[601] [602] United States with any foreign nation can be- | ton, 2 Curtis, 454, 459; and he held that whilst the United States. 'Whereas, the treaties concluded between the United States and France have been repeatedly violated on the part of the French Government; and the just claims of the United States for reparation of the injuries so committed have been refused, and their attempts to negotiate an amicable adjustment of all complaints between the two nations have been repelled with indignity; And whereas, under authority of the French Government, there is yet pursued against the United States a system of predatory violence, infracting the said treaties and hostile to the rights of a free and independent nation: "Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That the United States are of right freed and exonerated from the stipulations of the treaties and of the consular convention heretofore concluded between the United States and France; and that the same shall not henceforth be regarded as legally obligatory on the Government or citizens of the United States." (1 Stat. at L. 578.) designed; and if the latter, whether the reasons that Congress possesses the power to pass an Act, our province ends with its construction sented for determination. Congress has the and its application to cases as they are prepower under the Constitution to declare war, and in two instances where the power has been exercised-in the war of 1812 against Great Britain, and in 1846 against Mexico-the propriety and wisdom and justice of its action and best men in the country, but no one were vehemently assailed by some of the ablest doubted the legality of the proceeding; and any imputation by this or any other court of This Act, as seen, applied in terms only to the United States upon the motives of the the future. Of course, whatever of a perma- members of Congress who in either case voted nent character had been executed or vested for the declaration, would have been justly the under the treaties was not affected by it. In cause of animadversion. We do not mean to that respect the abrogation of the obligations intimate that the moral aspects of legislative of a treaty operates, like the repeal of a law, Acts may not be proper subjects of consideraonly upon the future, leaving transactions exe- tion. Undoubtedly they may be, at proper cuted under it to stand unaffected. The valid times and places, before the public, in the halls ity of this legislative release from the stipula- of Congress, and in all the modes by which the tions of the treaties was of course not a matter public mind can be influenced. Public opinfor judicial cognizance. The question whether ion, thus enlightened, brought to bear upon our Government is justified in disregarding its legislation, will do more than all other causes engagements with another nation is not one for to prevent abuses; but the province of the the determination of the courts. This subject courts is to pass upon the validity of laws, not was fully considered by Mr. Justice Curtis, to make them, and when their validity is whilst sitting at the circuit, in Taylor v. Mor-established, to declare their meaning and apply [603] 604] [605] their provisions. All else lies beyond their purposes her government is complete; to all While under our Constitution and form of are members of one great empire-for some 69 " The control of local matters being left to local authorities, and national matters being intrusted to the Government of the Union, the [606] problem of free institutions existing over a widely extended country, having different climates and varied interests, has been happily solved. For local interests the several States of the Union exist, but for national purposes, embracing our relations with foreign nations, we are but one people, one nation, one power. To preserve its independence, and give security against foreign aggression and encroachment, is the highest duty of every nation, and to attain these ends nearly all other considerations are to be subordinated. It matters not in what form such aggression and encroachment come, whether from the foreign nation acting in its national character or from vast hordes of its people crowding in upon us. The Government, possessing the powers which are to be exercised for protection and security, is clothed with authority to determine the occasion on which the powers shall be called forth; and its determination, so far as the subjects affected are concerned, are necessarily 1075 [607] conclusive upon all its departments and officers. I power vested in the Constitution of Mexico to The power of the Government to exclude foreigners from the country whenever, in its judgment, the public interests require such exclusion, has been asserted in repeated instances, and never denied by the executive or legislative departments. In a communication made in December, 1852, to Mr. A. Dudley Mann, at one time a special agent of the Department of State in Europe, Mr. Everett, then Secretary of State under President Fillmore, writes: This Government could never give up the right of excluding foreigners whose presence it might deem a source of danger to the United States.' Nor will this Government consider such exclusion of American citizens from Russia necessarily a matter of diplomatic complaint to that country." In a dispatch to Mr. Fay, our minister to Switzerland, in March, 1856, Mr. Marcy, Secretary of State, under President Pierce, writes: "Every society possesses the un doubted right to determine who shall compose its members, and it is exercised by all nations, both in peace and war.' "It may always be questionable whether a resort to this power is warranted by the circumstances, or what department of the Government is empowered to exert it; but there can be no doubt that it is possessed by all nations, and that each may decide for itself when the occasion arises demanding its exercise." In a communication in September, 1869, to Mr. Washburne, our minister to France, Mr. Fish, Secretary of State under President Grant, uses this language: "The control of the people within its limits, and the right to expel from its territory persons who are dangerous to the peace of the State, are too clearly within the essential attributes of sovereignty to be seriously contested. Strangers visiting or sojourning in a foreign country voluntarily submit themselves to its laws and customs; and the municipal laws of France, authorizing the expulsion of strangers, are not of such recent date, nor has the exercise of the power by the Government of France been so infrequent, that Sojourners within her territory can claim surprise when the power is put in force." In a communication to Mr. Foster, our minister to Mexico, in July, 1879, Mr. Evarts, Secretary of State under President Hayes, referring to the August 3, 1882, Mr. Frelinghuysen, Secretary of State under President Arthur, writes: "This Government cannot contest the right of foreign Governments to exclude, on police, or other grounds, American citizens from their shores." (Wharton's Int. Law Dig. § 206.) The exclusion of paupers, criminals and persons afflicted with incurable diseases, for which statutes have been passed, is only an applica tion of the same power to particular classes of persons whose presence is deemed injurious or a source of danger to the country. As applied to them, there has never been any question as to the power to exclude them. The power is constantly exercised; its existence is involved in the right of self-preservation. As to paupers, it makes no difference by whose aid they are brought to the country. As Mr. Fish, when Secretary of State, wrote in a communication under date of December 26, 1872, to Mr. James Moulding, of Liverpool, the Goveru ment of the United States "is not willing and will not consent to receive the pauper class of any community who may be sent or may be assisted in their immigration at the expense of Government or of municipal authorities." As to criminals, the power of exclusion has always been exercised, even in the absence of any stat ute on the subject. In a dispatch to Mr. Cramer, our minister to Switzerland, in December, 1881, Mr. Blaine, Secretary of State under President Arthur, writes: "While, under the Constitution and the laws, this coun- [609] try is open to the honest and the industrious immigrant, it has no room outside of its prisons or almshouses for depraved and incorrigible criminals or hopelessly dependent paupers who may have become a pest or burden, or both, to their own country." (Wharton's Int. Law Dig. supra.) The power of exclusion of foreigners being an incident of sovereignty belonging to the Government of the United States, as a part of those sovereign powers delegated by the Constitution, the right to its exercise at any time when, in the judgment of the Government, the interests of the country require it, cannot be granted away or restrained on behalf of any one. The powers of Government are delegated in trust to the United States, and are incapable of transfer to any other partics. They cannot [610] be abandoned or surrendered. Nor can their exercise be hampered, when needed for the public good, by any considerations of private interest. The exercise of these public trusts is not the subject of barter or contract. What ever license, therefore, Chinese laborers may have obtained previous to the Act of October 1, 1888, to return to the United States after their departure, is held at the will of the Government, revocable at any time, at its pleasure. Whether a proper consideration by our Government of its previous laws, or a proper respect for the nation whose subjects are affected by its action, ought to have qualified its inhibition and made it applicable only to persons departing from the country after the passage of the Act, are not questions for judicial determination. If there be any just ground of complaint on the part of China, it must be made to the political department of our Government, which is alone competent to act upon the subject. The rights and interests created by a treaty, which have become so vested that its expiration or abrogation will not destroy or impair them, are such as are connected with and lie in property capable of sale and transfer, or other disposition, not such as are personal and untransferable in their character. Thus, in The Head-Money Cases, the court speaks of certain rights being in some instances conferred upon the citizens or subjects of one nation residing in the territorial limits of the other, which are "capable of enforcement as between private parties in the courts of the country.' "An illustration of this character," it adds, "is found in treaties which regulate the mutual rights of citizens and subjects of the contracting nations in regard to rights of property by descent or inheritance when the individuals concerned are aliens." 112 U. S. 580, 598 [28: 798, 803]. The passage cited by counsel from the language of Mr. Justice Washington in Society for the Propogation of the Gospel v. New Haven, 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 464, 493 [5: 662], also illustrates this doctrine. There the learned Justice observes that "If real estate be purchased or secured under a treaty, it would be most mischievous to admit that the extinguishment of the treaty extinguished the right to such estate. In truth, it no more affects such rights than the repeal of a munici. pal law affects rights acquired under it." Of this doctrine there can be no question in this court; but far different is this case, where a continued suspension of the exercise of a governmental power is insisted upon as a right, because, by the favor and consent of the Government, it has not heretofore been exerted with respect to the appellant or to the class to which he belongs. Between property rights not affected by the termination or abrogation of a treaty and expectations of benefits from the continuance of existing legislation there is as wide a difference as between realization and hopes. During the argument reference was made by counsel to the Alien Law of June 25, 1798, and to opinions expressed at the time by men of great ability and learning against its constitutionality. (1 Stat. at L. 570, chap. 58.) We do not attach importance to those opinions in their bearing upon this case. The Act vested in the President power to order all such aliens as he should judge dangerous to the peace and safety of the United States, or should have reasonable grounds to suspect were concerned in any treasonable or secret machination against the Government, to depart out of the territory of the United States within such time as should be expressed in his order. There were other provisions also distinguishing it from the Act under consideration. The Act was passed during a period of great political excitement, and it was attacked and defended with great zeal [611] and ability. It is enough, however, to say that it is entirely different from the Act before us, and the validity of its provisions was never brought to the test of judicial decision in the courts of the United States. Order affirmed. SARAH M. JONES, Appt., v. MATILDA A. VAN DOREN ET AL. (See 8. C. Reporter's ed. 684-693.) Amendment to pleading-trustee, who is grantee, when is trustee-equity jurisdictiondower interest obtained by fraud-prayer for general relief, effect of-Statute of Limitations as to fraud. 1. If the amendment to the pleadings is one which the court, in the exercise of its discretion, might properly allow, a motion to strike the amended pleading from the files should be denied. 2. One who by fraudulent misrepresentations obtains a conveyance from the owner of any interest in property, real or personal, is in equity a trustee ex maleficio for the person defrauded; and anyone taking the property from such trustee with notice of the fraud and of the consequent trust is affected by the trust. 3. When a trustee, dealing with the trust property together with property of his own, as one mass, conveys part of the whole to a purchaser who takes it for value, in good faith, without notice of the fraud or of the trust, and who thererest of the property shall be charged with the trust fore acquires a good title, the question how far the so as fully to indemnify the person defrauded, can only be determined in a court of equity. 4. Where one defendant obtained a conveyance of the plaintiff's dower interest by fraud, and held that interest in trust for her, a codefendant, taking the property with full notice, is equally affected by the fraud and bound by the trust. 5. Where the prayer of the bill is chiefly directed towards securing a right to redeem the whole property by paying off the whole mortgage, but plaintiff the dower interest of which she has been the general object of the bill is to secure to the defrauded, and the bill contains a prayer for general relief, this is sufficient to enable a court of equity to decree such relief as the facts stated in the bill justify. 6. Where the plaintiff is not suing for her dower as such, the right to which accrued over twenty years before commencing the suit, but for property of which she has been defrauded, the Statute of Limitations begins to run only from the discovery of the fraud. [No. 202.] Argued March 14, 1889. Decided May 13, 1889. APPEAL from a decree of the Circuit Court of the United States for the District of Minnesota, dismissing, on demurrer, a suit to redeem a mortgage and for a reconveyance of land, in order to obtain plaintiff's dower interest therein. Reversed. See 8. C. below, 18 Fed Rep. 619. [684] [685] Statement by Mr. Justice Gray: This was a bill in equity filed May 18, 1883, by Sarah M. Jones, a citizen of Pennsylvania, against Matilda A. Van Doren, a citizen of Indiana, and Samuel J. Jones and Samuel J. Glover, citizens of Illinois. The original bill alleged that Robert H. Jones died intestate in April, 1863, leaving the plaintiff, his widow, and the defendant, Jones, his son and only heir at law, and seised in fee of one fourth undivided part of certain land described, in Minnesota; that the plaintiff became entitled to a dower interest therein, which by the laws of Minnesota was a life estate in one third part, and the son became vested with the title in fee, subject to her dower interest; that she, being informed that the estate was involved in litigation and having little or no knowledge of business, and at his request, for no consideration, and merely for the purpose of facilitating the conduct of the litigation, made a quitclaim deed of her interest to him, and that be accepted the deed upon the express understanding and agreement to receive it for that purpose only. The bill further set forth, as the result of the litigation, that certain described parcels of the land were set off to him in severalty; and alleged that he, conspiring and confederating with the defendant Matilda A. Van Doren (who was fully advised of all the facts above alleged) to defraud the plaintiff of her dower estate, made a mortgage by a conveyance in trust to the defendant Glover, on July 25, 1871, of all the land so set off, including the plaintiff's interest therein, to secure a sum of $10,000 lent to him by Mrs. Van Doren; that, as part of the conspiracy, a suit for foreclosure was begun in the name of Glover on August 26, 1876, and a decree obtained therein, under which all the land was sold, and (except a small portion purchased by one Galusha) bought by Mrs. Van Doren for the sum of $8,745.14, and a final de[686] cree, vesting title in the purchasers, was entered on May 22, 1880; that the plaintiff was ignorant of the mortgage and of the foreclosure suit until long after the final decree therein; that on December 16, 1876, in order to protect her dower right, she paid $1,808.48 in discharge of taxes on the land, of which payment the defendants availed themselves; and that Mrs. Van Doren, in 1881, sold a portion of the land to one Marshall, a bona fide purchaser, for the sum of $10,000, which she received and applied to her own use, and still held the rest of the land. held by her, and for such other or different relief as the nature of the case might require and as might be agreeable to equity. A demurrer to that bill was sustained and the bill dismissed, on the ground that the plaintiff, having conveyed her interest by a deed absolute on its face, the Statute of Frauds would not permit her to set up an oral trust, and, as no fraud, accident or mistake in making that deed was alleged, no trust arose by implication of law. 18 Fed. Rep. 619. The bill was then amended by substituting, for the allegations concerning the plaintiff's conveyance to the defendant Jones, allegations that he, with intent to defraud her, prepared an instrument which he represented to be a power of attorney to enable him to act for the plaintiff in regard to certain anticipated litigation and other business, and thereby induced her to sign it; that the instrument was in fact, as he knew, a quitclaim deed of all her right of dower; that she did not read the instrument, or know its true character or effect, but relied on his representations, and, had she read it, was then so ignorant of business that she would not have understood its legal purport; and that she always, until within six months before the filing of this bill, believed that the instrument was a mere power of attorney. [687] The defendant Van Doren demurred to the amended bill, and afterwards moved to have it Stricken from the files, for the reason that it stated a new and different cause of action, the original bill being based upon an express trust, and the amended bill upon a resulting trust arising by implication of law. The court overruled the motion, but sustained the demurrer, on the ground that the plaintiff was not entitled to the specific relief prayed for, as shown by its opinion sent up with the record and printed in the margin. A final decree was entered dismissing the bill, and the plain. [688] tiff appealed to this court. Mr. Charles E. Flandrau, for appellant A dowress may redeem from a mortgage even when she has joined in the mortgage, for the release of her dower. Jones, Mortg. § 1067; Eaton v. Simonds, 14 Pick. 98. She cannot redeem from a part, she must redeem from the whole mortgage. Collins v. Riggs, 81 U. S. 14 Wall. 491 (20: 723); Bradley v. Snyder, 14 III. 263; Benedict v. Gilman, 4 Paige, 58; Johnson v. Harmon, 19 Ia. 56; Knowles v. Rablin, 20 Ia. 101; Gage v. Brewster, 31 N. Y. 218; Martin v. Fridley, 23 Minn. 13. The bill alleges ignorance of all the facts *NELSON, J. The demurrer is sustained, for the reasons: The plaintiff further alleged that before filing her bill she demanded an account of Mrs. Van Doren, and offered to pay her all moneys paid or expended by her on or about the land, with interest, in redemption of the mortgage, and demanded a reconveyance, but she refused; and 1st. If the allegations of the bill of complaint are that the plaintiff was ready and willing to pay true, the right of the complainant to bring her ac to her all sums of money, and to do all other tion to recover dower exists, unless the Statute of acts that might be adjudged by the court neces-Limitations of the State of Minnesota has barred sary to redeem the land from the mortgage and foreclosure. The bill prayed for an account, and that the plaintiff, on paying to Mrs. Van Doren such sums as the court might direct to enable her to redeem the mortgage, should be adjudged to be entitled to redemption, and Mrs. Van Doren might be ordered to reconvey the land still of action by laches, the bill must fail, for the relief such recovery, Of course, if she has lost all right claimed is based upon an interest in the property as dowress. recover dower, the fraud alleged, which creates an 2d. If not barred by the statute of her action to impediment to a recovery at law, can be removed by a suit in equity and her dower obtained. Equity furnishes the most adequate and complete remedy, and dower is highly favored in that forum. 3d. The complainant is not entitled by the fraud |