respondent's case, the causal connection between any psychological disadvantage created by his admission and his ultimate decision to cooperate is speculative and attenuated at

going to kill you"); Clewis v. Texas, 386 U. S. 707 (1967) (suspect was arrested without probable cause, interrogated for nine days with little food or sleep, and gave three unwarned "confessions" each of which he immediately retracted); Reck v. Pate, 367 U. S. 433, 439-440, n. 3 (1961) (mentally retarded youth interrogated incommunicado for a week "during which time he was frequently ill, fainted several times, vomited blood on the floor of the police station and was twice taken to the hospital on a stretcher"). Typical of the state cases cited in the dissent's discussion are: e. g., Cagle v. State, 45 Ala. App. 3, 4, 221 So. 2d 119, 120 (1969) (police interrogated wounded suspect at police station for one hour before obtaining statement, took him to hospital to have his severe wounds treated, only then giving the Miranda warnings; suspect prefaced second statement with "I have already give the Chief a statement and I might as well give one to you, too"), cert. denied, 284 Ala. 727, 221 So. 2d 121 (1969); People v. Saiz, 620 P. 2d 15 (Colo. 1980) (two hours' unwarned custodial interrogation of 16-year-old in violation of state law requiring parent's presence, culminating in visit to scene of crime); People v. Bodner, 75 App. Div. 2d 440, 430 N. Y. S. 2d 433 (1980) (confrontation at police station and at scene of crime between police and retarded youth with mental age of eight or nine); State v. Badger, 141 Vt. 430, 441, 450 A. 2d 336, 343 (1982) (unwarned "close and intense" station house questioning of 15-year-old, including threats and promises, resulted in confession at 1:20 a. m.; court held “[w]arnings . . . were insufficient to cure such blatant abuse or compensate for the coercion in this case").

JUSTICE BRENNAN cannot seriously mean to equate such situations with the case at bar. Likewise inapposite are the cases the dissent cites concerning suspects whose invocation of their rights to remain silent and to have counsel present were flatly ignored while police subjected them to continued interrogation. See, e. g., United States ex rel. Sanders v. Rowe, 460 F. Supp. 1128 (ND Ill. 1978); People v. Braeseke, 25 Cal. 3d 691, 602 P. 2d 384 (1979), vacated on other grounds, 446 U. S. 932 (1980); Smith v. State, 132 Ga. App. 491, 208 S. E. 2d 351 (1974). Finally, many of the decisions JUSTICE BRENNAN claims require that the "taint" be "dissipated" simply recite the stock "cat" and "tree" metaphors but go on to find the second confession voluntary without identifying any break in the stream of events beyond the simple administration of a careful and thorough warning. See cases cited in n. 2, supra.

Out of the multitude of decisions JUSTICE BRENNAN cites, no more than half a dozen fairly can be said to suppress confessions on facts remotely

best. It is difficult to tell with certainty what motivates a suspect to speak. A suspect's confession may be traced to factors as disparate as "a prearrest event such as a visit with a minister," Dunaway v. New York, 442 U. S., at 220 (STEVENS, J., concurring), or an intervening event such as the exchange of words respondent had with his father. We must conclude that, absent deliberately coercive or improper tactics in obtaining the initial statement, the mere fact that a suspect has made, an unwarned admission does not warrant a presumption of compulsion. A subsequent administration of Miranda warnings to a suspect who has given a voluntary but unwarned statement ordinarily should suffice to remove the conditions that precluded admission of the earlier statement. In such circumstances, the finder of fact may reasonably conclude that the suspect made a rational and intelligent choice whether to waive or invoke his rights.

III

Though belated, the reading of respondent's rights was undeniably complete. McAllister testified that he read the Miranda warnings aloud from a printed card and recorded

comparable to those in the instant case, and some of these decisions involved other elements not present here. See United States v. Pierce, 397 F. 2d 128 (CA4 1968) (thorough custodial interrogation at station house); United States v. Pellegrini, 309 F. Supp. 250, 257 (SDNY 1970) (officers induced unwarned suspect to produce "the clinching evidence of his crime"); In re Pablo A. C., 129 Cal. App. 3d 984, 181 Cal. Rptr. 468 (1982) (25-minute interrogation of juvenile; court finds causal connection but notes that all prior cited cases relying on "cat-out-of-bag" theory have involved coercion); State v. Lekas, 201 Kan. 579, 442 P. 2d 11 (1968) (parolee taken into custody and questioned at courthouse). At least one State Supreme Court cited by JUSTICE BRENNAN that read Miranda as mandating suppression of a subsequent voluntary and fully warned confession did so with express reluctance, convinced that admissibility of a subsequent confession. should turn on voluntariness alone. See Brunson v. State, 264 So. 2d 817, 819-820 (Miss. 1972).

Elstad's responses. There is no question that respondent knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to remain silent before he described his participation in the burglary. It is also beyond dispute that respondent's earlier remark was voluntary, within the meaning of the Fifth Amendment. Neither the environment nor the manner of either "interrogation" was coercive. The initial conversation took place at midday, in the living room area of respondent's own home, with his mother in the kitchen area, a few steps away. Although in retrospect the officers testified that respondent was then in custody, at the time he made his statement he had not been informed that he was under arrest. The arresting officers' testimony indicates that the brief stop in the living room before proceeding to the station house was not to interrogate the suspect but to notify his mother of the reason for his arrest. App. 9-10.

The State has conceded the issue of custody and thus we must assume that Burke breached Miranda procedures in failing to administer Miranda warnings before initiating the discussion in the living room. This breach may have been the result of confusion as to whether the brief exchange qualified as "custodial interrogation" or it may simply have reflected Burke's reluctance to initiate an alarming police

"The Miranda advice on the card was clear and comprehensive, incorporating the warning that any statements could be used in a court of law; the rights to remain silent, consult an attorney at state expense, and interrupt the conversation at any time; and the reminder that any statements must be voluntary. The reverse side of the card carried three questions in boldface and recorded Elstad's responses:

"DO YOU UNDERSTAND THESE RIGHTS? 'Yeh'

"DO YOU HAVE ANY QUESTIONS ABOUT YOUR RIGHTS? 'No' "HAVING THESE RIGHTS IN MIND, DO YOU WISH TO TALK TO US NOW? 'Yeh I do!'"

The card is dated and signed by respondent and by Officer McAllister. A recent high school graduate, Elstad was fully capable of understanding this careful administering of Miranda warnings.

procedure before McAllister had spoken with respondent's mother. Whatever the reason for Burke's oversight, the incident had none of the earmarks of coercion. See Rawlings v. Kentucky, 448 U. S. 98, 109-110 (1980). Nor did the officers exploit the unwarned admission to pressure respondent into waiving his right to remain silent.

Respondent, however, has argued that he was unable to give a fully informed waiver of his rights because he was unaware that his prior statement could not be used against him. Respondent suggests that Officer McAllister, to cure this deficiency, should have added an additional warning to those given him at the Sheriff's office. Such a requirement is neither practicable nor constitutionally necessary. In many cases, a breach of Miranda procedures may not be identified as such until long after full Miranda warnings are administered and a valid confession obtained. See, e. g., United States v. Bowler, 561 F. 2d 1323, 1324-1325 (CA9 1977) (certain statements ruled inadmissible by trial court); United States v. Toral, 536 F. 2d 893, 896 (CA9 1976); United States v. Knight, 395 F. 2d 971, 974–975 (CA2 1968) (custody unclear). The standard Miranda warnings explicitly inform the suspect of his right to consult a lawyer before speaking. Police officers are ill-equipped to pinch-hit for counsel, construing the murky and difficult questions of when "custody" begins or whether a given unwarned statement will ultimately be held admissible. See Tanner v. Vincent, 541 F. 2d 932, 936 (CA2 1976), cert. denied, 429 U. S. 1065 (1977). This Court has never embraced the theory that a defendant's ignorance of the full consequences of his decisions vitiates their voluntariness. See California v. Beheler, 463 U. S., at 1125-1126, n. 3; McMann v. Richardson, 397 U. S. 759, 769 (1970). If the prosecution has actually violated the defendant's Fifth Amendment rights by introducing an inadmissible confession at trial, compelling the defendant to testify in rebuttal, the rule announced in Harrison v. United States, 392 U. S. 219 (1968), precludes use of that testimony

on retrial. "Having 'released the spring' by using the petitioner's unlawfully obtained confessions against him, the Government must show that its illegal action did not induce his testimony." Id., at 224-225. But the Court has refused to find that a defendant who confesses, after being falsely told that his codefendant has turned State's evidence, does so involuntarily. Frazier v. Cupp, 394 U. S. 731, 739 (1969). The Court has also rejected the argument that a defendant's ignorance that a prior coerced confession could not be admitted in evidence compromised the voluntariness of his guilty plea. McMann v. Richardson, supra, at 769. Likewise, in California v. Beheler, supra, the Court declined to accept defendant's contention that, because he was unaware of the potential adverse consequences of statements he made to the police, his participation in the interview was involuntary. Thus we have not held that the sine qua non for a knowing and voluntary waiver of the right to remain silent is a full and complete appreciation of all of the consequences flowing from the nature and the quality of the evidence in the case.

IV

When police ask questions of a suspect in custody without administering the required warnings, Miranda dictates that the answers received be presumed compelled and that they be excluded from evidence at trial in the State's case in chief. The Court has carefully adhered to this principle, permitting a narrow exception only where pressing public safety concerns demanded. See New York v. Quarles, 467 U. S., at 655–656. The Court today in no way retreats from the bright-line rule of Miranda. We do not imply that good faith excuses a failure to administer Miranda warnings; nor do we condone inherently coercive police tactics or methods offensive to due process that render the initial admission involuntary and undermine the suspect's will to invoke his rights once they are read to him. A handful of courts have, however, applied our precedents relating to confessions ob