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A receiver should not pay out
money as profits arising from the
receivership, without retaining a
sufficient amount to meet future fix-
ed charges and allowing for possi-
ble contingencies, such as a falling
off of future receipts.
A member of such church is not
responsible for its debt unless he in
some way sustained or acquiesced in
their creation. Males v. Murray.
A member of an unincorporated
religious society who sues the other
members on a note in which there is
a clause pledging the property of
the church in payment, is not enti-
tled to a personal judgment against
the defendant members nor to a de-
cree declaring the debt a lien, but
there must be a reference of the
cause for an accounting and a find-
ing as to the circumstances under
which the church property was
bound for the debt. Meyer V.
In replevin against sheriff,
the appearance of the defendant for
the purpose of obtaining an order
to sell the property pending litiga-
tion, and to make new parties, and
for the purpose of giving a redeliv-
ery hond, being only steps consistent
with his duty to retain possession
of goods to be sold on execution,
does not amount to a waiver of a
jurisdictional defense. Geiser V.
The failure by plaintiff in
plevin to set forth in the affidavit
that the property is not claimed un-
der a title acquired mediately or im-
mediately by transfer from one
from whom such property had been
taken by an execution order or pro-
cess, as provided by secs. 6613 and
5815, Rev. Stat., as amended, 88 O. L.,
273, is a jurisdictional defect. Ib.
In the ordinary action of replev-
in, where the property is confessedly
personal, and is susceptible of deliv.
ery, by the officer to the plaintiff on
the giving of a bond, or by the of-
ficer to the defendant on the giving
of a counter bond, and where all the
grounds for equitable relief which
the defendant has, he may set up as
a defense in the replevin suit, he has
an adequate remedy at law and in-
junction will not lie. But where the
question whether the property is
real or personal is in dispute, as in
The word "may" means "must"
or "shall” only in cases where pub-
lic interests or rights are concern-
ed, or where the public or third per-
sons have a claim de jure, that the
power shall be exercised, or where
something is directed to be done for
the sake of justice or the public
good. Board of Ed. v. Board of Ed.
The constitutional guaranty of
efficient system of common
schools throughout the state" does
not impose an obligation upon town.
ship boards to pay the tuition of a
few pupils who elect to enjoy the
advantages of a high school outside
the township of their residence,
either in the same or an adjoining
Under the Boxwell law (sec.
4029, Rev. Stat.), in which, when
first introduced, it was provided that
the high school tuition of certain
graduates "shall be paid by the
board of education of the township
in which such applicant resides,"
and which was changed by the com-
mittee to read “may" instead of
"shall," and so enacted, in which
form it remained for eight years, or
until 1899, when the legislature sub-
stituted the word "shall” for “may,"
a school board is not bound to pay
tuition in a high school in an adjoin-
ing county accruing during the time
when the law remained origi-
nally enacted. During that time the
word "may" did not have the force
of "must" or "shall."
Where a board of education, in
the exercise of this authority con-
ferred upon it by law, has seen fit
to pass a resolution prohibiting the
reading of the Bible and prayer or
other religious instructions in the
school, its action is final and cannot
be reviewed by the courts. Board
of Ed. v. Pulse.
The management of public
schools is by express statutory pro-
visions under the exclusive control
of boards of education. Each board
is required to "make such rules and
regulations" for the government of
the schools under its control as "it
may deem expedient and necessary.”
Where the board has made
rule, prohibiting such religious ex-
ercises and a teacher, after due no.
tice, refuses to obey the rule and
Statutes — Street Railways.
mental, effect must be given to the
will of the legislature. State ex rel.
v. Halliday, 63 Ohio St., 165, follow-
ed. State v. Lewis.
injury is suffered thereby is an in-
jury suffered in common by the en-
tire community, and even though
one piece of property may suffer in
a greater degree than another. ney.
ertheless the injury is not different
in kind and is therefore damnum
absque injuria. Mitchell Furniture
Co. v. Railroad Co.
Street Railways – Taxation.
A person whose returns of per-
sonal property for taxation
county auditor has reason to believe
are false and against whom he is
proceeding under sec. 2281-2, Rev.
Stat., is not required to appear be-
fore the auditor, in response to the
notice giving him an opportunity to
be heard, but if such person fails to
appear, the auditor may proceed in
his absence to ascertain from the
best evidence available the true
amount of property which such party
should have listed and have' same
entered on the duplicate for collec-
tion. Ohio Farmers Ins. Co. v. Hard.
Where an insurance
in explanation of and to justify its
returns of personal property at much
less than its full value, claimed
that it was the rule in the county
and generally in the state to tax per-
sonal property at about sixty per
cent. of its true value, the court held,
that while the constitution and laws
of the state require all property to
be taxed at its true value in money,
notice might be taken of the rule in
question: and that where the return,
if it were permissible to return such
property at sixty per cent. of its
value, would be a fair one, the court
has power to remit the penalty, and
permit the company to pay simple
taxes on the amount of property
which it failed to return.
An Ohio mutual insurance com-
pany, also doing business in other
states, should under sec. 2744, Rev.
Stat., list for taxation in Ohio not
only its property within the state,
but also its assets, whether in the
form of notes or cash balances in the
hands of agents in other states. The
fact that such company, in order to
do business in other states, may be
subjected to a franchise tax or a tax
for permission to do business in a
state, does not constitute double tax-
ation or relieve the company from
taxation of such assets or personal
property in Ohio.
The fact that the sworn annual
reports of a mutual insurance com-
pany to the state commissioner of in-
surance place the assets of the com:
pany at a much higher valuation
than the sum at which they were re-
turned for taxation, the two reports
being made by the same officers, who
had complete and accurate sources
of information, is proof that the com-
pany was aware of the true value of
its assets, and indicates, prima facie,
a purpose to evade or escape taxa-
tion; such returns, for these reasons
and in view of the knowledge, as to
property taxable in Ohio, required
upon the part of those making re-
turns for taxation, are SO grossly
careless as to be false within the
meaning of the statute as defined in
Ratterman v. Ingalls, 48 Ohio St.,
The definition of money, as given
sec. 2730, Rev. Stat., in the title on
taxation, that it means "any surplus
or undivided profits held by socie-
ties for saving or banks having no
capital stock, gold and silver coin,
bank notes of solvent banks in ac.
tual possession, and every deposit
which the person owning, holding in
trust or having the beneficial there
in is entitled to withdraw on de-
mand" applies to banks as well as in.
dividuals; under secs. 2 and 3, art.
12 of the constitution, what is money
if the property of an individual, for
the purpose of taxation, is and must
be money if the property of a bank.
Patton v. Bank.
Credit balances which an Ohio
bank has within its correspondent
banks in other states, against which
it may draw sight drafts, and the
right of withdrawal is not subject
to greater limitations than by the
usages of business exist as to general
deposits in banks carried by individ-
uals, are within secs. 2730 and 2739
Rev. Stat., held to be money and tar.
able without deduction and should
be returned as cash.
The word "cash" is synonymous
with the word “money" as used in
sec. 2730, Rev. Stat., in which the
meaning of the latter word is de-
Sections 2758 to 2769, Rev. Stat.,
are intended to operate uniformly
and impose the same burden upon all
banks and bankers, whether national
ferred to, does not constitute a false
return within the meaning of the
word "false" as defined in Ratterman
v. Ingalls, 48 Ohio St., 468; such re-
turns are incorrect.
Although the court is of the
opiuion that a reasonable construc-
tion of secs. 2781 and 2782, Rev. Stat.,
would not limit the investigation to
the current year in case of merely in.
correct returns and extend it to a
period of five years in case of false
returns, it is so held, on the author.
ity of Ratterman v. Ingalls, 48 Ohio
St., 468, and Probasco V. Raine, 50
Ohio St., 378.
Culpable negligence, in making
returns of property for taxation,
though there be no design to mislead
and deceive, is sufficient to make a
The conditions of falsity which
authorize the auditor to go back of
the current year being found to exist,
he may inquire into all matters
touching the correctness of the re-
turns and bring upon the duplicate
all the taxes which the party mak-
ing the return justly owed for that
year, adding a penalty of fifty per
cent. upon such items only as are
found to have been falsely omitted
Where the president of a bank,
being required to exercise diligence
in matters relating to taxation, and
having failed to return greenbacks
for taxation, admitted that some ru-
mor of the repeal of the law grant-
ing immunity from state taxation to
greenbacks had reached him, the fact
that he wrote to the representative
from his district in the state legisla-
ture as to whether the general assem.
bly of Ohio had repealed a law of con-
gress, is not diligence in acquiring
knowledge from sources where in.
formation is obtainable, which will
relieve such president from the im.
putation of culpable negligence or a
TELEGRAPH AND TELEPHONE
The construction and mainte-
nance of a telegraph or telephone
line upon a highway is a new and ad-
ditional burden upon the fee, to
which, when the highway was estab-
lished, it was not contemplated it
would be subjected, and for which
the owner is entitled to additional
compensation. Denrer v. Telephone