idea, I would say, purely and simply, it means a government by its citizens in mass, acting directly and not personally, according to rules established by the majority; and that every other government is more or less republican in proportion as it has in its composition more or less of this ingredient of the direct action of the citizens. . . . On this view of the import of the term 'republic,' instead of saying, as has been said, that it may mean anything or nothing, we may say with truth and meaning that governments are more or less republican as they have more or less of the element of popular election and control in their composition; and believing, as I do, that the mass of the citizens is the safest depository of their own rights, and especially that the evils flowing from the duperies of the people are less injurious than those from the egotism of their agents, I am a friend to that composition of government which has in it the most of this ingredient."

We could quote and cite any number of authorities, using the brief of the learned counsel for the defendants in error, but we deem it unnecessary to multiply them, and will proceed to examine the provisions of the charter with a view of determining if it fulfills the definition given by Mr. Jefferson; and, if it does, it is not obnoxious to the provisions of the federal Constitution as above quoted.

In the charter of the city of Dallas, all of the powers of government that is, the sovereignty of the municipality - are vested in the people, which powers are exercised by representatives of the people; that is, officers elected by the voters. The charter of the city of Dallas vests the power of government in the people by these words: "Section 1. Corporate Name. All inhabitants of the city of Dallas, Dallas county, Texas, as the boundaries and limits of said city are herein established or may be hereafter established, shall be a body politic, incorporated under, and to be known by, the name and style of the 'City of Dallas,' with such powers, rights and duties as herein provided."

It will be observed that the people who reside within the de

scribed limits of the city of Dallas constitute the city, and to them is intrusted the powers of government. The sovereignty of the municipal government, its powers by which its affairs are conducted, are vested in the masses of the people, just as is required to constitute a republican form of government, and the other requirements to fulfill the definition are met in the charter by the several provisions for the election of officers named therein. That the city of Dallas is strictly republican in form of government is not questioned, if the recall be eliminated. But it is said that with the recall provision, it ceases to be republican. How this can be is not made plain to us. With the recall provision in the charter, the people are still invested with the sovereign power of the municipality, and they are intrusted with the selection of their representatives, who are to administer the city government. It occurs to us that there is a greater degree of sovereignty with the people with the recall of their representatives than would otherwise be the case; in fact, the right of recall asserts in a larger degree the right of representation; that is, representation in fact of the will and wishes of the voters. This enlargement of the control of the masses does not make the government less republican.

The policy of reserving to the people such power as the recall, the initiative, and the referendum is a question for the people themselves in framing the government, or for the Legislature in the creation of municipal governments. It is not for the courts to decide that question. We are unable to see from our viewpoint how it can be that a larger measure of sovereignty, committed to the people by this method of government, and a more certain means of securing a proper representation in any way militates against its character as a republican form of government, and that it is thereby rendered in any sense obnoxious to the provision of the Constitution of the United States.

[5] Article 16,830, of the state Constitution reads: "The duration of all offices not fixed by the Constitution shall never exceed two years," etc. It is claimed that the recall by the citizenship

of a city deprives the officer of the benefit of his term of office without due process of law. If the officer had been elected to the office and the law were changed subsequently, there might be some ground for making such an argument, but in this case the law provided for the recall at the time the plaintiff in error was elected to his office, and he took it upon the condition that the people might remove him from office, and he cannot now be heard to say that he had been deprived of his office without due process of law, for, in fact, the proceeding is just what he contracted for when he accepted the office. It seems to be in the mind of some of the counsel that an officer has some kind of secured right to hold an office contrary to the will and wishes of the people he represents, but we are of opinion that he has no more right, as a matter of good morals, to hold such office under such circumstances than any employé or agent has to continue in the discharge of his duty for which he has been employed when he ceases to give satisfaction, except that under the Constitution and laws as they have heretofore existed in this state such an officer could not be removed upon a failure on his part to give satisfaction in the discharge of his duties, but must be guilty of some offense to justify the removal under the constitutional provisions which are in effect in this state.

[6] In the creation of the municipal corporation, the Legislature was not bound to make the term of office two years; it might have made it to extend to any time not exceeding two years; and we conclude what we have to say in expressing the view again, that we have so frequently stated, that the people of the city of Dallas were invested with the sovereign power of the city by virtue of the grant of the charter to them, and that the Legislature has the power to grant to them the right to remove, by process of the recall provision, any officer who failed to discharge his duty in a manner satisfatory to the people of that city.

[7] Section 7, art. 15, of the Constitution, reads: "The Legislature shall provide by law for the trial and removal from office

of all officers of this state, the modes for which have not been provided in this Constitution." It is objected that the removal by recall is violative of that section, because it does not provide for a trial of the officer. The section applies only to "officers of the state." In the connection in which it is used, the language must be held to refer to the class of officers treated of in that section, but omitted therefrom. We are of opinion that "officers of the state" have the same signification as "state officer." In article 5, § 24, the removal of all county officers had been provided for, and the language of section 7 of article 15 had the effect to include all state officers not included in that article. The objection is not sound, and is overruled.

The facts and questions of law are practically the same in cause No. 2,295, Lefevre v. Belsterling, this day decided, and this opinion applies to both cases.

It is ordered that the judgments of the district court and Court of Civil Appeals in each case be affirmed.

DIBRELL, J. I regret that I am not able to agree with a majority of the court in their disposition of this case, but, on account of the fact that the court is on the eve of adjournment, I will not have time to express my views on the questions involved. I consider the questions presented in this case of great importance, calling for a construction of more than one provision of the Constitution of this state, and affecting the form of our government.

I will reduce to writing my views for this dissent, and file later on.

VI. APPENDIX

THE PROPOSED OREGON SYSTEM1

[The following is a draft of a plan for a reform in the government of Oregon prepared by Mr. W. S. U'Ren and a group of Oregon citizens.]

There are 47 boards and commissions created to enforce the laws and manage the business of the State of Oregon. In addition to these we have the governor, secretary of state, state treasurer, superintendent of instruction, state printer, attorney-general, commissioner of labor, 34 sheriffs, unknown numbers of deputies, police, and constables, II district attorneys and 37 deputies. Every one is in a great degree independent of all others and of everybody else.

There is no one officer who is responsible to the people of the State for the enforcement of the state laws and the efficient management of the state business. The constitution says that the governor "shall take care that the laws of the State be faithfully executed," but gives him no power beyond that of making recommendations. No successful private business is conducted so carelessly as American public business and it is generally admitted that the state and county governments are seldom successful either in enforcing the laws or giving the taxpayers good value for their money.

At some general elections in Oregon the voters must choose from 20 to 39 officers. The number varies in different counties and districts and at different elections. The offices range in importance from county surveyor to governor and United States Senator. The usual number of candidates varies from about 80 to 170. In such a crowd is it any wonder that many grafters and incompetents are elected? The average citizen is compelled to vote according to his party brand because he cannot possibly have knowledge of the unfit among so many candidates for so many offices.

The plan herein proposed contemplates the election of only the most important officers. After the general election in 1914 the lowest 1 Senate Document, No. 603; 61st Cong., 2d Sess., pp. 145 ff.