96] 97] of the Second Class, and to Provide the Means Reference is also made to an Act of January which was not only withheld, but conspicuously Specific power was also given to one of the same." On the 27th of March, 1886, a rule to show "Following a public policy reviewed in its by an Act of 1885 the Act of 1881, relating to to was approved June 10, 1885, and reads thus: "SECTION 1. Be it enacted, by the General [498] [499] poration implies that the officials governing the Taxing Districts of the Second Class, and to " Those agencies existing for the local government of a municipality are bound to perform such duties as are necessary to enforce the taxing power, although not especially designated for that purpose, if there be a general grant of the power of taxation to the municipality itself. This duty is implied from the general grant, whether it be conferred directly by statute upon the particular municipality or devolved upon it as the successor in corporate obligation through a grant to its predecessor; therefore a mandamus will lie to enforce, by taxation, the payment of judgments against the original corporation, to be directed to the governmental agencies of the new corporation, they to proceed according to the general laws of the State governing the exercise of the taxing power by municipalities possessing the authority. Under the legislation of Tennessee repealing municipal charters and reorganizing the inhabitants into taxing districts, contrived to compel creditors to accept a compromise of their debts at reduced amounts, the prohibitions of the exercise of the taxing power by the new local governments are void, so far as relates to those grants of that power to the old corporations, which enter into contracts as a part of the remedy of creditors; and the "taxing districts" may be compelled to exercise the power given by these original grants, by proceeding, according to the general tax laws of the State, to certify to the county court clerk the necessary rate to pay the judgment, to be extended upon the tax books and collected as other taxes are collected. It is not necessary that the particular officials to perform this duty shall be designated in the statute; but the general grant to the cor The demurrer having been overruled, the respondents answered, denying the possession of any power or authority to levy any tax whatever to pay judgments and indebtedness such as represented by the petitioner; and averring that the old corporation had no power or authority in law to levy a tax for such purposes, and consequently no such power or authority devolved upon the taxing district; and that the power and authority to issue the bonds and levy a tax to pay interest thereon, upon which plaintiff's suits were founded, "was given to Brownsville by the Act of February 8, 1870, by the Legislature of Tennessee, but before the contract was completed or the election under said Act of 1870 held by Brownsville, or the bonds issued, the said Act of 1870 was repealed and abrogated by the Constitution of the State of Tennessee, which went into effect May 5, 1870." Respondents further alleged that the judgments were obtained by default, and that on the previous mandamus proceedings the question of want of power because of the abrogation of the Act of February 8, 1870, was not raised. Motion to quash this answer or return was then made by petitioner, and the cause submitted upon such motion, together with an agreed statement of facts to the same effect as the statement in the preceeding case, No. 1442, it being also stipulated that the judgments had been obtained by default and that the question of power in the corporation to levy a tax because the Act of 1870 had been abrogated by the Constitution was not raised in defense to the previous applications for writs of mandamus. The circuit court held (36 Fed. Rep. 149) that "No defense can be made to a writ of mandamus issued upon a judgment by default against a municipal corporation which might have been made to the original suit upon the coupons," and "therefore, where bonds issued [501] without legislative authority were invalid, that the defendant corporation was bound by a judgment by default upon the coupons, and could not set up as a defense to the mandamus that there was no Act commanding the tax to be levied, this being the same defense as the other, when it depends upon want of authority to issue the bonds, as in this case." In the opinion of the court, although the Act of February 8, 1870, was abrogated by the State Constitution and the bonds were therefore void, yet judgment upon the coupons conclusively established the validity of the bonds, and so also the validity of the legislation giving the remedy by a levy of taxes for their payment. The return of the respondent was according ly quashed, and judgment entered awarding the peremptory writ as prayed. =2] Messrs. W. W. Rutledge and Wm. M. | payment of the debt and expenses of the city," Where the petition or writ shows the bar, a When the holder took the bonds, he was Concord v. Robinson, 121 U. S. 165, 170 (30: 885, 838). The corporation must have the authority to levy and collect taxes for the particular debt reduced to a judgment before a mandamus can issue. Burroughs, Public Securities, 539-546; Heine v. Levee Comrs. 86 U. S. 19 Wall. 655 (22: 223). | We have no power by mandamus to compel a municipal corporation to levy a tax which the law does not authorize. U. S. v. Macon Co. 99 U. S. 582 (25: 331). The remedies given by the original contract are carried with it when merged into a judgment, and these remedies are all the creditor has. Harshman v. Knox Co. 122 U. S. 306 (30: 1152); Ralls Co. Ct. v. U. S. 105 U. S. 733 (26: 1220); Jeffries v. Lawrence, 42 Iowa, 498. The power to subscribe for stock in a railroad does not include the power to tax to pay for the stock. Dillon, Taxn. 678; Dillon, Mun. Corp. § 605; Cooley, Const. Lim. 518; 2 Desty, Taxn. 10531076. The writ of mandamus is nothing more than an action at law between the parties. Ky. v. Dennison, 65 U. S. 24 How. 66 (16: 717). It does not issue as a matter of right. It is in the nature of an action. the power so vested was confined in its exercise This express grant fell with the abrogation It is, however, contended that the coupons having passed into judgments, not only is all inquiry into their validity precluded, but also any denial of the power to tax to pay them granted by the Act of February 8, 1870. As already remarked, the circuit court did not hold that the peremptory writ should go to command a levy to pay judgments as debts in that form, but based its order upon the inability of the respondents by reason of the judg ments to assert the abrogation of the Act in question. Under the legislation between the issue of the Moody v. Fleming, 4 Ga. 115, 48 Am. Dec. 210. Messrs. Sparrel Hill, Henry Craft and ion of the court: Mandamus lies to compel a party to do that which it is his duty to without it. It confers no new authority, and the party to be coerced must have the power to perform the act. On the 19th of March, 1886, when this petition was filed, had the board of commissioners the power to levy and collect taxes to pay the judgments in question? The circuit court, in deciding that it had, proceeded upon the ground that the source of power was the Act of February 8, 1870, and we concur in the view that there was no other. The City of Brownsville possessed no inherent power to tax; and while under an Act of February 24, 1870, its inhabitants were constituted a corporation and body politic by the name and style of the Mayor and Aldermen of the City of Brownsvile," with power by ordinance "to levy and collect taxes upon all property, privileges, and polls taxable by the laws of this State, to appropriate money, and to provide for the Thus invited to look through the judgments The case of Harshman v. Knox County, 122 In that case, under section 17 of the General [503] bonds without limit as to its amount. Under | authorized the issue and gave the power to tax The power invoked is not the power to tax to pay judgments, but the power to tax to pay bonds, considered as distinct and independent, and therefore, when the relator is obliged to go behind his judgments as money judgments merely, to obtain the remedy pertaining to the bonds, the court cannot decline to take cogniz The judgment is reversed and the cause remanded with a direction to dismiss the petition. G. W. NORTON ET AL., Plffs. in Err., v. THE BOARD OF COMMISSIONERS (See S. C. Reporter's ed. 505, 506.) and that no such remedy exists. Res judicata may render straight that which is crooked, and black that which is white, Facit ex curvo rectum, Upon the trial the circuit court required the ex albo nigrum; Jeter v. Hewitt, 63 U. S. 22 relator to put in, with the record of the pro- How. 352, 364 [16:345, 348]; but where appli[504] ceedings and judgment, the bonds; and it`ap- cation is made to collect judgments by process peared that the latter recited that they were is not contained in themselves, and requiring, to sued for a subscription authorized by the Act be sustained, reference to the alleged cause of incorporating "the Missouri and Mississippi action upon which they are founded, the aid Railroad Company;" and as the jury found of the court should not be granted when upon that the relator had not proved that, despite the face of the record it appears, not that mere the recitals in the bonds, they were issued un- error supervened in the rendition of such judgder the general law, the court rendered judgments, but that they rest upon no cause of acment in favor of the respondents. But this tion whatever. court reversed that judgment upon the ground that, as "It was part of the plaintiff's case to show, not merely the execution of the bonds by the county authorities, but that they were issued in pursuance of a law making them the valid obligations of the county," and it having been averred that they were issued under section 17 of the General Railroad Law (c. 63, Stat. at L. 1866), that fact was confessed by the default, and its truth stood admitted on the record, and as mandamus in such cases was a remedy in the nature of an execution, it could in that case be limited in its mandate "only by that which the judgment itself declares." And the court says, Mr. Justice Matthews delivering the opinion: "It may well be that in a case where the record of the judgment is silent on the point, the original contract may be shown, notwithstanding the merger, to determine the extent of the remedy provided by the law for its enforcement; but that is not admissible where, as in this case, the matter has been adjudged in the original action. By the terms of the judgment in favor of the relator, it was determined that the bonds sued on were issued under the authority of a statute which prescribed no limit to the rate of taxation for their payment. In such cases, the law which authorizes the issue of the bonds gives also the means of payment by taxation. The findings in the judgment on that point are conclusive." But there the power to issue the bonds was not questioned. The controversy was as to the rate of taxation, depending upon which Act they were issued under. If the original contract could have been resorted to, the decision might have been otherwise as to the rate; but it was held that that could not be done, because, from the averments which formed part of the complete judgment record, it appeared that the bonds were issued under one Act rather than the other, while each of the Acts fully [505] Want of jurisdiction-filing of record. the case. Submitted Jan. 4, 1889. Decided March 5, 1889. ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United IStates for the Western District of Tennessee, Messrs. Sparrel Hill, Henry Craft and Messrs. W. W. Rutledge and Wm. M. [505] Mr. Chief Justice Fuller delivered the opin [506] ion of the court: Judgment was rendered against the plaintiffs in error in the Circuit Court of the United States for the Western District of Tennessee on the 29th of November, 1886, and writ of error brought December 28, 1886, accompanied by a citation to the adverse party, duly returnable to the October Term, 1887, and served in January and March of the latter year. But the record was not filed herein until December 20, 1888, [470] and the rule is settled that under such circum- | tado v. Cal. 110 U. S. 535 (28: 238); Hagar v. The writ of error is dismissed. UNITED STATES, ex rel. MARY ELIZABETH LEVEY, Piff. in Err., v. STROTHER M. STOCKSLAGER, Commis sioner of the General Land Office. (See S. C. Reporters' ed. 470-478.) Due process of law includes a trial or hearing according to some settled course of judicial proceedings. Hoke v. Henderson, 4 Dev. (N. C.) 15; Taylor v. Porter, 4 Hill, 146; Vanzant v. Waddel, 2 Yerg. 260; State Bank v. Cooper, 2 Yerg. 599; Jones v. Perry, 10 Yerg. 59; Wynehamer v. People, 13 N. Y. 378; Norman v. Heist, 5 Watts & S. 171; Bates v. Dist. of Columbia, 1 MacArth. 433. The joint resolution was unconstitutional and void. New Bedford Bridge, 2 Gray, 350; Calder v. Hamilton's Works, Vol. 3, 518; Com. v. Bull, 3 U. S. 3 Dall. 388 (1: 648); Ogden v. Saunders, 25 U. S. 12 Wheat. 213 (6: 606); Wilkinson v. Leland, 27 U. S. 2 Pet. 657 (7: 542); Green v. Biddle, 21 U. S. 8 Wheat. 92 (5: 547); Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 718 (25:501; Bronson v. Kinzie, 42 U. S. 1 How. 811 (11: Act for relief of heirs of John Bouligny-vested 1. The Joint Resolution of Congress, approved March 30, 1867, directing the suspension of the execution of the law for the relief of the heirs of John Bouligny suspended the execution of such Act until the further Act of the Congress of the United States. 2. The Act of March 2, 1867, for the relief of said heirs, did not give the widow and children of Bouligny a vested right in the certificates of new location which were to be issued. 3. Inasmuch as nothing had been done by the officers of the land department under the Act of March 2, 1867, and no certificates had been made out, and the whole matter still remained executory, no vested right had attached at the time of the approval of the joint resolution. 4. Therefore, that resolution did not deprive the widow and children of any property or right of property in violation of the Constitution. 5. No jurisdiction is given to the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia of a suit against the United States or a public officer for the specific performance of a contract made by the United States. [No. 1481.] Argued Jan. 24, 25, 1889. Decided Mar. 5,1889. iff in error: The Act gave the widow and minor children a vested right in the scrip. Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U. S. 6 Cranch, 87 (3: 162); Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U. S. 4 Wheat. 518 (4: 629); McGee v. Mathis, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 143 (18; 314); Cooley, Const. Lim. 332; 2 Pars. Cont. 527; U. 8. v. Schurz, 102 U. S. 399 (26: 172). The right thus secured was property and could not be abridged without due process of law. Sinking Fund Cases, 99 U. S. 733 (25:506); Smith v. U. 8. 35 U. S. 10 Pet. 329 (9: 442); Bryan v. Kennett, 113 U. S. 192 (28: 913); Murray v. Hoboken Land & 1. Co. 59 U. S. 18 How. 276 (15:374); Walker v. Sauvinet, 92 U. S. 92 (23: 679); Kennard v. La. 92 U. S. 481 (23:479); Davidson v. N. O. 96 U. S. 105 (24: 620); Hur 608 (11:397); Planters Bank v. Sharp, 47 U. S. 6 How. 327 (12:447); Von Hoffman v. Quincy, 71 U. S. 4 Wall. 535 (18: 403); Walker v. Whitehead, 83 U. S. 16 Wall. 314 (21: 357); Terry v. Anderson, 95 U. S. 628 (24:365); Tenn. v. Sneed, 96 U. S. 69 (24: 610); La. v. Pilsbury,105 U.S. 301 (26: 1098); Fisk v. Jefferson Police Jury, 116 U. S. 131 (29: 587); Seibert v. Lewis, 122 U. S. 284 (30: 1161); Terrett v. Taylor, 13 U. S. 9 Cranch, 43 (3: 650); Rice v. Minnesota & N. W. R. Co. 66 U. S. 1 Black, 358 (17:147); Osborn v. Bank of U. S. 22 U. S. 9 Wheat. 738 (6:204); Board of Liquidation v. McComb, 92 U. S. 541 (23: 628); Va. Coupon Cases, 114 U. S. 293 (29: 193); Norton v. Shelby Co. 118 U. S. 442 (30: 186). Messrs. A. H. Garland, Atty-Gen., and Heber J. May, Assist. Atty., for defendant in error. Mr. Justice Blatchford delivered the opin- [471] ion of the court: This is a writ of error to review a judgment of the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, in general term. The writ is brought by the United States, on the relation of Mary Elizabeth Levey, intermarried with George Collins Levey, against Strother M. Stockslager, Commissioner of the General Land Office. Mary Elizabeth Levey filed a petition in the Supreme Court of the District of Columbia, praying for a writ of mandamus. The petition set forth that the petitioner was formerly Mary Elizabeth Bouligny, the widow of John E. Bouligny, deceased, and the person named in the Act of Congress of March 2, 1867, hereinafter set forth; and that she is now the wife of George Collins Levey, and was such on the 29th of March, 1888. The Act of Congress referred to (c. 208, 14 Stat. at. L. 635) was set forth in the petition, and is in these words: "An Act for the relief of the heirs of John E. Bouligny. "Be it enacted, by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United States of America in Congress assembled, That there be, and hereby is, confirmed to Mary Elizabeth Bouligny, Corrinne Bouligny, and Felice Bouligny, widow and children of John E. Bouligny, deceased, the one sixth part of the land claim of Jean [472] |