view a judgment in favor of plaintiff against
the County of Lake, on county warrants issued
for county expenses. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.
Messrs. Daniel E. Parks and H. B. John-
son, for plaintiff in error:

liability by reason of being indebted to the
constitutional limit.

Bloomington v. Perdue, 99 Ill. 329; Buchanan
v. Litchfield, 102 U. S. 278 (26: 138.)

The phrase for all purposes includes debts
without regard to the methods of their contrac-
tion.

People v. May, 9 Colo. 404.

The adoption of a constitutional limitation
like the one under consideration prohibits the
incurring of indebtedness under propositions
that have already been voted upon by the peo-bearer, are not negotiable paper.
ple.

Aspinwall v. Daviess Co. 63 U. S. 22 How.
364 (16: 296); Falconer v. Buffalo & J. R. Co.
69 N. Y. 491; State v. Funding Board, 28 La.
Ann. 249.

The words of the Constitution "for all pur-
poses" exclude all consideration of the nature of
the indebtedness or the reason of its contraction.
Springfield v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626; Litchfield |
v. Ballou, 114 U. S. 190 (29: 132).

It is not permitted to interpret what has no
need of interpretation.

Jackson v. Lewis, 17 Johns. 477; Waterford
& W. Turnp. Co. v. People. 9 Barb. 170; People
New York Cent. R. Co. 13 N. Y. 80.

V.

Such orders, even when made payable to

Jerome v. Rio Grande Co. 5 McCrary, 639, 18
Fed. Rep. 873; Nashville v. Ray, 86 U. S. 19
Wall. 468 (22: 164); Wall v. Monroe Co. 103
U. S. 74 (26; 430); Ouachita Co. v. Wolcott, 103
U. S. 559 (26: 505); Claiborne Co. v. Brooks,
111 U. S. 400 (28: 470).

An evidence of indebtedness, issued after the
constitutional limit has been exceeded, is abso-
lutely_void.

McPherson v. Foster, 43 Iowa, 48; Law v.
People, 87 Ill. 385; Fuller v. Chicago, 89 Ill.
282; Prince v. Quincy, 105 II. 138, 215; Spring-
field v. Edwards, 84 Ill. 626; Litchfield v. Ballou,
114 U. S. 190 (29: 132).

Mr. Willard Teller, for defendant in error:
To authorize an implied limitation, the im-

Though used in their plain and ordinary
sense, general words may be limited by the rel-plication must be a necessary one.
ative word "such" to a particular description of
thing contained in a preceding_section.

Rex v. Gwenop, 3 T. R. 135; Morris v. Mellin,
6 Barn. & C. 446; Bennett v. Daniel, 10 Barn.
& C. 500; Poulter's Case, 11 Coke, 33a; Rex v.
Marks, 3 East, 157; Wood v. Mytton, 10 Q. B.
806; Eastern Counties & L. & B. R. Co. v. Mar-
riage, 9 H. L. Cas. 32; Reg. v. Rose, 6 Q. B. 153;
Reg. v. Randall, 4 El. & Bl. 564; Rex v. Baw-
bergh, 2 Barn. & C. 222; Doe v. Hodgson, 12
Ad. & El. 135; Skuse v. Davis, 10 Ad. & El.
635; King v. Burrell, 12 Ad. & El. 460; Reg. v.
Lee, L. R. 1 Q. B. Div. 198; Kemp v. Holland,
10 Mo. 255; Sullivan v. State, 36 Ark. 64; Val-
entine v. Borden, 100 Mass. 273; Summerman
v. Knowles, 33 N. J. L, 202; Evans v. Com. 3
Met. 453; Com. v. Miller, 3 Cush. 243; Com. v.
Hancock Free Bridge Corp. 2 Gray, 58; U. S.
v. Gooding, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 460, 477 (6: 693);
Whiteford v. Com. 6 Rand. 721; S. C. 18 Am.
Dec. 771.

The insertion of the word such would operate
to destroy the effect of the important word all.
The word all is regarded as one of the most
definite, important and technical words known
to the English language.

Harrington v. Smith, 28 Wis. 43; Demarest
v. Wynkoop, 3 Johns. Ch. 142; Torrance v.
McDougald, 12 Ga. 530; Collins v. Carman, 5
Md. 505, 533; Guest v. Opdyke, 31 N. J. L. 552;
Latshaw v. McNees, 50 Mo. 381; Allgood v.
Blake, L. R. 7 Exch. 339; Magrave v. White, 8
Barn & C. 412; Sidaway v. Hay, 3 Barn. & C.

12.

A distinction cannot be made between con-
tractual and compulsory obligations.
People v. May, 9 Colo. 404, 414; Rollins v.
Lake Co. 34 Fed. Rep. 845.

A county has no powers except those con-
ferred by law.

Ray Co. v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236; Mister v.
City of Kansas, 18 Mo. App. 217; People v.
State Treas. 23 Mich. 504; People v. Chicago, 51
Ill. 34.

People v. Rucker, 5 Colo. 455: People v.
Wright, 6 Colo. 92; Alexander v. People, 7
Colo. 155.

Neither the laws of the State nor its Constitu-
tion should be interpreted so as to deprive the
county of power to effectuate the ends of their
being.

Cooley, Const. Lim. 240 (5th ed.); 1 Dillon,
Mun. Corp. § 23; Hamilton Co. v. Mighels, 7
Ohio St. 109; Talbot Co. v. Queen Anne's Co.
50 Md. 245: State v. St. Louis Co. Ct. 34 Mo.
570; Ray Co. v. Bentley, 49 Mo. 236.

The section must be so construed as to be
consistent with the objects of the whole instru-
ment and to secure effectiveness to all parts
of it.

Platt v. Union Pac. R. Co. 99 U. S. 58 (25:
427); U. S. v. Bassett, 2 Story, 389; Den v.
Du Bois, 16 N. J. L. 285; People v. Osborne,
Colo. 605; Opinion of Judges, 22 Pick. 573;
Com. v. McCaughey, 9 Gray, 297.

Courts are not confined to the exact words;
these may be rejected or restrained.

Reiche v. Smythe, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 162
(20: 566); U. S. v. Buchanan, 9 Fed. Rep. 689;
Bond v. Jay, 11 U. S. 7 Cranch, 353 (3 367);
Walker v. Springfield, 94 Ill. 364.

General terms should be so limited in their
application as not to lead to injustice, oppres-
sion or any absurd consequence.

U. S. v. Fisher, 6 U. S. 2 Cranch, 358 (2: 304);
Chinese Merchant v. Case, 13 Fed. Rep. 605;
Southern Pac. R. Co. v. Orton, 32 Fed. Rep.
457-477; Cooley, Const. Lim. 86-7; Dwar.
Stat. Rule 4, p. 144; Springfield v. Edwards, 84
Ill. 626.

Where exceptions follow general words, or
where certain specific things are subjected to a
change or restriction, everything else, even of
a similar nature, is excluded.

Broom, Legal Maxims, 515, 516, 517; U. 8.
v. Fisher, 6 Ü. S. 2 Cranch, 358, 387 (2: 304);
Re Bliss, 9 Johns. 349; Rex v. Richardson, 1
Burr. 517; Rex v. Bell, 7 T. R. 600; Dwar.
Stat. 221; Gaddis v. Richland Co. 92 İll. 124;

A municipal corporation, otherwise liable for
negligence, would not be exempt from such | Brush v. Lemma, 77 Ill. 496.

[663]

[664]

The cause was tried below on an agreed state | subject. Manifestly, the purpose of the col-
of facts, before the court, on the written waiver
of a jury. In the agreement is found the fol-
lowing stipulation:

"It is further stipulated and agreed that if section six (6) of article eleven (11) of the Constitution of the State of Colorado, be construed to be a limitation upon the power of defendant county to contract any and all indebtedness, including all such as that sued upon in this action, then it is admitted that the claimed indebtedness sued on herein was incurred after the limitation prescribed by said Constitution had been reached and exceeded by the said defendant, the County of Lake; and in the event of such a construction by this court, or the Supreme Court of the United States, then and in that case, and for the purposes of this action, it is hereby also admitted that all the allegations of the fifth separate defense to this action of the answer of the defendant are true and correct, and the defendant entitled to judgment

thereon."

location of the two passages in one section is not
that by a wrested reading the latter may yet
further limit and complicate the power of bor-
rowing; but that the meaning of the latter pas-
sage may be more sharply and clearly defined
and emphasized by an antithesis. It is an ex-
ample not of inadvertence, but of good rhetoric,
and care given to the wording of the section.
as if special attention had been by discussion

The next provisions are:

Fourthly. That the aggregate debt of any county for all purposes (exclusive of debts contracted before the adoption of the Constitution) shall not at any time exceed the sum of three mills (or six, as the case might be) on assessed values; unless the taxpayers vote in favor of such excess, at some general election; and

Fifthly. That even when an election has been held, the aggregate debt so contracted shall not exceed, at any one time, the sum of six mills (or twelve as the case might be) on the as

sessed values.

We are unable to adopt the constructive in-
The court below held (34 Fed. Rep. 845): terpolations ingeniously offered by counsel for
First, that the said section six, in all of its defendant in error. Why not assume that the
sentences, does not refer exclusively to debts framers of the Constitution, and the people.
contracted by loan, but there are two independ- who voted it into existence, meant exactly
ent declarations in it, the second declaration what it says? At the first glance, its reading
beginning with the words, "and the aggregate produces no impression of doubt as to the mean-
amount of indebtedness of any county, for all ing. It seems all sufficiently plain; and in
purposes, etc.;" secondly, that in determining such case there is a well settled rule which we
whether the limit of county indebtedness, fixed must observe. The object of construction, ap-
by the second declaration, had been reached, it plied to a Constitution, is to give effect to the
is immaterial how any particular portion of intent of its framers, and of the people in adopt-
the indebtedness arose; but that, thirdly, when ing it. This intent is to be found in the in-
such limit had been reached, while the power strument itself; and when the text of a con-
of the county to incur further debt by constitutional provision is not ambiguous the
tract was suspended, the liability for further
amounts in the shape of fees and salaries, and
other "compulsory obligations" imposed by
the will of the Legislature, remained and was
enforceable. Proceeding on this idea, the cir-
cuit court rendered judgment in favor of the
plaintiff below; whereupon the county brought
the case here by writ of error.

courts, in giving construction thereto, are not
at liberty to search for its meaning beyond the
instrument.

To get at the thought or meaning expressed
[in a statute, a contract or a Constitution, the
first resort, in all cases, is to the natural sig-
nification of the words, in the order of gram-
matical arrangement in which the framers of
the instrument have placed them. If the words
convey a definite meaning, which involves no
absurdity nor any contradiction of other parts
of the instrument, then that meaning, apparent
on the face of the instrument, must be accepted,
and neither the courts nor the Legislature have
the right to add to it or take from it. Newell
v. People, 7 N. Y. 97; Hills v. Chicago, 60 Ill.
86; Denn v. Reid, 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 524 [9: 519];
Leonard v. Wiseman, 31 Md. 204; People v.
Potter, 47 N. Y. 375; Cooley, Const. Lim. p.
57; Story, Const. § 400; Beardstown v. Vir-
ginia, 76 Ill. 34. So, also, where a law is ex-
pressed in plain and unambiguous terms wheth-

[670]

We are unable to assent either to the conclusions of the court below, or to the positions of defendant in error. The language of the sixth section seems to be neither complicated nor doubtful; and we think it plain that what is meant is exactly what is said; no more and no less. It deals with the subject of county debts, and, to begin with, assumes a unit of measurement which is one and one half dollars in the thousand of assessed values; that is, one and and half mills on the dollar. This is about equal to the average amount of taxes levied for county purposes per annum under normal conditions. The provision then proceeds as follows: First. It provides that no county shall bor-er those terms are general or limited, the Leg [671] row money in any way;

Secondly. Exception is then made in favor of the erection of necessary public buildings, and the making or repairing of public roads and bridges; and,

Thirdly. The loans allowed by the foregoing exception to be taken in any one year are limited to the amount of one and one half mills on assessed values in one class of counties, and three mills in another class.

Here the matter of indebtedness by loan is completed; and the section passes to a broader

islature should be intended to mean what they
have plainly expressed, and consequently no
room is left for construction. United States v.
Fisher, 6 U. S. 2 Cranch, 358, 399 [2: 304, 317];
Doggett v. Florida R. Co. 99 U. S. 72 [25: 301].

There is even stronger reason for adhering
to this rule in the case of a Constitution than
in that of a statute, since the latter is passed by
a deliberative body of small numbers, a large
proportion of whose members are more or less
conversant with the niceties of construction
and discrimination, and fuller opportunity ex-

[672]

ists for attention and revision of such a charac- | 52 Wis. 37, the court says: "We have been
ter, while Constitutions, although framed by urged with great ability to give the section
conventions, are yet created by the votes of the such construction as to forever prevent unjust
entire body of electors in a State, the most of discrimination by the Legislature; and grave
whom are little disposed, even if they were consequences have been assumed as the result
able, to engage in such refinements. The sim- of a different construction. On the other hand,
plest and most obvious interpretation of a Con- we have been urged with equal ability that
stitution, if in itself sensible, is the most likely such a decision would unseat many titles, stop
to be that meant by the people in its adoption. revenue, necessitate a revision of the laws of
Such considerations give weight to that line taxation, and possibly the calling of a consti-
of remark of which People v. Purdy, 2 Hill, 35, tutional convention. The answer to all this is
affords an example. There, Bronson, J., com- obvious. It is no part of the duty of the court
menting upon the danger of departing from to make or unmake, but simply to construe
the import and meaning of the language used this provision of the Constitution. All ques- [673]
to express the intent, and hunting after proba- tions of policy; all questions of restriction
ble meanings not clearly embraced in that lan- and unjust discrimination; all questions of
guage, says: "In this way the Constitution is flexibility and adjustability to meet the varied
made to mean one thing by one man and some wants and necessities of the people-must be
thing else by another, until in the end it is in regarded as having been fully considered and
danger of being rendered a mere dead letter, conclusively determined by the adoption of the
and that, too, when the language is so plain Constitution. The oath of all is to support it
and explicit that it is impossible to mean more as it is, and not as it might have been. To do
than one thing, unless we lose sight of the in- so may, in some cases, lead to individual hard-
strument itself and roam at large in the fields ships; but to do otherwise would be most por-
of speculation."
tentous with evil." In Law v. People, 87 Ill.
Words are the common signs that mankind 395, the court said: "But, should it work hard-
make use of to declare their intention to one ship to individuals, that by no means warrants
another; and when the words of a man ex- the violation of a plain and emphatic provision
press his meaning plainly, distinctly and per- of the Constitution. The liberty of the citizen,
fectly, we have no occasion to have recourse and his security in all his rights, in a large de-
to any other means of interpretation.
gree depend upon a rigid adherence to the pro-
Defendant in error insists that the interpreta-visions of the Constitution and the laws, and
tion contended for by the county leads to cer- their faithful performance. If courts, to avoid
tain absurd consequences, viz., that it is sense- hardships, may disregard and refuse to enforce
less to limit the power of a county to incur their provisions, then the security of the citizen
debt generally, since its exercise of such a is imperiled. Then the will, it may be the un-
power may, by sudden exigencies, become im- bridled will, of the judge would usurp the
peratively necessary to the discharge of its place of the Constitution and the laws; and the
functions; that it would be to require the violation of one provision is liable to speedily
county to provide in advance by taxation or become a precedent for another, perhaps more
otherwise, for the payment of expenses, which, flagrant, until all constitutional and legal bar-
from their nature, can only be guessed at; that riers are destroyed, and none are secure in their
it would be to enable any county in two years, rights. Nor are we justified in resorting to
by a vote and a loan, to exhaust the whole pos- strained construction or astute interpretation,
sible indebtedness in the way of buildings, to avoid the intention of the framers of the
roads and bridges, leaving no margin for other Constitution, or the statutes adopted under it,
necessities; that it would be to destroy the even to relieve against individual or local hard-
county governments, since the county officials ships. If unwise or bard in their operation,
and others will not work for nothing, and the the power that adopted can repeal or amend,
margin of possible debt is, in nearly all the and remove the inconvenience. The power to
counties, already reached; and that it would do so has been wisely withheld from the courts,
be to avoid nearly all the tax payments hereto- their functions only being to enforce the laws
fore made in warrants. All of these objections as they find them enacted."
could well be answered from the facts as dis-
closed by the bill of exceptions; but it is not
necessary.

In the light of these principles, expressed in the authorities quoted and in many others, we must decline to read the expression in section six, "and the aggregate amount of indebtedness of any county, for all purposes,” etc., as if

We cannot say, as a matter of law, that it
was absurd for the framers of the Constitu-
tion for this new State to plan for the estab-it were written "and the aggregate amount of
lishment of its financial system, on a basis that
should closely approximate the basis of cash.
It was a scheme favored by some of the ablest
of the earlier American statesmen. Nor can
the fact disclosed in the bill of exceptions, that,
after the adoption of the State Constitution, the Neither can we assent to the position of the
county officials and many of the people, de-court below that there is, as to this case, a dif-
signedly or undesignedly, disregarded the con-
stitutional rule, render the plan absurd. If it
was a mistaken scheme, if its operation has
proved or shall prove to be more inconvenient
than beneficial, the remedy is with the people,
not with the courts.

such indebtedness," etc. This the defendant
in error concedes to be necessary to his case.
We see no admissible reason for the introduction [674]
of this restrictive word such, except to alter
radically the plain meaning of the sentence.

In Wisconsin Cent. R. Co. v. Taylor County,

ference between indebtedness incurred by con-
tracts of the county and that form of debt de-
nominated "compulsory obligations." The
compulsion was imposed by the Legislature of
the State, even if it can be said correctly that
the compulsion was to incur debt; and the Leg.
islature could no more impose it than the coun-

ty could voluntarily assume it, as against the value, and the other the ratio between that assessed
disability of a constitutional prohibition. Nor value and the debt proposed, these being exactions
of the Constitution itself, it is not within the power
does the fact that the Constitution provided for of a Legislature to dispense with them, either di-
certain county officers, and authorized the Leg-rectly or indirectly, by the creation of a ministerial
islature to fix their compensation and that of commission whose finding shall be taken in lieu of
other officials, affect the question. There is no
necessary inability to give both of the provi-
sions their exact and literal fulfillment.

In short, we conclude that article six aforesaid is "a limitation upon the power of the county to contract any and all indebtedness, including all such as that sued upon in this ac

the facts.

8. Where the Legislature, being the source of exaction, has created a board authorized to determine whether such exaction has been complied with, its finding is conclusive as to a bona fide pur[No. 1265].

chaser.

Submitted Jan. 3, 1889. Decided May 13, 1889.
[N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United

tion;" and therefore, under the stipulation States for the District of Colorado, to review
already set forth, the county is entitled to judg-

ment.

a judgment in favor of plaintiff in a suit
against a county in the State of Colorado to re-
cover on coupons for interest on bonds issued
by the county. Reversed.

The facts are stated in the opinion.

Messrs. Daniel E. Parks and H. B.
Johnson for plaintiff in error

Messrs. Robert E. Foot and Willard
Teller for defendant in error.

This action was instituted in the Circuit
Court of the United States for the District of
Colorado.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 674-684.)
Municipal bonds-recitals, do not extend to mat-
It is a suit against the County of Lake, in
ters of law-fact ascertainable by record-when that State, and is based on one hundred and
recitals do not cover such fact-amount of as ninety-eight coupons, aggregating the sum of
sessed valuation-constitutional requirements $7,280, and being for interest on certain bonds
cannot be dispensed with by the Legislature-issued by the county on the second of January,
legislative exactions.

1. The purchaser of municipal bonds is held to know the constitutional provisions and the statutory restrictions bearing on the question of the authority to issue them; also the recitals of the bonds he buys; while, on the other hand, if he acts in good faith and pay value, he is entitled to the protection of such recitals of facts as the bonds

may contain.

2. Where the recitals of the bonds are merely to the effect that the statute has been fully complied with, and there is no recital that the constitutional requirements have been observed, there is no estoppel as to the constititutional question.

3. A recital does not extend to or cover matters of law; and a certificate reciting the actual facts, and that thereby the bonds were conformable to the law, when, judicially speaking, they are not, will not make them so, nor can it work an estoppel upon the county to claim the protection of the law.

4. If the fact necessary to the existence of the authority is by law to be ascertained, not officially by the officers charged with the execution of the power, but by reference to some express and definite record of a public character, then the authority to act will depend upon the existence of the requisite fact as shown by the record, and not upon its ascertainment and determination by anyone.

5. All persons claiming under the exercise of such a power may be put to proof of the fact made a condition of its lawfulness, notwithstanding any

recitals in the instrument.

1882.

The case was tried in the court below on an
agreed statement of facts, which is in the bill
of exceptions. From that agreement it ap-
pears that the bonds, from which the coupons
sued on were detached, were executed in ex-
change for divers warrants of the county, to
the amount of five hundred thousand dollars;
that they were executed in compliance with an
Act of the General Assembly of Colorado, en-
titled "An Act to Enable the Several Counties
of the State to Fund their Floating Indebted [676]
ness;" that the indebtedness of the county on
the 6th day of September, 1881, the day the
first notice was published under the Act, as
evidenced by county warrants, was $500,000,
and the assesed valuation of the property of said
county on said day was $16,423,403, afterwards
rebated, in 1882, to $5,017,000, in accordance
with a decision of the supreme court; and that
such was the indebtedness and valuation on the
day the bonds and coupons were issued.

There is also in the record an agreement be-
tween the parties that if section six of article
eleven of the Constitution of the State of Col-
orado be construed to be a limitation upon the
6. No recital as to the amount of the assessed power of the defendant county to contract any
taxable valuation of the property to be taxed for and all indebtedness, including all such as that
the payment of the bonds can take the place of the sued upon in this action, then it is admitted
assessment itself, where the amount as fixed by ref-
erence to that record is made by the Constitution that the claimed indebtedness sued on here-
the standard for measuring the limit of the munic-in was incurred after the limitation prescribed
ipal power, and the ascertainment of that fact is
not submitted to the county officers.
7. Where the standard of validity is created by
the Constitution and in that standard two factors
are to be considered, one the amount of assessed

by said Constitution had been reached and ex-
ceeded by the said defendant, the County of
Lake; and in the event of such a construction
by the Circuit Court, or the Supreme Court of
the United States, then and in that case, and
for the purposes of the action, it is also ad-
mitted that the defendant is entitled to judg
ment thereon, unless the defendant is estopped