It does not appear that the premises were occupied for residence purposes; the fair inference from the evidence being that Wurm not only did not live there, but that he did live at the Thirty-Fifth street place. It thus appears that the officers, having seized this warm whisky while in Wurm's possession (knowing that to be his name), and hearing the ridiculous story he told to explain his possession of the liquor, had their suspicions very properly and naturally directed to these premises, through the fact of his possession of the gas receipt, and deposit being in the name of another. With their suspicions thus aroused and directed, and supplemented by what they saw on the approach of the premises and before entry, they were in our judgment justified in entering without search warrant this combined distillery and brewery. This is decisive of the only issue involved, and does not take into consideration the undisputed evidence that upon their return from the premises Wurm stated to them that he was in fact the proprietor, and employed the two men to make "moonshine" and "home-brew," which he sold and delivered to saloonkeepers. The judgment is affirmed.

STEINAU CO. v. COMMON SENSE NOVEL

TY CO.

ALSCHULER, Circuit Judge. The appeal is from the decree of the District Court finding invalid patent No. 1,436,365, granted appellant Nov. 21, 1922, for improvement in advertising display signs. The patent is for a window sign in which the let ters are depressed or countersunk from the plane of the sheet from which the sign is made, and the letters gilded or otherwise brightly colored, the sign to be attached to the inside surface of the window by means of an adhesive substance previously applied to so much of the sheet as is not so countersunk. The claimed single feature of advance over the prior art is in the unitary sign wherein the part of the sheet which contacts with the glass is adapted to receive the adhesive substance, making a sign cheaply producable in large quantities, and readily and durably attachable in its entirety to the inside of the glass.

Window signs of countersunk letters of V-shape or other cross-section are old in the art, and such single letters, for use in window signs, and with narrow rims about the edge of the letter for receiving sticking substance for attachment to the inner surface of a window, are also old. A device such as the latter was considered in the Sixth circuit as far back as 1903 in Rodwell Sign Co. v. F. Tuchfarber Co., 127 F. 138, 62 C. C. A. 252.

December 8, 1924.)

No. 3430.

Patents 328-Steinau patent, 1,436,365, for unitary window sign, held invalid for lack of invention.

Steinau patent, No. 1,436,365, for unitary window sign having depressed letters, gilded or brightly colored, to be attached to inside of window by means of substance applied to part of sheet not depressed, held invalid for lack of invention.

Appeal from the District Court of the

United States for the Eastern Division of the Northern District of Illinois.

Suit by the Steinau Company, a copartnership, against the Common Sense Novelty Company. Decree for defendant, and plaintiff appeals. Affirmed.

Thomas A. Banning, Jr., and Samuel W. Banning, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellant.

Charles H. Poole, and Clarence E. Mehlhope, both of Chicago, Ill., for appellee. Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and PAGE, Circuit Judges.

of letters. With such a background we cannot perceive any element of invention in combining two or any number of such letters in any desired shape or form into a single sign, and applying to the parts which would contact with the surface of the glass glue or other sticking substance, just as was done with the single letters.

From the affidavit of Mr. Bostwick, whose company manufactures for appellant its signs purporting to be made under the patent, it would seem that one of the difficulties was to find a glue which would permit the shipment of these signs in large quantities and in contact with each other without their sticking together, and at the same time be suitable for properly attaching the sign to the glass so that changes of temperature of the window glass will not cause the signs to loosen and fall. He describes the difficulty of obtaining such a glue and the experiments of some of the largest glue manufacturers in the United States, resulting ultimately in the production of a suitable glue, and a very considerable business in the

Aliens 54-Evidence held sufficient to show accused knowingly distributed literature opposing organized government.

Evidence of previous arrest of alien sought to be deported for distributing literature opposing all organized government, and his statement that he believed in its teachings, held sufficient to show that he knew nature of literature distributed by him in violation of Act Cong. Oct. 16, 1918, as amended by Act Cong. June 5, 1920 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 42894b[1]).

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.

Habeas corpus by Joe Gebartus against Chas. H. Paul. From a judgment quashing the writ, relator appeals. Affirmed.

then permitted to go unprosecuted, but was again taken while distributing the same sort of matter. The inference is quite irresistible that he understood the nature of it, and deliberately persisted in doing what the law Act of Congress Oct. of the land forbade. 16, 1918, as amended by Act June 5, 1920 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, § 42894b[1]).

The judgment of the District Court is affirmed.

ree'd 20 7(ad) 353.

THE PICTONIAN.

(District Court, E. D. New York. Nov. 26,

1924.) No. 1081.

1. Treaties 2-Governments may by treaty authorize searches and seizures of foreign vessels.

Though the right to search and seize ships of other nations for violation of the United States laws is limited by international laws, rulers or governments may by treaty agree not to complain of such action or agree that such search and seizure may be made.

2. International law 10 - Vessels on high seas subject to laws and treaties of own country.

Vessels on the high seas are subject to the . laws of their own country and to treaties made by the sovereign or government of their coun

try.

Roy L. Morse, of Milwaukee, Wis., for appellee.

Before ALSCHULER, EVANS, and PAGE, Circuit Judges.

PER CURIAM. This is an appeal from judgment quashing writ of habeas corpus challenging sufficiency of deportation proceedings brought against appellant, an alien. The warrant of deportation recites that it is predicated upon the finding that appellant had in his possession for purposes of circulation and distribution written and printed matter advising, advocating, and teaching opposition to all organized government. It is conceded that he was in fact distributing such matter, and the only contention is that the evidence wholly fails to show that he knew the matter was of that nature.

authorizing seizure of British vessels within certain limits held self-executing.

The treaty between Great Britain and the United States of May 22, 1924, authorizing the seizure of vessels for certain violations of law within one hour's sailing distance of the coast, having been ratified by the Senate, is selfexecuting and needs no further legislation to insure its validity.

4. Treaties

12-Legislation declaring certain acts crimes not prerequisite to enforcement of treaty provisions.

Seizures and libels under treaty between Great Britain and the United States of May 22, 1924, in which Great Britain agrees to make no objection to the boarding and seizure of private vessels violating United States' laws within one hour's sailing distance of coast, held authorized as against objection that Congress has not by law declared acts denounced by Rev. St. § 3450 (Comp. St. § 6352), Tariff Act 1922,

584, 586, 587, 593 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, §§ 5841h3, 5841h5, 5841h6, 5841h12, 5841h13), and National Prohibition Act, §§ 3, 26, tit. 2 (Comp. St. Ann. Supp. 1923, §§ 101382aa, 101381⁄21⁄2mm), to be crimes when committed beyond 3 and 12 mile limits.

and then stated as his reason for such distribution that he believed in the matters and things set forth in the literature. He was

3 F. (2d)-10

feiture of British vessel under treaty held sufficient.

A libel against a ship seized under the treaty with Great Britain of May 22, 1924, need

The treaty having been ratified by the Senate is self-executing and needs no further legislation to insure its validity.

There is nothing in the Constitution nor in the treaty itself which requires the passage of any further legislation to carry out the terms of a treaty. Foster v. Neilson, 2 Pet. (27 U. S.) 253, 7 L. Ed. 415.

[4] Claimant contends that the acts alleged against the vessel in the case at bar are not crimes because Congress has not by law declared such acts to be crimes when committed beyond the three or at most the twelve-mile limits, and that Congress is without power to make such acts crimes when committed beyond such limits.

This claim is not, in my opinion, well founded, because while Congress might under international law be without power to enact laws which without their consent would bind foreign nationals outside of the territorial limits of this country, I see no reason why any such foreign sovereign or government cannot either consent to the extension of the territorial limits of this country as to their ships, subjects, or citizens, or where, as in the treaty to which reference will be made, uphold the threemile limit as the territorial limits of the United States, and at the same time agree not to object to the seizure within certain other defined limits, beyond the three-mile limit, and the forfeiture after adjudication by the courts of the United States of any vessel which has committed, is committing, or is attempting to commit any offense against the existing laws on any particular subject which had prior thereto been enforceable within the territorial limits of the United States, its territories or possessions. As I read the treaty which will hereinafter be referred to, that is exactly what Great Britain has done, and such treaty binds her ships and subjects and has the effect of law, and perforce the laws of the United States relating to the particular subject are extended in their application to the ships and subjects of Great Britain within such additional limits, to accomplish the purpose in said treaty set forth, and the right to search and seize is given.

So much of the treaty between the United States and Great Britain to aid in the prevention of the smuggling of intoxicating liquor into the United States, dated January 23, 1924, which. became effective May 22, 1924, as is necessary for consideration in the matter at bar, reads as follows:

"Article L. The high contracting parties declare that it is their firm intention to up

hold the principle that 3 marine miles extending from the coast line outwards and measured from low-water mark constitute the proper limits of territorial waters."

"Article II. (1) His Britannic majesty agrees that he will raise no objection to the boarding of private vessels under the British flag outside the limits of territorial waters by the authorities of the United States, its territories or possessions in order that inquiries may be addressed to those on board and an examination be made of the ship's papers for the purpose of ascertaining whether the vessel or those on board are endeavoring to import or have imported alcoholic beverages into the United States, its territories or possessions in violation of the laws there in force. When such inquiries and examination show a reasonable ground for suspicion, a search of the vessel may be initiated.

"(2) If there is reasonable cause for belief that the vessel has committed or is committing or attempting to commit an offense against the laws of the United States, its territories, or possessions prohibiting the importation of alcoholic beverages, the vessel may be seized and taken into a port of the United States, its territories, or possessions for adjudication in accordance with such laws.

"(3) The rights conferred by this article shall not be exercised at a greater distance from the coast of the United States, its territories, or possessions than can be traversed in one hour by the vessel suspected of endeavoring to commit the offense. In cases, however, in which the liquor is intended to be conveyed to the United States, its territories, or possessions by a vessel other than the one boarded and searched, it shall be the speed of such other vessel and not the speed of the vessel boarded which shall determine the distance from the coast at which the right under this article can be exercised."

"Article III. No penalty or forfeiture under the laws of the United States shall be applicable or attach to alcoholic liquors or riage of such liquors, when such liquors are to vessels or persons by reason of the carlisted as sea stores or cargo destined for a port foreign to the United States, its territories, or possessions on board British vessels voyaging to or from ports of the United States, or its territories or possessions, or passing through the territorial waters thereof, and such carriage shall be as now provided by law with respect to the transit of such liquors through the Panama Canal, provided that such liquors shall be kept under seal continuously while the vessel on

which they are carried remains within said territorial waters and that no part of such liquors shall at any time or place be unladen within the United States, its territories, or possessions."

The right to search under the circumstances alleged in the case at bar seems, under the terms of said treaty, to be beyond question, and in my opinion the treaty was intended by both nations to and did deal with the matter in a complete way.

This was also the opinion of the court in U. S. v. Schooner Frances Louise, 1 F. (2d) 1004, decided in the United States District Court of Massachusetts, September 30, 1924, in which case the libel was dismissed on the ground that the government had failed to prove that the distance to the vessel libeled could be covered in our hour's sailing from shore by contact boat, but the court thoroughly considered the question of the validity of the treaty and held:

"I have great doubt whether any such broad right of seizure exists as the government contends. But it is not necessary to decide this question, because I am clearly of opinion that the whole situation is covered by the treaty. It dealt explicitly with the case of liquor ships hovering on our coast and being visited by small boats from shore. Of course, such small boats only come to the hovering vessel to get contraband goods. Both parties understood that. The plain inference is that such trading does not render the hovering vessel amenable to seizure as long as she keeps to the high seas, except as provided in the treaty. I think both nations intended the treaty to deal with the matter in a complete way. If so, upon familiar principles of law, it is conclusive. See Texas & Pacific Ry. Co. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U. S. 427, 436, 437, 27 S. Ct. 350, 51 L. Ed. 553, 9 Ann. Cas. 1075. The construction of it is a judicial question. Jones v. Meehan, 175 U. S. 1, at page 32, 20 S. Ct. 1, 44 L. Ed. 49. I have no doubt that it is constitutional."

[5] For the decision of the question now presented it is not necessary that the libel allege that the ship was committing an offense against the laws of the United States at the time of the seizure, because by the treaty, article 2, subdivision (2), supra, attempting to commit an offense against the laws of the United States is made a sufficient ground of seizure, and it is impossible to deny that a ship is attempting to violate the laws specified in the libel, even if such laws applied only within the three-mile limit, when it is alleged, as in the libel in the

action at bar, that the ship was off our coast attempting to make contact with an American vessel, motorboat K14622, and that it did attempt to smuggle intoxicating liquor into the United States.

Latham, Cowart and Schwarz v. United States of America, 2 F. (2d) 208, decided by the United States Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit, October 21, 1924, in which case, in the absence of a treaty, the court said:

"One who ranges along the land or water line of any country with the design of aiding in the subversion of its laws challenges that country to enforce its laws and assumes the risk of his own mistakes and the action of wind and tide and all the forces of nature." And-"The defense, therefore, that the defendants sold the whisky on the high seas where it was lawful to sell it is not available. The defendants being under arrest in the United States, it make no difference that they were outside the jurisdiction when by aiding and abetting they become principals in crime committed in the United States."

Claimant makes some objection to the particular causes of forfeiture alleged in the libel, but I find the exceptions to the second, third, fourth, and fifth causes of forfeiture should be overruled and disallowed; but the exception to the first cause of forfeiture requires further consideration.

[6,7] The treaty was made to aid in the prevention of the smuggling of intoxicating liquor into the United States, and I do not believe that the mere possession of liquor, at some undescribed place beyond the territorial limits of the United States by a British ship, without any intention to attempt to commit an offense against the laws of the United States, would be suffi cient under the treaty to constitute a caus of forfeiture under the laws of the United States, including the treaty; but to possess the liquor within the extended limits with the intent to smuggle it into the United States would seem to constitute an attempt to commit an offense against our laws.

In the first cause of forfeiture as alleged in the libel there are no allegations as to the location of the vessel, nor that the distance from the coast to the schooner can be traversed in one hour by the vessel endeavoring to commit the offense. I therefore hold that the exception to the first cause of forfeiture, solely because of a lack of the necessary allegations as pointed out, is sustained. But as an amendment of this cause of forfeiture, if the district attorney desires to amend, can undoubtedly be made within