language of section 67f, though obtained within four months prior to the filing of the bankruptcy proceeding. In the language "that all levies, judgments, attachments, or other liens, obtained through legal proceedings against a person who is insolvent," the words "other liens," under the familiar rule of ejusdem generis, must be held to relate to liens of the same kind and character as those obtained by levies, judgments and attachments. The words "levies, judgments and attachments," are in very common use and each has a well-known and definite meaning. An attachment proceeding is one whereby the property of a defendant is seized upon a writ of attachment in a suit for the recovery of money, the writ ordinarily being issued upon proper affidavits at or after the commencement of the suit and before rendition of judgment, the property taken to be held to satisfy such judgment as may be obtained. Under such writ there ordinarily is no lien until the property of the defendant is actually taken under the writ.

The term "judgments" must relate to the usual and ordinary judgments of courts of record, by means of which, through statutory provisions, they become liens upon real estate, usually from the time of their entry, but ordinarily they do not become liens upon personal property at all. In order that a lien may be obtained upon personal property, it is usually true that an execution must be issued and placed in the hands of the proper officer. Sometimes the lien attaches upon the placing of the execution in the hands of the officer; under other circumstances, it does not become a lien until an actual levy is made upon the property of the defendant in the judgment by the taking of the property into the possession of the officer. It is that act that is usually and ordinarily known as a levy, and if we assume, which we must, that the language of the act was used in its usual and ordinary sense, then the word "levies," as used, cannot be given any other meaning. Bouvier defines "to levy an execution" "to raise or levy so much money on execution," and, again, "a seizure; the raising of the money for which an execution has been issued." We are unable to find any case pertaining to a levy in a judicial proceeding which does not deal with an action under some sort of a writ against the property of the defendant in the action either for the purpose of holding the property for future

sale to satisfy a future judgment, as in attachment, or to take the property for the purpose of sale to satisfy an existing judgment.

Bouvier defines "replevin" as a form of action which lies to gain possession of ɲersonal chattels which have been taken from the plaintiff unlawfully. That definition is perhaps not quite broad enough, because it will also lie for goods which at the time of the action are in the wrongful possession of the defendant. From time immemorial the practice in replevin has been for the officer to take possession of the property described in his writ and deliver it to the plaintiff. Bouvier defines "replevy”—“to redeliver goods which have been distrained to the original possessor of them." The action of replevin has nothing to do with the taking of a defendant's property for the purpose of satisfying any claim of the plaintiff. On the contrary, it is based upon the wholly antagonistic theory that the property, or at least the right of possession thereof, belongs to the plaintiff and not to the defendant. Other language in section 67f strongly indicates that the taking of property in replevin was not considered a levy within the purview of the act. The language is that "all levies shall be deemed null and void and the property affected by the levy shall be deemed wholly discharged and released from the same, and shall pass to the trustee as a part of the estate of the bankrupt." Exceptions follow, but they cannot possibly relate to actions in replevin.

If one who rescinds a sale for fraud, and obtains a return of his property in an action of replevin before the commencement of bankruptcy proceedings, is to have the property discharged and released, so that it shall pass to the trustee as part of the estate of the bankrupt, then the section takes away from all such plaintiffs a substantial and valuable remedy for which no substitute is given by the act. It cannot be presumed that Congress intended that the word "levies" should be given any such unusual meaning. When appellant took the property under replevin he took it as his own property, and one does not have liens upon his own property. A lien is some right that A. has in the property of B. for the purpose of securing or satisfying some demand.

The order is reversed, with directions to dismiss the petition.

UNITED STATES v. CENTRAL WHARF TOWBOAT CO. et al.

(Circuit Court of Appeals, First Circuit. December 26, 1924.)

No. 1790.

Salvage 27-Decree awarding salvage held not erroneous or excessive.

Findings as to value of salvaged vessel and of two tugs and revenue cutter saving her, the degree of danger involved and proportionate service rendered held not clearly wrong, and salvage allowance of $9,000 to the tugs, valued at $50,000 and $25,000, not grossly excessive or contrary to law; the vessel being valued at $70,000.

Appeal from the District Court of the United States for the District of Maine; Clarence Hale, Judge.

Suit in admiralty for salvage by the Central Wharf Towboat Company and the Saco River Towing Company, owners of the steam tug Cumberland, and A. G. Prentiss, respectively, against the United States, owner of the steamship Annahuac. From a decree for libelants (295 F. 346), respondent appeals. Affirmed.

Arthur M. Boal, Asst. Admiralty Counsel, U. S. Shipping Board, of Washington, D. C. (Frederick R. Dyer, U. S. Atty., and William B. Nulty, Asst. U. S. Atty., both of Portland, Me., on the brief), for the

United States.

Nathan W. Thompson, of Portland, Me. (Thompson, Hoague & Hill, of Portland, Me., on the brief), for appellees.

ter Ossipee was unable to get in as near the shore as the tugs; that the revenue cutter could not have floated the Annahuac without the aid of the tugs; in failing to find that the tugs Cumberland and Prentiss could not have floated the Annahuac without the aid of the revenue cutter; in finding that the greater part of the service was rendered by the tugs; in making a total salvage award of $15,000; in holding that the tugs were entitled to three-fifths of the total salvage award; and in entering decree for $9,000.

It appears that the steamer Annahuac, on the evening of April 15, 1923, when off the coast of Maine, encountered a severe southeast snowstorm, lost her bearings, and struck heavily on the ragged ledges of Fortune's Rocks near Biddeford Pool; that, in trying to get off the ledges on her own power, the blades of her propeller were stripped and her rudder jammed hard to starboard; that the master and crew left the steamer and went to the Coast Guard Station at Fletcher's Neck, where they stayed the remainder of the night, arriving there about midnight; that the next morning the steamtugs Prentiss and Cumberland arrived in the vicinity of the wreck, and thereafter, shortly before high tide, the revenue cutter Ossipee; that at that time the Annahuac lay in shore with her stern and counter exposed to the sea and listing to starboard; that the Prentiss arrived first, the Cumberland about an hour later, and the revenue cutter shortly before noon. When the Prentiss arrived the Anna

BINGHAM, Circuit Judge. This is an appeal by the United States, respondent and owner of the steamer Annahuac, from a decree in an admiralty proceeding brought in the federal District Court for Maine by the appellees (libelants), owners respectively of the steam tugs Cumberland and Prentiss, in their own behalf and that of their crews, for salvage services. The two libelants joined in the libel, and the award is to be divided between them in accordance with an agreement.

In its assignment of errors the appellant complains that the court erred in holding that the salvage value of the Annahuac was $70,000; in finding that the values of the tugs Cumberland and Prentiss were in the vicinity of $50,000 and $25,000 respectively; that practically all the dangers of the salvage services were taken by the tugs Cumberland and Prentiss; that the revenue cut

the sea, and, as the violence of the sea continued to increase, she pounded harder. When the cutter first arrived she stopped from a quarter of a mile to a mile from the wreck (the testimony in this regard varying) and dropped anchor, as her bearings showed that she had reached the "danger angle" beyond which it was not safe to go. As the cutter desired to reach a point from 100 to 200 fathoms from the wreck, the services of the Prentiss, whose captain, Goldthwaite, was thoroughly familiar with the ledges in that vicinity, were obtained to pilot the cutter further in, which it did, taking her to within 100 or 120 fathoms of the wreck. At this time the tide was beginning to ebb, and time was important if the Annahuac was to be floated on that tide. And the evidence showed that she would have been smashed to pieces on the rocks if she had not been floated at that time, as the violence of the storm was continually increasing; that, after the cutter had been piloted

We are unable to see wherein the District Court in fixing the amount of the award violated any rule of law applicable to the case, or that its findings were clearly wrong, or the award grossly excessive. See Santa Rita (C. C. A.) 281 F. 760, and cases there cited.

to his daughter Dorothy Bailey, alleged to have been in fraud of his creditors. The District Court, in appropriate proceedings, set aside the transactions.

The first-named cause related to the transfer of real estate in the state of Georgia by the said C. T. Bailey to his daughter, Dorothy, and the second the transfer by him to

BAILEY et al. v. BLACKMON (two cases). (Circuit Court of Appeals, Fourth Circuit. December 20, 1924.)

Nos. 2269, 2270.

1. Appeal and error 1022 (2)-Findings of fact by master, approved by court, will be accepted, unless clearly not supported by evidence.

Where the District Court and a master agree on findings of fact, their conclusions will be accepted by the appellate court, unless plainly not supported by the evidence.

2. Fraudulent conveyances ~278(1)—Transfer of property by insolvent to his daughter presumptively fraudulent.

Transfers by an insolvent to his daughter are presumptively fraudulent, and call for full explanation on part of beneficiary.

Appeals from the District Court of the United States for the Eastern District of South Carolina, at Charleston, in bankruptcy; Henry A. Middleton Smith, Judge.

Proceedings by O. C. Blackmon, Jr., trustee in bankruptcy of C. T. Bailey, against C. T. Bailey and Dorothy Bailey and against C. T. Bailey in his own right and as guardian of Dorothy Bailey, and others. Decrees for complainant, and defendants appeal. Affirmed.

Alfred Wallace, Jr., of Columbia, S. C. (De Pass & De Pass, of Columbia, S. C., on the brief), for appellants.

D. W. Robinson, of Columbia, S. C. (Wes

ton & Aycock, of Columbia, S. C., on the brief), for appellee.

on property in Columbia, S. C. Both the conveyances of the real estate and the transfer of the bond and mortgage are alleged to have been made voluntarily while Bailey was insolvent, and with the intent to dewhether or not the two deeds of conveyance fraud his creditors. The issues are, first, of the Georgia land and the assignment of the bond and mortgage were voluntary; second, whether made by C. T. Bailey while insolvent; and, third, whether made with the intent and purpose to defraud C. T. Bailey's creditors.

After full hearing, the District Court overruled demurrers filed by the defendants, the appellants herein in each case, and referred the causes to a referee to take testimony upon all the issues in the causes, and make report thereon together with his findings and conclusions of facts to the court. The referee, upon full consideration of the testimony submitted by the respective parties, found that the two deeds for the Georgia land and the assignment of the mortgage and bond were all voluntary, made at a time that C. T. Bailey was insolvent and unable to pay his debts, and for the purpose and with the intent to defraud his creditors, especially the Palmetto National Bank, and that the effect of the execution of the conveyances of the lands in Georgia and of the assignment of the bond and mortgage was to hinder, delay, and defraud his creditors, particularly the bank referred to.

affirmed the findings of the referee, and made The learned judge of the District Court additional findings as to the deeds conveying the Georgia real estate, as follows:

"It is further found as conclusions of fact:

WADDILL, Circuit Judge. On the 8th of November, 1921, C. T. Bailey was duly adjudged a bankrupt by the United States District Court for the Eastern District of South Carolina, at Columbia, and these two proceedings involve the validity of certain

ley, purporting to be dated March 20, 1920, mentioned in the bill of complaint, and which were probated for record January 18, 1921, and recorded January 25, 1921, were actually executed and delivered in January, 1921.

"2. That no valuable consideration was paid for the execution and delivery of either of said deeds, but that the same were at

tempted voluntary donations from C. T. Bailey to his daughter, Dorothy Bailey.

"3. That in January, 1921, the grantor, C. T. Bailey, was insolvent, and that at the date of the filing of the bill of complaint herein there were still existing unpaid creditors, who were existing creditors at the date of the execution and delivery of the said deeds.

"4. That the said two deeds of conveyance were executed and delivered with the intent and for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding the creditors of the defendant C. T. Bailey.

"It is further found as conclusions of law: "1. That the said two deeds of conveyance, having been made by the grantor when insolvent, as by way of voluntary donation, are invalid, null, and void as against existing creditors.

"2. That the said two deeds of conveyance having been made and executed with the intent and for the purpose of hindering, delaying, and defrauding creditors, are invalid, null, and void as against such creditors."

Other findings of the District Judge regarding the mortgage and bond transfer, which need not be set out, were made, the assignment set aside, and the mortgage and bond declared to belong to the estate of the bankrupt, C. T. Bailey, and as to the precise amount due on the mortgage bond a further reference was made to the referee to ascertain and report on the same. From this action of the District Court the appeals under consideration, heard together, were taken, and it is as to the correctness of these rulings that this court is to pass.

It will be observed at a glance that the questions involved are almost entirely those of fact, though incidentally the jurisdiction of the court was raised. This objection was without merit and properly overruled by the trial court (United States F., & G. Co. v. Bray, 225 U. S. 217, 218, 32 S. Ct. 620, 56 L. Ed. 1055; Robertson v. Howard, 229 U. S. 261, 33 S. Ct. 854, 57 L. Ed. 1174; Scheper v. Scheper, 125 S. C. 89, 102, 103, 118 S. E. 178, 183, and the same was abandoned in oral argument before this court.

[1] In passing upon cases involving questions of fact, this court will be largely bound by the findings made by the trial court, especially when the witnesses were there seen and heard; and where the District Court and the master agree, in such instances their conclusions should be accepted and followed, unless plainly not supported by the testimony. The recent decision of this court of Prosser v. Chapman, Trustee, 2 F. (2d) 134, from the Eastern District of South Carolina, at Charleston, decided on the 21st of October, 1924, correctly states the rule in this respect.

[2] In these cases, so far from differing from the court below in its rulings on the questions of fact, it seems to us that but one conclusion could have been reached, and that the findings of fact of the District Court and of the referee were clearly right. The decision of this court in the Prosser Case above cited is peculiarly applicable, in that it involved, as here, transactions between an insolvent debtor and members of his family, which are presumptively fraudulent, and call for full explanation on the part of the beneficiaries. In that case, the transaction was between husband and wife; in this, it is father and daughter. What was said there would seem conclusive of the cases here, and to it and the authorities cited, special reference is made. In addition, the following citations to the statutes of South Carolina and Georgia, and cases bearing thereon applicable especially to the present cases, are made. 2 Park's Ann. Code of Georgia 1914, Civil, art. 2, § 3224 (2695); 3 Code of South Carolina 1922, § 5218; Jackson v. Lewis, 34 S. C. 6, 7, 12 S. E. 560; Barrett & Co. v. Still, 102 S. C. 21, 86 S. E. 204; Betts & Co. v. Richardson, 112 S. C. 283, 99 S. E. 815; First Nat. Bank of Cartersville v. Bayless et al., 96 Ga. 684, 23 S. E. 851; Monroe Mercantile Co. v. Arnold, 108 Ga. 449, 34 S. E. 176; Gray v. Collins, 139 Ga. 776, 78 S. E. 128, 129; Gregory v. Gray, 88 Ga. 172, 14 S. E. 187.

The decrees of the District Court will be affirmed, with costs.

Affirmed.