60. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Actions-Process.-Where a married women is sued jointly with her husband, and served with process, but he is not served, if she fails to appear and plead her coverture as a defense, the judg ment against her is valid, and may be satisfied by exe cution against her general estate.-CARTER V. KAISER, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 265.

61. HUSBAND AND WIFE-Fraudulent Conveyances.Where a conveyance from a husband to a wife is not made to hinder or defraud subsequent creditors, it will not be set aside in favor of such a creditor, although made without adequate consideration. -KING V. WELLS, Iowa, 77 N. W. Rep. 338.

62. INJUNCTIONS- Covenants in Deed.-A preliminary injunction will not be granted to a grantor to restrain the violation of a covenant in a deed against doing business on the premises on Sunday, where it has been openly violated for several years by defendant grantee and by other grantees of the same grantor including his tenants, under a like covenant, and where defend. ant has expended large sums in improving his property in reliance on the grantor's apparent abandonment of the restrictions. -OCEAN CITY ASSN. V. SCHURCH, N. J., 41 Atl. Rep. 914.

63. INJUNCTION-Enforcement of Bond Rights of Sureties. The court which grants an injunction, and takes an injunction bond to save the defendant from loss caused thereby, may, in an ancillary proceeding, summarily enforce such bond against the sureties; but in such proceeding, at least when the amount of recov. ery is uncertain, the sareties must have notice and their day in court before the amount of damages is fixed against them.-LESLIE V. BROWN, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 171.

64. INSURANCE-Powers of Agent to Bind Company.A limitation upon the authority of a general agent of an insurance company, having power to make contracts of insurance for the company, will not relieve it from liability on a policy issued by such agent, although in violation of such limitation, where the insured had neither actual nor constructive notice of the limitation.-TEUTONIA INS. Co. v. EWING, U. S. C. C. of App., Sixth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 217.

65. INTERVENTION-Parties.-A person claiming own. ership of property in litigation may, at any time be. fore trial, become a party to the action by interven. tion, and have his claim adjudicated.--MCCONNIff v. VAN DUSEN, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 348.

67. INTOXICATING LIQUORS License Notice of Application. Where the matter published in each of two editions of a daily paper is not substantially the same, and each edition has a different heading or name, and is sent to a different list of subscribers, notice of an ap plication for liquor license is required to be inserted in but one edition thereof daily for the requisite length of time; and its circulation alone is to be considered in determining whether the proper newspaper was selected.-FEIL V. KITCHEN BROS. HOTEL CO., Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 344.

68. JUDGMENT BY MISTAKE - Setting Aside.-Code, § 274, authorizing the setting aside of a judgment taken against a party through his "mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect," does not authorize the setting aside of a judgment against a corporation, be. cause, acting on its attorney's advice, it verided its answer by an agent, and not by an officer, as required by section 258, that being a mistake of law. -PHIFER V. TRAVELERS' INS. CO. OF HARTFORD. CONN., N. Car., 31 S. E. Rep. 715.

69. JUDICIAL SALES-Rents and Profits.-A purchaser of lands at judicial sale is not entitled to rents and

profits until his right of possession attaches on confirmation of sale.-HYDER V. O'BRIEN, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 262.

Rent

70. LANDLORD AND TENANT Lien.-Under 2 Gen. St. 1897, ch. 121, § 26, providing that any rent due for farming land shall be a lien on the crop growing or made on the premises, a landlord has a lien for his rent on crops grown on the leased premises by a sublessee of his tenant.-BERRY V. BERRY, Kan., 55 Pac. Rep. 348. 71. LICENSE-Revocation.-An orål license to use a roadway over the land of another is irrevocable after the licensee has performed labor on the faith thereof. -NOBLE V. SHERMAN, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 150.

72. MASTER AND SERVANT - Injuries to Employee.-A person or corporation using the cars or appliances of another person or corporation, as to its employees, uses such cars or appliances charged with the same duty as to inspection as if they were his or its own.UNION STOCK YARDS Co. v. GOODWIN, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 357.

73. MASTER AND SERVANT Injury to Employee-Burden of Proof.-In a suit brought to recover for the death of a coal miner, who is killed in an explosion in a coal mine, where the plaintiff claims that the explo sion was caused by an air course being partially ob structed by accumulation of water, so that sufficient air was not passing through it to properly ventilate the mine, the burden of proof is on the plaintiff to show that such air course was so obstructed that sufficient air was not passing through it.-DESERANT V. CERRILLOS COAL R. Co., N. Mex., 55 Pac. Rep. 290.

74. MECHANICS' LIEN-Continuous Contracts-Notice. -Defendants furnished labor and material as directed by the owner of a building for the purpose of making it into an opera house. There were no plans and specifications to work by, and no agreement as to price or time of payment, or as to the amount of work to be done, or when it was to be completed, and at no time had there been any settlement of the amount due to defendants. Held, that a notice of a mechanie's lien filled within the statutory time from the last item included all the items, though prior to such time the work had been interrupted, and parts of it had been completed.-PATTON V. MATTER, Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 173. 75. MINES AND MINERALS-Construction of Oil Lease. -An oil and gas lease provided that the lessee should pay as rental a share of all oil produced, and a stipulated sum for each gas well the product of which was utilized. Its term was 10 years, and as much longer as oil or gas was produced in paying quantities. It bound the lessee to complete one well in a district named within one year, or pay a fixed sum per annum thereafter until such well should be completed. The lessee completed a well within the year, which was unproductive, and then ceased further operations. Held, that the lease necessarily contemplated, as the sole consideration to the lessor, the development of the leased property, and that by ceasing efforts to that end for a number of years the lessee abandoned the lease, and lost all rights thereunder.-FOSTER V. ELK FORK OIL & GAS Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 178.

76. MINES AND MINERALS - Possession of Surface.The possession of the surface of land does not carry with it the possession of the minerals beneath, so as to confer title thereto under the statute of limitations, where the estate in the minerals has been severed from that in the surface.-CATLIN COAL CO. v. LLOYD, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 144.

77. MORTGAGES-Merger of Equitable in Legal Title. -When a mortgage was given to secure two notes, and the holder of one of them, with knowledge of the ex. istence of the other, surrenders his note to the maker in consideration of a conveyance of the mortgaged land in fee, the equitable lien is not merged in the legal title, but the holder is entitled to share pro rata with the holder of the other note on a foreclosure of the latter. -STEWART V. EATON, Wash., 55 Pac. Rep. 314.

78. MORTGAGE BY WIFE - Acknowledgment.-An acknowledgment of a mortgage by a married woman, stating that it was executed freely, voluntarily, and understandingly and "without fear or compulsion from any person," instead of "without constraint from her husband, and for the purposes therein expressed," as required by statute, is fatally defective.-Cox v. RAILWAY BLDG. & LOAN ASSN., Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 226. 79. MUNICIPAL BONDS Estoppel by Recitals.-A municipal corporation cannot make a false certificate on the face of its negotiable bonds, or a false record that they are issued in accordance with the law for a lawful purpose, and then defeat a recovery upon them by an innocent purchaser, who has bought in reliance upon the certificate of record, by proof that they were in fact issued for an unlawful purpose.-BOARD OF COMBS. OF HASKELL COUNTY, KAN., v. NATIONAL LIFE INS. CO. OF Montpelier, VT., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 229.

80. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Bonds Estoppel by Recitals.-Under the constitution and statutes of Kansas, which vest the board of commissioners of a county with the power to settle and allow claims against it, a recital in bonds issued by a county that they were is isued by the county board in accordance with the provisions of a statute authorizing counties to refund their indebtedness is a representation that the debt refunded was just and valid; and, as against an Innocent -| purchaser of such bonds in reliance upon this representation, the county is estopped from denying it for the purpose of defeating their collection.-BOARD OF COMBS. OF Seward County, Kan., v. ETNA LIFE INS. Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Eighth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 222. 81. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS Combination to Prevent Competitive Bidding.-Under Ky. St. § 3450, part of charter of cities of third class, providing that the mayor shall advertise the letting of contracts for street improvements "in some newspaper published in said city, for at least ten days," insertion of notice in a newspaper for one time ten days before the letting is sufficient. An agreement between competitors in business that one of them shall make a bid for both, the work to be divided between them, is not a fraudu. lent combination to prevent competitive bidding which will render void a contract awarded to such bidder.-WOODWARD V. COLLETT, Ky., 48 S. W. Rep.

164.

Contracts

82. MUNICIPAL CORPORATION Ratification. Where a municipal corporation receives and retains substantial benefits under a contract which it was authorized to make, but which was void because irregularly executed, it is liable in an action brought to recover the reasonable value of the benefits received.-LINCOLN LAND CO. v. VILLAGE OF GRANT, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 349.

83. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-Delinquent Payments for Water.-Where a city agrees with a water company to pay, in monthly installments, out of its current revenues for the year, for water furnished, to entitle such company to interest on delinquent installments before the end of the current year it should allege that there were sufficient current revenues to pay such installments when due.-WATERWORKS Co. v. CITY OF SAN ANTONIO, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 205.

84. MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS - - Ordinances-Injunction.-A taxpayer has a right of action to restrain a city from holding an election in a new ward, claimed to have been illegally created, and from expending the public revenues in defraying the expenses thereof.CASCADEN V. CITY OF WATERLOO, Iowa, 77 N. W. Rep.

333.

85. NATIONAL BANK-Intent to Defraud.-An intent to injure or defraud a national bank within the meaning of section 5209 of the Revised Statutes of the United States does not necessarily involve malice or ill-will toward the bank. The law presumes that every sane person, who has attained the age of discretion, con. templates and intends the necessary or natural conse.

quences of his own acts; and it is sufficient that the unlawful intent is such as, if carried into execution, will necessarily or naturally injure or defraud the bank.UNITED STATES V. KENNEY, U. S. C. C., D. (Del.), 90 Fed. Rep. 257.

86. NUISANCE-Obstruction of Highway.-When the authorities of a municipal corporation, invested by the legislature with authority so to do, construct an improvement in a public street, such improvement is not a nuisance, though it damage adjacent property, and interfere with the owner's enjoyment thereof, and be negligently constructed.-CITY OF OMAHA V. FLOOD, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 379.

87. PARENT AND CHILD-Custody of Child.-The statute and the demands of nature commit the custody of young children to their parents, rather than to strangers; and the court may not deprive the parent of such custody, unless it be shown that such parent is unfit to perform the duties imposed by the relation, or has forfeited the right.-NORVAL V. ZINSMASTER, Neb., 77 N. W. Rep. 373.

88. PARTNERSHIP-Accounting.-A partner contribut. ing second-hand machinery that he had purchased at a master's sale cannot complain of an order on a partnership accounting allowing him what he was prepared to bid for the machinery at such sale.-FRIERSON V. MORROW, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 245.

89. PLEADING Complaint Assignment.-A complaint averring that a contractor had assigned to plaintiff warrants (and all rights thereunder) issued in payment of work done under the contract is insufficient to state a cause of action as assignee or successor in interest under the contract.-SEATTLE NAT. Bank v. SCHOOL DIST. NO. 40, Wash., 55 Pac. Rep. 317.

90. PLEADING Statute of Limitations.-When the statute of limitations of a foreign State is set up as a defense, it is error for the court, on motion, without a trial, to render a judgment of dismissal, for the reason that the plaintiff, under the provisions of said section 4217, Rev. St., is deemed to have controverted the new matter thus set as a defense, and the defendant is put on his proof. The plaintiff may deny the existence of such statute of limitations as pleaded, or may confess and avoid it in any manner the law permits.-ALSPAUGH V. REID, Idaho, 55 Pac. Rep. 300.

91. PRINCIPAL AND AGENT-Remedies of Principal.Where a part owner of a machine, having authority to dispose of the property, sold it for a note, and thereafter purchased the machine for himself from the mak. ers of the note, surrendering the note to them, they were not liable to the co-owner for his interest, his remedy being against the selling owner.-CLINE V. STRADLEE, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 272.

92. RAILROAD COMPANY-Abandonment of Track.Under Rev. St. Ohio, § 3272, providing that a railroad company shall make no change in its road or terminal which will involve the abandonment of the road, either partly or completely constructed, where a com. pany, under its resolution for building a branch line, had a discretion as to the place where it should fix the terminus, and, after bullding its track to certain mines, established the terminal station a mile or so from the end of such track, that part of the track beyond the station is not a part of its line of road to which the statute applies, but is simply a spur or switch track.MERCANTILE TRUST Co. v. COLUMBUS, S. & H. R. Co., U. S. C. C., S. D. (Ohio), 90 Fed. Rep. 148.

93. RAILROAD COMPANY-Consolidation or Merger.A provision in a charter authorizing a railroad company to consolidate with other railroad companies "on such terms as they may agree on" must be construed as meaning such terms as are consistent with the law as announced in their charters and otherwise.-ADAMS V. YAZOO & M. V. R. Co., Miss., 24 South. Rep. 200.

94. RAILROAD COMPANY-Foreclosure Suits.-Upon a petition of intervention, in a suit to foreclose a rail. road mortgage, by one claiming a prior vendor's lien on a portion of the right of way of the road, the court

may, if it sustains the claim for a lien, in order to pre. vent a dismemberment of the road by a sale of such portion, order the amount found due the claimant paid by the receiver from the earnings of the road, or, if necessary, from the proceeds of the entire road when sold, or, as a last resort, it may decree the separate sale of the portion covered by the lien.-WHEELING BRIDGE & TERMINAL RY. Co. v. REYMANN BREWING Co., U. S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 189.

95. RAILROAD COMPANY-Preferred Claims in Insolv. ency. A claim against a railroad for car rentals or mileage accruing prior to a receivership is not entitled to payment as a preferential debt.-GRAND TRUNK RY. Co. v. CENTRAL VERMONT R. Co., U. S. C. C., D. (Vt.), 90 Fed. Rep. 163.

96. RAILROAD COMPANY-Street Railroads-Contribu tory Negligence.-A person who stepped off facing the rear of a street car, which started too quickly, and injured her, is not guilty of contributory negligence, if when she started to take the last step the car was not moving.-MORRISON V. CHARLOTTE ELECTRIC RAILWAY, LIGHT & POWER CO., N. Car., 31 8. E. Rep. 720.

97. RECEIVERS-Set-off.-Where a receiver of an estate pending litigation over real property collected rent thereon from the occupant, who was by the final decree adjudged to be the owner of one-half the prop. erty, the rent collected upon such half did not become a part of the estate, but remained the property of the real owner; and he may set-off the same against a claim for rent subsequently due from him to the receiver upon the other half of the property.-GRANT V. BUCKNER, U. S. S. C., 10 S. C. Rep. 163.

98. RECEIVERS-Taxes-Sales.-Under Horner's Rev. St. 1897, § 6436, providing that where a receiver neglects to pay taxes on property he may be cited to show cause why such taxes, with penalty, should not be paid, it was a "good and sufficient cause" that the receiver had sold the property, which was realty, by the court's order and approval, and that the purchaser had taken it subject to taxes.-STETSON V. ROCHESTER SHOE CO., Ind., 52 N. E. Rep. 149.

99. SALES-Retention of Title.-A wholesaler at various times shipped goods to a retailer, the bills being marked, "Consigned; our property until paid for." He knew that the latter mingled the goods with his regular stock and retailed them to customers. He placed no restrictions on such sales, and required no reports of sales, and no account of sales was kept, but part of the goods were paid for out of the general proceeds. Held, that he retained no title as against an assignee for benefit of creditors.-MAYER V. CATRON, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 255.

100. SHERIFFS-Bonds.-Exemplary damages cannot be recovered on a bond given, by order of court, by one appointed as temporary sheriff, to recompense the sheriff for "all damages and costs" he should sustain by reason of his being suspended from office on the bringing of an action to remove him, in case the causes for removal were found to be untrue or insufficient.MCMULIN V. ELLIS, Tex., 48 S. W. Rep. 217.

101. STATUTES-Enactment-Evidence.-While legis. lative journals, as public records, may be looked at for the purpose of ascertaining whether a statute, parts of which they affirmatively show were duly passed, was in reality enacted as a whole, yet, where the evidence of its non-enactment as a whole consists only of infer ences, though strong, derivable from silence and omis sions of statement from the journal, they cannot be held sufficient to overcome the presumptive evidence of the due enactment of the statute furnished by its enrollment, its attestation by the presiding officers of the two houses, and its approval by the governor.-IN RE TAYLOR, Kan., 55 Pac. Rep. 340.

102. STATUTE OF FRAUDS-Lands-Contracts.-A verbal promise to convey land at a certain time in the future is taken out of the statute of frauds where the donee takes possession and retains it until such time, and

makes valuable improvements.-GAINES V. KENDALL, Ill., 52 N. E. Rep. 141.

103. TAXATION-Collection of County Taxes.-Under Ky. St. § 1729, allowing the sheriff, for collecting the county revenue, 10 per cent. on the first $5,000, and 4 per cent. upon the residue, the county taxes cannot be classified according to the different sources from which they are collected, and the sheriff allowed 10 per cent. on the first $5,000 collected of each class.-PENDLETON COUNTY V. MCMILLAN, Ky., 48 S. W. Rep. 154.

104. TAXATION-Erroneous Listing of Property.-The action of the cashier of a national bank in giving in to the officers of the city for taxation against the bank a number of the shares of its stock, taxable under the laws of the State to the stockholders, does not estop a receiver subsequently appointed for the bank, but before the tax is paid, from setting up the mistake.CITY OF WILMINGTON V. RICAUD, U. S. C. C. of App., Fourth Circuit, 90 Fed. Rep. 214.

105. TRUSTS-Change of Securities.-Where one holdIng as trustee securities owned by another exchanges them for other securities, without authority from the owner, and without the investment of any funds of his own, the owner has his election either to take the substituted securities received by the trustee, or to recover the value of his own securities which were given in exchange.-WOODRUM V. WASHINGTON NAT. BANK, Kan., 55 Pac. Rep. 333.

106. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Alienation of Land by Heir.-The sale of land by executory contract is an alienation thereof, within Ky. St. § 2087, which provides that the estate aliened by an heir before suit brought to subject it to the ancestor's debts shall not be liable to the creditors, in the hands of a bona fide purchaser, unless action is instituted within six months after the estate is descended.-PARKS V. SMOOT'S ADMRS., Ky., 48 S. W. Rep. 46.

107. VENDOR AND PURCHASER-Assumption of Mort gage.-A vendee assumed a mortgage against the property, but gave his note for the full purchase price, and afterwards filed a bill, and had such note canceled to the amount of the mortgage, and gave his note for the amount to the mortgagee instead. The note recited that it was a purchase-money note. Held, that such note did not create a vendor's lien against the land.-ALLEN V. NEWTON, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 283.

108. WILLS-Charities-Bequests.-Bequests of speci fied sums were made to "the trustees of" two named churches, to build a parsonage for each of the pastors in charge. There were certain persons in the community known as such "trustees," and they were well known to the testatrix as such. Held, that the be quests were to them as individuals, and not in a body, in trust for the purpose named, and were valid though the trustees were not incorporated.-SHEETS V. HARDIN, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 267.

109. WILLS-Devises-Remainders.-The rule that a devise of a remainder to the children of a life tenant inures to the benefit of the children surviving the life tenant, to the exclusion of the heirs of a deceased child, is not changed by Mill. & V. Code, § 2812, making the use of the word "heirs" unnecessary in conveying a fee, and section 3035, making a will to take effect as though it was executed immediately before testator's death.-NEAL V. HODGES, Tenn., 48 S. W. Rep. 263.

110. WILLS-Rule in Shelley's Case.-Testatrix provided that her estate should be converted into money and divided equally among her children, share and share alike; but directed that her daughters' shares be placed in the hands of her son, as trustee, and that he should hold the same during the life of each one, respectively, and pay each of them the yearly profit dur ing the life of each, and to their individual heirs after the death of each; and appointed her son executor to execute the will as he might deem best. Held, that the devise did not vest in each daughter the absolute title to her portion, and gave her no power of testamentary disposition thereof.-HOOKER V. MONTAGUE, N. Car., 31 8. E. Rep. 705.

Central Law Journal.

ST. LOUIS, MO., FEBRUARY 3, 1899.

The Supreme Court of Illinois, some time ago, was called upon to apply a statute of Kansas governing the liability of stockholders of corporations, in a suit to enforce same, instituted in the State of Illinois. In that case the Illinois court ruled in effect that the provision of the Kansas constitution regarding corporations is not self executing, but that legislation is required for its proper enforcement. This was the case of Tuttle v. National Bank of Republic, 161 Ill. 497. In a case just decided-Bell v. Farwell,-involving a somewhat similar question, an effort was made to induce the court to reverse its ruling, but without effect, the court in terms adhering to its former decision and holding that the liability imposed upon stockholders by the constitution and statute of Kansas, is not penal in its nature; hence, in the construction of contracts, and in ascertaining their validity, the law of the country where the contract was made or is to be performed, must in general govern, and this court will enforce the construction of the foreign statute adopted by the highest court of its State, although it might find that on similar language in our own State, it would place a different or even reverse construction, that although the liability of a Kansas stockholder to the corporate creditors is imposed by statute, yet it is one arising out of contract, since the charter provides that the stockholders shall be liable to creditors individually.

Under the declaration in the case upon the facts, which were admitted by demurrer, it appears that, according to the law of Kansas, the stockholder is liable to the judgment creditors of the corporation, as upon a contract which is suable everywhere, and the facts alleged in this respect are different from those in any case heretofore presented to this court. The Illinois court points out the distinction between the case at bar and Tuttle v. National Bank of Republic, supra, and states that had the statutes set up in the case at bar, and their construction by the Kansas Supreme Court, been before the Supreme Court of Illinois, in the Tuttle case, a different result might have been reached on the question of remedy; nor does the rule estab

lished in Young v. Farwell, 139 Ill. 326, and Patterson v. Lynde, 112 Ill. 196, apply to this case, as stated in the declaration. They also hold that a resort to a court of equity in the State of Kansas is not required before bringing an action to enforce the individual liability of the stockholder, as it is not to the corporation, nor to all its creditors, but to each individual creditor, from each individual stockholder, not joint, but several.

V.

Efforts have been made in various of the States to enact statutes, having for their object, the prevention of lynch law. A statute of that kind was adopted in Ohio in effect giving the next of kin of a person killed by a mob, the right to recover $5,000 from the county. The first court to consider the validity of this statute declared it unconstitutional. Caldwell v. Cuyahoga County, 15 Ohio C. C. 167, affirming 4 Ohio N. P. 249, on the ground that it taxes the county for purely private interests. In Mitchell Champaign County, 5 Ohio N. P. 158, the court of common pleas again held the statute unconstitutional on the ground that it denied due process of law and the right of trial by jury. But this latter decision is now reversed by the circuit court which holds the act valid on the ground that its main purpose is not to give a recovery to private persons, but to impose a penalty on the county which is given to the next of kin, not because they are damaged but because the legislature sees fit thus to dispose of the penalty. "Whether or not" says Judge Wilson, in the course of a well reasoned opinion "the statute is subject to any of these constitutional infirmities depends upon the purpose intended to be subserved by its enactment. If it simply undertakes to give to private persons a right to recover for the pecuniary injury they may suf. fer by reason of the death of a relative from mob violence, the statute fixing the amount of the recovery, and that being the sole purpose of the statute, it would be the exercise of judicial power, for that it determines without the intervention of a jury the extent of the injury and the amount in damages; and it would be open to the other objections as well. If, however, it be not the main purpose of the act to give the right and fix the amount of recovery to a private person in such case, but rather to assess a fine upon and collect a penalty from a community which has

failed to prevent mob violence, it subserves a public purpose-the preservation and protection of life and property, to which end all laws are enacted-and would be an exercise of the police power of the government, not the judicial.

"Legislation of this nature, whether it fixes a right to recover for the destruction of property or injury to the person or for the death of a person occasioned by a mob, is not enacted for the sole purpose of giving to a party the right to recover his damages, but is primarily the assessment of a fine upon a political subdivision of the State, such as a county, for its failure in the exercise of the duties of good citizenship to prevent riot and suppress mob violence. The object of the statute in question is to subserve such public end, and is the exercise of the police power of the government, which is wholly within the province of the legislature. The amount fixed by the statute as being recoverable by the administrator of the deceased party for the next of kin is not damages, but a penalty, the extent of which the legislature, in its wisdom, may determine. There is no occasion for an inquiry of damages. It must be presumed that the legislature has fixed upon such amount as it deemed sufficient to make the citizens in every community active and vigilant in the enforcement of the law and in the detection and prevention of crime. Under the right provided for the recovery of damages for death caused by negligence the rule is different. In such cases there is reason for an in'quiry of damages. The parties can recover only to the extent of their pecuniary injury; but under this statute a fixed amount is made payable to the next of kin, regardless of whether they are pecuniarily injured or not. It is not because they are damaged that they receive it, but because this penalty, which the statute places upon the community, must be disposed of in some way, and the legislature has seen fit to cast it upon the next of kin."

or any other court of appeals under the bankrupt law of 1898. The court construes the sections of the bankrupt law as to what debts are to have priority and also in relation to wages due workmen. The court also states when it has jurisdiction on appeal in bankrupt cases, and when in equity. The following is from the opinion: "It is this direction for the payment of labor claims in priority to the general creditors that is asked to be reviewed here as a question of law. "The bankrupt law, chapter 7, section 64b, provides that "The debts to have priority, except as herein provided, and to be paid in full out of the bankrupt's estate, and the order of payment shall be (4) wages due to workmen, clerks or servants which have been earned within three months before the date of the commencement of proceedings, not to exceed $300 to each claimant. Debts owing to any person who by the laws of the States, or of the United States, is entitled to priority.'

(5)

"The laws of the State of Illinois with respect to voluntary assignments provides, Rev. St. Ill.. 1898, chapter 10, section 6, page 172: That all claims for the wages of any laborer or servant, which have been earned within the term of three months next preceding the making of such assignment, and which have been filed within said term of three months after such assignment, and to which no exception has been made, or to which exception has been made and the same having been adjudicated and settled by the court, shall, after the payment of the costs, commissions and expenses of assignment, be preferred, and first paid to the exclusion of all other demands and claims.'

"By chapter 38 A, Rev. St. Ill., 1898, page 629, it is provided "That hereafter, when the business of any person, corporation, company or firm shall be suspended by the action of creditors, or be put into the hands of a receiver or trustee, then in all such cases the debts owing to laborers and servants which have accrued by reason of their labor or employment, shall be considered and treated as preferred claims, and such laborers or employees shall be preferred creditors, and shall be first paid in full, and if there be not sufficient to pay them in full the same shall be paid from the proceeds of the sale of the property seized.'

"It is preliminarily insisted by the labor claimants, the respondents here, that this court cannot entertain jurisdiction of the matter for the reason that no claim allowed amounted to the sum of $500 or over, and that the petitioners, the general creditors, cannot accumulate several claims which shall aggregate over $500, and thereby confer jurisdiction upon this court. The latter proposition is doubtless true; but we think that the contention that this court is without jurisdiction is made in misapprehension of the statute. The bankrupt act, section 24, invests the Circuit Courts of Appeals with appellate jurisdic tion of controversies arising in bankruptcy proceedings, and section 25 provides that an appeal