against such railroad company for an injury re
ceived, while in the line of his employment,
through the negligence of a fellow servant or
employé engaged with him in the same com-

such injured servant or employé has himself
been guilty of negligence or want of ordinary
care which has directly contributed to produce
the injury complained of."

plaintiff in error that the Act of 1874 of Kan-
sas prohibits railroad companies from setting
up as a defense contributory negligence on the
part of the injured employé, see Quackenbush
v. Wisconsin & M. R. R. Co. 62 Wis. 411; South-mon work of the master or employer, unless
western R. R. Co. v. Paulk, 24 Ga. 356; Coosa
River Steamboat Co. v. Barclay, 30 Ala. 120;
Thorpe v. Rutland & B. R. R. Co. 27 Vt. 140;
State Board of Assessors v. Central R. R. Co. 4
Cent. Rep. 426, 48 N. J. L. 146; Veazie v. Mayo,
49 Me. 156; State v. Wabash, St. L. & P. R. Co.
83 Mo. 144; Ohio & M. R. R. Co. v. McClelland,
25 Ill. 140; Davis v. State, 3 Lea, 376; Common-
wealth v. Eastern R. R. Co. 103 Mass. 254; New
Albany & S. R. R. Co. v. Tilton, 12 Ind. 3;
Cooley, Const. Lim. 5th ed. 482, § 390, p. 717,
581.

This law denies to no person affected by it "equal protection of the laws."

Owensboro & N. R. Co. v. Daviess County, 3 S. W. Rep. 364; Ohio & M. R. R. v. McClelland, 25 Ill. 140.

Mr. Justice Field delivered the opinion of

[206] the court:

[207]

To this charge the defendant excepted. The jury found a verdict for the plaintiff for $12,000, upon which judgment was entered. On appeal to the Supreme Court of the State the judgment was affirmed; and to review the latter judgment the case is brought here.

At the trial, and in the Supreme Court of the State, it was contended by the defendant, and the contention is renewed here, that the Law of Kansas of 1874 is in conflict with the 14th Amendment of the Constitution of the United States, in that it deprives the Company of its property without due process of law, and denies to it the equal protection of the laws.

In support of the first position the Company
calls the attention of the court to the rule of
In 1882, the defendant below, the Missouri law exempting from liability an employer for
Pacific Railway Company, a corporation cre- injuries to employés caused by the negligence
ated under the laws of Kansas, operated lines or incompetency of a fellow servant, which
of railway in the latter State. It also had con- prevailed in Kansas and in several other States
trol of two track yards adjacent to the City of previous to the Act of 1874, unless he had em-
Atchison, designated respectively as the upper ployed such negligent or incompetent servant
and lower yard, and it used two switch engines without reasonable inquiry as to his qualifica-
in moving cars from one yard to the other. On tions, or had retained him after knowledge of
the 11th of February of that year the plaintiff his negligence or incompetency. The rule of
was in the service of the Company as a fire-law is conceded where the person injured, and
man on one of these engines employed in trans- the one by whose negligence or incompetency
ferring cars from one point to another in the the injury is caused, are fellow servants in the
upper yard, when it was run into by the other same common employment, and acting under
engine, owing to the negligence of the engineer the same immediate direction. Chicago, M. &
of the latter. By the collision the right foot St. P. R. Co. v. Ross, 112 U. S. 377, 389 [28:
and leg of the plaintiff were so crushed as to 787, 792]. Assuming that this rule would ap-
necessitate amputation. For the damages thus ply to the case presented but for the Law of
sustained the present action was brought in a Kansas of 1874, the contention of the Company,
district court of the State. On the trial the de- as we understand it, is that that law imposes
fendant requested the court to instruct the jury, upon railroad companies a liability not pre-
that if they found from the evidence that the viously existing, in the enforcement of which
plaintiff was injured through the carelessness their property may be taken; and thus author-
of a fellow servant, he could not recover; izes, in such cases, the taking of property with-
which instruction was refused, and the defend-out due process of law, in violation of the 14th
ant excepted. The court charged the jury as
follows:

"At the common law a master or employé could not be held liable for an injury sustained by one servant by reason of the mere negligence of a fellow servant engaged in the same common employment, the negligence of the fellow servant not being deemed in such case the negligence of the master; and such was the law of this State up to 1874, but at that time this rule of the common law was abrogated, so far as it related to railroad companies and their employés in this State, by a statute which reads as follows:

"Every railroad company organized or doing business in this State shall be liable for all damages done to any employé of such company in consequence of any negligence of its agents, or by any mismanagement of its engineers or other employés, to any person sustaining such damage.'

"This enactment so far modifies and changes the common law that a servant or employé of a railroad company may maintain an action

Amendment. The plain answer to this con-
tention is that the liability imposed by the law
of 1874 arises only for injuries subsequently
committed; it has no application to past inju-
ries, and it cannot be successfully contended
that the State may not prescribe the liabilities
under which corporations created by its laws
shall conduct their business in the future, where
no limitation is placed upon its power in this
respect by their charters. Legislation to this
effect is found in the statute books of every
State. The hardship or injustice of the Law
of Kansas of 1874, if there be any, must be re-
lieved by legislative enactment. The only
question for our examination, as the law of
1874 is presented to us in this case, is whether
it is in conflict with clauses of the 14th Amend-
ment. The supposed hardship and injustice
consist in imputing liability to the Company,
where no personal wrong or negligence is
chargeable to it or to its directors. But the
same hardship and injustice, if there be any,
exist when the Company, without any wrong
or negligence on its part, is charged for inju

[208]

[209]

[210]

ries to passengers. Whatever care and pre- | meets a particular necessity, and all railroad
caution may be taken in conducting its busi- corporations are, without distinction, made
ness or in selecting its servants, if injury hap- subject to the same liabilities. As said by the
pen to the passengers from the negligence or court below, it is simply a question of legisla-
incompetency of the servants, responsibility tive discretion whether the same liabilities
therefor at once attaches to it. The utmost shall be applied to carriers by canal and stage
care on its part will not relieve it from liability, coaches and to persons and corporations using
if the passenger injured be himself free from steam in manufactories. See Missouri Pac. R.
contributory negligence. The law of 1874 ex- Co. v. Humes, 115 U. S. 512, 523 [29: 463, 466];
tends this doctrine, and fixes a like liability Barbier v. Connolly, 113 U. S. 27 [28: 923];
upon railroad companies, where injuries are Soon Hing v. Crowley, Id. 703 [28:1145.]
subsequently suffered by employés, though it Judgment affirmed."
may be by the negligence or incompetency of
a fellow-servant in the same general employ-
ment and acting under the same immediate
direction. That its passage was within the
competency of the Legislature we have no
doubt.

MINNEAPOLIS AND ST. LOUIS RAIL [210]
WAY COMPANY, Plff. in Err.,

v.

FRED. C. HERRICK.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 210-212.)

Iowa law as to master and servant.

1. The law of Iowa imposing liabilities upon railroad companies for injuries to employés in its service, though caused by the negligence or incompetency of a fellow servant, is not in conflict with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the United States.

2. Missouri Pacific Railway Co. v. Mackey, ante, 107, followed.

1888.

State of Minnesota, to review a judgment in [N ERROR to the Supreme Court of the favor of plaintiff, for injuries sustained by him through the negligence of defendant's engineer. Affirmed.

Reported below, 31 Minn. 11.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
Mr. C. K. Davis, for plaintiff in error:
The Statute of Iowa is void as in conflict
with the Fourteenth Amendment to the Consti-
tution of the United States.

The objection that the Law of 1874 deprives
the railroad companies of the equal protection
of the laws is even less tenable than the one
considered. It seems to rest upon the theory
that legislation which is special in its character
is necessarily within the constitutional inhibi-
tion; but nothing can be further from the fact.
The greater part of all legislation is special,
either in the objects sought to be attained by it
or in the extent of its application. Laws for
the improvement of municipalities, the opening
and widening of particular streets, the intro-
duction of water and gas, and other arrange-
ments for the safety and convenience of their Argued April 2, 3, 1888. Decided April 23,
[No. 202.]
inhabitants, and laws for the irrigation and
drainage of particular lands, for the construc-
tion of levees and the bridging of navigable
rivers, are instances of this kind. Such legis-
lation does not infringe upon the clause of the
14th Amendment requiring equal protection of
the laws, because it is special in its character;
if in conflict at all with that clause, it must be
on other grounds. And when legislation ap-
plies to particular bodies or associations, im-
posing upon them additional liabilities, it is not
open to the objection that it denies to them the
equal protection of the laws, if all persons
brought under its influence are treated alike
under the same conditions. A law giving to
mechanics a lien on buildings constructed or
repaired by them for the amount of their work,
and a law requiring railroad corporations to
erect and maintain fences along their roads,
separating them from land of adjoining pro-
prietors so as to keep cattle off their tracks, are
instances of this kind. Such legislation is not
obnoxious to the last clause of the 14th Amend-
ment, if all persons subject to it are treated alike
under similar circumstances and conditions in
respect both of the privileges conferred and the
liabilities imposed. It is conceded that corpo-
rations are persons within the meaning of the
Amendment. Santa Clara County v. Southern
Pac. R. R. Co. 118 U. S. 394 [30: 118]; Pembina
Con. Silver Min. & M. Co. v. Pennsylvania, 125 U.
S. 181 [31: 650]. But the hazardous character
of the business of operating a railway would
seem to call for special legislation with respect
to railroad corporations, having for its object
the protection of their employés as well as the
safety of the public. The business of other
corporations is not subject to similar dangers to
their employés, and no objections, therefore,
can be made to the legislation on the ground
of its making an unjust discrimination. It

|

Ex parte Virginia, 100 U. S. 339 (25:676); Tiernan v. Rinkor, 102 U. S. 123 (26:103); Weil v. Calhoun, 25 Fed. Rep. 865; Stockton Laundry Case, 26 Fed. Rep. 611; Virginia v. Rives, 100 U. S. 313 (25:667); Santa Clara County v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. 18 Fed. Rep. 385; 8. C. 118 U. S. 396 (30:118); Yick Wo v. Hopkins, Id. 356 (30:220); Pearson v. Portland, 69 Me. 278; San Mateo County v. Southern Pac. R. R. Co. 8 Am. & Eng. R. R. Cas. 1; Northern Pac. R. R. Co. v. Carland, 5 Mont. 146.

When the natural and reasonable effect of a
state statute is to violate the Federal Constitu-
tion, it will be void.

Henderson v. Mayor of N. Y. 92 U. S. 259
(23:543); Chy Lung v. Freeman, Id. 275 (23:550);
Neal v. Delaware, 103 U. S. 370 (26:567); Soon
Hing v. Crowley, 113 U. S. 703 (28:1145); Cooley,
Const. Lim. 4th ed. 719 (marg. p. 577) et seq.;
Bank Tax Case, 69 U. S. 2 Wall. 200 (17:793).
A corporation is a person, and, as such, en-
titled to the equal protection of the laws.

U. 8. Bank v. Deveaux, 9 U. S. 5 Cranch, 61,
87 (3: 38, 44); Society for Propagation of Gospel
v. New Haven, 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 464 (5:662).

Before the adoption of this statute the common-law rule was of general application inIowa, that the principal is not liable for damage sus

[211]

tained by an employé by the negligence of a co- | employés of the corporation, and in consequence employé.

The compensation due the appellant for the use of its tracks, etc., was the sum theretofore paid, as a holding over, with consent of owner. Clapp v. Noble, 84 Ill. 62; Golloway v. Kerly, 9 Bradw. 501; Prickett v. Ritter, 16 lll. 96; Mc-panies. Kinney v. Peck, 28 Ill. 174; Otto v. Jackson, 35 Ill. 349.

The defendant paid the petitioner for the use of its tracks and terminal facilities from February 1, 1881, to March 1, 1882, at the same The petitioner was organized in 1880, its rate as previously paid to the receiver of the whole capital stock being owned by these four Peoria and Springfield Railroad Company, companies, one quarter by each. On Febru-l amounting to $17,537.83. The petitioner

[203]

claimed for the same period the sum of $9,394.- | of the property, to exclude the defendant from
38 for terminal expenses, and the sum of $24,- its use, if the defendant would not accept the
375 for rent, and applied the sum received from petitioner's terms, in no way intimated that
the defendant to the payment in full of the first upon the facts of the case the defendant could
of these claims, and in part of the second, leav- be held to have accepted those terms.
ing $16,231.55, which the petitioner now
sought to recover.

The master, to whom the petition was referred, reported that there was nothing before him which enabled him "to report the amount of compensation which the petitioner should have, except as the result of the conditions upon which the receiver continued to use the property after the attempted making of a contract between the parties resulting in the notice referred to;" but found "from their relations, and the implied understanding upon the part of the receiver arising from them," that the sum claimed was due from the defendant to the petitioner.

The circuit court sustained exceptions taken by the defendant to the master's report, and dismissed the petition. Its opinion, which is not made part of the record, is reported in 18 Fed. Rep. 484. The petitioner appealed to this

court.

The only matter in dispute is whether the defendant is liable to the petitioner, by way of rent, from February 1, 1881, to March 1, 1882, for anything more than has already been paid. There is no more ground for implying an assent by the defendant to the claim of the petitioner, than for implying an assent of the petitioner to the position of the defendant. When the petitioner demanded of the receiver of the defendant the like rent, as well as the like rate for terminal expenses, as was to be paid by the four companies, the receiver of the defendant declined to assent to the demand without an order of the court whose officer he

There is no evidence tending to show that the
sum paid by the defendant is not all that its
use of the property was fairly worth. The rent
which each of the four companies, who owned
all the stock of the petitioner company, agreed
by express contract to pay that company, af-
fords no test of what is a reasonable rent as be-
tween the petitioner and a stranger, like this
defendant, who had no interest in its stock, and
was no party to that contract. As observed in
the opinion of the circuit court: "The Peoria
and Pekin Union Company was really owned
by the other companies which made the agree-
ment with it, and consequently they were sub-
stantially owners of the property of the Peoria
and Pekin Company. It was substantially a
contract, therefore, made by one party with it-
self, which it was insisted should be the test of
payment by the receiver."
Decree affirmed.

RICHARD H. PORTER, Appt.,

v.

STEPHEN V. WHITE.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 235-245). Appeal, effect of-lien of attorney on fund.

1. An appellant in this court who has appealed from a decree of the General Term of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia is only entitled to relief in regard to that portion of the decree which was appealed from the special term to the general term.

2. A power of attorney to prosecute a claim for
was. The parties thereupon came to a tem- one half of the recovery, on which is indorsed a sub-
porary arrangement, by which the defendant tution contains no assignment of any specific in-
stitution of plaintiff as the attorney, which substi-
agreed to pay the terminal expenses demanded, terest in the claim and no provision creating any
and the parties submitted the question of rent lien upon it or its proceeds, does not give the plaint-
to the circuit judge as an arbitrator, and it was priation, or show any agreement that he should be
iff any equitable lien on the fund by distinct appro-
agreed that until his determination the defend-paid out of the fund, to such an extent that he can
ant should continue to pay the same charges
that it had paid before February 1, 1881.

By the terms of that agreement, then, the amount of rent to be paid by the defendant was left uncertain, and dependent upon the

award of the judge. The affidavit of the pe

compel an assignment to himself of a part of the
fund, or the execution to himself of authority to
collect the same from the Secretary of State.
[No. 221.]
Argued April 12, 1888. Decided April 30, 1888.

APPEAL from a decree of the Supreme

Court of the District of Columbia in General Term reversing a decree of the Special Term that defendant pay certain moueys to plaintiff and assign to plaintiff, by such form of conveyance as will be recognized by the State Department, a portion of the payments due upon a Mexican award. Affirmed.

Reported below, 5 Mackey, 180, 4 Cent. Rep.
151.

The facts are fully stated in the opinion.
Messrs. S. S. Henkle, J. J. Johnson and
Wm. E. Earle, for appellant.

titioner's own witness shows that the judge, af-
ter some delay, declined to act as an arbitrator.
The judge's view upon the subject appears in
the opinion afterwards delivered by him in the
circuit court, in which he said: "On looking
into the question at the time, the judge was of
the opinion that the contract which was de-
manded of the receiver by the Peoria and Pe-
kin Union Company was oppressive in its
terms, and doubted whether the receiver could
afford to pay the prices then demanded; but at
the same time, admitting that the Peoria and
Pekin Company was the owner of the property
and that it had the right to prescribe on what
terms the receiver should do his railroad busi-
ness between Pekin and Peoria and in the lat-
ter city, stated that if the receiver would notion of the court:
accept the terms he could not be permitted to
have the use of the property of the Peoria and
Pekin Union Company." The judge, while he
recognized the right of the petitioner, as owner

Mr. Stephen V. White, appellee, in person.

Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opin

This is a bill in equity, filed in the Supreme
Court of the District of Columbia, by Richard
H. Porter against Stephen V. White. The case
arises as follows: On the 4th of July, 1868, a

[235]