ISOLATION HOSPITAL OF PRINCETON UNIVERSITY.

(Isolation Hospital on the left, connected by corridor with General Hospital.)

reason for the course adopted by the Legislature. We had the evidence of scientific men to this effect-that there is always a probability of danger when sewage matter is thrown into a stream, because people may drink of that stream, and if any epidemic disease is prevalent in a town from which the sewage matter proceeds, that disease may be communicated to the inhabitants of another by the water. Well, that alone would be sufficient justification for the Legislature, if it entertained that opinion, inserting this enactment in the act of Parliament. That being so, I think I am bound, as regards the information, to grant an injunction to restrain the defendants from infringing the provisions of the act of Parliament.

"The bill stands upon a totally different footing. It is a bill by the local board of Workington alleging nuisance committed by the defendants. Now, I must say I cannot find any evidence of nuisancecaused by the defendant's acts. The sewage is thrown into the river in comparatively small quantities, at a distance of eight or nine miles from the town of Workington. The water has been carefully analyzed at the intake of Workington, and no trace of the sewage can be discovered; that is to say, from some cause or other, that which was polluted water at or near the outfall has ceased to be polluted water by the time it arrives at Workington. That I take to be the effect of the evidence, and if the plaintiff board can only sue on the ground of nuisance, and they cannot prove nuisance, it follows that their bill must be dismissed."

In Attorney-General v. Shrewsbury Bridge Company, 21 Ch. Div. 752, and 1 Eng. Rul. Cas. 567, the Attorney-General, at the relation of two shareholders in the defendant company and by two shareholders as plaintiffs, claimed an injunction to restrain the company from proceeding with their works. Justice Fry said: "The question which has been mainly argued is this: Had the Attorney-General a right under the circumstances to intervene without showing substantial injury to the public? It appears to me there is a conflict of authority on this point, or rather some want of uniformity in the various authorities. But, before considering the authorities, I will make this observation: This is clearly a case in which the defendant company, without any power (for their powers had come to an end), thought it fit to do certain acts which undoubtedly tended in their nature to interfere with public rights, and so tended to injure the public. The question is whether, under such circumstances, the Attorney-General is justified in interfering, though there is no evidence of actual injury to the public. In my judgment, he is entitled to do so, and the Court is bound to attend to his interference. One of the English cases on the subject is Attorney-General v. Oxford, Worcester and Wolverhampton Railway Company. There, at the instance of the Attorney-General, the Court restrained the opening of a railway not authorized by the board of trade, and Lord Romilly, Master of the Rolls, said that the view he took of the case was this-that undoubtedly the Attorney-General

might apply to the Court in case of a nuisance. It was properly said on the other side that in all such cases the Court required that the nuisance should be proved. But he was also of the opinion that the Attorney-General, as parens patrial, might apply to the Court to restrain the execution of an illegal act of a public nature, provided it was established that the act was illegal and it affected the public generally. Again, in Attorney-General v. Cockermouth Local Board, Sir Jessel, Member of the Rolls, refused to grant an injunction on the bill, because he came to the conclusion that there was no evidence of any nuisance resulting to the plaintiffs from the defendants' acts. Nevertheless, at the instance of the Attorney-General, he granted an injunction to restrain the defendants from polluting the water of the river because that was expressly prohibited by the act of Parliament. There, as in the present case, there was no evidence of any actual injury, but there was evidence that the defendants were doing certain illegal acts, which tended in their nature to injure the public, and accordingly the injunction was granted, with costs. In the more recent case of Attorney-General v. Great Eastern Railway Company, the learned Lords-Justices appear to have differed somewhat in their opinions. If they had expressed any decided view affecting the present case, I need not say that I should have followed it. But, having regard to that difference of opinion, it appears to me that that case furnishes no distinct guide to me. But, when I examine the judgment of Lord-Justice James, who was most adverse to the rights of the Attorney-General, I think that, even according to his view, the present action would be maintained, for, commenting on AttorneyGeneral v. Cockermouth Local Board, he said: "The board were doing works which would or might probably poison a running stream, in direct violation of the law which prohibited them from committing a nuisance.' Just as there the acts which restrained without proof of injury were acts which in their nature tended to injure the public, so, in the present case, the acts which the Attorney-General sought to restrain were in their nature such as tended to injure the public. In coming, therefore, to the conclusion that this action can be maintained without proof of actual injury to the public, I think I am acting in accordance witn the view of Lord-Justice James. There is, moreover, the authority of Lord Hatherly, in Attorney-General v. Ely, Haddenham aud Sutton Railway Company. He said: "The question is whether what has been done has been done in accordance with the law; if not, the Attorney-General strictly represents the whole of the public in saying that the law shall be observed.' Here the law has been broken in a manner tending to injure the public, and, in my judgment, the relators are entitled to costs. The costs have not been increased by adding the relators as plaintiffs, and I shall allow the whole of the costs now in dispute."

See, also, London Association of Ship Owners and Brokers v.

London and India Docks Joint Committee, 1892, vol. 3 (L. R.), p. 270.

This case differs from Newark Aqueduct Board v. Passaic, 18 Stew. Eq. 406, where an injunction was sought to restrain what appeared to be a prospective injury. The bill in that case had no such legislative authority as the bill in this case. In this case we depend on the facts showing corruption of the water, or tendency to corrupt it, and the act of 1899, as the justification for the injunction we pray for.

The provision authorizing the State Board of Health to file the bill in this case is similar to the provision contained in Gen. Stat. 1846, § 2, which has been sustained as valid legislation. See State v. Jersey City, 10 Dick. Ch. Rep. 116; same case affirmed, Ib. 591. The means authorized to be adopted under the health laws for the protection of health are preventive rather than punitive. That fact must never be lost sight of in construing legislation like that under which the bill in this case has been filed.

As was said by Justice Knapp for the Supreme Court, in Garrett v. State, 20 Vr. 103, the "purpose which the Legislature had in view in creating boards of health was to supply additional means to prevent disease and discomfort such as might arise from contamination of air, water and food."

III The Facts of this Case, and the Law as Applied to those Facts.

I have preferred to consider the law upon which the bill is supposed to be founded before referring to the facts. For, it is quite natural, I think, that the first impression made upon the mind by reading the bill of complaint should be that it does not set out a case for equitable jurisdiction. Hoping that what has been said under the first two heads of this brief may have shown that our Court of Chancery may acquire jurisdiction to grant an injunction under the terms of chapter 41 of the Laws of 1899, without any allegation or proof of actual damage to any person or persons whomsoever, I now consider the facts of this case.

There is no dispute about the material facts of this case. They are all admitted. Here they are:

The defendant is a corporation and is engaged in the manufacture of paper.

Its factory is located on the banks of the Rahway river, in Milburn township, Essex county; it employs forty hands, is in continuous operation, day and night, and makes two tons of paper per day. (Testimony, p. 4).

Its raw stock consists of rags, burlaps, hemp, twines, cords and jute, 15 to 20 per cent. of which is colored stock (p. 8). It is purchased wherever it can be obtained to advantage (p. 70). It is of different grades. The shirt clippings are of two kinds, No. 1 being