But, aside from this attitude, it is the well-settled law that one standing in loco parentis to those held out as members of his family is entitled to all the rights of a parent. (Whitaker v. Warren, 60 N. H. 20 [49 Am. Rep. 302].) He also incurs the same liability with respect to them that he is under to his own children. (Starkie v. Perry, 71 Cal. 495, 497 [12 Pac. 508]; Larsen v. Hansen, 74 Cal. 320, 322 [16 Pac. 5].) The relation being established, the reciprocal rights, duties, and obligations pertaining to it arise between them the same as if he was their natural father. (Eickhoff v. Sedalia etc. Ry. Co., 106 Mo. App. 541, 544 [80 S. W. 966]; 1 Schouler's Domestic Relations, 6th ed., secs. 686, 687.) We see no reason, therefore, why one standing in such relation may not voluntarily assume the liability imposed by the statute in the same manner and with like effect as though he were a natural father.

[2] It is next contended that the portion of section 24 of the Motor Vehicle Act under consideration is violative of section 24 of article IV of the state constitution, which provides that "every act shall embrace but one subject, which subject shall be embodied in its title." [3] All that is required in that connection is that the subject must be in some way indicated by the title of the act, or be logically germane to it, and included within its scope. (Pratt v. Browne, 135 Cal. 649, 653 [67 Pac. 1082].) As said in another case, there must be a reasonably intelligent reference to the subject to which the legislation of the act is addressed. (Estate of McPhee, 154 Cal. 385, 389 [97 Pac. 878].) Numerous provisions having one general object, fairly indicated by the title of the act, may be united. The general purpose of the statute being declared the details provided for its accomplishment will be regarded as necessary incidents. (Ex parte Liddell, 93 Cal. 633, 637 [29 Pac. 251].) The title of the Motor Vehicle Act declares that it is one enacted (among other things) "to regulate the use and operation of vehicles upon the public highways and elsewhere; . . . to provide for the licensing of persons operating motor vehicles; to prohibit certain persons from operating vehicles upon the public highways." The mere statement of appellant's objection is sufficient to refute it. While the provision declaring upon what terms and conditions minors

may be licensed to operate motor vehicles is not carried in the title, the subject is germane to the general subject there expressed, and forms a part of the comprehensive scheme provided. It is an appropriate method of effecting ⚫ one of the main objects of the law. (Robinson v. Kerrigan, 151 Cal. 40, 50 [121 Am. St. Rep. 90, 12 Ann. Cas. 829, 90 Pac. 129]; Pritchard v. Whitney Estate Co., 164 Cal. 564, 567 [129 Pac. 989].)

[4] Appellant's final contention is that the provision of the act is unconstitutional because it is unreasonable and discriminatory, and is not uniform and general in its application. The application of the law to minors in a class by themselves is not unreasonable or arbitrary. The argument that the law attempts to put into a class by themselves all minors, irrespective of their age, experience, ability to drive, or their financial responsibility, is one that should be presented to the legislative department and not to the courts. (In re Stork, 167 Cal. 294, 296 [139 Pac. 684].) While some minors are more apt at learning to run motor vehicles than others possibly more apt than many adults— the fact remains that they are minors. They are in position to be, and in a vast number of cases are, entrusted with the control and operation of motor vehicles upon the public highways. While an automobile is not, in and of itself, a dangerous machine, it may become such in the hands of a careless and indiscreet person. The statute prohibiting the operation of motor vehicles upon the public highways by minors, without their first having obtained licenses which can only be procured upon an assumption of liability for their negligence by parent or guardian, is in effect a determination by the legislature that minors have not that discretion and judgment which entitles them to unrestrained permission to operate such vehicles upon the public thoroughfares, freed from all parental liability for their negligence except in those cases where it can be established that they are acting as the agent or servant of the owner of the car causing an injury. (Daily v. Maxwell, 152 Mo. App. 415, 425 [133 S. W. 351].) The legislature no doubt had in mind the fact that the authorities are in accord in holding that, as a general rule, in an action based on the negligent running of an automobile the owner of the car who was not present at the infliction of the injury cannot be

held liable except it be shown that the person in charge not only was the agent or servant of the owner, but also was engaged at the time in the business of his service. (Daily v. Maxwell, supra; Bryant v. Pacific Elec. Ry. Co., 174 Cal. 737, 742 [164 Pac. 385].) In this state it is now firmly established, also, that in the absence of a statute creating a liability, the rule applies when the driver is a minor child, and the father is the owner of the car, and all courts recognize the general rule that a parent is not liable for the torts of his child. (Spence v. Fisher, 184 Cal. 209, 211, 212 [14 A. L. R. 1083, 193 Pac. 255].)

We may assume, also, that the law-making body was fully cognizant of another rule of law relating to the torts of minors, which is somewhat in the nature of an exception, and that is that a parent may become liable for an injury caused by the child where the parent's negligence made it possible for the child to cause the injury complained of, and probable that it would do so. (Schultz v. Morrison, 91 Misc. Rep. 248 [154 N. Y. Supp. 257, 258]; Hoverson v. Noker, 60 Wis. 511, 514 [50 Am. Rep. 381, 19 N. W. 382]; Chaddock v. Plummer, 88 Mich. 225 [26 Am. St. Rep. 283, 14 L. R. A. 675, 50 N. W. 135].) This liability is based upon the rules of negligence rather than on the relation of parent and child (Doran v. Thomsen, 76 N. J. L. 754, 760 [131 Am. St. Rep. 677, 19 L. R. A. (N. S.) 335, 71 Atl. 296]), and finds support in the direct relation of cause and effect. (Elmendorf v. Clark, 143 La. 971 [L. R. A. 1918F, 802, 79 South. 557].) In the case of an injury by an automobile, the liability rests not alone upon the fact of ownership, but upon the combined negligence of the driver in the operation of the automobile, and of the owner in entrusting the machine to an incompetent driver. (Berry on Automobiles, 2d ed., sec. 603; Parker v. Wilson, 179 Ala. 361, 371 [43 L. R. A. (N. S.) 87, 60 South. 150].)

The legislature has now declared that under a given state of facts a liability exists where none existed before. The right of action here provided for is, in effect, a modification of the common-law rule exempting a parent from liability for the torts of his minor child, joined with the other rule that a parent may become liable for an injury caused by the child, and made possible, and probable, through the parent's negligence. Its creation does no violence to the

190 Cal.-44

provision of the constitution (art. I, sec. 11) requiring general laws to have uniform operation, nor that (art. I, sec. 21) forbidding a grant of special privileges to one citizen, or class of citizens, which are not given on the same terms to all. (Pritchard v. Whitney, 164 Cal. 564, 568 [129 Pac. 989].)

The objection that the law attempts to create a liability on the part of a parent or guardian signing a minor's application, without regard to any inherent liability of such parent or guardian, and without regard to their negligence or fault, is answered by what we have already said. The statute involved in Daugherty v. Thomas, 174 Mich. 371 [Ann. Cas. 1915A, 1163, 45 L. R. A. (N. S.) 699, 140 N. W. 615], so strongly relied upon by the appellant, is not the same as the one here. The court there had under review an act of the legislature which made the owner of an automobile liable for any injury caused by the negligent operation of his car by any person who might obtain posses sion of it, even though it be without his consent or knowledge. In declaring such provision repugnant to the constitution, the court said, at page 379, it was not then dealing with "the question of the responsibility, be it moral or otherwise, of the owner of an automobile who has placed it in the hands of an irresponsible person to use."

The judgment is affirmed.

Lennon, J., Kerrigan, J., Lawlor, J., Seawell, J., Myers, J., and Wilbur, C. J., concurred.

[S. F. No. 10512. In Bank.-March 24, 1923.]

A. C. BAYLEY, Petitioner, v. E. F. GARRISON, as Auditor, etc., Respondent.

[1] PUBLIC OFFICERS-INCREASE OF PAY OF DEPUTY-CONSTITUTIONAL LAW. Increase of the pay of existing deputies of a public officer, during the term of the principal, in cases where the principal

Change of salary of deputy or other subordinate as violation of constitutional provision against change of salary of public officer during term of office, note, 37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 388,

at the commencement of his term was given a fixed salary and allowed deputies, also with fixed salaries, and all paid out of the county treasury, does not violate the provisions of section 9 of article XI of the state constitution, which prohibits the increase of the salary of an officer during his term.

PROCEEDING in Mandamus to compel the Auditor of Alameda County to audit demand demand for salary. Writ

granted.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
Fitzgerald, Abbott & Beardsley for Petitioner.

Ezra W. Decoto and Frank Mitchell, Jr., for Respondent.'

WILBUR, C. J.-This is an original proceeding in mandamus brought by a deputy in the office of the county clerk of Alameda County whose position existed before the county clerk took office on January 6, 1919, but whose compensation was increased by the legislature of 1921, during the term of the office of the county clerk. The point involved, as stated in the petitioner's points and authorities, is as follows: "His petition involves the question as to the right to increase the pay of existing deputies, during the term of the principal, in cases, where the principal at the commencement of his term was given a fixed salary and allowed deputies, also with fixed salaries, and all paid out of the county treasury."

That question was determined in favor of the petitioner's contention in the case of Harrold v. Barnum, 8 Cal. App. 21 [96 Pac. 104]. In addition to the authorities cited in that opinion in support of the view there expressed the following cases may be cited: Board of Commrs. of Muskogee County v. Hart, 29 Okl. 693 [37 L. R. A. (N. S.) 388, 119 Pac. 132]; State v. Oklahoma City, 38 Okl. 349 [134 Pac. 58]; State ex rel. Rumbold v. Gordon, 238 Mo. 168 [Ann. Cas. 1913A, 312, 142 S. W. 315]; Bowers v. City of Albuquerque, 27 N. M. 291 [200 Pac. 421]; Stone v. State, 18 Ala. App. 228 [89 South. 824]; Quernheim v. Asselmeier, 296 Ill. 494 [129 N. E. 828]; People v. Stong, 67 Colo. 599 [189 Pac. 27]; Hibbard v. Suffolk County, 163 Mass. 34 [39 N. W. 285].