ACTIONS ON BILLS OF EXCHANGE.
A suit may be brought against the drawer and endorser of a bill of exchange
on its non-acceptance. The undertaking of the drawer and endorser is,
that the drawer shall accept and pay; and the liability of the drawer only
attaches when the drawer refuses to accept, or having accepted refuses to
pay. A refusal to accept is, then, a breach of the contract, upon the hap-
pening of which a right of action instantly accrues to the payee to recover
from the drawer the value expressed in the bill, that being the considera-
tion the payee gave for it. Such also is the undertaking of an endorser,
before the bill is presented for non-acceptance, he being in fact a new
drawer of the same bill, upon the terms expressed on the face of it. Evans
v. Gee. 80.
The admiralty has no jurisdiction in matters of account, between part owners.
The Steamboat Orleans v. Phabus. 175.
The master, even in a case of maritime services, has no lien upon the vessel for
the payment of them. Ibid.
The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty in cases of part owners, having unequal
interests and shares, is not, and never has been, applied to direct a sale
upon any dispute between them as to the trade and navigation of the ship
engaged in maritime voyages, properly so called. The majority of the
owners have a right to employ the ship, on such voyages as they please;
giving a stipulation to the dissenting owners for the safe return of the ship,
if the latter, upon a proper libel filed in the admiralty, require it: and the
minority of the owners may employ the ship in the like manner, if the ma-
jority decline to employ her at all. Ibid.
The admiralty has no jurisdiction over a vessel not engaged in maritime trade
and navigation; though on her voyages she may have touched at one ter-
minus of them in tide water, her employment having been substantially on
other waters. The true test of its jurisdiction in all cases of this sort, is,
whether the vessel is engaged, substantially, in maritime navigation, or in
interior navigation and trade, not on tide waters.
The jurisdiction of courts of admiralty is limited, in matters of contract, to those
and those only, which are maritime. Ibid.
Contracts for the navigation of steamboats, employed substantially on other
than tide waters, or in interior navigation and trade, are not the subjects
of admiralty jurisdiction. Ibid.
ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION.
The master's wages are not a lien upon the vessel. The Steamboat Orleans v.
Phabus. 175.
It is very irregular, and against the known principles of courts of admiralty, to
allow in a libel, in rem, and, quasi, for possession, the introduction of any
other matters of an entirely different character; such as an account of the
vessel's earnings, or the claim of the part owner for his wages and advances
as master. The Steamboat Orleans v. Phabus. 175.
ADVERSE POSSESSION OF LAND.
1. It is well settled that to constitute an adverse possession of land, there need
not be a fence, a building, or other improvements made; it suffices for this
purpose, that visible notorious acts are exercised on the premises in con-
troversy, for twenty-one years, after an entry under a claim and colour of
title. Lessee of Ewing v. Burnett. 41.
2. Where acts of ownership have been done upon land, which from their na-
ture indicate a notorious claim of property in it, and are continued for
twenty-one years, with a knowledge of an adverse claimant, without inter-
ruption or an adverse entry by him, for twenty-one years; such acts are evi-
dence of an ouster of a former owner, and of an actual adverse possession
against him; if the jury shall think the property was not susceptible of a
more strict and definite possession than had been held. Ibid.
3. Neither actual occupation or cultivation are necessary to constitute actual
possession, when the property is so situated as not to admit of any perma-
nent useful improvement; and the continued claim of the party has been
evidenced by public acts of ownership; such as he would exercise over
property which he claimed in his own right, and could not exercise over
property which he did not claim. Ibid.
4. An adverse possession for twenty-one years, under claim or colour of title,
merely void, is a bar to a recovery under an elder title by deed, although
the adverse holder may have had notice of this deed. Ibid.
1. Louisiana. L. conveyed, in 1822, in fee simple, to F. and S. certain real
estate in New Orleans, by deed, for a sum of money paid to him; and took
from them a counter-letter, signed by them; by which it was agreed that on
the payment of a sum stated in it, on a day stated, the property should be
reconveyed by them to L., and if not so paid, the property should be sold
by an auctioneer; and after repaying, out of the proceeds, the sum men-
tioned in the counter-letter, the balance should be paid to L. The money
was not paid on the day appointed, and a further time was given for its
payment, with additional interest and charges; and if not paid at the ex-
piration of the time it should be sold by an auctioneer. An agreement was
at the same time made by L. that the counter-letter should be delivered up
to F. and S. and cancelled. The money not being paid it was again agreed
between the parties, that if on a subsequent day fixed upon, it should not,
with an additional amount for interest, &c. be paid, the property should
belong absolutely to F. and S. The money was not paid, and F. and S.
afterwards held the property as their own. The Court held this transac-
tion to be an antichresis, according to the civil code of Louisiana: and on
a bill filed in the District Court of the United States for the Eastern Dis-
trict of Louisiana, in 1832, decreed that the rents and profits of the estate
should be accounted for by S. who had become the sole owner of the pro-
perty by purchase of F.'s moiety, and that the property should be sold by
an auctioneer; unless the balance due S., after charging the sum due at the
time last agreed upon for the payment of the money, and legal interest,
with all the expenses of the estate, deducting the rents and profits, should
be paid to S.; and on payment of the balance due S. the residue should be
paid to the legal representative of L. Livingston v. Story. 351.
2. Under the law of Louisiana there are two kinds of pledges; the pawn, and
the antichresis. A thing is said to be pawned, when a movable is given as
a security the antichresis is when the security given consists in immova-
bles. Ibid.
3. The antichresis must be reduced to writing. The creditor acquires by this
contract the right of reaping the fruits or other rewards of the immovables
given to him in pledge; on condition of deducting, annually, their proceeds
from the interest, if any be due to him, and afterwards from the principal of
his debt. The creditor is bound, unless the contrary is agreed on, to pay
the taxes, as well as the annual charges of the property given to him in
pledge. He is likewise bound, under the penalty of damages, to provide
for the keeping and necessary repairs of the pledged estate; and may lay
out, from the revenues of the estate, sufficient for such expenses. Ibid.
4. The creditor does not become proprietor of the pledged immovables, by the
failure of payment at the stated time; any clause to the contrary is null:
and in that case, it is only lawful for him to sue his debtor before the court
in order to obtain a sentence against him, and to cause the objects which
have been put into his hands to be seized and sold. Abid.
5. The debtor cannot before the full payment of his debt, claim the enjoyment
of the immovables which he has given in pledge; but the creditor, who
wishes to free himself from the obligations under the antichresis, may al-
ways, unless he has renounced this right, compel the debtor to retake the
enjoyment of his immovables. Ibid.
6. The doctrine of prescription, under the civil law, does not apply to this case,
which is one of pledge; and if it does, the time before the institution of
this suit had not elapsed, in which, by the law of Louisiana, a person may
sue for immovable property. Ibid.
7. By the contract of antichresis the possession of the property is transferred to
the person advancing the money. In case of failure to pay, the property is
to be sold by judicial process; and the sum which it may bring, over the
amount for what it was pledged, is to be paid to the person making the
pledge. Ibid.
1. No appeal lies from the decree of a district judge of the United States, on a
petition presented by the defendant under the second section of the "act
providing for the better organization of the treasury department;" where an
order had issued by the solicitor of the treasury to the marshal of the United
States, and the property of an alleged debtor, the petitioner, had been
seized and was about to be sold to satisfy the alleged debt. No appeal by
the government is authorized by the act, and the general law giving ap-
peals does not embrace the case. The United States v. Cox. 162.
2. The law is the same where an appeal was taken from the district judge to
the circuit court, and an appeal taken thence to the Supreme Court; and
where an appeal was taken to the Supreme Court, from the district judge
of Louisiana, having the powers of a circuit court. Ibid
3. The case of the United States v. Nourse, cited and confirmed. Ibid.
4. The act of congress gives to the district judge a special jurisdiction, which
he may exercise at his discretion, while holding the district court, or at
any other time. Ordinarily, as district judge, he has no chancery powers;
but in proceeding under this statute he is governed by the rules of chan-
cery, which apply to injunctions, except as to the answer of the govern-
ment. Ibid.
ACTS OF CONGRESS RELATIVE TO THE SLAVE
TRADE.
Certain persons, who were slaves in the state of Louisiana, were, by their
owners, taken to France as servants; and after some time, were by their
own consent, sent back to New Orleans; some of them under declarations
from their proprietors that they should be free; and one of them, after her
arrival, was held as a slave. The ships in which these persons were pas-
sengers, were, after arrival in New Orleans, libelled for alleged breaches
of the act of congress. of April 20th, 1818, prohibiting the importation of
slaves into the United States. Held, that the provisions of the act of con-
gress do not apply to such cases. The object of the law was to put an end
to the slave trade, and to prevent the introduction of slaves from foreign
countries. The language of the statute cannot properly be applied to per-
sons of colour, who were domiciled in the United States, and who are
brought back to their place of residence, after their temporary absence.
The United States v. The Garonne. 73. Same v. The Fortune. 73.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. An action may be maintained on a promissory note drawn in favour of M'M.
and F. in the name of M'M., F. having no interest in the note; the same
having been given to M'M. by F., on the dissolution of a partnership which
had existed between M'M. and F. for M'M.'s share of the partnership pro-
perty. Although the drawers of the note and F. were citizens of Louisiana,
a suit on the note was properly brought in the United States' court of
Louisiana, by M'M., who at the time the note was given, and the suit was
brought, was a citizen of Ohio. M'Micken v. Webb et al. 25.
2. Jurisdiction of the circuit and district courts of the United States. 1, 2.
3. An endorsement, in blank, on a promissory note authorizes the filling it up,
either before or after action brought, with the name of the party for whose
use the suit may be brought; and if the holder, though the indorsee, is a
citizen of another state, he may sue on the note in the courts of the United
States, although the drawer and drawee of the note were citizens of the
same state, and not of the state of which the plaintiff is a citizen. Evans
v. Gee. 80.
4. The bona fide holder of a bill of exchange has a right to write over a blank
endorsement directing to whom the bill shall be paid, at any time before or
after the institution of a suit. This is the settled doctrine in the English
and American courts; and the holder, by writing such direction over a
blank endorsement ordering the money to be paid to a particular person,
does not become an endorser. Ibid.
5. A suit may be brought against the drawer and endorser of a bill of exchange,
on its non-acceptance. The undertaking of the drawer and endorser is,
that the drawer will accept and pay; and the liability of the drawer only
attaches, when the drawee refuses to accept, or having accepted, fails to
pay. A refusal to accept is then a breach of the contract, upon the hap-
pening of which a right of action instantly accrues to the payee, to recover
from the drawer the value expressed in the bill; that being the considera.
tion the payee gave for it. Such also is the undertaking of an endorser
before the bill has been presented for acceptance, he being, in fact, a new
drawer of the same bill upon the terms expressed on the face of it. Ibid.
1. The terms, bills of credit, in their mercantile sense, comprehend a great va-
riety of evidences of debt, which circulate in a commercial country. In
the early history of banks, it seems their notes were generally denominated
"bills of credit," but in modern times they have lost that designation, and
are either called bank bills, or bank notes. But the inhibitions of the con-
stitution, apply to bills of credit; in a limited sense, Briscoe et al. v. The
Bank of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. 258.
2. The definition of a bill of credit, which includes all classes of bills of credit
emitted by the colonies or states, is a paper issued by the sovereign power,
containing a pledge of its faith, and designing to circulate as money. Ibid.
3. A state cannot emit bills of credit, or, in other words, it cannot issue that de-
scription of paper, to answer the purposes of currency, which was denomi
nated, before the adoption of the constitution, bills of credit. But a state
may grant acts of incorporation for the attainment of those objects, which
are essential to the interests of society. This power is incident to sove-
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