Connors v. Golding & Sons Company.

bolted in its place, so as to retain the charge in the cylinder while in process of reduction, and the cylinder was then started and rotated for some six hours, when it was stopped, with the head closing the opening on the upper side. The head was then removed and-if the charge was found to be reduced to proper condition-a screen was bolted in the opening, and by rotating the cylinder, the finely reduced flint was sifted out and the cylinder was ready for another charge.

There were six of these cylinders in the mill. They were driven by means of a large engine, the power being connected by means of a line shaft driven by the engine on which pulleys were placed at proper positions which were connected by belts with pulleys on the shafts of the several cylinders; so that either of the cylinders could be stopped, discharged, charged again and started, independent of the others, and without the engineer's notice or a change of engine speed.

The cylinders were raised above the general floor of the mill some ten feet, and were enclosed in boxes built separately around each, and there was a platform above the level of the cylinders, for the purpose of reaching the machinery and cylinders; over the middle of each cylinder there was an opening with a door to close the same when not necessarily open, and through this opening the cylinders were charged, the manhead put on, taken off, etc.

The mode of removing the manhead was for the cylinder man to stop the motion of the cylinder by throwing the belt, by means of a lever, from the pulley which operated the cylinder to a loose pulley on the shaft ; he then opened the door in the platform, stepped down on the standing cylinder, removed the manhead, put in the screen, and returning to the platform started the cylinder in motion so as to screen out the reduced charge.

The lever used to throw the belt on and off, to start and stop the cylinder, was extended below the platform, so that the cylinder might, when necessary, be started, or stopped, from below.

Charge to the Jury.

BILLINGSLEY, J.

Gentlemen of the Jury: You should approach the consideration of this case with your minds absolutely free from prejudice against or sympathy for either of the parties, the plaintiff or defendant. It is the imperative duty of the jury to consider this case and decide it precisely the same as you would if it was a suit between two individuals, and the fact that the plaintiff is an individual and the defendant is a corporation should make no difference to you whatever.

In considering and deciding this case, you should look solely to the evidence for the facts, and to the charge of the court for the law of the case, and find your verdict accordingly without reference to who is

Columbiana Common Pleas.

plaintiff or who is defendant. It is improper for counsel in the argument of the case to state any matter or thing bearing upon the questions of fact, and claimed to be within his personal knowledge, or which may have been stated to him by others not appearing as witnesses in the case, or which has not been mentioned in the evidence in the case, and it will be your duty to disregard all such statements, and to arrive at your verdict upon the evidence actually given in the case, without placing any reliance upon, or giving credit to, statements of counsel not supported by evidence.

The plaintiff claims that, by reason of the injuries of the defendant, he has received a personal injury, and brings this suit to recover damages from the defendant for such injury. In his petition filed in this case, the plaintiff states that he was employed by the defendant to perform the duty of charging and discharging cylinders, used by the defendant in its flint mill for the purpose of grinding flint; that in discharging and recharging such cylinders it was the plaintiff's duty to disconnect such cylinders from the machinery which propelled it, and to have it remain disconnected while he was discharging and recharging the cylinder; and that while plaintiff was engaged in discharging one of the cylinders in defendant's mill, and while he was standing on that cylinder where it was necessary for him to be for that purpose, one Benjamin Wilkinson, who, plaintiff claims, was then in charge of defendant's works, and having the entire management thereof, and the supervision of plaintiff and other employees, with full authority and power from the defendant to control and direct the plaintiff and other employees of the defendant, without any notice to the plaintiff, and without making any effort to ascertain the whereabouts of plaintiff, and well knowing the manner in which it was necessary for plaintiff to perform the work aforesaid, and knowing the dangerous nature thereof, and knowing it was about the time when said cylinder should be emptied and recharged, threw the belt on the pulley on one of said cylinders on which the plaintiff was then standing, and thereby caused the same to revolve rapidly, and draw the body of the plaintiff between said cylinder and the frame surrounding the same, thereby crushing, bruising and mangling the body of plaintiff so as to break his leg in two places, crush the ankle thereof, break his collar bone, and thereby bruised, cut, and sprained his back and otherwise caused the plaintiff serious bodily injury, causing him to suffer great pain, and incapacitating him for labor, and permanently disabling him; by reason of which he has incurred large expense in securing medical and other attendance, to the damage of the plaintiff in the sum of ten thousand dollars.

To this petition the defendant has filed its answer, which contains three defenses. By the first, the defendant denies each and all the allegations contained in the plaintiff's petition, and in the second defense,

Connors v. Golding & Sons Company.

the defendant claims that, at the time of the alleged injuries to the plaintiff, if such injuries were received, the plaintiff had exclusive charge and control of the cylinders and the department of the works of the defendant in which the cylinders were placed, and that no one had anything whatever to do with the management of said cylinders except the plaintiff, and that, if any accident occurred resulting in the serious injuries complained of by the plaintiff, it was by virtue of plaintiff's own fault and carelessness, in negligently attending to his own duties, and by not properly using the means in his hands and provided by the defendant for the plaintiff's safety in operating said cylinders, in this: that each cylinder can be run and stopped independently of any others; that the engine is run steadily night and day, but by means of levers any one of the cylinders can be stopped when required without interfering with the engine or other cylinders or machinery; that, as a means of safety, there is a rope attachment which, when thrown over the levers used for the purpose of disconnecting the cylinders from the machinery, prevents the starting or putting in motion of the cylinders until the one is charged and the lever released by removing said rope and pulling the lever in the opposite direction; that this lever and rope, as safety attachments, were on the cylinder in charge of plaintiff at the time that the accident complained of occurred, and that the defendant carelessly and negligently neglected to put the rope in its proper place, and over the lever, so as to prevent the starting of the cylinder until after he had removed the manhead and placed the screen-opening on the cylinder for the purpose of emptying the same; all of which the defendant says was the duty of the plaintiff to do, and that the injuries, if any, received by the plaintiff, were due to the plaintiff's carelessness in this respect.

By the third defense, the defendant denies that Benjamin Wilkinson was in charge of said work, and denies that he had any management thereof, but says on the contrary the said Wilkinson was, at the time when the plaintiff claims to have received the injuries mentioned in the petition, employed by the defendant to run the engine, oil the machinery, and keep、、 the belts in order, and nothing more; and that he had no control over the plaintiff or over the department in which the plaintiff had sole charge of the cylinders, and that if said Wilkinson did throw the belt on the pulley of the cylinder, causing the same to revolve rapidly, as alleged in plaintiff's petition, the said engineer acted upon his own responsibility, and without the consent and direction, and against the positive instructions. of the defendant.

To this answer the plaintiff has filed a reply, in which he denies all the material allegations contained in this answer. In brief, then, in the petition the plaintiff claims he received the injury he complains of, by reason of the negligence of the defendant, and without any fault on the part of the plaintiff. And the defendant claims that, if the plaintiff re

Columbiana Common Pleas.

ceived an injury, he received it by reason of his own negligence, or that his negligence contributed to the injury, or that if the injury was caused in any degree by the negligence of Benjamin Wilkinson, said Wilkinson was a fellow-servant of the plaintiff, for whose negligence as fellowservant the defendant would not be liable.

These pleadings, the plaintiff's petition, the defendant's answer and the plaintiff's reply thereto, make up what are called the issues or questions between the parties to the case.

By them the plaintiff asserts certain facts to be true, and the defendant says they are not true. This casts upon the plaintiff the burden of establishing by a preponderance of the evidence, that the plaintiff received an injury while in the employ of the defendant, through the negli gence of the defendant, and without any fault of the plaintiff.

In civil actions, facts or propositions are not required to be established beyond a reasonable doubt, nor are they required to be clearly proven. It is only required that they be established by a preponderance of the evidence.

By a preponderance of the evidence is meant the greater weight of evidence. A proposition is said to be established by a preponderance of the evidence when there is a greater weight of evidence in favor of than against it. If, when weighed and considered, the evidence is found to be exactly evenly balanced, the party on whom rests the burden of proof must fail; but if the weight of evidence is found to preponderate in his favor, no matter how slight the preponderance, then the matter should be decided in his favor. A preponderance of the evidence in the case is not alone to be determined by the number of witnesss testifying to a particular fact, or state of facts. In determining on which side the preponderance of the evidence is, the jury should take into consideration the opportunities of the several witnesses for seeing and knowing the things about which they testify, their conduct and demeanor while testifying, their interest or absence of interest, if any, in the result of the suit, the probability or improbability of the truth of their several statements, in view of the evidence, facts, and circumstances proven at the trial, and from all these circumstances determine upon which side is the weight or preponderance of the evidence.

According to these rules and instructions, you will proceed to determine the questions between the parties in the case, and I shall now give them to you.

First: Did the plaintiff, while in the employ of the defendant, receive a personal injury?

Second: Did he receive such injury by reason of the negligence of the defendant?

Third: If the plaintiff did receive a personal injury by reason of the defendant's negligence, was the plaintiff himself free from negligence?

Connors v. Golding & Sons Company.

I will now call your attention to these propositions more particularly, and in the order in which I have just stated them.

First: Did the plaintiff, while in the employ of the defendant, receive the personal injury which he complains of? As to this proposition you will look solely to the eivdence. I can say but little that will aid you in determining that.

Second: If he did receive such injury, was it by reason of the negligence of the defendant? This proposition involves several questions. In the first place it is necessary for you to understand what is meant by negligence. And I say to you that, generally, negligence is the failure of the party to exercise that degree of care which men of common prudence usually and ordinarily exercise under the same or like circumstances.

Now, on the question as to whether or not there was negligence on behalf of the defendant, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Benjamin Wilkinson did the act which caused the plaintiff's injury. That is, it is necessary for the plaintiff to show, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Benjamin Wilkinson started this cylinder in motion, and that by starting it he caused the injury to the plaintiff of which he complains. It is not only necessary to show that Wilkinson started the machine, but it is necessary for the plaintiff to show that he did it negligently; that in doing it he did not exercise that care and caution which men of common prudence would ordinarily exercise in respect to that matter, under the same or like circumstances. Now you will look to the testimony and all the facts and circumstances, and if you find, by a preponderance of the evidence, that Benjamin Wilkinson did set this cylinder in motion, and thereby caused the injury to the plaintiff, then you should consider whether or not he did it negligently; that is, whether or not he exercised that degree of care that a prudent man would ordinarily exercise under those or similar circumstances.

But this is not all. In order to charge the defendant with such negligence, if you find that Wilkinson did this and did it negligently, and that such negligence caused plaintiff's injury, you must further find that he was, for the time being at least, the representative of the owners or operators of this factory, that he had some power or authority or control over the plaintiff in connection with the work which the plaintiff was then engaged in. In order to be the representative of the defendant, he must have had authority to direct and control the plaintiff in manner of doing the work in which the plaintiff was then engaged The plaintiff in the performance of his duties must have been subject to the orders and direction of the said Wilkinson, must have had some control and authority over the plaintiff. If Wilkinson did not have such power and control and authority to direct the plaintiff in the management of his work, the