same with the original. The introduction of these records was objected to on the ground that the papers were not properly acknowledged or authenticated. The objection is not tenable. The acknowledgment attached to the certificate is in due form, and the authentication of the copy filed, by the Secretary of State of New York, the public officer charged with the custody of the original, or of one of the duplicate originals, under his official seal, is sufficient to entitle the copy to be placed on file for record in the office of the recorder of the county, and with the secretary of the Territory. The law of the Territory in force at the time with reference to foreign corporations provided that, before they proceeded to do business under their charter or certificate of incorporation in the Territory, they should "file for record with the secretary of the Territory, and also with the recorder of the county in which they are carrying on business, the charter or certificate of incorporation, duly authenticated, or a copy of said charter or certificate of incorporation.' The law does not specify in what way the copy filed shall be authenticated, and, in the absence of any provision on that subject, the certificate of the official custodian, under the seal of his office, must be deemed sufficient. It does not appear that a copy of the certificate of incorporation was filed with the secretary of the Territory, but no objection to the introduction of the county records having been taken on that ground, it will be presumed that such filing existed, and, if required, it could have been readily shown. There was no error, therefore, in the ruling of the court admitting the records of the county showing the incorporation of the plaintiff in the State of New York.

that he and his colocater are citizens of the United States, over the age of twenty-one years; that said location is made in good faith, and matters as stated in the foregoing notice of location by him subscribed are true. "JULIUS HORST. "Subscribed and sworn to before me this 26th day of August, 1880. "[County Seal.] O. B. TOTTEN, County Clerk."

Section 2324 of the Revised Statutes, which went into effect on the first of December, 1873, provides that records of mining claims subsequently made "shall contain the name or names of the locators, the date of the location, and such a description of the claim or claims located, by reference to some natural object or permanent monument as will identify the claim." These provisions, as appears on their face, are designed to secure a definite description-one so plain that the claim can be readily ascertained. A reference to some natural object or permanent monument is named for that purpose. Of course the section means, when such reference can be made. Mining lode claims are frequently found where there are no permanent monuments or natural objects other than rocks or neighboring hills. Stakes driven into the ground are in such cases the most certain means of identification. Such stakes were placed here with a description of the premises by metes; and to comply with the requirements of the statute, as far as possible, the location of the lode is also indicated by stating its distance south of "Vaughan's Little Jennie mine," probably the best known and most easily defined object in the vicinity. We agree with the court below that the Little Jennie mine will be presumed to be a well known natural object or permanent monument until the contrary appears, where a location is described as in this notice, and is further described as being 1500 feet south from a well known quartz location, and there is nothing in the evidence to contradict such a description, distance, and direction."

3d. As to the citizenship of the locators of the mining claim. The Revised Statutes open the mineral lands of the public domain to exploration and occupation and purchase, by citizens of the United States and persons who have declared their intention to become citizens. It is therefore objected here that there is no evidence of the citizenship of the original locators, but the objection is not tenable. The oath of one of the locators, accompa nying the recorded notice of location, as to their citizenship, is prima facie evidence of the fact and it will be deemed sufficient until doubt is thrown upon the accuracy of his statement.

4th. As to the inferences deducible from the

"TERRITORY OF MONTANA, County of Lewis and Clarke,

88.

$3,500 to Polly Palmer, on lots 1 and 3 in said block No. 104. On the 30th of May, 1871, Polly Palmer commenced a suit in a state court of Kansas against McElroy and his wife to forcclose the mortgage, and, on October 4, 1871, obtained a judgment of foreclosure for $3,764.16, which ordered that the property be sold to satisfy the mortgage. It was sold, and purchased by Polly Palmer. The sale was confirmed by the court, and, on January 4, 1872, a sheriff's deed for the property was made to her, which was duly recorded. At the time the foreclosure suit was commenced, the United States Marshal had made a levy on said property, under an execution issued on the judgment of the United States, and the said lots 1 and 3 had been advertised to be sold on June 6, 1871. On that day, lot 1 was sold to the United States; and on October 16, 1871, the District Court of the United States confirmed the sale, and ordered a deed to be made to the United States. In the foreclosure suit, the United States was not made a party, and did not appear. At the time that suit was commenced, the judgment of the United States was a lien on lots 1 and 3. Polly Palmer died in November, 1872, and McElroy died in 1881. On October 30, 1883, the United States received a deed for lot 1, from the marshal of the district, based on the sale of June 6, 1871, in accordance with the order of October 16, 1871, and has been ever since June 16, 1871, the owner of lot 1, with full right of possession thereof, subject only to the right of the heirs at law of Polly Palmer. The amount due to the estate of Polly Palmer on the mortgage of August 7, 1869, and on the judgment of foreclosure has been paid.

The bill alleges that the United States offers to pay the amount, if any, due on the mortgage, in order to redeem the property, waives an an[265] swer on oath, and prays that an account be taken of the amount due; that lot 3 be first subjected to its payment; that an account be taken of the rents and profits of lot 1, and if they have been more than sufficient to satisfy the mortgage debt, the defendants be decreed to pay the excess to the United States; and that the United States be permitted to redeem lot 1, and the defendants be adjudged to deliver up its possession to the United States.

The decision of the circuit court, reported in 25 Fed. Rep. 804, proceeded upon the ground that, as the government in this case came into a court of equity claiming the same rights as a private individual, and the case did not involve any question of governmental right or duty, the ordinary rules controlling courts of equity as to laches should be enforced; and that, as the bill was filed more than 12 years after the sheriff's deed had been made to Polly Palmer, and more than 13 years after the sale on execution to the United States, the claim of the government was barred by its laches.

This decision of the circuit court was made in December, 1885, prior to the decisions of this court in the cases of Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, 117 U. S. 151 [29:845]; United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. 118 U. S. 120 [30: 81]; and United States v. Beebe, 127 U. S. 338 [ante, 121]. These cases determine that the decree in the present case must be reversed.

In Van Brocklin v. Tennessee, p. 158 [847], this court said: "The United States do not and cannot hold property, as a monarch may, for private or personal purposes. All the property and revenues of the United States must be beld and applied, as all taxes, duties, imposts, and excises must be laid and collected, to pay the debts and provide for the common defense and general welfare of the United States.'"

In the present case, the United States holds the title to the property in question, as it holds all other property, for public purposes and not for private purposes. So holding the title and the right of possession under their deed, it holds in the same manner, and for public pur poses, the incidental right of redemption. In this view, the doctrine often laid down, and again enforced in United States v. Nashville, C. & St. L. R. Co. applies to this case. It was there said, p. 125 [83]: "It is settled beyond [266] doubt or controversy-upon the foundation of the great principle of public policy, applicable to all governments alike, which forbids that the public interests should be prejudiced by the negligence of the officers or agents to whose care they are confided-that the United States, asserting rights vested in them as a sovereign government, are not bound by any Statute of Limitations, unless Congress has clearly manifested its intention that they should be so bound. Lindsey v. Miller, 31 U. S. 6 Pet. 666 [8:538]; United States v. Knight, 39 U. S. 14 Pet. 301, 315 [10: 465]; Gibson v. Chouteau, 80 U. S. 13 Wall. 92 [20: 534]; United States v. Thompson, 98 U. S. 486 [25: 194]; Fink v. O'Neil, 106 U. S. 272, 281 [27: 196, 199]."

This doctrine is applicable with equal force, not only to the question of a Statute of Limitations in a suit at law, but also to the question of laches in a suit in equity. In United States v. Beebe, p. 344 [ante, 124], it was said: "The principle that the United States are not bound by any Statute of Limitations nor barred by any laches of their officers, however gross, in a suit brought by them as a sovereign government to enforce a public right or to assert a public interest, is established past all controversy or doubt." These views entirely cover the present case.

It was suggested in the decision of the court below, as a ground for applying to the United States the doctrine of laches, that the Government was not made a party to the foreclosure suit because it could not have been made such party except at its own will, and that it would be a hardship to the other parties to this suit to allow the Government to lie by for so many years, and then come into a court of equity to assert the rights sought to be maintained in this suit. It is a sufficient answer to this view to say, that the principle we have announced has long been understood to be the rule applicable to the government, and that it rests with Congress, and not with the courts, to modify or change the rule.

The decree of the Circuit Court is reversed and the case is remanded to that Court, with a direc tion to take such further proceedings as may be according to law and not inconsistent with this opinion.

Mr. Justice Field did not sit in this case or take any part in its decision.

[426] AMOS W. SHEPHERD, Piff. in Err.,

[427]

v.

THE BALTIMORE AND OHIO RAILROAD COMPANY.

(See S. C. Reporter's ed. 420-434.)

Damages against a railroad company for laying its track upon a street-Ohio statute-owner of property near the street entitled to damages -diminution of value-rule of damagestemporary damage-fact assumed.

1. Under the Ohio statute making a railroad company which lays its track upon a street responsible for injuries to private property, the right to recover damages for such injuries is not limited to owners of property immediately upon the street occupied by the track or structures of the company. 2. The owner of property near to the street is entitled to the remedy given by the statute, if the injury to it is the direct and necessary result of the Occupancy of the street by the railroad company. 3. When the diminution of the value of the property can be fairly attributed to such occupancy and use of the street, the company is liable for the injury.

road.

4. Where the property has been depreciated in value by reason of the street's being occupied by a railroad company, such depreciation is ascertained by the difference in its value before and its value after the final location and construction of the 5. The temporary injury sustained on account of obstructions placed in the street during the building of the railroad constitutes a cause of action apart from the claim under the statute for per6. Where the issue as to the injury was the real point of inquiry on the trial, the rulings of the court excluding proper evidence upon that issue will not be sustained for want of affirmative proof in the record of plaintiff's ownership of the property.

manent depreciation of the property.

[No. 213.]

company which lays a track upon any such street, alley, road, or ground shall be responsible for injuries done thereby to private or public property, lying upon or near to such ground, which may be recovered by civil action brought by the owner, before the proper court, at any time within two years from the completion of such track." R. S. Ohio, p. 851. This is, with. out material change, the first section of the Act of April 15, 1857, entitled "An Act to Amend the Act Entitled 'An Act to Provide for the Creation and Regulation of Incorporated Companies in the State of Ohio,' Passed May 1, 1852, and to Regulate Railroad Companies." Laws of Ohio, 1857, p. 133.

The lots in question are situated on the west side of Union (formerly Water) Street, thirtythree feet south from Thirty-First (formerly First) Street, and extend back one hundred and twenty feet to an alley, running from Crescent a two-story brick building, the first floor being Street to Thirty-First Street. Upon the lots is used as a dry-goods store and the rest of the building as a hotel. The railroad companywith the assent, as we assume, of the municipal authorities of Bellaire-constructed its road in Thirty-First Street, upon arches springing from stone pillars about twenty-seven feet apart, each pillar being twelve feet long, six feet thick, and thirty feet high. Two of the pillars are in Union Street, at the intersection of that street with Thirty-First Street, each of them extending fifteen inches within the line of the sidewalk on each side of the roadway of Union Street through Thirty-First Street. It took from three to four years to build the railroad in the latter street. During that period Union Street for about one hundred feet south from

1889.

'N ERROR to the Circuit Court of the United the of

review a judgment in favor of defendant in an action to recover damages against a railroad company for the construction of its road in a public street. Reversed.

Statement by Mr. Justice Harlan:

This action was brought to recover damages for injuries alleged to have been done by the defendant in error to certain improved lots on Union Street, in Bellaire, Ohio, of which the plaintiff in error, who was the plaintiff below, claims to be the owner. It is based upon section 3283 of the Revised Statutes of Ohio, which provides: "If it be necessary, in the location of any part of a railroad, to occupy any public road, street, alley, way, or ground of any kind, or any part thereof, the municipal or other corporation or public officers or authorities, owning or having charge thereof, and the company, may agree upon the manner, terms, and conditions upon which the same may be used or occupied; and if the parties be unable to agree thereon, and it be necessary, in the judgment of the directors of such company, to use or occupy such road, street, alley, way, or ground, such company may appropriate so much of the same as may be necessary for the purposes of its road, in the manner and upon the same terms as is provided for the appropriation of the property of individuals; but every

(which is parallel to and the next street south from Thirty-First Street) was obstructed by stone, timber, rock, derricks, steam engines, tending in front of and past the lots in question. For a great part of the time the railroad was being built teams could not get to this property because of these obstructions, and at times persons could hardly get to it or pass by it on foot. Before the railroad was built in Thirty-First Street the property was worth from $9,000 to $10,000, the store bringing an annual rent of from $400 to $500, and the whole building $1,000; afterwards it was not worth more than from $4,000 to $5,000, and the rental was reduced one half.

These facts having been proven by a witness on behalf of the plaintiff, subject to objection to their competency, the court, on motion of the defendant, excluded from the consideration of the jury so much of the evidence as related to the depreciation of the value of the property by reason of the above obstructions, and all the testimony relative to the diminution of its rental value.

[428]

The plaintiff then made a formal offer to [429] prove that the building of the railroad in Thirty-First Street was in progress three or four years, during which time the company obstructed Union Street, in front of his property, with materials of all kinds used in building the railroad, so that access to his property was seriously obstructed; that because of such obstruction his tenants occupying the premises left them,