DEDICATION (Continued). ments containing the statement that the property has been so reserved and the erection of slight improvements thereon to fit it for public use constitutes additional evidence of the intention.— Phillips v. Laguna Beach Co., 180. 2. ACCEPTANCE OF OFFER - EVIDENCE. — An acceptance in pais of property offered for dedication for park purposes is sufficiently shown by entry and use by the public for camping purposes, parking of automobiles, eating of lunches and viewing the ocean on which the property fronted, since a park does not have to be laid off in paths or planted with flowers, but it may be merely an open space which the public may use for any purpose it sees fit of a public nature.-Id. 3. INVALIDITY AS TO DEED OF TRUST. ABSENCE OF EVIDENCE OF DEDICATION. An offer of dedication of property for park purposes and acceptance by user cannot be claimed against the trustee and beneficiary under a deed of trust given to secure a loan to the dedicator, where there was nothing of record to impart notice of dedication and no evidence of public use appeared on a visit to the premises. Id. See Public Utilities, 6. DEEDS. 1. DELIVERY-FINDINGS - EVIDENCE-INTERPLEADER.—In an action of interpleader by a vendee to have determined whether payments under a contract of purchase of real property should be made to an alleged grantee of the vendor or to the administrator of the vendor's estate, the finding of the trial court that there was a valid delivery of a deed to the property in question from the vendor to said grantee, who was a niece of said vendor, was sufficiently supported, where the conveyancer, who drew the deed. testified that the vendor came to his office and said "she wanted to convey that property" to her niece "and that she wanted me to hold that deed as custodian, and at her death instructed me to deliver it to" her niece, that he told her that to make a legal delivery she should leave the deed with him unconditionally, as the lawyers put it, "without any strings to it," and that after this explanation he prepared the deed which the vendor signed and acknowledged and delivered to him, and that he placed it in his deposit box, in which place it remained until the death of the vendor, and where it was also shown that the execution and delivery of the deed was a very natural disposition of the vendor's property, and that, according to the vendor's own statements, she wanted her niece and the latter's husband to have everything she possessed.-DeCou v. Howell, 741. 2. EVIDENCE-MOTION TO STRIKE OUT-FAILURE OF COURT TO RULEABSENCE OF ERROR.-In such action, where the conveyancer, in DEEDS (Continued). reply to an interrogatory as to what he said to the grantor by way of instructing her as to the method of conveying title by deed to be held in escrow, answered: "That in order to make a legal delivery she should leave it with me unconditionally, as lawyers put it, 'without any strings to it,'" and counsel moved "to strike that out unless it is understood that he [witness] said the words, 'without any strings to it,'" the failure of the trial court to rule upon the motion did not constitute error, for the reasons, first, that the witness used the words "no strings to it" in the conversation with the grantor which he was then relating; second, if counsel regarded the language as uncertain he had an opportunity to clear it up on cross-examination; and, third, the word "unconditionally" and the phrase "no strings to it" were used as synonymous expressions.—Id. 3. EVIDENCE-CONCLUSION-MOTION TO STRIKE OUT-ACCEPTANCE OF COURT'S SUGGESTION—WITHDRAWAL OF QUESTION AND ANSWER.—In such action, the objection that the trial court failed to strike out an affirmative answer given by the conveyancer to the question as to whether or not the grantor "assented" to his instructions in a certain particular was untenable, where, admitting that the answer was a conclusion, counsel was forewarned that it would be such by the question propounded and should have objected, and, moreover, the conversation and conduct of the parties were given in detail at the court's suggestion, which was accepted by counsel, the latter's acceptance amounting in effect to a withdrawal of both question and answer.—Id. 4. FINDINGS-SUFFICIENCY OF.-In such action, a finding "That none of the denials set forth by the defendant . . . in the first clause of paragraph II of his answer are true" and "That none of the denials of said defendant set forth in the second clause of paragraph II of the said answer are "true," is sufficiently definite and upon material issues, where paragraphs I and II of said answer contain admissions and denials respectively separately stated, and are brief, and there is nothing to confuse or mislead by the reference made in the finding to the respective paragraphs of said answer.-Id. 5. EVIDENCE- DELIVERY INTENT - SUBSEQUENT DECLARATIONS AND ACTS OF GRANTOR. - Subsequent declarations and acts of the grantor are admissible to show the intention of the grantor at the time the deed was made, the issue in this class of cases being whether or not the grantor delivered his deed with the intent that it should convey title; and in such cases the acts and declarations, in short, the conduct of a deceased grantor, may be given in evidence either in confirmance of delivery or in disproof thereof.—Id. See Mortgages, 6, 7, 9. DEEDS OF TRUST. 1. DELIVERY-SUFFICIENCY OF EVIDENCE.-In this action by the administratrix of an estate of a deceased person to quiet title against the defendants, who claimed under a lost and unrecorded deed by the deceased to them as trustees, the direction of the grantor to keep the deed for the grantees, made in their presence, with the subsequent declaration contained in a certificate signed by the grantor showing her intention that the deed should be effective in connection with other testimony was amply sufficient to justify the finding that the deed was delivered with the intention of vesting title.-Hayes v. Breeden, 345. 2. JUDGMENT OWNERSHIP IN FEE-APPEAL BY OTHER THAN BENEFI CIARY - EFFECT OF. The judgment in favor of the defendants in such action will not be reversed because of the declaration therein of the defendants' ownership of the property in fee, whereas under the deed they were trustees and were required to dispose of the property and to distribute the proceeds to the beneficiaries, where the appellant was not a beneficiary.-Id. See Dedication, 3. DEFAULT. See Claim and Delivery, 2. DELIVERY. See Contracts, 31; Deeds, 1; Deeds of Trust, 1; Mortgages, 6. DEMAND. WHEN UNNECESSARY.-A demand is unnecessary where it appears it would be unavailing.-Prichard v. Kimball, 757. DENIAL. See Pleading, 1-3, 5, 6. DESCRIPTION. See Contracts, 29; Criminal Law, 6, 7; Motor Ve hicle Act, 5. DISCRETION. See California Water Storage District Act, 9, 10, 14; Divorce, 8; Injunction, 4; Place of Trial, 5-9. DISMISSAL. See Appeal, 30. DISTRIBUTION. See Estates of Deceased Persons, 12-14. DITCHES. See Vendor and Vendee, 3. DIVORCE. 1. COMPLAINT-VERIFICATION-FILING-LAPSE OF TIME-EFFECT OF.A complaint in an action for divorce which alleges that the plaintiff has been a resident of the state for one year and county for three months immediately preceding the commencement of the action states the essential jurisdictional facts, although verified seventy-seven days before filing, and reference to such complaint is sufficient in an affidavit for publication of the summons, since the pleading speaks from the date of its filing. Hurt v. Haering, 198. 2. PUBLICATION OF SUMMONS EXISTENCE OF CAUSE OF ACTIONALLEGATION OF JURISDICTION.-The allegation of jurisdiction in a complaint for divorce, while essential to the maintenance of the action in the particular county in which it is instituted, is not an essential part of the cause of action within the meaning of section 412 of the Code of Civil Procedure providing for the service of summons by publication and declaring that it must appear either in the affidavit for the publication or by the verified complaint on file that a cause of action exists against the defendant.— Id. 3. PLEADING - - NAME OF DEFENDANT.-In an action for divorce it is proper to sue the husband by the name that he has always been known to the plaintiff and others, notwithstanding the statement of a different name in the marriage license.—Id. 4. STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS-SECTION 343, CODE OF CIVIL PROCEDURE. Section 343 of the Code of Civil Procedure, which provides that all actions other than those specified in the preceding sections of that code relating to the time of the commencement of actions must be commenced within four years from and after the time of the accrual of the cause of action, has no application to divorce actions, for the reason that section 127 of the Civil Code, dealing specifically with actions for divorce, provides that there shall be no limitation of time for the commencement of actions for divorce except such as are contained in section 124 of the Civil Code.-Morgan v. Morgan, 522. 5. INCARCERATION OF DEFENDANT IN ASYLUM- DELAY IN BRINGING ACTION-WHEN NOT UNREASONABLE.-In an action for divorce upon the ground of habitual intemperance of the husband, where the latter was incarcerated in an insane asylum on account of alcoholism for nearly five years after the accrual of the cause of action, a delay of nearly three years in bringing the action after the discharge of the defendant is not so unreasonable as to make it imperative upon the court to deny the divorce. This is so notwithstanding the fact that plaintiff might, perhaps, have commenced suit against defendant after he was committed to the institution and while he was still an inmate.-Id. 190 Cal.-53 DIVORCE (Continued). 6. PRESUMPTION OF COLLUSION - REBUTTAL.-It is not necessary, in order to rebut the presumption of connivance, collusion, or condonation, provided for in section 125 of the Civil Code, that a showing of legal disability be made. If the evidence adduced tends to show that the delay, which in the absence of explanation would seem unreasonable, was in fact, under all the circumstances, reasonable, that is sufficient.-Id. 7. POLICY OF LAW.-It is not the policy of the law to encourage divorces.-Id. 8. ATTORNEY'S FEES AND COSTS-POWER OF COURT.-Under section 137 of the Civil Code, the court, at any time during the pendency of an action for divorce, has authority to require the husband to pay as alimony any money necessary to enable the wife to prosecute or defend the action, where it is found that the parties are husband and wife, that the husband has the ability to pay and the wife is without the necessary means.-Walker v. Walker, 575. 9. ALIMONY APPLICATION BY HUSBAND FOR REDUCTION-MODIFICATION OF FINAL DECREE-APPEAL BY WIFE-EXPENSES AND COSTS -JURISDICTION TO AWARD.-The superior court has jurisdiction to award a former wife whatever costs and expenses are necessary for the prosecution of an appeal from an order modify ing the allowance of alimony made to her in the final decree of divorce, which appeal is rendered necessary by the application of the husband for the modification of the decree.-Lamborn v. Lamborn, 794. 10. PENDENCY OF ACTIONS-TIME - GENERAL RULE EXCEPTION. While it is true that an ordinary action is deemed to be pending 1. ACT OF 1903-BOND ELECTION-PETITION.-The board of directors of a drainage district is not authorized under the statute of 1903 (Stats. 1903, p. 291), without a petition therefor, to call a second election, after the defeat of a previous one, for the purpose of creating the original bonded indebtedness authorized by section 274 of the act for the construction of the necessary improvement for which the district was organized.-In re Garden Grove Drainage Dist., 529. |