LOSSES OF MEXICANS AND AMERICANS.

401

the storming columns, and his dispositions for the capture of the summit of the Cerro del Obispado prove his efficiency in a most difficult position, and Taylor's discernment in selecting him.

59

60

The loss sustained by the Americans was severe, being over 500 in killed and wounded; that of the Mexicans is not known, but it probably far exceeded that of the invaders." As to the bravery of the Mexicans in their defence of Monterey there is no dispute. Taylor admitted that the gallantry displayed was alike creditable to the troops and the nation, and the officers of his army bore ample testimony to it."9 With regard to the terms of the stipulation, it caused no little dissatisfaction, not only to the army, but to the United States at large. That the Mexican forces should have been allowed to retire, when every circumstance seemed to assure the necessity of their unconditional surrender, caused general disappointment; and the suspension of hostilities interfered with the plans of the government for the vigorous prosecution of the war. The public press severely criticised the convention, and on the 13th of October Marcy addressed a letter to Taylor which plainly indicated the dissatisfaction of the government. It disapproved of the armistice, and Taylor was instructed to give the requisite notice that it was to cease at once."

61

58 Taylor in his report of October 9, 1846, places it at 488, namely, 12 officers and 108 men killed, and 31 officers and 337 men wounded. Id., p. 88. But from the official statements published later the number is given as 506, namely, 16 officers killed and 24 wounded, and 126 men killed and 310 wounded. Worth's division only lost 55 in killed and wounded, to which number must be added 22 killed and wounded of Texan volunteers attached to it. Reid's Tex. Rangers, 239-51; Niles' Reg., 1xxi. 183-4; Fry's Life of Taylor, 262. Ampudia places the loss of the Americans at 1,500. Despues de una defensa brillante en que el enemigo fué rechazado con pérdida de mil quinientos hombres de varios puestos.' Bustamante, Nuevo Bernal Diaz, ii. Ill. A translation of this report of Ampudia's to the Mexican minister of war will be found in Niles' Reg., Ixxi. 186.

59 Worth states that in the several conflicts with his division the enemy's loss was ascertained to exceed 450 men. U. S. Gort Doc., Cong. 29, Ses. 2, H. Ex. 4, p. 108.

Captain Henry writes: Thus far they have fought most bravely, and with an endurance and tenacity I did not think they possessed.' Campaign Sketches, 209.

61 U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, pp. 355-6. Taylor, in his HIST. MEX., VOL. V. 25

Such was the reception which the news of the capture of Monterey met with in the United States. As a material result bearing upon the ultimate object of the war, the possession of the city at the cost of so much bloodshed was of no advantage. It was an experimental movement, which merely proved the bravery and endurance of American troops, and the impracticability of carrying on the war with any effect, through sterile regions, in the direction of the Mexican capital. In fact, the campaign on the Rio Grande had proved by no means consequential.

62

reply, shows that he adopted the convention from cogent reasons, namely: that with his force he could not so invest Monterey as to preclude the escape of the Mexican army; that the considerations of humanity outweighed the doubtful advantages to be gained by a resumption of the attack. With regard to the armistice, it paralyzed the enemy during a period when, from the want of necessary means, he could not possibly move. Id., pp 359-60. In his letter to Gaines he writes: Besides, they had a very large and strong fortification'-the citadel-' a short distance from the city which, if carried with the bayonet, must have been taken at a great sacrifice of life, and, with our limited train of heavy or battering artillery, it would have required twenty or twenty-five days to take it by regular approaches.'_ Niles' Reg., lxxi. 342. Jefferson Davis, writing from Victoria, Tamaulipas, Jan. 6, 1847, says: I did not then, nor do I now, believe we could have made the enemy surrender at discretion;... we could drive the enemy from the town; but the town was untenable while the main fort (called the new citadel) remained in the hands of the enemy.' Reid's Tex. Rangers, 205.

62 I do not intend,' says Taylor, writing to Gaines from Monterey, Nov. 5th, 'to carry on my operations (as previously stated) beyond Saltillo-deeming it next to impracticable to do so.' Niles' Reg., lxxi. 342.

CHAPTER XVI.

OPERATIONS IN THE NORTH-BUENA VISTA.

JULY 1846-MARCH 1847.

EXPEDITIONS AGAINST NEW MEXICO AND CALIFORNIA-DONIPHAN'S MARCH TO CHIHUAHUA-Battle OF SACRAMENTO-OPERATIONS OF THE GULY SQUADRON-TAYLOR'S PLANS-HE ADVANCES TO SALTILLO-TAMPICO EVACUATED BY THE MEXICANS-TAYLOR OCCUPIES VICTORIA AND ABANDONS IT-SCOTT TAKES COMMAND-WITHDRAWAL OF AMERICAN TROOPS -MEXICAN PREPARATIONS-SANTA ANNA AT SAN LUIS POTOSÍ-HIS MARCH TO AGUA NUEVA-TAYLOR TAKES UP A POSITION AT LA ANGOSTURA-DESCRIPTION OF THE PASS-DISPOSITIONS OF THE TWO ARMIES -BATTLE OF BUENA VISTA-THE FINAL CHARGE REPULSED-SANTA ANNA RETREATS.

IN anticipation of war with Mexico, the government of the United States had issued orders to the naval commanders in the Pacific to take possession of the California ports immediately upon receiving news of the commencement of hostilities, without waiting for further instructions. The neglect with which Mexico had long treated that province had rendered its inhabitants lukewarm. Not that they were wanting in patriotism; but their frequent appeals to the government never having been answered, there had been engendered a corresponding indifference with regard to their continuing in the Mexican republic. This indifference was, moreover, fostered by the agents of the United States government; and when in July the American admiral, having received information that hostilities had broken out on the Rio Grande, proceeded to carry out his instructions, he met with no active resistance, and the United States flag was

raised in California without the shedding of blood. Unfortunately the arrogant conduct of a certain United States officer had alienated the kindly feelings of the inhabitants. An uncalled-for revolt of the American citizens against the authorities had further aggravated this antipathy, and thereby led to the only bloodshed that occurred in the acquisition of California. It gradually inflamed the spirits of the people, who some months later rose against the newly constituted power, and appealed to arms. Meanwhile the government at Washington had organized a land expedition against New Mexico and California, under General Kearny, who began his operations in August. Taking possession of the former territory, and establishing a provisional government, Kearny pressed forward to California, and arrived there just in time to aid in suppressing the rebellion. His operations, combined with those of the fleet, soon ended matters. Left to their own resources, the Californians offered but a feeble resistance, and their rich territory was lost to Mexico forever. It is unnecessary, however, to enter further into the particulars connected with the conquest of California and New Mexico, as they are fully narrated in other volumes of this history.1

Besides the expedition against these provinces, another was planned about the same time against Chihuahua, with the object of furthering the scheme of cutting off the northern provinces of Mexico, as advocated by Taylor.

This latter undertaking was, how

1 Hist. Arizona and New Mexico; Hist. California, this series. For Mexican views on the acquisition of California, the reader can consult Otero, Negoc. Diplom., 1-12.

2

Marcy, in his letter to Taylor of June 8, 1846, writes: 'It is proper that I should advise you that a considerable force, which will also be under your command, will soon assemble at San Antonio de Béjar. The ultimate destination of this force is Chihuahua.' Its destination, however, was not as yet deinitely determined upon. U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, H. Ex. 60, p. 323-4. Taylor, replying July 2d, expressed the opinion that operations on the frontier 'should be confined to cutting off the northern provinces an undertaking of comparative facility and assurance of success. Ich p. 331.

WOOL'S EXPEDITION TO CHIHUAHUA.

405

ever, of a more experimental nature than that directed against California. In the first instance, it was presumed that the northern departments, being opposed to the central system of government, would not only observe neutrality, but would avail themselves of the presence of a strong American force as an opportunity to throw off their allegiance to Mexico, as Texas had done. But this hope was frustrated by the change in the government, and the adoption of the federal system; and the cabinet at Washington soon became aware that the inhabitants of these regions were not only hostile, but would actively obstruct a march into the interior.

Meanwhile General Wool had been placed in charge of the troops that were to operate in Chihuahua. He was instructed to concentrate his command at San Antonio de Béjar, in Texas, and direct his march according to instructions from Taylor, under whose orders the expedition was placed. Taylor, however, considering that Wool was charged by the government with a distinct operation, refrained from controlling his movements, and confined himself to directing him to march on the city of Chihuahua with such portion of his force as could be transported and subsisted. At the same time it was suggested that he should' advance by way of Monclova.

About the end of September Wool began his march from San Antonio de Béjar, his force amounting to nearly 3,000 men. On the 8th of October he reached the Rio Grande at the presidio of that name, and crossing the river without difficulty on the 11th, arrived at Santa Rosa on the 24th. Finding that the only route from this place to Chihuahua practicable for wagons and artillery lay through Monclova, he

Assist Adj.-gen. Bliss to Wool, in Id., p. 410.

'Namely, five companies U. S. dragoons, one of light artillery-6 pieces, Captain Washington-and three of the 6th infantry, making 500 regulars; one regiment of Arkansas cavalry, two of Illinois infantry, and one company of Kentucky infantry; in all 2,440 volunteers, giving a total of 2,940 efficient men. Ripley's War with Mex., i. 301; Mansfield's Mex. War, 85. This force was called the army of the centre.