with the debtor's consent, and even without his consent a partial assignment may be enforced in equity if the other persons interested are brought in as parties to the suit.'

"Fourth Street Bank v. Yardley, 165 U. S. 634, 644 [41 L. Ed. 855, 17 Sup. Ct. Rep. 439, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes] was a suit on an assignment of a part of a bank account. It was there held 'That the owner of a chose in action or of property in the custody of another may assign a part of such rights, and that an assignment of this nature, if made, will be enforced in equity, is also the settled doctrine of this court. (Trist v. Child, 21 Wall. 441, 447 [22 L. Ed. 623, see, also, Rose's U. S. Notes]; Peugh v. Porter, 112 U. S. 737, 742 [28 L. Ed. 859, 5 Sup. Ct. Rep. 361].)' "In Chambers v. Lancaster, 160 N. Y. 342 [54 N. E. 707], a contractor subcontracted with another to furnish machinery for a third party, assigning to the subcontractor the right to collect the portion of the contractor's fee which he was to receive upon delivery of the machinery. The action was brought to collect that amount. In considering an objection that certain testimony was erroneously admitted, the court said: "This testimony only bore upon the question of plaintiff's right to recover that which was but a part of an entire cause of action. This the defendant company insists the plaintiff cannot do. Such was formerly the rule, but it has long been settled in this state that a valid assignment of a part of an entire debt or obligation can be made, and since the decision of this court in Risley v. Phenix Bank of New York, 83 N. Y. 318 [38 Am. Rep. 421], the right of an assignee to bring suit on the equity side of the court, making the assignor, as well as the debtor, a party, has been frequently resorted to, and is supported by the decision in Risley's case, the court saying: "The tendency of modern decisions is in the direction of more fully protecting the equitable rights of assignees of choses in action, and the objection that to allow an assignment of part of an entire claim might subject the creditor to several actions to enforce a single obligation, has much less force under a system which requires all parties in interest to be joined as parties to the action.'"'

"National Exchange Bank v. McLoon, 73 Me. 498 [40 Am. Rep. 388], was a case where a person who was entitled to certain property in the hands of trustees as adminis

trators, assigned an amount equal to what he thought was all of such property to creditors. It later appeared the property held for him exceeded the amount assigned, and other creditors trustced the administrators. In holding that the assignees might recover their portion of the money, the court said: 'In a court of equity, however, the objections to a partial assignment of a demand which are formidable in a court of law, disappear. In equity, the interests of all parties can be determined in a single suit. The debtor can bring the entire fund into court, and run no risks as to its proper distribution. . .

"The debtor is not the only party whose interests should be considered. There is as much natural equity, in many cases, in protecting an assignment of a part of a claim as an assignment of the whole of it. Equitable assignments are the outgrowth of the requirements and refinements of the present business era. In many ways, directly and indirectly, do circumstances create assignments of parts of funds, in dealings through servants, tenants, consignees, bankers and other agencies.'

"In Grain v. Aldrich, 38 Cal. 514 [99 Am. Dec. 423], the plaintiff sued to recover part of an entire debt, without joining his assignor. The court said: 'Legal and equitable relief are administered in the same forum, and according to the same general plan. A party cannot be sent out of court, merely because his facts do not entitle him to relief at law, or merely because he is not entitled to relief in equity, as the case may be. He can be sent out of court only when, upon his facts, he is entitled to no relief, either at law or in equity. . . . Under the English practice, a court of equity would not grant the plaintiffs relief, as the case now stands; not, however, upon the ground that the facts do not entitle him to it, but because all of the parties interested in the subject-matter are not before the court. . Under our system of practice, then, the real objection in this case is not a want of facts, but a want of parties. The defendants are entitled, if they so desire, to have all the parties having an interest in the subject-matter before the court, in order that its judgment shall be a final determination of the whole matter, and leave nothing to be done by piecemeal.'

190 Cal.-18

[2] "From these cases it follows that appellant was not required to ask for a recovery of the whole amount of the note. It was sufficient for him to join respondents E. R. Dudley and B. B. Dudley, the owners of the remainder of the obligation, as parties defendant. Once joined, it devolved upon them, as prayed in the complaint, to set up any claim they had in the subject matter, the execution of the note and appellant's claim having already been set forth. The rights of all the parties could then be settled in the one action. It would have been necessary for appellant to have joined these respondents if he had sued for the entire amount, and the final judgment would have been the same in such a case as in this one, where they themselves can ask for such relief as they may desire. An entirely different situation is presented here, where these parties are joined, and can defend their rights in the subject-matter in the one action, than in the ordinary case of splitting a cause of action, where one person sues to recover part of his claim in one action, and later brings a second action to recover the remainder. Even in such a case, the defendant's objection would not be to the circumstance that the plaintiff brings the first suit for a less amount than is due, but that a second action is brought to recover the balance. (Paladini v. Municipal Markets Co., 185 Cal. 672 [200 Pac. 415]; Smith v. Vandalia Railroad Co., 188 Ill. App. 426, 429.)

"Respondents have cited several authorities in support of their position, but in our opinion none of them is authority for their contention. The first of these is Nightingale v. Scannell, 6 Cal. 506 [65 Am. Dec. 525], wherein the question was presented whether or not in an action by one partner to recover damages for a trespass against partnership property, a partner joined as a defendant because he refused to join as a plaintiff could testify in the action. It was said that since in such a case 'the recovery must be entire for the whole injury' and 'the whole cause of action must be determined in one' and 'the partner recovering is liable to account to his copartner defendant,' the latter is 'interested immediately in the event of the suit, and is not therefore a competent witness for plaintiff.' But in that case the plaintiff was seeking to recover for an injury to the partnership property, on behalf of the partnership. As far as he was concerned personally, he only sought damages to the amount

of his interest in the goods, and there was no objection to his recovering that amount. In Thomas v. Rock Island G. and S. Mining Co., 54 Cal. 578, an assignee of one-half a judgment sued to set aside an order and entry of satisfaction, and for a judgment for his interest in the first judg ment. It was held such an action could not be maintained without the express agreement or distinct ratification of the judgment debtor, but it did not appear there that the judgment creditor had been joined as a party to the suit. Clancy v. Plover, 107 Cal. 272 [40 Pac. 394], involved the right of an assignor to recover what was due to him under a mechanic's lien after a subcontractor as an assignee had already recovered from the debtor the portion due him, the subcontractor not having joined the assignor in the first suit. That case is, therefore, not authority here, and it clearly appears from that case that the assignee in the previous action had been allowed to recover a part of the total amount due.

[3] "Respondents in this connection contend appellant has never properly joined respondents E. R. Dudley and B. B. Dudley as parties defendant under section 382 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that 'if the consent of anyone who should have been joined as plaintiff cannot be obtained, he may be made a defendant, the reason thereof being stated in the complaint.' Respondents E. R. Dudley and B. B. Dudley in their answer denied they had been requested to join as plaintiffs, and it is insisted on behalf of all the respondents that the evidence showed clearly that they had not been requested and never refused to so join. As far as the respondents other than E. R. Dudley and B. B. Dudley are concerned, it is sufficient if the two latter respondents are made parties in some capacity, so that their rights may be determined in this action. (In Patten v. Pepper Hotel Co., 153 Cal. 460 [96 Pac. 296], the junior pledgee of a promissory note, secured by a mortgage, commenced an action to foreclose the mortgage. The senior pledgee was made a party. The defendant demurred on the ground of defect of parties, in that there was no allegation that the senior pledgee had refused to join as plaintiff. It was said in that case that 'All those, therefore, who were interested in enforcing the lien of the mortgage, were before the court either as parties plaintiff or defendant. This was

all that the appellant, as successor in interest to the mort

gagor, could insist on. It was immaterial to the appellant,

as such successor, whether the bank as first assignee of the note and mortgage, was a party plaintiff or defendant. If the bank did not object, it did not lie with appellant as successor of the mortgagor to raise the question.' With reference to respondents E. R. Dudley and B. B. Dudley, they in their answer alleged the same facts concerning the execution of the note and mortgage as did appellant, and they asked for general relief. The matter of requesting a person to become a plaintiff before joining him as a defendant closely resembles that of serving a party with process, and may properly be governed by the same rules. It is unquestioned that where a defendant appears and asks some relief which can only be granted upon the hypothesis that the court has jurisdiction of the cause and of his person, it is a submission to the jurisdiction of the court as completely as if he had been regularly served with process, whether such an appearance, upon its terms, is limited to a special appearance or not (Security Loan etc. Co. v. Boston etc. Fruit Co., 126 Cal. 418 [58 Pac. 941, 59 Pac. 296]; Thompson v. Alford, 128 Cal. 227 [60 Pac. 686]), and when a party appears generally he is deemed to waive service of process. (Hibernia Savings and Loan Soc. v. Cochran, 141 Cal. 653 [75 Pac. 315].) Respondents E. R. Dudley and B. B. Dudley must, therefore, be deemed to have waived the request by their appearance in the action and prayer for affirmative relief. They are in no way prejudiced, for they are in a position to protect their rights fully as well by their cross-complaint as they would have been had they been joined as plaintiffs.

[4] As above stated, we are satisfied that the evidence sufficiently shows that the obligation of the corporation accrued before March 17, 1911. That a deed was received by the corporation before that time and that in consideration thereof a note was executed in the corporate name on behalf of the corporation by the president and secretary and indorsed by five of the directors is conceded. The only doubt as to the authority of the president and secretary to execute the note of March 7, 1911, on behalf of the corporation arises from the fact that no record was kept of the transaction at the meeting of the board of directors. Several wit