main-levée, aucune décharge de cautionnement ne pourront être accordées autrement que dans les cas marqués par l'arrêté des consuls, du 6 germinal dernier, et par les règlemens auxquels cet arrêté ne déroge pas.
Fait à Paris, le 3 prairial an 8, maison de l'Oratoire, lieu des séances du conseil. Présens les citoyens REDON, président; NIOU, LACOSTE, Moreau, Montigny-Monṛplaisir, Barennes, DUFAUT, PARCEVAL-GRANDMAISON et TOURNACHON, membres du conseil.
En foi de quoi, la présente décision a été signée par le président.
Le secrétaire-général; signé, CALMELET.
1. A question of fact, under the 46th section of the Collection Law of the 2d of March, 1799, c. 128. exempting from duty the wearing apparel, and cother personal baggage, of persons arriving in the United States. The Robert Edwards, 2. Where the res gesta, in a reve- nue cause, are incapable of ex- planation consistently with the innocence of the party, con- demnation follows, although there be no positive testimony of the offence having been com- mitted. ib. 3. Although a mere intention to · evade the payment of duties be. not, per se, a cause of forfeiture, yet when a question arises, whether an act has been com- mitted which draws after it that consequence, such intention
will justify the Court in not putting on the conduct of the party, in respect to the act in question, an interpretation, as favourable as under other cir- cumstances it would be disposed to do. Ib.. 191 4. In all proceedings in rem, on an appeal, the property follows the cause into the Circuit Court, and is subject to the disposition of that Court. But it does not follow the cause into the Su- preme Court, on an appeal to that Court. The Collector, 194 5. After an appeal from the Dis-
trict to the Circuit Court, the former Court can make no or- der respecting the property, whether it has been sold, and the proceeds paid into Court, or whether it remains specifi- cally, or its proceeds remain, in the hands of the Marshal. ib. 6. It is a great irregularity for the Marshal to keep the property, or the proceeds thereof, in his
own hands, or to distribute the same among the parties entitled, without a special order from the Court; but such an irregulari- ty may be cured by the assent and ratification of all the parties interested, if there be no mala fides. The Collector, 194 7. Under the 67th section of the Collection Act of the 2d of March, 1799, c. 128. where goods were entered by an agent of the owner on his behalf, and the entry included only a part of the goods which the packages contained, and the owner sub- sequently made a further, or post entry of the residue of the goods; and the packages being opened several days afterwards and examined by the Collector in the presence of two mer- chants, and their contents found to agree with the two entries taken together, but to differ materially from the first entry; held, that the Collector was not precluded from making a seizure of the goods after the second entry, for a variance between the contents of the packages and the first entry, and that such seizure must be followed by confiscation, unless it should appear that such difference pro- ceeded from accident and mis- take, and not from an intention to defraud the revenue. The. United States v. Six Packages of Goods, 520
AGENT AND PRINCIPAL. H. and others, merchants in Balti- more, consigned a vessel and
cargo to W. and others, mer- chants in Amsterdam, with in- structions to them respecting her ulterior destination, which showed, that on the failure of getting a freight to Batavia, or of selling the vessel at a price limited, she was to proceed to St. Petersburg, and there take in a return cargo of Russia goods for the United States, but with instructions to the master committing to him the manage- ment of the ulterior voyage. No freight to Batavia could be obtained, and the vessel could not be sold for the price limit- ed at Amsterdam; and W. and others, purchased in Amsterdam, with the concurrence of the master, a return cargo of Rus- sian goods, partly with the mo- ney of H. and others, and partly with money advanced by them- selves. On the return of the vessel to Baltimore, H. and others objected to the purchase of this cargo in Amsterdam, as being contrary to express or- ders, and gave notice to W. and others, of their determination to hold them responsible for all losses sustained in consequence of this breach of instructions; but received the goods and sold them. W. and others brought an assumpsit against H. and others, to recover from them the moneys advanced. The de- claration contained the three usual money.counts. Held, 1st. That the plaintiffs had a demand in law against the defendants, which could be maintained in this form of action. 2dly. That whether the plaintiffs could, or could not, be made responsible in' any form of action which might be devised for the possible loss
resulting from the breaking up of the intended voyage to St. Petersburgh, the defendants were not entitled to a deduction from the plaintiffs' demand, for the amount of such loss. Wil- links v. Hollingsworth, 240. 251
See CONSTITUTIONAL LAW Lo- CAL LAW, 5, 6.
BILLS OF EXCHANGE AND
PROMISSORY NOTES.
1. Where the second day of grace falls on Saturday, it is the last day of grace; and notice of non- payment given to the drawer of a bill on that day, after a de- mand upon the acceptor on the same day, is sufficient to charge. the drawer. Bussard v. Leer- ing, 102 2, Notice to the drawer, by putting the same into the post-office, where the persons live in diffe- rent places, is good. ib.
3. After demand of the maker of a note, on the third day of grace, notice to the endorser on the same day, is sufficient by the general law merchant. Linden berger v. Beall, 104 4. Evidence of a letter, containing notice, having been put into the post-office, directed to the en- dorser, at his place of residence, is sufficient proof of the notice to be left to the jury, and it is unnecessary to give notice to the defendant to produce the letter before such evidence can be admitted.
5. No protest of a promissory note, or inland bill of exchange, is necessary. Young v. Bryan, 146
6. A protest of an inland bill or promissory note is not necessa- ry, nor is it evidence of the facts stated in it. The Union Bank v. Hyde, 572 7. The following undertaking of the endorser of a promissory note, "I do request that here- after any notes that may fall due in the Union Bank, in which I am, or may be endorser, shall not be protested, as I will con- sider myself bound in the same manner as if the said notes had been or should be legally pro- tested," held to be ambiguous as to whether it amounted to waiver of demand and notice; and parol proof admitted to show that it was the understand- ing of the parties, that the de- mand and notice required by law to charge the endorser, should be dispensed with. ib.
1. There is no difference in re- spect to the conclusiveness of a judgment at law and of a decree in Chancery. Both are conclu- sive as to the facts directly in controversy. Hopkins v. Lee,
109. 113 2. A decree cannot be pronounced, on the testimony of a single witness, unaccompanied by cor- roborating circumstances, against a positive denial, by the defend- apt, of any matter directly charged by the bill, in the de-
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