But a similar proposal on the part of the American general had been rejected by Ampudia more than a month before, and Taylor, under the changed aspect of affairs, was no longer disposed to suspend operations. He declined to listen to the proposal; the possession of Matamoros he said was now a sine qua non; he, however, said that Arista might withdraw his forces, leaving behind the public property of every description." Meantime Arista experienced all the bitterness attending defeat. Resentful murmurs against his conduct were no longer confined to the soldiery; the officers openly commented with severity on his line of action, while he, shutting himself up in his house, sought to ease his mortification by calling his soldiers cowards and coarsely insulting them." Thus all harmony between the general and his division was interrupted by a quagmire of mutual disgust, into which even the most moderate of his subordinates were drawn. On the 10th he had convened a council of his chief officers, but this did not mend matters. With angry threats he denounced the criticisms against him, and then with puerile imprudence fully exposed the demoralized condition of his army, and the impossibility of attempting the defence of Matamoros.42 When Requena returned from his unsuccessful mission, Arista's decision was made. Leaving behind his sick and wounded, to the number of 500, spiking what artillery he could not take

41

43

39 U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298.

40

Diciendo que á cada soldado se le podian poner unas enaguas y otros denuestos así.' Campaña contra los Amer. del Norte, 22.

41 Manifestó que estaba pronto á batirse con todas las clases de la division, pues dijo era ya necesario andar con el sable en la mano para el oficial y para el soldado.' Id., 22-3.

42 This meeting, remarks the author of the Campaña just quoted, had a worse result than the disaster of the 9th. The division became thereby informed that it was without support, that there were only provisions enough to last for a few days and ammunition for a few hours; that Matamoros could only be put in a state of defence at the cost of much time and labor; and that no portion of the army could rely upon any other for support, as the whole was demoralized.

13 Siendo 321 heridos y los demas de otras enfermidades.' Official report no. 3 in Id. Taylor says 'more than 300 of the enemy's wounded have been left in the hospitals.' U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 298,

away, and throwing a large quantity of ammunition into the river, he abandoned Matamoros the same evening, directing his course to Linares. Passing through Venado, Ebanito, Nutria, and Calabozo—a line of country almost destitute of provisions and water he arrived there on the 29th of May. The sufferings of the soldiers were dreadful; nothing was wanting of hunger, thirst, and toil to make their misery full. When on the fourth day a heavy storm of rain temporarily relieved their thirst, the benefit was counterbalanced by the road being rendered almost impassable, and all along the wayside weak and exhausted men sank despairingly in the mud and perished. Numbers died writhing in convulsions or struck dead by sunstroke, and some in their despair put an end to their own lives. The desertion, too, was great, and when the army reached Linares it numbered less than 3,000 men.“ On June 3d Arista received the order of his removal, and resigned the command on the following day to General Mejía.

Meanwhile, General Taylor crossed the river early on the 18th without resistance, and occupied the city. He gave assurances before doing so that the civil rights of the citizens would be respected, and adopted measures by the establishment of a system of police to insure order. On the following morning Lieutenant-colonel Garland was despatched with a body of cavalry in pursuit of the retreating Mexicans, with orders to harass their rear. This officer followed them beyond Ebanito, but was then compelled to return, owing to the scarcity of water and provisions. He captured, however, a party in the rear, and brought with him twenty-two prisoners, arriving at Matamoros

on the 22d.

"Namely: 28 general and field officers; 209 company officers; and 2,638 rank and file. Official Doc. no. 5, in Campaña contra los Amer. del Norte, in which work a more detailed account of this retreat will be found, as also in Méx., Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 48–51. General García died as he was entering Linares.

CHAPTER XV..

CAPTURE OF MONTEREY.

MAY-SEPTEMBER, 1846.

THE UNITED STATES DECLARES WAR-SCOTT AND THE GOVERNMENT AT VARIANCE CALL FOR VOLUNTEERS - GAINES' UNADVISED ACTIONTHE VOLUNTEER QUESTION-WANT OF A WAR PLAN-MARCH TO MONTEREY-PREPARATIONS OF THE MEXICANS-AMPUDIA APPOINTED COMMANDER-IN-CHIEF DESCRIPTION OF MONTEREY-THE SIEGE-Capture OF FORT TENERÍA-HARD FIGHTING-WORTH'S OPERATIONS-AMPUDIA CAPITULATES-MONTEREY EVACUATED-DISSATISFACTION IN THE UNITED

STATES.

WHEN the government of the United States became aware, by news of the capture of Captain Thornton's party, that hostilities had broken out, the president addressed an extraordinary message, May 11th, to congress, then in session, invoking its prompt action. to recognize the existence of the war, and to place at the disposition of the executive the means of prosecuting it with vigor, and thus hastening the restoration of peace. It is to be observed that Mr Polk is both inconsistent and unjust, not to say wilfully mendacious, in his endeavor to throw the whole blame of the war upon Mexico. After giving the details of Slidell's failure at negotiations to adjust the questions in dispute, "both the questions of the Texas boundary and the indemnification of our citizens". an admission that the boundary question was still unsettled-he asserts that "Mexico has passed the boundary of the United States, has invaded our territory, and shed American blood upon American soil."

U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 48. Benton, Thirty Years' View, ii. 678, in his remarks upon throwing the blame of the war upon

Nevertheless congress adopted his views without delay, and on the 13th declared that by an act of the republic of Mexico, a state of war existed between the two governments; it authorized the president to call for volunteers to any number, not exceeding 50,000, to serve for twelve months after arrival at the place of rendezvous, and placed at his disposal $10,000,000.

The president immediately intimated to General Scott, the commander-in-chief of the United States army, his intention to assign to him the command of the forces in Mexico. But a rupture soon occurred, brought on by the strictures of political parties. Scott held a high reputation for military skill, and he had already been spoken of by the whig party as their candidate for the presidency. His action was therefore narrowly watched by both friends and enemies. The plan of the campaign, arranged at private consultations between the president, W. L. Marcy, secretary of war, and General Scott, was to seize the northern territories of Mexico, and, making the Rio Grande the base of future operations, compel Mexico to come to terms, by moving the main army against the capital, the centre of her resources. But serious difficulties presented themselves at the outset. The nearest base of supplies was New Orleans, too distant from the Mexican frontier. It was agreed that an army of 30,000, regulars and volunteers, would be required. But to provide and send in advance to the several places of rendezvous arms, accoutrements, and supplies of all kinds; to procure proper means of transportation by land and water; and at the same time to study the routes of march and all other details Mexico, and the cool assumption that it had been made by her, says: 'History is bound to pronounce her judgment upon these assumptions, and to say that they are unfounded....The actual collision of arms was brought on by the further advance of the American troops to the left bank of the lower Rio Grande, then and always in possession of Mexico, and erecting field-works on the bank of the river, and pointing cannon at the town of Matamoras (sic) on the opposite side....It was under these circumstances that the Mexican troops crossed the river, and commenced the attack. And this is what is called spilling American blood on American soil. The laws of nations and the law of self-defence justify that spilling of blood.'

HIST. MEX., VOL. V. 24

connected with the movement into the interior of Mexico, were not the labors of a few days. Scott knew this full well. He suggested the 1st of September as the earliest day for passing in full force beyond the Rio Grande,' ard assiduously applied himself to the preliminary work, in which he was engaged fourteen hours daily. But the nation was excited and impatient. His necessary delay at Washington was regarded as inactivity. Why did he not hasten to the seat of war? it was asked; and prominent men made unfavorable comments upon his presence in the capital. It was forgotten that the vast preliminary arrangements could only be made advantageously at that place, through the respective chiefs of the general staff. Within only a week after the declaration of war Marcy informed Scott that much impatience was felt because he had not already put himself en route for the Rio Grande. There was, moreover, a bill before the senate which proposed to authorize the appointment of two additional major-generals, giving the president power also of selecting generals for the command of the 50,000 volunteers. This measure, if adopted, would have given the president power to place some new general over the head of Scott. The sensitiveness of the commander-in-chief, who as yet had received only verbal orders assigning him to the command, was irritated, and on the 21st of May he addressed a letter to the secretary of war which contained expressions that were construed into reflections upon the conduct of the president.

After four days' consideration of his note, the president directed Marcy to inform him that he was relieved of the command, but would be continued in his

He afterward, May 25th, came to the conclusion, according to most reliable information, that such operations could not be assumed with the least possible advantage before the 1st of October. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. 378, p. 11.

3 See Scott's letter to Marcy in Id., p. 16.

Marcy replied on the 25th, astonished at Scott's language. 'I do not want a fire upon my rear from Washington,' Scott returned, and the fire in front from the Mexicans.' U. S. Govt, Cong. 29, Ses. 1, Sen. Doc. 378, pp. 4–9.