of Mrs. Parker, we think the court committed no error. It is wellsettled law in Ohio, that the declarations of the prosecuting witness, made immediately or soon after the commission of the alleged rape, may be received in evidence. They are to be received, not as evidence of their own truth, not as evidence of the guilt of the defendant, but merely in "corroboration of the prosecuting witness in the sense that they remove from her testimony a cloud of suspicion that might otherwise rest upon it. It was for this purpose exclusively that the court below admitted the declarations in question. The ground of objection to their admission was not stated by counsel at the time they were offered. The fact that sufficient evidence had already been given to show that complaint was made, although suggested by the court as a probable ground of the objection, was disavowed by the counsel. The ground now assumed is that the court allowed the witness to go too far into the details of the complaint, and particularly that the witness was allowed to state the fact that the prosecutrix declared the defendant to be the guilty party. Undoubtedly the safer and better rule, in the generality of cases, is to limit the prosecution to a general statement of the fact that complaint was made, or the substance of her declarations, and leave to the prisoner to bring out the details, if he chooses so to do. How far the prosecution shall be permitted to go into details, in giving the declarations of the female, must, to a certain extent at least, be left to the discretion of the court. Whether the court might, in any given case, so far abuse that discretion as to render the proceeding erroneous, we need not now decide. It is enough for this case to say that we are by no means prepared to lay down as law the rule insisted upon by counsel; namely, that in proving her declarations. the fact that the prosecutrix charged the crime upon the defendant should be suppressed. If she was acquainted with the party, and recognized him at the time of the outrage, his name would be almost the first word she would utter in making her outcry or complaint, and the complaint would be unnatural without it. It is because it is natural for a female to make immediate complaint, when so violated, that the law calls upon her to show the fact of such complaint, and the law will not require her to make a complaint that is unnatural and constrained. We think the court did not err in admitting the testimony of Mrs. Parker.

We are of opinion, however, that the court did err, to the prejudice of the defendant, in ruling out the questions propounded to the witness Hurlburt, on cross-examination. Hurlburt had testified, on his examination in chief, that Mrs. Hale, at the interview referred to, unhesitatingly and unqualifiedly recognized and identified the defendant as the guilty man. He was then asked, on crossexamination, whether he did not, at the close of the interview, say to Mrs. Hale, in effect, that she had failed to recognize or identify the defendant, and also whether he (the witness) did not subsequently say that Mrs. Hale, during the interview, admitted that she could not swear positively that he was the man. This was legitimate cross-examination. The plain object of both questions was to discredit the statements of the witness, by impeaching his veracity

or his memory. An affirmative answer to either of the two questions propounded would have directly tended to show, both that the witness had failed to give the whole conversation had between him and Mrs. Hale, at the time referred to, and also that he did not then understand her as identifying the prisoner, at least not as identifying him with that certainty or freedom from doubt, indicated by the witness's testimony in chief. We are clear in the conviction that the defendant was denied the benefit of a full and fair cross-examination of the witness, and that the court were in this subject in error. It is argued, however, that the error is not shown to be prejudicial to the defendant, for the reason that his counsel did not at the time disclose what they expected to prove by the witness. I know of no case where the rule requiring such a disclosure has been applied to a cross-examination. Whether such a case might arise, need not now be decided. We are satisfied it has no just application to this case, where the object and purpose of the inquiry was as manifest without any disclosure as it could possibly be made by an express avowal of counsel. Being an adversary witness, counsel could not be presumed to know what his answer would be. purpose and object was to impeach the witness. How this object was to be effected, counsel could not tell until they should hear his answer. If he answered affirmatively, he would stand impeached by the admission; if he answered negatively, then, and not till then, a foundation would have been laid for contradicting his testimony. We are of opinion, therefore, that the court, in ruling out these questions propounded to the witness on cross-examination, erred, to the prejudice of the plaintiff in error.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for new trial.

The

SIDNEY A. FRAZIER v. THE STATE OF OHIO.

(23 Ohio St. 551. Supreme Court, December, 1873.)
Bias of Juror.

Where a person called as a juror in a criminal case is challenged, on the ground that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, if it shall appear that such opinion was formed upon reading what purported to be a report of the testimony of the witnesses of the transaction, he is not, under section 134 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (as amended February 10, 1872), competent to serve as a juror in the case, and should be set aside by the court.

But if such opinion “shall appear to have been founded upon reading newspaper statements, communications, comments, or reports, or upon rumor or hearsay, and not upon conversations with witnesses of the transactions, or reading reports of their testimony or hearing them testify," the person so challenged may, in accordance with the proviso of said section, be admitted to serve as a juror if he shall state," on oath, that he feels able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidenee," and the court is satisfied that the juror is impartial and will render an impartial verdict in the case.

ERROR to the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County.
The facts are sufficiently stated in the opinion of the court.

C. H. Blackburn, for plaintiff in error.

F. B. Pond (Attorney General), for the state.

DAY, J. In the Court of Common Pleas of Hamilton County, at the June Term, 1873, Sidney A. Frazier was indicted and convicted for procuring an abortion upon Hattie Sperling. One of the grounds upon which it is sought to reverse the judgment rendered in the case is, that the court erred in refusing to sustain the prisoner's challenges to several of the jurors; to which rulings exceptions were duly taken.

A struck jury was called; and, during the impanelling of the jury, the accused, after his peremptory challenges were exhausted, challenged three jurors for cause, on the ground that each of them had "formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused."

Upon the examination of the jurors on oath, as required by the statute, "as to the ground of such opinion," it appeared that each of them had formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused; but they severally stated that they could, nevertheless, render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence.

One of them testified that his opinion was formed from what he had read in the newspapers respecting the case; another stated that his opinion was formed from reading the papers, including what was published therein as the testimony taken before the coroner's jury in regard to the transaction; and the other said his opinion was formed entirely from reading what purported to be a report of such testimony, as published in the newspapers.

The Constitution guarantees to the accused a "trial by an impartial jury." This right cannot be impaired. But what will constitute an abridgment of the right is, of necessity, a judicial question. Subject to the constitutional limitation, the General Assembly, in the exercise of its general legislative power, may prescribe what shall be the qualifications of jurors in criminal cases.

Under an act which provided that a juror might be challenged for any cause that rendered him an "unsuitable juror," the validity of which was to be determined by the court, it was held in Fouts v. The State (7 Ohio St. 471) to be a good cause of challenge that a juror had formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, although he might state that he thought his opinion thus formed would not influence his verdict in the case.

Subsequently, by an act passed March 3, 1860 (S. & C. 1197), it was provided that, when a juror is objected to on the ground that he had formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court shall examine him as to the grounds of his opinion, and if it shall appear to be formed upon reading newspaper statements or reports, or upon rumor or hearsay, and not upon conversation with witnesses of the transaction, or hearing them testify, and the juror shall say that he feels able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence, the court, if satisfied that the juror will render an impartial verdict, may, in its discretion, admit the juror as competent to serve

in the case.

In Cooper v. The State (16 Ohio St. 328), it was held that this act

was not repugnant to the Constitution; for, though it provided that an opinion formed in the manner indicated in the statute should not absolutely disqualify a juror, it was still left, to the court to determine whether he was a suitable juror, and he was to be accepted only on condition the court was satisfied that he would render an impartial verdict.

The Act of 1860, however, was repealed by the Code of Criminal Procedure, passed May 6, 1869. Section 134 of the Code provided, without qualification, that it shall be good cause for challenge to any person called as a juror, "that he has formed or expressed an opin ion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused." Thus the rule declared in Fouts v. The State was established by express statutory

enactment.

But by an act passed February 10, 1872 (69 Ohio L. 11), section 134 of the Code was amended by adding thereto a proviso, containing provisions similar to those of the Act of 1860, which is as follows:

"Provided, that if a juror shall state that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, the court shall thereupon proceed to examine, on oath, such juror as to the ground of such opinion; and if it shall appear to have been founded upon reading newspaper statements, communications, comments, or reports, or upon rumor or hearsay, and not upon conversations with witnesses of the transactions, or reading reports of their testimony or hearing them testify; and the juror shall say, on oath, that he feels able, notwithstanding such opinion, to render an impartial verdict upon the law and the evidence, the court, if satisfied that said juror is impartial and will render such verdict, may, in its discretion, admit such juror as competent to serve in such case."

This proviso modified the enactment which unconditionally disqualified a person from sitting as a juror in a criminal case, when he is challenged on the ground that he has formed or expressed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused. But the modification extends only to cases where the opinion "shall appear to have been formed upon reading newspaper statements, communications, comments, or reports, or upon rumor or hearsay." In such cases, if the juror swears that he feels able to render an impartial verdict, it is left to the discretion of the court to admit him as a competent juror, on being satisfied that he is impartial and will render an impartial verdict in the case. This is the extent of the authority conferred by the proviso. The court is not authorized to exercise such discretion, where the opinion of the juror is formed upon "conversations with witnesses of the transaction, or reading reports of their testimony, or hearing them testify." On the contrary, when a juror is challenged on the ground that he has formed his opinion, and it appears that it was formed upon either of these grounds, the idea of a discretionary power in the court, to admit him "as competent to serve" in the case, is negatived by the proviso.

When the opinion is formed upon either of the negative grounds enumerated, the case is not aided by the proviso, but is controlled alone by the section as it stood before the proviso was added. Such cases come directly under the rule in Fouts v. The State, that a

juror who has formed an opinion as to the guilt or innocence of the accused, and is challenged on that ground, should be set aside as an unsuitable juror. This, moreover, is in accordance with the obvious meaning and intent of the statute.

A good reason for distinguishing opinions, formed from hearing the statements of witnesses or reports of their testimony in relation to the case, from those formed upon hearsay or newspaper statements merely, arises from the danger of a juror confounding in his memory the facts heard or read as the testimony of the witnesses, with that given on the trial. But whatever may be the reason, the distinction is made. One class of opinions is embraced in the modification intended by the proviso; the other is excluded.

Reports of the testimony of the witnesses of the transaction were not included in the negative clause of the Act of 1860; but in the reënactment of the provisions of that act in 1872, the matter was deemed of sufficient importance to enlarge the negative clause of the latter act, so as to embrace such reports; and it is clear that the object of inserting the added provision in that clause would not be attained, unless it be construed to embrace what the juror understood to be reports of the testimony of witnesses of the transactions; for the proviso does not contemplate the hearing other testimony than his own upon the ground of his opinion.

In the case before us, one of the jurors challenged had formed his opinion entirely from reading reports of the testimony of witnesses of the transaction, as published in the newspapers. The court, therefore, erred in not sustaining the challenge of the accused to that juror, and in permitting him to serve in the case.

Another juror formed his opinion, in part, from reading reports of such testimony as published in the newspapers. He should have been set aside. He had formed an opinion, and therefore fell within the general rule against his competency. He was unable to say that his opinion was not founded upon reading reports of the testimony; and, therefore, it came within the negative clause, excluding it from the exception to the general rule provided for in the proviso of the statute. It makes no distinction between opinions formed in part upon the reported testimony of the witnesses, and those formed wholly from such testimony. Nor is there any difference in principle, for no measure can be taken of the degree of influence that the reading of the testimony had in forming the opinon of the juror.

The other juror challenged, for aught that appears, formed his pinion entirely "upon reading newspaper statements." He came within the exception, found in the proviso, to the general rule of the statute. The court, therefore, if satisfied of his impartiality, might admit him as "competent to serve" in the case. But, for the error in not sustaining the challenge of the accused to the two jurors before referred to, the judgment must be reversed, and the cause remanded for a new trial.

The other questions made in argument, so far as they are presented by the record, are settled by the Criminal Code, or by familiar rules of law, and require no further notice.

Judgment reversed, and cause remanded for a new trial.