the instant case. However, the principle upon which both decisions rest is that section 1, chapter 38, Laws 1917, imposes no liability on a county for the loss of or injury to animals in the process of dipping for tick eradication, unless such is inflicted while the animal is being actually dipped or immersed in the vat.

This construction of the act is so narrow as to partially defeat its real purpose and intent. I do not dispute that the word "dipping" means an immersion or plunge in a fluid, and that there is a difference between "immersion" and "sprinkling;" yet the purpose of both is that of cleansing or eradication in one respect or another.

But I cannot agree that the intent of the statute was to confine liability for injury to those cases only where the injury actually occurred in the vat.

The legislature meant to provide that the owner of an animal should recover for an injury received in the "process of dipping" under the supervision of the proper authorities of the county. It is clear to me that, where the fluid is prepared and administered by and under the proper authority, either by dipping the animal in the vat or by pouring the liquid on it, or by sponging it with the liquid, this constitutes "dipping" within the meaning of the act.

In the Sullivan Case, supra, the owner of the animal was compelled to bring it to the dipping vat, where the authorized person in control of the dipping for the county undertook to carry out "the process of dipping" by applying the fluid to the skin of the animal without actually putting it into the dipping vat. The animal died from the effect of the application of the fluid. ·

To say that the owner cannot recover for his loss under these circumstances is to deny him recovery for a loss occasioned by the authorized dipping authorities when he was complying with the mandate of the law to produce his animal at the dipping vat to be dipped for

tick eradication. The owner must comply with the law in bringing his stock to the dipping vat, and that, too, whether the animal be infected with ticks or not, and regardless of the condition of the animals or the distance to the vat. He cannot object to the dipping. He submits his animal to the authority in control to be dipped in the manner such authority may adopt. The authority in charge of the dipping vat elects to apply the fluid in a slightly different manner from that of driving the animal through the dipping vat, but it is for the accomplishment of the same purpose, the eradication of ticks, and in pursuing this method of dipping the animal is injured. It seems to me that the act intended to impose liability under such circumstances.

I do not think the legislature intended to deny compensation to the owner for a loss by injury in dipping where the owner in good faith has complied with the law by producing and submitting his stock to be dipped by the proper authority at the premises of the dipping vat. I can picture the humble citizen with one family cow that contributes largely to the sustenance of the family, who has to drive his cow several miles on an unpleasant day to the dipping vat. There he submits his animal to the lawful authority in charge of the vat to be dipped under his direction. This officer of the county with sole control of the process of dipping decides to apply the fluid by pouring it upon the animal instead of running it through the vat, which latter process might be more dangerous under some circumstances, and he proceeds to carry out the purpose of the dipping law by an application of the fluid, and the animal dies from the dipping. Under the majority deeision this citizen whose property has been, in a certain sense, taken or damaged for public use, must lightly return to his home and family without his cow, and must bear the loss because the lawful authority in charge of the dipping operations

elected to apply the fluid in a somewhat different manner than that of plunging the animal through the vat.

The legislators in dealing with this question undoubtedly intended to protect the stock owners against losses where the dipping is done by the proper authority at the place designated and for the purpose of eradication of ticks. In the enactment and enforcement of drastic laws governing private property I think it is reasonable to say that the legislature intended a liberal application in favor of the rights of the citizen.

STEVENS, J., concurs in this dissent.

BOARD OF SUP'RS OF WARREN COUNTY v. HACKETT, TREASURER.

[85 South. 116, In Banc. No. 21181.]

COUNTIES. Treasurer held not entitled to commissions where there is a county depository.

Under our statutes the county treasurer in a county where there is a county depository receives for his salary a fixed compensation; and, though the appointment of the county depository be irregular or defective, nevertheless, if it qualifies by depositing with the county treasurer the statutory securities, receives a commission, and handles all public funds of the county, the treasurer cannot claim for his compensation the statutory commissions allowed to a county treasurer on public funds where there is no county depository, especially after the treasurer has officially recognized and acquiesced in the appointment of such depository.

APPEAL from circuit court of Warren county.
HON. E. L. BRIEN, Judge.

W. R. Hackett, Treasurer of Warren County, presented a claim for the balance of his salary to the Board of Supervisors of Warren County. Claim rejected, and

on appeal to the circuit court there was judgment for the Treasurer, and the Board of Supervisors appeals. Reversed, and judgment entered for the Board of Supervisors.

Anderson, Vollor & Kelly, for appelant.

John C. Bryson, for appellee.

STEVENS, J., delivered the opinion of the court.

Appellee, as the duly elected county treasurer of Warren county, propounded and presented to the board of supervisors a claim for one thousand six hundred and twenty-five dollars, the balance, as alleged, of salary due him for the years 1918 and 1919 as treasurer of said county. The board rejected the claim, and an appeal was prosecuted to the circuit court, and the learned circuit judge, a jury being waived, found in favor of appellee in the sum of one thousand five hundred twentyfive dollars and twenty-four cents, with interest and costs. From this judgment the board appeals.

Appellee's claim is founded upon the assumption and contention that there was no legally appointed county depository in Warren county for the years 1918 and 1919, and that he, in the absence of a duly accredited county depository, is entitled to the lawful commissions upon all public funds of the county for the years mentioned, that these commissions exceeded the maximum of one thousand dollars a year, and that therefore appellee is entitled to recover one thousand dollars per annum, less amounts already paid him and for which credit is offered.

The facts are: In December, 1917, the board ordered the clerk to advertise for a county depository for 1918 "in compliance with the provisions of chapter 194 of the Acts of 1912 and the amendments as provided in

chapter 257 of Acts of 1914." No reference was made to chapter 208 of the Acts of 1916 then in force and effect. There being no response to this advertisement, in January, 1918, the clerk was directed to advertise again, and in this order and advertisement no reference was made to the Acts of 1916. In response to this last advertisement the First National Bank of Vicksburg offered to act as county depository in the following words:

"We will pay you a premium of one hundred dollars if we are designated the depository, said amount to be credited twenty-five dollars each quarter."

This being the only bid, it was accepted. The bank at once qualified by giving the securities required by statute. These securities were deposited with the county treasurer and accepted and preserved by him. A legal commission was issued to the bank, and the bank thereafter proceeded to receive all public funds and to discharge fully and completely all the duties of a county depository for that year, 1918. A similar proceeding was had by the board in selecting a depository for the year 1919; the only difference being that the bank in filing its bid offered "to pay flat premium of four hundred dollars in quarterly payments of one hundred dollars each." The order of the board stated that, this "being the best and only bid offered," it was accepted, and again the bank was commissioned and duly qualified and discharged the duties of a county depository for

1519

During the year 1918 and for the first three months of 1919 appellee presented to the board and drew his allowance of twenty-five doliars a month, c1 three hundred dollars per annum, for the year 1918, and a similar pro rata for the first three months of the year 1919. Appellee decided that the First National Bank was not a legal depository, and, in consequence thereof, that he was entitled to the full remuneration of one thousand