belief that it would solve most if not all of the difficulties which arise in investigations of this kind. In Banks v. Goodfellow, L. R. 5. Q. B. 560, Cockburn, C. J. said: "When delusions exist which have no foundation in reality and spring only from a diseased and morbid condition of the mind, to that extent the mind must necessarily be taken to be unsound." In American Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Hopper, 33 N. Y. 624, it was said: "If a person persistently believes supposed facts which have no real existence except in his perverted imagination, and against all evidence and probability, and conducts himself, however logically, upon the assumption of their existence, he is, so far as they are concerned, under a morbid delusion; and delusion in that sense is insanity." In Middleditch v. Williams, 45 N. J. Eq. 726, 17 Atl. 826, 4 L.R.A. 738, Van Vleet, vice ordinary, said: "According to these definitions, it is only a delusion or conception which springs up spontaneously in the mind of a testator, and is not the result of extrinsic evidence of any kind that can be regarded as furnishing evidence that his mind is diseased or unsound: in other words, that he is subject to insane delusions. If, without evidence of any kind, he imagines or conceives something to exist which does not in fact exist, and which no rational person would in the absence of evidence believe to exist, then it is manifest that the only way in which his irrational belief can be accounted for is that it is the product of mental disorder. Delusions of this kind can be accounted for upon no reasonable theory except that they are the creations of the mind in which they originate." In Friedersdorf v. Lacy, 173 Ind. 429, 90 N. E. 766, it was said: "An insane, delusion is a spontaneous conception and acceptance of that as a fact which has no existence except in the imagination and which is persistently believed in against all evidence and probability." In the case of In re Calef, 139 Cal. 678, 73 Pac. 539, an insane delusion was said to be the spontaneous and firmly fixed belief of a diseased mind which no argument or evidence can overthrow and which a rational mind could not entertain. In the case of In re Scott, 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527, it was said: "In ordinary language, a person is said to be under a delusion who entertains a false belief or opinion which he has been led to form by reason of some deception or fraud, but it is not every false or unfounded opinion which is in legal phraseology a delusion, nor is every delusion an insane delusion. If the belief or opinion has no basis in reason or probability, and is without any evidence in its support, but exists without any process of reasoning, or is the spontaneous offspring of a perverted imagination, and is adhered to against all evidence and argument,

the delusion may be truly called insane; but if there is any evidence, however slight or inconclusive, which might have a tendency to create the belief, such belief is not a delusion. One cannot be said to act under an insane delusion if his condition of mind results from a belief or inference, however irrational or unfounded, drawn from facts which are shown to exist." See to the same effect. Morgan v. Morgan, 30 App. Cas. (D. C.) 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 1037. In Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S. E. 306, the court said: "The very name 'monomania' implies partial insanity and excludes the idea of any sort of ratiocination as to the particular subject to which the partial insanity relates. Monomania cannot be implied because a person takes a narrow, or prejudiced, or utterly illogical view of a particular subject.

It is not the result of any conclusion; the person does not arrive at his conviction because of any attempt either at reasoning or investigation; the partial insanity is the offspring of a disordered intellect." And see the reported case.

The essence of an insane delusion is that it has no basis in reason and cannot be dispelled by reason. Merrill v. Rolston, 5 Redf. (N. Y.) 220. In re Tracy, 46 Hun 675, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 103. So it was said in Barr v. Sumner (Ind.) 107 N. E. 675: "Of course, there may be a belief, the falsity of which cannot be disproved by evidence, such as, for example, the supposed appearance of an angel to a testator, at night, when alone. Here, however, we are dealing with a mistake that could be disproved by evidence, and with a belief of the existence of a thing neither inherently impossible nor improbable. There was no evidence presented to testatrix of the mistake in her belief, nor was there resort to argument or persuasion to convince her of its falsity." Similarly in the case of In re Kendrick, 130 Cal. 360, 62 Pae. 605, it was said: "Finally, as to each and all of these alleged delusions, it does not appear that any of them were dominant ideas in the mind of Mrs. Kendrick. They were not always nor constantly referred to when Mrs. Masterson was under consideration, and very many witnesses never heard any such expressions from her. It is a characteristic of monomania and insane delusion that when the conversation turns upon the subject, the patient is dominated by it and cannot conceal his conviction."

2. ILLOGICAL OR UNREASONABLE CONCLUSION AS TO RELATIVE FROM FACTS. Since the accepted definitions require that a belief shall, to be an insane delusion, arise spontaneously in the mind of the testator, a belief existing as a conclusion of the testator from facts is not such a delusion though

the conclusion is illogical and the facts are insufficient to give it reasonable support. Taylor v. McClintock, 87 Ark. 243, 112 S. W. 405; In re Scott, 128 Cal. 57, 60 Pac. 527; In re Kendrick, 130 Cal. 360, 62 Pac. 605; Young v. Malloy, 110 Ga. 10; Bauchens v. Davis, 229 Ill. 557, 82 N. E. 365; Rush v. Megee, 36 Ind. 69; Friedersdorf v. Lacy, 173 Ind. 429, 90 N. E. 766; Coffey v. Miller, reported in full, post, this volume, at page 30; Bean v. Bean, 144 Mich. 599, 108 N. W. 369; Sibley v. Morse, 146 Mich. 463, 109 N. W. $58; Leffingwell v. Bettinghouse, 151 Mich. 513, 115 N. W. 731; Stackhouse v. Horton, 15 N. J. Eq. 202; Davenport v. Davenport, 67 N. J. Eq. 320, 58 Atl. 535; Clapp v. Fullerton, 34 N. Y. 190, 90 Am. Dec. 681; Coit v. Patchen, 77 N. Y. 533; In re Tracy, 46 Hun 675, 11 N. Y. St. Rep. 103; In re Gross, 47 Hun 633, 14 N. Y. St. Rep. 429; In re Fricke, 64 Hun 639 mem. 19 N. Y. S. 315; In re Smith, 24 N. Y. S. 928; In re Cline, 24 Ore. 175, 33 Pac. 542, 41 Am. St. Rep. 851; In re Diggins (Ore.) 149 Pac. 73; Alexander's Estate, reported in full, post, this volume, at page 33; In re Herr (Pa.) 96 Atl. 464. And see infra this note subdivision III. Unfounded Belief as to Particular Matter. "An insane delusion does not mean a mistaken conclusion from a given state of facts, nor a mistaken belief as to the existence of facts. An erroneous conclusion of a sane person may arise from incorrect reasoning or from a deduction from information which he supposed to be correct." Bohler v. Hicks, 120 Ga. 800, 48 S. E. 306. In Morgan v. Morgan, 30 App. Cas. (D. C.) 436, 13 Ann. Cas. 1037, it was said respecting an alleged delusion that a child of the testator was illegitimate: "The facts developed in that suit appear to have convinced the testator that he was not the father of the youngest child, and to have tended to raise some doubt in his mind as to the paternity of the two older ones. Then the evidence of his declarations made it to appear that he claimed to have acquired further information, relating to earlier misconduct of their mother, by which he was led to disclam their paternity also. The source and nature of this information were declared to two persons. The information might have been false, and he might have been largely induced to give credit to it by the undoubted fact of the mother's later misconduct. While, therefore, he might have acted under a delusion, it was not an insane delusion, that is to say, a conception originating spontaneously in the mind, without evidence to support it, and which could be accounted for on no reasonable hypothesis." So in Stull v. Stull, 1 Neb. (unofficial) Rep. 380, 389, 96 N. W. 200, it was said: "Now, with reference to his belief that his wife had turned the children against him, this idea, while perhaps cruel and unjust, was

not without some evidence for a basis; for the testimony clearly shows that in 1871 his sons, with the exception of Marinus, combined against him and coerced him into deeding his home place to his wife, by threatening to apply for a conservator of his estate unless he did so. The only reason that they allege for this was that he had signed a bond for his son Marinus and a note for one of his neighbors. The evidence clearly shows that after this the deceased became, as one of the contestant's witnesses said, 'dissatisfied,' and left his home, and resided from that time, until he came to the home of his son, John S. Stull, in 1895, among strangers. It is also in evidence that his children neglected him, and seldom, if ever, recognized him in any manner for several years after he had left his old home. During this time it is in evidence that he complained of the neglect of his children and blamed his wife for it. When a man, stricken in years and suffering from bodily infirmities, has been long taught, like King Lear, to feel

'How sharper than a serpent's tooth it is
To have a thankless child'

-the fact that he complains of neglect is not sufficient to establish an insane delusion." The rule was stated and applied in Fulton v. Freeland, 219 Mo. 494, 118 S. W. 12, 131 Am. St. Rep. 576, the court saying: "There is no such thing as a delusion founded upon facts. It is a mental conception in the absence of facts. If the idea entertained has for a basis anything substantial it is not a delusion. There may be a misjudgment of facts or there may be an accentuated opinion founded upon insufficient facts, but not a delusion, rising to the dignity of a mental aberration. As to the conspiracy of his former wife and her relatives and friends forming a plot in the East to do him bodily injury, it cannot be said that this was a delusion in face of the facts. His brother had written him sufficient facts to remove his views from the realm of delusions." In the case of In re Merriman, 108 Mich. 454, 66 N. W. 372, it was said: "So, as regards the statement which Howard made after the making of the will, implying that his father was trying to cheat him, it can be said of this that Dwight Merriman delayed in turning over to Howard his money, and while such a judgment of his father was harsh, and perhaps unwarranted, it cannot be said it had no foundation in fact." So in Purdy v. Evans, 156 Ky. 342, 160 S. W. 1071, it was said: "The prejudice, resentment, or anger of testator toward his daughter may have been without reasonable cause; yet, it was not the spontaneous production of a diseased mind based upon no evidence whatever; for it had some basis in fact. It arose from the refusal of his daughter to live with him, and from her

marriage with one to whom testator objected; and, however imperfect the process of his reasoning, or however illogical or unjust the conclusion that she was so greatly at fault as his conduct toward her proves his belief to have been, it was not without some basis in fact; at least there was sufficient to free it from the imputation of spontaneity, and, therefore, from the charge of having its origin in an insane delusion." Likewise in Owen v. Crumbaugh, 228 Ill. 380, 10 Ann. Cas. 606, 81 N. E. 1044, 119 Am. St. Rep. 442, the court said: "Take for example, the fact that the testator said that his brother and sisterin-law caused the death of his only child. The evidence explained what the testator meant. The child was being fed from the milk of a cow belonging to the testator's brother. It is not denied that the owner of the cow took it away from the testator's home without his consent, thereby making it necessary to feed the child upon the milk of another cow. It is not denied that the child sickened and died after the change in its food. Who would say that there was no evidence whatever for the charge that the taking away of the cow was the cause of the baby's death?" In the case of In re White, 121 N. Y. 406, 24 N. E. 935, it was said: "As to the testator's belief that there was collusion between neighbors, surveyor and his son to defraud him, we cannot say that there was absolutely no basis for any such reasoning by testator. There were the facts that the testator and his neighbors disputed on questions of boundary lines and fences; that his son disagreed with his views of his rights in the matters; and that one of the neighbors, his son and the surveyor, recommended by his son, were Masons. Can we say that because he could not believe anything good of the Masonic fraternity, and because he supposed them bound to stand by each other as against an outsider, that he was influenced by an insane delusion? Delusion is insanity, where one persistently believes supposed facts, which have no real existence, except in his perverted imagination, and against all evidence and probability, and conducts himself, however logically, upon the assumption of their existence. That was so held in American Seamen's Friend Soc. v. Hopper [33 N. Y. 619] supra. But if there are facts, however insufficient they may in reality be, from which a prejudiced, or a narrow, or a bigoted mind might derive a particular idea, or belief, it cannot be said that the mind is diseased in that respect. The belief may be illogical, or preposterous, but it is not, therefore, evidence of insanity in the person. Persons do not always reason logically, or correctly, from facts, and that may be because of their prejudices, or of the perversity, or peculiar construction of their minds. Wills, however, do not depend for

their validity upon the testator's ability to reason logically, or upon his freedom from prejudice."

What was said in Phillips v. Chater, 1 Dem. (N. Y.) 533, to be "a very simple and practical standard" by which to determine the rationality of a belief was laid down in Boughton v. Knight, L. R. 3 P. & D. (Eng.) 64, wherein Sir James Harmon in charging the jury said: "The tribunal that is to determine the question (whether judge or jury), must, of necessity, take his own mind as the standard whereby to measure the degree of intellect possessed by another man. You must not arbitrarily take your own mind as the measure, in this sense, that you should say, I do not believe such and such a thing, and therefore the man who does believe it is insane. Nay, more; you must not say, I should not have believed such and such a thing, therefore the man who did believe it is insane. But you must of necessity put to yourself this question, and answer it: Can I understand how any man in possession of his senses could have believed such and such a thing? And if the answer you give is, I cannot understand it, then it is of the necessity of the case that you should say the man is not sane."

The question at issue being the state of the testator's mind facts not known to him which tend to support that belief cannot be considered. Matter of Stoll, 90 Misc. 266, 153 N. Y. S. 362.

3. UNREASONABLE ANTIPATHY TO RELATIVE.

a. In General.

An unfounded prejudice or antipathy on the part of a testator toward even a near relative is not ordinarily evidence of an insane delusion.

California. In re Kendrick, 130 Cal. 360, 62 Pac. 605; In re Calef, 139 Cal. 673, 73 Pac. 539; In re Riordan, 13 Cal. App. 313, 109 Pac. 629.

Connecticut.-Kimberly's Appeal, 68 Conn. 428, 36 Atl. 847, 57 Am. St. Rep. 101, 37 L.R.A. 261.

Georgia.-Carter v. Dixon, 69 Ga. 82.

Illinois. Claussenius v. Claussenius, 179 Ill. 545, 53 N. E. 1006; Huggins v. Drury, 192 Ill. 528, 61 N. E. 652; Schmidt v. Schmidt, 201 Ill. 191, 66 N. E. 371; Drum v. Capps, 240 Ill. 524, 88 N. E. 1020; Carnahan v. Hamilton, reported in full, post, this volume at page 21.

Indiana.-Barr v. Sumner, 107 N. E. 675. Kentucky.-Purdy v. Evans, 156 Ky. 342, 160 S. W. 1071.

Maine.-Barnes v. Barnes, 66 Me. 286 Mississippi.-Mullins v. Cottrell, 41 Miss.

291.

Missouri.-Current v. Current, 244 Mo. 429, 148 S. W. 860.

Nebraska. In re Clapham, 73 Neb. 492, 103 N. W. 61.

New Jersey.-Stackhouse v. Horton, 15 N. J. Eq. 202; Hollinger v. Syms, 37 N. J. Eq. 221.

New York.-Dobie v. Armstrong, 160 N. Y. 584, 55 N. E. 302; Matter of Lang, 9 Misc. 521, 30 N. Y. S. 388; Matter of Brush, 35 Misc. 689, 72 N. Y. S. 421; Matter of Town. send, 73 Misc. 481, 133 N. Y. S. 492; Phillips v. Flagler, 82 Misc. 500, 143 N. Y. S. 798; In re Forman, 54 Barb. (N. Y.) 274; Bull v. Wheeler, 6 Dem. (N. Y.) 123.

Oregon.-Potter v. Jones, 20 Ore. 239, 25 Pac. 769, 12 L.R.A. 161.

Pennsylvania.-McGovean's Estate, 185 Pa. St. 203; In re Hemingway, 195 Pa. St. 291, 45 Atl. 726, 78 Am. St. Rep. 815; In re Alexander, reported in full, post, this volume, at page 33; In re Herr (Pa.) 96 Atl. 464; Matter of Mintzer, 5 Phila. 206, 20 Leg. Int. 380.

Rhode Island.-Jenckes v. Probate Ct. 2 R. I. 255.

"People may hate their relations for bad reasons and yet not be deprived of testamentary power." Carpenter's Estate, 94 Cal. 419, 29 Pac. 1101. In Carter v. Dixon, 69 Ga. 82, it was said: "A testator may entertain his animosities, cherish his prejudices, and nurse his wrath against heirs at law of his estate, and he may be guided and controlled by them in the disposition of his property; still, if he is competent in mind and makes a will freely and voluntarily, these conditions of his mind will not per se destroy his testamentary capacity." So it was said in Schneider v. Manning, 121 Ill. 376, 12 N. E. 267. "A man may become prejudiced against some of his children, and that, too, without proper foundation; and because he may make unjust remarks against them, remarks not warranted by the facts,-it does not follow that he has insane delusions, or that he is devoid of testamentary capacity. If such was the rule, but few wills would be able to stand the test where an unequal distribution of property has been made by a testator among children." See to the same effect Huggins v. Drury, 192 Ill. 528, 61 N. E. 652. In Lowe v. Williamson, 2 N. J. Eq. 82, it was said: "It was further urged, that the testator was under a species of derangement or delusion as to his relative; that he took up a prejudice without cause. I have before said, that I find no good reason for this hostility, but it is plain that the testator had such feelings towards them. There was no intimacy with them. They visited him very little. He had an idea that they looked down upon him, and was no doubt jealous of their superior standing. There was, then, no delusion, but a real

ity in the fact, that there existed no cordiality between him and his relatives. It was of long standing; not sudden and accidental, but abiding." In the case of In re Spencer, 96 Cal. 448, 31 Pac. 453, wherein it appeared that the testatrix entertained a strong prejudice against her daughter-in-law it was said: "There is nothing to show anything like mental unsoundness or monomania on the part of the testatrix. It is quite probable that the conduct of Homer in various matters caused her to attach blame to Ella, when it should have fallen on Homer himself; but she did not know the real facts. She believed the son, whom she loved, rather than the daughter-in-law, whom she disliked and mistrust. ed; but would not any sane mother, under the circumstances, have done the same? The likes and dislikes of human beings-their confidences and mistrusts-are often capricious and arbitrary; but they are not evidences of insanity because they cannot be logically defended to the satisfaction of those who think them wrong. In the case at bar there is no warrant for the claim that the testatrix's dislike of her daughter-in-law and her family was an insane delusion; it was simply such a feeling, arising out of the recondite principles of attraction and repulsion, as is quite common among people of undoubted sanity." In Trumbull v. Gibbons, 22 N. J. L. 117, the court said: "In what does the alleged delusion exist, or how has it been exhibited in the present case? I have carefully looked through the testimony to be found in the case prepared, and in the documents, including the diary and the libels, which evidence I am not disposed to recapitulate or record. It is sufficiently referred to and stated in the charge of the Chief Justice for the present purpose, and it undoubtedly exhibits a sad instance of the extent to which family feuds may be carried. There seems to have been, on the one side, an imperious and haughty temper sustained by wealth and power, and restrained by no softening influences from moral or religous principles. On the other, as I take it, there was great imprudence on the part of a daughter and son-in-law in dealing with the errors of an uncontrollable and violent parent, upon whom they were dependent. But I can find nothing like delusion or insanity. The first dissatisfaction and incipient dislike were heightened, by continued disputes and irritation, into settled aversion and enmity; but this was the result of obvious causes having an actual existence, and not the consequences of imaginary difficulties. The rebukes for alleged licentiousness, the disputes and difficulties with regard to property, threatened divorce, the libel suit, all these matters, which embittered the feelings of the testator in the highest degree, were not mere imaginary causes of offence.

These and other successive bitter quarrels between the testator and his son-in-law, daughter, and family, certainly occurred, and they account for the provisions of the will, by which the latter were disinherited, without any necessity to resort for explanation to monomonia or any other form of insanity." In Conner v. Skaggs, 213 Mo: 334, 111 S. W. 1132, wherein it appeared that the testator disinherited a daughter who married against his wishes, it was said: "Testator's opinions as to the soundness of Mr. Conner's morals, may have been grossly narrow and unjust, but there was no insanity about it. It is natural and usual for men to act on what they are told by others, in whom they trust. The solicitude of the father was natural. A clandestine courtship in the teeth of parental protest is a most dangerous domestic experiment. Mischief and unwholesomeness lurk in the shade of concealment. The resentment of the father was most human and natural though extravagantly exhibited. That he did not rise to the lofty and divine plane of complete forgiveness when time had healed his wounds, is unfortunate; but is still natural and human-not insanity."

b. Exceptional Cases.

However, an antipathy of a testator toward a near relative may be so violent, extravagant and baseless as to amount to an insane delusion. Dew v. Clark, 3 Add. Ecc. (Eng.) 79; Nicewander v. Nicewander, 151 Ill. 156; Huggins v. Drury, 192 Ill. 528, 61 N. E. 652; Miller v. White, 5 Redf. (N. Y.) 320; Thomas v. Carter, 170 Pa. St. 272, 33 Atl. 81, 50 Am. St. Rep. 770; Chaney v. Bryan, 16 Lea (Tenn.) 63. And see Brown v. Ward, 53 Md. 387, 36 Am. Rep. 422. As was said in Broughton v. Knight, L. R. 3 P. & D. (Eng.) 64: "It is unfortunately not a thing unknown that parents-and in justice to women I am bound to say it is more frequently the case with fathers than mothers,-that they take unduly harsh views of the characters of their children, sons especially. That is not unknown. But there is a limit beyond which one feels that it ceases to be a question of harsh unreasonable judgment of character, and that the repulsion which a parent exhibits towards one or more of his children must proceed from some mental defect in himself. It is so contrary to the whole current of human nature that a man should not only form a harsh judgment of his children, but that he should put that into practice so as to do them injury or deprive them of advantages which most men desire above all things to confer upon their children. I say there is a point at which such repulsion and aversion are themselves evidence of unsoundness of mind." In the leading case of Dew v. Clark,

supra, an issue as to testamentary capacity was awarded, it appearing that the testator harbored the most unfounded and unreasonable impressions in regard to the character of an only daughter, against whom, in consequence, he entertained an unnatural dislike. He imagined that the daughter was vile, profligate, and depraved in the highest degree, and treated her accordingly with the utmost severity, and even cruelty, and finally cut her off in his will with an inadequate provision. It was a dislike founded purely on delusion. It was satisfactorily shown, that while this delusion had gained such possession of his mind that nothing could shake his belief, yet, in point of fact, she was amiable in disposition, engaging in her manners, of superior natural talents, diligent, dutiful, affectionate, modest, and virtuous, and giving no occasion for the extraordinary feelings exhibited by the father. In Ballantine v. Proudfoot, 62 Wis. 216, 22 N. W. 392, the court said: "It is rare that a mother, without the greatest provocation, entertains such an aversion to a daughter that she refuses to see her in her last illness. And yet, but a few hours before she died, Mrs. Stewart was asked if her daughter should not be sent for, and she replied that she did not wish to see her daughter; that the Proudfoots might come and look upon her after she was dead. Such unnatural feelings are so contrary to human nature that we are inclined to account for them on the ground that the mother at the time was not herself, but was laboring under some mental disorder." In Merrill v. Rolston, 5 Redf. (N. Y.) 220, the court said: "If she had taken the notion that George had become indifferent to her wishes, and rebellious against her au thority, however unreasonable and untrue, it might have been said that there was some semblance of fact and circumstances to base the suspicion upon, in his marriage against her will, which an imperious disposition and over-jealous nature might have magnified into an unpardonable offense; but her extravagant and irrational exaggeration of his so-called offense, her apparently sincere imputation of an unworthy and depraved character, of his reprehensible, impure and immoral conduct, her baseless accusation of unworthiness and

wickedness and impurity on the part of George and his estimable and accomplished wife, her utterly false and irrational statement that his adopted father from his visit to Liverpool, which appears to have been about 1852, discovered his innate depravity, and thereafter distrusted and disliked him, and refused him his name, and her alleged discovery of his baseness and subsequent dislike of him, all entirely and overwhelmingly disproved by numerous subsequent letters, full of extravagant expressions of confidence in his ability, education, moral purity, and her