The dissenting judge argued that respondents' property interests were conditioned by the procedural limitations accompanying the grant thereof. He considered constitutional requirements satisfied because there was a reliable pretermination finding of "cause," coupled with a due process hearing at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id., at 566.

Both employers petitioned for certiorari. Nos. 83-1362 and 83-1363. In a cross-petition, Loudermill sought review of the rulings adverse to him. No. 83-6392. We granted all three petitions, 467 U. S. 1204 (1984), and now affirm in all respects.

II

Respondents' federal constitutional claim depends on their having had a property right in continued employment." Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S. 564, 576-578 (1972); Reagan v. United States, 182 U. S. 419, 425 (1901). If they did, the State could not deprive them of this property without due process. See Memphis Light, Gas & Water Div. v. Craft, 436 U. S. 1, 11–12 (1978); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S. 565, 573-574 (1975).

Property interests are not created by the Constitution, "they are created and their dimensions are defined by existing rules or understandings that stem from an independent source such as state law. . . Board of Regents v. Roth, supra, at 577. See also Paul v. Davis, 424 U. S. 693, 709 (1976). The Ohio statute plainly creates such an interest. Respondents were "classified civil service employees," Ohio Rev. Code Ann. § 124.11 (1984), entitled to retain their positions "during good behavior and efficient service," who could not be dismissed "except . . . for . . . misfeasance,

Of course, the Due Process Clause also protects interests of life and liberty. The Court of Appeals' finding of a constitutional violation was based solely on the deprivation of a property interest. We address below Loudermill's contention that he has been unconstitutionally deprived of liberty. See n. 13, infra.

4

malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office," § 124.34. The statute plainly supports the conclusion, reached by both lower courts, that respondents possessed property rights in continued employment. Indeed, this question does not seem to have been disputed below."

The Parma Board argues, however, that the property right is defined by, and conditioned on, the legislature's choice of procedures for its deprivation. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83-1363, pp. 26-27. The Board stresses that in addition to specifying the grounds for termination, the statute sets out procedures by which termination may take place." The

'The relevant portion of § 124.34 provides that no classified civil servant may be removed except "for incompetency, inefficiency, dishonesty, drunkenness, immoral conduct, insubordination, discourteous treatment of the public, neglect of duty, violation of such sections or the rules of the director of administrative services or the commission, or any other failure of good behavior, or any other acts of misfeasance, malfeasance, or nonfeasance in office."

"The Cleveland Board of Education now asserts that Loudermill had no property right under state law because he obtained his employment by lying on the application. It argues that had Loudermill answered truthfully he would not have been hired. He therefore lacked a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to the position. Brief for Petitioner in No. 83–1362, pp. 14-15.

For several reasons, we must reject this submission. First, it was not raised below. Second, it makes factual assumptions-that Loudermill lied, and that he would not have been hired had he not done so that are inconsistent with the allegations of the complaint and inappropriate at this stage of the litigation, which has not proceeded past the initial pleadings stage. Finally, the argument relies on a retrospective fiction inconsistent with the undisputed fact that Loudermill was hired and did hold the security guard job. The Board cannot escape its constitutional obligations by rephrasing the basis for termination as a reason why Loudermill should not have been hired in the first place.

After providing for dismissal only for cause, see n. 4, supra, § 124.34 states that the dismissed employee is to be provided with a copy of the order of removal giving the reasons therefor. Within 10 days of the filing of the order with the Director of Administrative Services, the employee may file a written appeal with the State Personnel Board of Review or the Commission. "In the event such an appeal is filed, the board or commis

According to

procedures were adhered to in these cases. petitioner, "[t]o require additional procedures would in effect expand the scope of the property interest itself." Id., at 27. See also Brief for State of Ohio et al. as Amici Curiae 5-10.

This argument, which was accepted by the District Court, has its genesis in the plurality opinion in Arnett v. Kennedy, 416 U. S. 134 (1974). Arnett involved a challenge by a former federal employee to the procedures by which he was dismissed. The plurality reasoned that where the legislation conferring the substantive right also sets out the procedural mechanism for enforcing that right, the two cannot be separated:

"The employee's statutorily defined right is not a guarantee against removal without cause in the abstract, but such a guarantee as enforced by the procedures which Congress has designated for the determination of cause.

"[W]here the grant of a substantive right is inextricably intertwined with the limitations on the procedures which are to be employed in determining that right, a litigant in the position of appellee must take the bitter with the sweet." Id., at 152–154.

This view garnered three votes in Arnett, but was specifically rejected by the other six Justices. See id., at 166-167 (POWELL, J., joined by BLACKMUN, J.,); id., at 177-178, 185 (WHITE, J.,); id., at 211 (MARSHALL, J., joined by Douglas and BRENNAN, JJ.). Since then, this theory has at times seemed to gather some additional support. See Bishop v. Wood, 426 U. S. 341, 355-361 (1976) (WHITE, J., dissenting); Goss v. Lopez, 419 U. S., at 586-587 (POWELL, J., joined

sion shall forthwith notify the appointing authority and shall hear, or appoint a trial board to hear, such appeal within thirty days from and after its filing with the board or commission, and it may affirm, disaffirm, or modify the judgment of the appointing authority." Either side may obtain review of the Commission's decision in the State Court of Common Pleas.

by BURGER, C. J., and BLACKMUN and REHNQUIST, JJ., dissenting). More recently, however, the Court has clearly rejected it. In Vitek v. Jones, 445 U. S. 480, 491 (1980), we pointed out that "minimum [procedural] requirements [are] a matter of federal law, they are not diminished by the fact that the State may have specified its own procedures that it may deem adequate for determining the preconditions to adverse official action." This conclusion was reiterated in Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U. S. 422, 432 (1982), where we reversed the lower court's holding that because the entitlement arose from a state statute, the legislature had the prerogative to define the procedures to be followed to protect that entitlement.

In light of these holdings, it is settled that the "bitter with the sweet" approach misconceives the constitutional guarantee. If a clearer holding is needed, we provide it today. The point is straightforward: the Due Process Clause provides that certain substantive rights-life, liberty, and property-cannot be deprived except pursuant to constitutionally adequate procedures. The categories of substance and procedure are distinct. Were the rule otherwise, the Clause would be reduced to a mere tautology. "Property" cannot be defined by the procedures provided for its deprivation any more than can life or liberty. The right to due process "is conferred, not by legislative grace, but by constitutional guarantee. While the legislature may elect not to confer a property interest in [public] employment, it may not constitutionally authorize the deprivation of such an interest, once conferred, without appropriate procedural safeguards." Arnett v. Kennedy, supra, at 167 (POWELL, J., concurring in part and concurring in result in part); see id., at 185 (WHITE, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).

In short, once it is determined that the Due Process Clause applies, "the question remains what process is due." Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U. S. 471, 481 (1972). The answer to that question is not to be found in the Ohio statute.

An essential principle of due process is that a deprivation of life, liberty, or property "be preceded by notice and opportunity for hearing appropriate to the nature of the case." Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U. S. 306, 313 (1950). We have described "the root requirement" of the Due Process Clause as being "that an individual be given an opportunity for a hearing before he is deprived of any significant property interest." Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U. S. 371, 379 (1971) (emphasis in original); see Bell v. Burson, 402 U. S. 535, 542 (1971). This principle requires "some kind of a hearing" prior to the discharge of an employee who has a constitutionally protected property interest in his employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U. S., at 569-570; Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U. S. 593, 599 (1972). As we pointed out last Term, this rule has been settled for some time now. Davis v. Scherer, 468 U. S. 183, 192, n. 10 (1984); id., at 200-203 (BRENNAN, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). Even decisions finding no constitutional violation in termination procedures have relied on the existence of some pretermination opportunity to respond. For example, in Arnett six Justices found constitutional minima satisfied where the employee had access to the material upon which the charge was based and could respond orally and in writing and present rebuttal affidavits. See also Barry v. Barchi, 443 U. S. 55, 65 (1979) (no due process violation where horse trainer whose license was suspended "was given more than one opportunity to present his side of the story").

The need for some form of pretermination hearing, recognized in these cases, is evident from a balancing of the competing interests at stake. These are the private interest in

'There are, of course, some situations in which a postdeprivation hearing will satisfy due process requirements. See Ewing v. Mytinger & Casselberry, Inc., 339 U. S. 594 (1950); North American Cold Storage Co. v. Chicago, 211 U. S. 306 (1908).