building formed a stronghold, with a redoubtable garrison in every family. The smallness of his force compelled him to take prompt and severe measures. Artillery was at once brought out to sweep the differents streets with grape and canister, and to batter down houses from which missiles came, while troops charged the crowds and stormed the dwellings.

The long-feared horrors of a siege had come at last in aggravated form, intensified by outrages on the part of criminals whom Santa Anna had released before his departure, with a view, as many declared, of occupying the enemy and retarding pursuit. The confusion was swelled to a panic by alarmed families who hastened to leave the city, or who crowded the churches to implore protection from the virgin. Santa Anna sent some troops to give direction to the outbreak, but they were too few to effect anything. The Mexicans wasted their valor in barren achievements, that stood relieved for a moment by noble gallantry, only to sink the next into oblivion. All day the city trembled before the roar of cannon and the flash of musketry, which changed from one quarter to another. Night brought no respite; for although the battle lessened, darkness magnified the din, now swelled by the tramp of noisy soldiers, while bandits crept within the shadows of the walls upon their kindred errand. Early on the 15th a few enthusiasts began anew the conflict; but the earnest proclamations of the ayuntamiento had their effect, sustained by the imposing demonstrations of Scott to carry out his threat of razing every building that revealed a hostile movement. With the rising of the sun the struggle ceased.

64

But Scott was too weak to risk the dangers of a pursuit. He estimates the released criminals at 2,000, who were intent on plunder during the tumult roused by impelling national hatred. U. S. Govt Doc., p. 383-4, ubi sup. Zamacois denies that Santa Anna released convicts for the purpose indicated. Hist. Mij., xii. 844-5. Roa Bárcena, Recuerdos, 507, avows that patriots stirred the tumult; roused by the arrogance of the victors, as explained in Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 326-7, the promoter being Col Carbajal of the guardia nacional. Garland was wounded by the first shot.

Several writers condemn the pronounced efforts of the wealthy to check

The valley campaign was ended, at a cost to the victors of more than 2,700 killed and wounded, besides the sick. This heavy inroad upon a force of 11,000 speaks well for the resistance of the Mexicans, as do their losses, estimated by Scott at over 7,000. Their lack of success must be attributed first of all to bad generalship, which permitted the unchallenged advance of Scott across the range and round Chalco Lake; which depended too much on certain positions in

the popular outburst, and their offensive display of flags for protection. Others exaggerate the cruel conduct of the invaders, while admitting that the worst outrages on their side were committed by renegades from Puebla who tore along with red-banded hats. Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 328-42. Roa Bárcena, however, applauds Scott's attitude as really humane under the cir cumstances, Recuerdos, 511, and believes with Zamacois, Hist. Mej., xii. 849, that another army might have behaved worse. Even the permission by Scott to ravage hostile localities was acted upon with great limitation. Ripley's War with Mex., ii. 444. Peterson points to the deeds of the English at Badajoz and San Sebastian as horrible compared with the worst isolated cases here. Mil. Heroes, ii. 126. Stragglers continued to be killed by lawless Mexicans. Semmes' Campaign, 355; Mex. War, by English Soldier, 261-2. Additional details in Monitor, Sept. 15, 1847, et seq.; Arco Iris, Sept. 26, 1847; Gen. of Lib., Sept. 25, 1847; Sonorense, Oct. 1, 1847, etc., which speak of plundering léperos, of girls collecting stones, etc.

65 Together with 3,730 prisoners, one seventh being officers, including 13 generals, among them 3 ex-presidents. The capture embraced more than 20 colors and standards, 75 pieces of ordnance, besides 57 wall-pieces, 20,000 small arms, an immense quantity of shot, shells, powder, etc. His report is in U.S. Govt Doc., Cong. 30, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 1, p. 384-5. Yet the report of the inspector-general adds only 1,330 military prisoners to those taken before Sept. 7th, whereof 823 on the 13th and 14th. Id., p. 430-1. For list of captured officers, see Archivo Mex., Actas, ii. 374-89. Some accounts place Scott's loss in the valley at 4,600 rank and file, 90-100 officers, and about 1,000 sick. Nacional, Boletin and Sonorense, the latter of Nov. 12, 1847. Scott gives the casualties among his officers at 383, and the losses on the 13th and 14th at 862. Roa Bárcena assumes that 300 of his men suffered from the tumult alone. See also reports in U. S. Govt Doc., Cong. 31, Ses. 1, Sen. Ex. 11; Id., Mess. and Doc., 1847-48, ii. app. 1-236. Details and comments in Bustamante, Invasion, MS., 87-152; Id., Mem. Hist., vii. 1–237; viii. 27-35, the autograph records by this venerable historian, who witnessed many of the scenes. Diario Exact. Mex., MS., 61-5, gives a diary of occurrences in the capital during the siege; and Rayon adds many valuable facts from a military standpoint, in Asedio y Defensa, 157-268, with orders and correspondence. Also Rivera, Hist. Jalapa, iii. 934-56, iv. 5 et seq. Observations by medical men, in Vander Linden, Rel.; Id., Mem. Salud. Mil., pt 3. Official reports of the capture of Mexico, in Arco Iris, Sept. 16-19, Oct. 3-4, 10, 15, Nov. 18-22, Dec. 11, 1847, with estimates of losses; Correo Nac., Dec. 10-11, 1847; Razonador, Nov. 24, 1847; Gen. Lib., Oct. 16, 1847; also Monitor, Federalista, Espir. Pub. Moreliano, Sonorense, and other journals; Scott's Mem., 508-17; McSherry's Puchero, 103-26; Jenkins' Mex. War, 427-31; Addey's McClellan, 31-85, giving the share of this rising officer in the campaign; Frost's Pict. Hist. Mex., 576-90; Mayer's Mex. Aztec., i. 415-16; Semmes' Service Afloat, 400-79; Young's Ilist. Mex., 534-7; Zamacois, Hist. Méj., xii. SOS-40; Rivera, Gob. Méx., ii. 332–7; Perez, Dicc., ii. 473-85; Balbotin, Invasion, 120.

ERRORS OF THE MEXICANS.

523

the blind hope that the enemy would fall into traps; which manifested itself in the insubordination and neglect of Valencia, the inaction of Santa Anna at Padierna and his lack of firmness and provision in subsequent encounters, and in the remissness of Álvarez. Other causes are found in the defective organization and rawness of the troops, mostly composed of inexperienced recruits and militia, and supplied with inferior arms, circumstances that swell the glory of the defence at Churubusco, Molino del Rey, and Chapultepec.

66 Scott's victories, while brightened by the stanchness and moderation of his army, are somewhat dimmed by costly sacrifices, due to dilatory movements and neglect of opportunities, and by allowing an astute opponent to circumvent him.

CHAPTER XX.

END OF THE UNITED STATES WAR.

1847-1848.

SANTA ANNA'S ADMINISTRATION-ANAYA'S FIRST TERM-FEDERAL CONSTI TUTION RESTORED-STATE of Guerrero-SANTA ANNA RESIGNS-PRES IDENT PEÑA AND HIS EFFORTS FOR PEACE-INVADER'S RULE and OperATIONS-SANTA ANNA DEPRIVED OF COMMAND-ANAYA AGAIN PRESIDENT -PEÑA SUCCEEDS-PEACE POLICY CONTINUED-INTERNAL DISTURBANCES -WAR OF RACES IN YUCATAN-TREATY WITH THE UNITED STATES, WHOSE FORCES EVACUATE MEXICO-GAINS AND LOSSES-EVILS OF THE WARPAREDES' REVOLUTION-END OF PEÑA'S ADMINISTRATION.

SOON after Santa Anna assumed the executive office, he formed what may properly be called a semiparliamentary cabinet, the ministers being Manuel Baranda, of relations; José Ignacio Gutierrez, of war; Juan Rondero, of the treasury; and F. Suarez Iriarte, of justice. Congress authorized him, under certain restrictions,' to borrow twenty million dollars. The Farías law of January 11th against clerical property was revoked.

Santa Anna's stay at the capital was short; with the authorization of the legislative body he took command of the national arms, General Pedro María Anaya being named his substitute,2 and taking charge of the presidency on the 2d of April.3

1 He was not to sell any portion of the national territory, neither was he to levy forced loans, nor seize private property without compensation, nor enter into contracts for foreign colonization. Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1847, 49-51; Apunt. Hist. Guerra, 124-7; Niles' Reg., lxxii. 214-16.

This was in accordance with the act of April 1st, suppressing the vicepresidency, authorizing the appointment of a substitute for the president when absent or unable to act, and fixing the 15th of May prox. as the date for the states to elect the president of the republic. Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1847, 53-5; Mayers' Mex. Aztec., i. 369; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 264–6; Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., vi. 190-1.

The ministers tendered their resignations, which were not accepted.

ANAYA AND SANTA ANNA.

525

Anaya was born in Huichapan in 1795, and began his military career in June 1811, as a cadet. In 1821 he joined Iturbide's movement, and marched to Guatemala under General Filisola. In 1823 he was made a major of cavalry; four years later a lieutenantcolonel; and in the short time from April to June 1833 a colonel and brigadier-general, for his faithful support of federal institutions. In later years he held several civil offices.

The whole attention of the government was now engaged in the war. The capital was placed under martial law, and the executive clothed with extraordinary powers.

On Santa Anna's return, May 20th, Anaya surrendered the government to him, and went to the front. Santa Anna's measures after this were wholly military, excepting one on the 21st of May, when he swore to carry out, and did publish, the Acta Constitutiva y de Reformas, passed on the 18th by the constituent congress, the third article of which declared that the acta constitutiva and federal constitution, sanctioned respectively on the 31st of January, and 24th of October, 1824, formed the only political Iriarte was, however, succeeded in the department of justice May 15th by Luis de la Rosa; and Gutierrez, in that of war, May 22d, by Lino José Alcorta. His promotions were so slow that, having taken part in 20 actions, he only became a captain early in 1819, and still held this rank in 1821.

3 Several important measures were adopted, namely: organization of the national guard; a law for the punishment of deserters; and one of general amnesty for all political offences from the time Mexico became a nation. Another to the same effect was issued June 14th. Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 268-9, 284–5.

The act is dated April 20th. He was, however, forbidden to make peace with the U. S., to conclude negotiations with foreign powers, or to sell national territory. Art. 5 declares it high treason for any one to enter into treaties with the U. S. Bustamante, Mem. Hist. Mex., MS., vi. 228-9; Méx., Col. Ley. y Dec., 1847, 60-2; Dublan and Lozano, Leg. Mex., v. 267-8. 'In the defence of the capital, Anaya was taken prisoner, but during the armistice, was unconditionally released.

8 His ministers at the time were: of relations, M. Baranda to 17th June, D. Ibarra to 6th July, José R. Pacheco to Sept. 16th; of justice, J. M. Duran to June 17th, V. Romero to Sept. 16th; of the treasury, Juan Rondero to Sept. 7th, and F. M. Lombardo to Sept. 16th; of war, I. Gutier rez to May 22d, L. J. Alcorta to Sept. 16th. Méx., Mem. Hacienda, 1870,