In the trial of a criminal case the district attorney is
entitled to discuss before the jury all the facts and circum-
stances bearing upon the issue with the same freedom that
is to be awarded to counsel in any case. Id.
343, 351. See BETTING AND GAMING, 1, 2, 3, 4.
384h. See CONSTITUTION.
389. See MISDEMEANOR, 1.
397. See BOARD OF HEALTH.
458. See PRIZE FIGHT, 1.
528. See LARCENY, 3, 4.
556. See OPPRESSION, 1, 2, 3.
597. 598. See BAIL.
A person charged with poolselling, bookmaking, etc., is
liable to be punished under section 351 of the Penal Code,
and his liability is not limited to a suit for a penalty in a
civil action at the instance of the complainant or th
civil action at the instance of the complainant or the
maker of the bet of which he was the stakeholder. People
ex rel. Clifton v. De Bragga, 12.
1. FAILURE TO SUPPRESS DISORDERLY HOUSE.
It is not error for the court, upon the trial of an indict-
ment charging a police officer with wilfully failing to ob-
serve and inspect a house of ill-fame within his precinct,
to refuse to charge," The defendant might have the strong-
est moral certainty in the world that the house No. 148
West 33d street was a house of prostitution, yet if he did
not know of somebody who can swear of his own knowledge
to the facts of which the defendant was morally certain,
the defendant had no right to make an arrest. Such an
arrest would have been wanton and an indefensible act of
false imprisonment." Such a request to charge eliminates
the element of the defendant's personal knowledge of the
character of the house. People v. Glennon, 213.
(Affirming 16 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 298; see People v.
Herlihy, 16 N. Y. Crim. Rep. 235.
As the defendant's duty in the premises was not limited
to making an arrest, the court properly refused to charge
that "the defendant would not have been justified in
making an arrest, based upon no other evidence than that
of the reputation of the house No. 148 West 33d street as
a disorderly house, house of ill-fame, or house of prostitu-
tion, nor upon evidence insufficient in law to secure a con-
viction, should he have made such an arrest," especially
where the jury had previously been instructed that the
defendant could not be convicted unless he had evidence
regarding the character of the house. Id.
A police officer who has personal knowledge of the ex-
istence of a house of prostitution is bound to observe and
inspect the house and to repress and restrain all unlawful
conduct or practice therein, and arrest the person main-
taining it whether he knew of anybody else could swear
to the fact or not, and a failure to do so makes him guilty
of a misdemeanor under section 117 of the Penal Code. Id.
4. SAME PRESUMPTION OF INNOCENCE.
Where the court charges that the presumption of in-
nocence "renders it unnecessary for the defendant to tes-
tify as a wittness to his innocence," and that "to overthrow
this presumption of innocence there must be legal evidence
of guilt carrying home to the mind of every juror a degree
of conviction short only of absolute certainty," it is not
improper for the court to refuse to further charge that
"this presumption of innocence is legal proof or evidence."
Id.
1. EVIDENCE-PENAL CODE, SEC. 458.
Evidence that two individuals had a physical contest
with fists, where each spectator contributed a dollar and
that it continued ten or fifteen minutes with intervals of
rest, and that one of the men was knocked down once or
twice, was sufficient to establish that it was a "ring prize
fight," in violation of section 458 of the Penal Code, al-
though the fighting space was not marked off by ropes and
the evidence did not show what rules were in vogue. Peo-
ple v. Finucan, 254.
2. AIDING AND ABETTING PRIZE FIGHT-CODE CRIM. PROC.,
Where the owner of a barn rents it for the purpose
holding a "smoker," with the "privilege of a boxing con-
test," and the tickets were on sale in his bar room and he
avoided going into the building during the day, it tends
to corroborate the evidence as to the letting of the premises
furnished by one of the contestants as required by section
399, Code Criminal Procedure.
EVIDENCE-CORROBORATION OF COMPLAINANT-PENAL CODE
Where upon the trial of an indictment for rape in the
second degree complainant gave the only direct evidence as
to the commission of the crime, and the prosecution called
four witnesses, one who testified that complainant was
pregnant and the others that she had been seen in defend-
ant's company and had gone to the place where complain-
ant testified the crime was committed, it fails to furnish
the corroborative testimony required by section 283 of the
Penal Code, as the material fact to be proved and as to
which corroboration of complaint is required, is the al-
leged sexual intercourse. People v. Haischer, 287.
1. EVIDENCE-PROOF OF LIKE TRANSACTIONS PROXIMATE IN
Defendant, a licensed pawnbroker, was indicted for re-
ceiving stolen goods from one Hess, who stole the goods.
Hess testified that defendant, some months before buying
the goods in question and at the time of selling other stuff,
agreed to buy "anything that comes along no matter what
it is," and they had an understanding that if at any time
there was anybody in the pawn shop that "looked suspic-
ious Hess was to say that these were clothes from the
cleaners, let me have a dollar and a half." After Hess had,
without objection, testified to selling stolen property to de-
fendant on several occasions prior to and including the date
charged, the People, over defendant's objection, were al-
lowed to show that at different times within about three
weeks thereafter, Hess sold stolen goods to the defendant,
and that on one occasion when Hess claimed to have seen a
detective he had gone through the form agreed upon be
tween him and defendant in the event of such a contin-
gency. Held, that the evidence was competent, as it was
sufficiently proximate in time and tended to show guilty
knowledge on the part of the defendant. People v. Weisen-
berger, 1.
Held, further, that the guilt of the defendant was so
clearly and satisfactorily established that the reception of
this evidence, even if incompetent, did not require a re-
versal of the conviction.
3. TRIAL-REQUEST TO CHARGE AS TO TESTIMONY OF PARTICU-
LAR WITNESS.
The court is not required to analyze and separate the
evidence and say to the jury that unless they believed the
testimony of a certain witness or witnesses they must ren-
der a verdict in a particular way.
4. EVIDENCE OF DEFENDANT'S RECEIVING GOODS STOLEN BY
SAME THIEVES FROM ANOTHER OWNER-ADMISSIBLE TO
SHOW GUILTY KNOWLEDGE.
Upon the trial of a defendant indicted for the crime of
feloniously receiving stolen property, known to him to
have been stolen, evidence that the defendant had received
property stolen by the same thieves from a different owner
is admissible to establish the guilty knowledge of the de-
fendant in receiving the property charged in the indictment
to have been stolen. People v. Doty, 366.
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