Although all I had hoped has not been attained, yet I shall be always glad that these letters have passed between us. Believe me, my dear Sir, Yours, very faithfully, HENRY E. MANNING. LETTER XV. Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING. My dear Sir, Kinson, Wimborne, July 14, 1854. The assertions which you have next to maintain, are the following:-"That a wife may support her previous children, (and other relatives, such as poor brothers and sisters,) out of her husband's goods, against his will, and spend something under the twentieth of his income on alms and gifts.Hom. Ap. Tract x. 2. 33. That a nobleman in extreme distress may steal, if he is ashamed to beg.-x. 2. 15. That a servant may compensate himself for a salary remarkably too small.-vii. 3. 10. That a rich man's son may steal from his father three scudi, without grave sin. That a principe's son commits only a venial sin if he steal from his father anything under fifty scudi. That a monk is guilty only of a venial sin if he steal any sum less than four scudi from the monastery." You appear to me to excuse this teaching on the following grounds : 1. That in the three last cases-the rich man's son, the principe's son-the monk—the act is said to be sin, namely, venial sin. 2. That in the three first cases-the wife-the distressed nobleman the servant-the act is not sin, because it is not theft. 3. That the reason why the wife's act is not theft, is, that she has a right, on grounds of justice, to what she takes. 4. That the reason why the distressed nobleman's act is not theft, is, that it is an act dictated by extreme necessity; and that where there is extreme necessity, all goods are common, and there is no place for stealing. 5. That the reason why the servant's act is not theft, is, that he has a right to what he takes, on grounds both of need and justice. I believe that this a fair and concise representation of your views. I would answer as follows:: 1. It is true that S. Alfonso counts the act in the three cases of the rich man's son, the principe's son, and the monk, to be sin; but he goes out of his way to pick out these acts of theft, and declares them to be only venial sins. Now the difference in value between venial and mortal sins, is, of course, enormous; and if we wish to know what he thinks these acts worth, we must look to see what he counts to be mortal. Of course these acts are immeasurably less sinful than any laid down as mortal. To abstain from hearing Mass on Sundays, and certain Saints' Days, without good reason, is mortal. Consequently, it is a far less sin for a rich man's son to steal 12s. from his father, for a principe's son to steal £10 from his father, for a monk to steal 168. from his monastery, than to abstain from hearing Mass on Sundays and holy days of obligation, without good reason-so much less, that in the three first cases, the sin need not be confessed-does not diminish God's love towards the agent-is punished only temporally,-while, in the last case, it extinguishes the life of the soul, and is punishable by eternal hellfires. This appears to me to be exalting positive precept at the expense of morality. 2. Whether S. Alfonso calls the act of the wife, of the distressed nobleman, and of the servant, thefts or not, is, to me, of no moment. It is easy to frame definitions which shall exclude what ought to be included; and an argument from such definition is purely verbal, and, therefore, valueless. The question is, whether those acts are thefts, or not. If they are, S. Alfonso does sanction theft, however much he may deny them to be thefts. I may, however, observe that the words furta filiorum, furta domesticorum, &c. are used, without any notice of their being used abusive; and "surripere" is the common verb employed, which, if it is not translated "pilfer," must, at least, be expressed, not by "take," but "take clandestinely." Moreover, Liguori heads one of his divisions of chapters, 4, 5, 4, with a distinct assertion in so many words, that they are theft "verè furtum." 3. Has the wife the right to support her poor brothers, &c. out of her husband's goods, against his will, and to spend under the twentieth of his income in alms and gifts? You say Yes, for two reasons. One because, according to Lugo, the wife is not a slave, but a companion, &c. from which he draws a very just conclusion, but as different from Liguori's doctrine as heaven from earth-that the husband ought to allow his wife the moderate use of their goods. That is very true; but it does not follow that she is to take them, if he does not do so. The other reason is, "that the duty of giving alms is from the Divine Law." True; but out of one's own goods, I presume. Liguori lays down what are the goods of a wife, namely, her "dotalia," and her "paraphernalia," but says that she may give alms and gifts out of the other goods as well; and justifies it, not by the command of the Divine Law, but by "consuetudo." 4. The distressed nobleman's case is exactly the same as that of the Unjust Steward, supposing that the latter was a man of high birth. Si aliquem virum honoratum valde puderet mendicare vel laborare, an potest ex alienis sibi providere? Negant Salm. . . . . . . Affirmant vero Viva, &c. &c. Hocque mihi videtur probabilius. In other words, "I cannot dig, to beg I am ashamed," therefore I will clandestinely take what does not belong to me. And this, according to Liguori, is justifiable. He would lose his character if he begged, therefore he is unable so to relieve his wants, and is labouring under quasi-extreme need; but as soon as a man is labouring under quasi-extreme need, he is no longer subject to the laws respecting meum and tuum. This runs us up to the principle on which Socialism rests. I am not a Socialist, and although I might allow that a case might occur in which extreme need justified appropriation, yet to lay it down, as you say, "six times," as a principle to guide action, that to appropriate goods not your own is allowable as soon as you are reduced to extreme necessity, or quasi-extreme, or very grave necessity, such as incurring danger of death, or risk of losing a limb, or of becoming a prisoner, or of being sent to the galleys, or of incurring a bad disease, or of losing your character, appears to me to strike at the root of social security, and of morality alike. 5. The case of the servants taking their masters' property to make up their wages to a sum higher than that which they bargained with their master to receive, is one which you pass over lightly. You say that they might be free from malitia peccati. This does not meet the case. According to Liguori they are; they are doing an act which cannot be blamed, on grounds of justice, right, and integrity. "The civil law," in "punishing such an act as theft," appears to me to show itself far superior to the Moral Theologians' law, which justifies it. There is one other thing which I would note. You say, "He (Liguori) is of opinion that the case of the nobleman is one of extreme necessity. Others are not. You and I are equally at liberty to admit it, or not." Is this perfectly correct? You and I are equally at liberty to admit it; but are we at liberty equally not to admit it, to condemn it as conflicting with plain principles of morality? If so, what mean the high-sounding sentences in the Preface to the Theologia Moralis? Nullam inesse opinionem contra fidem aut bonos mores, &c. &c. I would fain not think so, for I have persuaded myself that the reason why Archdeacon Manning has maintained these, and other principles of morality, with their applications, has been, that he has been compelled to do so by his system—that he is not at liberty to do otherwise without giving up his present position; and as long as he does defend them, I would fain be allowed to think so still. I remain, my dear Sir, FREDERICK MEYRICK. LETTER XVI. Rev. F. MEYRICK to Rev. H. E. MANNING. My dear Sir, Kinson, Wimborne, July 18, 1854. What you have next undertaken is to defend the principle and practice of Equivocation, as laid down by Liguori. Accordingly, you have to maintain that, when asked a question which cannot but be answered in the affirmative, it is truthful to reply, "I say, No," intending the questioner to understand that you deny his question, but meaning, in your own mind, simply to affirm that you are making use of the word "No" in your conversation.-4. 2. 151. You have to justify the once well-known principle, Η γλώσσ ̓ ὀμώμοχ ἡ δὲ φρὴν ἀνώμοτος, which is identical with that Liguori lays down, 4. 2. 171. where he says, that if a man has only sworn externally, he has not sworn, he has joked. You must hold that a man may insert a not" into an affirmative sentence, in a whisper not heard so as to be understood by the other party, and that his oath is then truthful, while he means to swear No, and the other conceives that he is swearing Yes. You must hold that oaths, promises, vows, pledges, secrets, do not lose all security, through his teaching with regard to their sanctity and the means of releasing oneself from them. You must, I suppose, regard Ex capite meo hoc erui, &c. Hom. Ap. xi. 18. as truthful, and "mentitus sum quia omne peccatum est mendacium," as truthful. 66 The only arguments which you have brought forward are two. (1.) S. Alfonso denies that he allows the use of falsehood, and does allow the use equivocation, therefore equivocation is not falsehood. (2.) Jeremy Taylor has teaching of a similar nature. The first of these arguments is the same as that which you used with regard to stealing. S. Alfonso excludes equivocation by his definition of falsehood; and therefore, it is true that in his own estimation, and according to his own definition, in teaching the lawfulness of his equivocation, he does not teach that falsehood is lawful; but the question is, whether equivocation (and what equivocation is, we must gather from his own examples, such as those given above) is not, morally speaking, falsehood; and if it is, in teaching the lawfulness of equivocation, he does teach the lawfulness of falsehood. That equivocation is moral falsehood, is to me clear, because, on analyzing it, we find it to consist of a moral untruth, conveyed by means of a material truth, and that it is only a confusion existing in men's minds with respect to moral truthfulness and material truth, which could ever have led them to regard equivocation as morally truthful. Indeed, I cannot doubt that equivocation, as interpreted by Liguori's examples, is merely a double lie; first, a lie to another, and then a deception passed on himself by the speaker, to the effect that he has not lied. 2. With regard to Jeremy Taylor, one great difference between him and Liguori on this point seems to be, that while the latter confines the name of lie to that one species of moral untruth which is conveyed by means of a material untruth, leaving men at liberty with respect to the other species, Taylor, on the other hand, applies the name of lie to every deception passed upon our neighbour; but in the case of children, madmen, persons incompetent to judge for their own good, persons willing, persons justly presumed to be willing, he holds that they may be deceived to their good. To them, therefore, if spoken for their good, he allows what he calls a lie. And, in some other exceptional cases, he thinks that charity may override the duty of veracity. Verbally, therefore, and technically, Taylor allows a lie in some cases, and Liguori does not; but, nevertheless, Taylor is far the stricter of the two, because his word "lie," and Liguori's word "lie," mean quite different things, Liguori's "lie" being a narrow species contained under the broad of Taylor's "lie." genus The following passage, with which he concludes the subject, seems to express Bishop Taylor's mind. "He that does speak, and is bound to speak, must speak according to the mind of him with whom he does converse, that by our fault he be not deceived against his right, against justice, against charity." But I am not careful to enter at length into a defence of Bishop Taylor. I prefer Bishop Sanderson's teaching on this point, as I think that Taylor has given somewhat too great a liberty to men to conceive that other virtues, such as justice and charity, may interfere (as they sometimes do) with the duty of veracity; and I think it is a pity that he has used the word |