retain possession of the goods until his reasonable charges have
been paid, although nothing may be said on the subject. But when goods are
sent, not according to the contract with the owner, but by some other route,
there is no lien for freight money. Nor in case of prepayment of the freight
upon contract for through rate. Marsh v. Union Pacific R. R. Co. 359.
28. A common carrier receiving goods from another carrier, with knowledge
that a through contract has been made, and the price of transportation to the
point of destination paid in advance, can assert no lien on such goods for trans-
porting them over its line. Id.
29. Trover lies for the value of goods illegally withheld under claim of lien
for freight money. Id.
30. A consignor of goods, after they have passed from the hands of the rail-
road company with which the contract of affreightment was made, into the
hands of another company, has the same right to change their destination while
in transitu, by taking a new bill of lading, as if the first company had a continu-
ous line to the place of destination. Sutherland v. Second Nat. Bank, 368.
31. Such new bill of lading is valid when called in question between a bona-
fide holder and one claiming a lien by virtue of an attachment. Id.
32. The service of an attachment upon a railway company creates no lien
upon property not within the county at the time it is served. Id.
33. B. R. & Co. sold and shipped to V. R. & H., on the 22d September, 1875,
on four months' time, a bill of goods. They telegraphed M. & Bros. to stop
the goods. The telegram was taken to the freight agent of the railroad, who
promised to do so, and that he would reship them to the sellers, who were noti-
fied. The goods were afterwards, by mistake or negligence, delivered to V. R.
& H., who failed on the 23d December following. Upon maturity of the ac-
count, B. R. & Co. brought suit against V. R. & H., recovered judgment, but
failed to make their debt, the property of the debtors being absorbed by
prior judgments. B. R. & Co. sued the railroad company for wrongfully de-
livering the goods. Held, the notice was sufficient. There need be no express
demand. The notice is sufficient, if the carrier is clearly informed that it is the
intention and desire of the seller to exercise the right of stoppage in transitu.
Bloomingdale v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Co. 371.
34. It is not required, when the right of stoppage in transitu is exercised, that
the buyer should have been declared a bankrupt or insolvent by legal proceed-
ings, or that he should have made an assignment, but insolvency fairly means
that the party should be shown to have been unable to meet the debt due the
seller, at the time of the exercise of the right, when the debt should fall due.
The purchaser may not have actually failed or have gone to protest, but might
be hopelessly insolvent. But the objection that the purchaser was not insolvent
at the time of the stoppage, can only be taken by the purchaser, and not by the
carrier, except that he may show as a matter of defence that the debt could have
been made by due diligence. Id.
35. The bringing suit upon the debt when due and recovery of judgment,
does not estop the seller from suing the carrier for wrongful delivery. Id.
36. One who passed out of a railway car and got upon the platform thereof,
and attempted to step or jump from the car while it was in motion, cannot recover
for injuries suffered in consequence thereof, even though he had reached his place
of destination, and the train, which had previously stopped to permit passen-
gers to alight, had not so stopped for a reasonable length of time. Jewell v.
Chicago, etc., R. R. Co. 379.
37. Where the railroad does not halt its train at a station a sufficient length of
time to enable a passenger, by the use of reasonable diligence, to get off before
it is started again, and it is so started while the passenger is in the act of alight-
ing, whereby he is thrown down and injured, the company is liable. Straus v.
Kansas City, etc., R. R. Co. 384.
38.. Where insufficient time is allowed a passenger for safe and convenient
egress from the cars, and before he attempts to alight the train is started, and
he then jumps from the train while its motion is so slight as to be almost imper-
ceptible, and is injured, it is for the jury to determine, from the age and physi
cal condition of the passenger, whether he is guilty of contributory negligence.
Id.
39. If the train is stopped a sufficient length of time for the passenger to con-
veniently alight, and without any fault of defendant's servants he fails to do so,
and the conductor, not knowing and having no reason to suspect that the pas-
senger was in the act of alighting, caused the train to start while he was so
alighting, then the company is not liable for the resulting injury. Id.
40. Where the conductor, after allowing a sufficient length of time for pas-
sengers to alight, starts the train before the passenger is in the act of getting off,
and is therefore guilty of no negligence, and after the train is in motion the
passenger who has been dilatory jumps from the train and is injured, he cannot
recover. Id.
41. Where the shippers of live-stock over a railroad entered into an agreement
with the railroad company, whereby it was stipulated and agreed that the carrier
should not be responsible for injury to the stock in consequence of a failure or
neglect to water or feed them while in transit, and the carrier negligently car-
ried them beyond the destination to which they were shipped, in consequence
of which they were deprived of the attentions of the shippers and their agents,
and were without food or water during two days, held, the carrier was liable
for damages occasioned to the stock thereby. Bryant v. Southwestern R. R. Co.
888.
42. Where a person ships cattle over a railway under a special contract of
carriage, he cannot elect to charge the railroad company with the liabilities of a
common carrier. Lake Shore, etc., R. R. Co. v. Bennett, 391.
43. A railroad company is not liable for delay in receiving and carrying goods
or in transporting them after they have been received whenever the delay is
necessarily caused by unforeseen disaster which human prudence cannot provide
against, as by an uncontrollable mob. Id.
44. The fact that a railroad company has reduced the wages of its employés
cannot be held to justify or excuse a mob composed of indiscriminate persons
in stopping trains and delaying the transportation of goods, nor can the com-
pany be held responsible for the consequences of such unlawful proceedings
when they cause such delay. Id.
45. Damages cannot be recovered in an action of contract for improper arrest
of a passenger for attempting to use a ticket purchased of the company's agent.
The action should be of tort. Murdock v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co. 406.
46. Where, for a consideration, a railroad company undertakes to transport a
passenger from one point of its line to another, there arises an implied contract
on the part of the company that it has, for that purpose, provided a safe and
sufficient road, and that its cars are safe and trustworthy. Phila., etc., R. R.
Co. v. Anderson, 407.
47. Where a passenger is injured by an accident arising from a collision, or a
defect in the machinery or roadway, he is required, in the first place, to prove no
more than the fact of the accident and the extent of the injury; a prima-facie
case is thus made out, and the onus is cast upon the carrier to disprove neg-
ligence. Id.
48. This prima-facie presumption may be overthrown by proof, to the satis-
faction of the jury, that the injury complained of resulted from inevitable
accident, or from something against which no human prudence or forethought
could provide. Id.
49. Where an accident occurs by reason of the washing away of an embank-
ment of a railroad because of insufficient drainage, the company will not be
relieved of liability by the fact that the road was constructed under the super-
vision of a competent engineer, and that the drainage at the point of the acci-
dent was provided for in a manner directed and approved by him. Id.
50. The fact that the defendant is the lessee of the road does not relieve it
from the consequences of its own negligence, and it was bound to see that the
road, whether owned or leased, was safe and sufficient between the points named
on the passenger's ticket. Id.
51. Where freight is carried over connecting railroads, each road is liable for
loss or injury accruing through its own negligence, even although the first car-
rier may also by express contract have assumed a responsibility for losses occur-
ring on the lines of succeeding carriers. Aijen v. Boston, etc., R. R. Co. 426.
52. Where the contract of a common carrier contemplates the employment of
a connecting carrier to complete the transportation, the mere reception of the
property by the latter will create sufficient privity between it and the shipper to
enable him to maintain an action against it on the contract, and in such case the
connecting carrier will be entitled to the benefit of all valid limitatious upon the
carrier's liability provided in the contract; but in order to avail itself of them,
they must be specially pleaded. Halliday v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. 433.
53. While it is true that a railroad carrier may by contract restrict its liability to
its own line, there is no doubt that it may also extend its liability beyond its
own line. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. v. Larned, 436.
54. So, where a railroad company in its own wrong shipped a lot of cotton
from its depot in Arkansas, to Waterville, in the State of Maine, beyond the ter-
minus of its road, and on the application of the agent purchasing the cotton, gave
him a bill of lading containing a printed stipulation restricting its liability to
its own line of road, naming the number of bales, and containing this entry,
written in a blank: "To be forwarded from Waterville, Maine (where the cot-
ton is now lying), at consignee's expense. All charges for transportation to that
point, and necessary charges to be paid by him,"-and the oral evidence showed
it was to be transported to Putnam, Connecticut, it was held, that the company
was liable to the assignee of the bill of lading, the consignee, for the value of the
cotton, on account of its non-delivery at Putnam. Id.
55. An agent for eastern parties bought cotton in Arkansas, which he left at
defendant's railroad depot, taking receipts for the same, but gave no orders for
its shipment, and the railroad company, without any authority from such agent,
shipped the same to Waterville, Maine, where another company-the Maine
Central R. R. Co.-delivered the same to a person who was not in fact entitled
to it. On learning the facts the defendant railroad gave a bill of lading, agree-
ing to transport the cotton to the person who was entitled to it, in Connecticut,
at the consignee's cost and expense; which was not done, the person receiving
the cotton refusing to give it up, claiming it was bought for him. The agent
drew a draft on his principal, to which he attached the bill of lading, properly
assigned, which was paid by the principal, and the latter brought suit against
the defendant railroad for the value of the cotton, and recovered. It was con-
tended that the consignee should have sued the Maine Central R. R., and not
the defendant. Held, that while he might have waived the defendant's contract,
and have sued the other company for a conversion, or the person receiving the
cotton, he was under no obligation to do so, and that the recovery against the
defendant was warranted. Id.
56. While it may be that property in the adverse possession of another is not
transferable so as to pass the title, yet where a railroad company gives a bill of
lading reciting that the property is then lying in a depot at a certain place, and
agrees to forward the same to the consignee, and others advance money on the
faith of such bill of lading, which is assigned by the shipper, the railroad com-
pany will be estopped, as against such persons, from showing that at the time
of giving such bill of lading, and its indorsement, the goods were in the adverse
possession of another person, so as to defeat an action brought by the consignee
so advancing money on the bill of lading. Id.
57. Section 2084 of the Georgia Code, providing that the last of a connecting
line of railroads over which goods are shipped which receive them as in good
order is liable to the consignee, does not apply to baggage of a passenger
checked and accompanying him on his passage. Wolff v. Central R. R. Čo.
58. Where a passenger with a through ticket over a connecting line of rail-
roads checks his baggage at the starting point through to his destination, and
upon arrival it is damaged or has been broken open and robbed, he may sue
the railroad which issued the check, or he may sue the road delivering the bag-
gage in bad order. Id.
59. That under the American authorities each of the roads composing such a
continuous line over which a passenger travels on a through ticket, and baggage
is sent on a through check, is a principal contractor, adopting the contract of the
first road, and is therefore liable for spoliation of baggage, irrespective of the
point at which it actually occurred. Id.
60. Are such roads also jointly liable as partners or joint contractors? Id.
61. In the absence of special contract, a common carrier receiving a parcel
marked to a point beyond its route, but having no special business relationship
with the carrier on the connecting line, is responsible, as such carrier, only for
safe and seasonable delivery at the end of its own route to the carrier next in the
line of transportation. Hadd v. U. S. Ex. Co. 443.
62. In case of money delivered to the agent of an express company to be sent
to a place beyond the route of the company, it appeared that plaintiff paid charges
through, and received a receipt for the money to be sent containing a memoran-
dum of such payment. Held, that on the facts, q.v., there was not a special
contract to carry to destination. Id.
63. The receipt contained a clause limiting the liability of the company to the
risks of carriage to the end of its route. The consignor could not read, and the
agent read the principal part of the receipt to him, but did not read that clause.
Held, that as that clause was expressive only of the company's liability under
the law, the omission to read it was no fraud on the consignor. Id.
64. Such a receipt, like any simple receipt, may be explained by parol evi-
dence. Id.
65. On November 12th a railroad received certain boxes of tobacco to be car-
ried from Atlanta to Macon; they reached the latter place on November 15th,
and under an agreement between the consignee and the carrier, they were set
aside by the latter in its depot to be sold and the proceeds used to pay past-due
freights, it being agreed that the balance, if any, should go to the consignee.
He did not receive the boxes and then turn them over, nor did he assign the bill of
lading, nor was the freight paid. On December 12th the consignors sought to
stop the boxes in transitu, and failing to obtain them on demand, sought to re-
cover against the carrier. Held, that no actual delivery had taken place so as to
prevent a stoppage in transitu. Macon, etc., R. R. Co. v. Meador.
66. Can a carrier purchase the title of a vendee and set it up against the vend-
or's right of stoppage in transitu? Quære. Id.
67. Goods bought and paid for were delivered to a railway company, whose
bill of lading was executed to the vendor acknowledging the receipt of the goods
to be conveyed to the vendee. Held, that the contract for transportation is in
legal effect with the vendee, and the company liable to him for non-delivery of
the goods. In such case the title vests in the vendee purchaser, and a delivery
of the goods to the carrier is a delivery to the purchaser himself. Gwyn v.
Richmond, etc., R. R. Co. 452.
68. Where one through his agent sells goods to another, and they are shipped
to the purchaser, the agent has no right to stop the goods in transitu because
his principal owes him on account of money advanced in the purchase of the
goods. Id.
69. As a general rule and under ordinary circumstances, it is the duty of a
railroad company to provide every passenger with a seat, and that if a passenger
exercising reasonable care and prudence is injured in consequence of the com-
pany's neglect of duty in this regard, the latter must respond in damages. Cam-
den, etc., R. R. Co. v. Hoosey, 454.
70. In an action against a railroad company, where it was in evidence that S.,
the regular agent of the defendant at a certain depot, lived three miles from the
depot, and that T. lived at the depot for two years prior to the bringing of the
action, and discharged the duties of agent in receiving and forwarding freight,
selling tickets, etc., all of which was done in the name of S. and with the
knowledge and acquiescence of defendant; it was held, that T. was the agent of
defendant, and that defendant was bound by any act of his within the scope of
the authority impliedly given. Katzenstein v. Raleigh, etc., R. R. Co. 464.
71. The plaintiff, a fish merchant, signed a contract by which, in considera-
tion of the defendants, a railway company, carrying his fish at a rate one fifth
less than the ordinary rate, he agreed to free the defendants from "all liability
for loss or damage by delay in transit or from whatever cause arising." Owing
to pressure of business the fish of the plaintiff and others was some hours late
in starting, and reached London too late for the market. Held, that, as the de-
fendants carried at alternative rates, the condition was just and reasonable, al-
though it was absolute and contained no exception, and would in the absence of
alternative rates have been unjust and unreasonable. Brown v. Manchester, etc.,
R. R Co. 481.
72. A railroad has no right to exclude colored passengers holding first-class
tickets from their first-class cars. Gray v. Cincinnati, etc., R. R. Co. 588.
73. Liability of carrier on through bill of laden.
Nav. Co. 588.
74. Through tickets. Right of holder to transfer.
R. R. Co. 588.
Harding v. International
Hudson v. Kansas Pacific
75. A passenger entitled to transportation under a special contract must pro-
vide himself with the proper evidence of it. He has no right to oblige the con-
ductor to use force in expelling him. Hall v. Memphis, etc., R. R. Čo. 589.
76. A carrier cannot exempt himself by contract from loss occasioned by his
negligence. Amer. Ins. Co. v. St. Louis, etc., R. R. Co. 589.
77. A railroad is liable for injuries to a passenger when occasioned by the
negligence of a corporation which furnishes it with motive power. Keep v.
Indianapolis, etc., R. R. Co. 589.
78. A carrier is not liable for loss occasioned by the forgery of the shipper in
raising the bill of laden. Lehman v. Central R. R. Co. 590.
79. Plaintiff held entitled to payment for articles purchased by him, his trunk
having been mis-sent and temporarily lost. Millen v. Brash, 590.
80. Goods were sent a route other than that directed by shipper. Held, that
the carrier had no lien for freight. The market value of goods at place of
conversion is the true measure of damages. Marsh v. Union Pacific R. R.
Co. 591.
81. Defendant assumed that the stock was delivered in good order and re-
ceived by the plaintiff without objection or notice from him that it was other-
wise. Held, on demurrer, that the answer was not good in confession and avoid-
ance. Ohio, etc., R. R. Co. v. Nickless, 591.
82. What it is necessary to show to recover the penalty in Iowa for discrimi-
nation in rates of freight. Paxton v. Illinois, etc., R. R. Co. 591.
83. Penalty for travelling without payment of fare. Regina v. Paget, 591.
84. Railroads must use every test recognized by experts as regards their motive
power. Robinson v. N. Y., etc., R. R. Co. 592.
85. Compensation for carrying mail as regards two carriers. Railroad Co. v.
U. S. 592.
86. The railroad agent signed a bill of laden for goods not delivered. Held
that the carrier was not estopped to show that no goods had been delivered, and
that the agent acted outside the scope of his authority. Robinson v. Memphis,
etc., R. R. Co. 593.
87. A carrier has no right to deliver goods at their destination_to a general
agent of the consignor, the consignee not residing at the place. Wilson Sew-
ing Machine Co. v. Louisville, etc., R. R. Co. 593.
88. A railroad has no right to make discriminations in rates of freight based
upon amount shipped. Hays v. Penna. Co. 594.
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