arise from them, first, to the party, by the loss of his livelihood, and the subsistence of his family; secondly, to the public, by depriving it of a useful member."); Gamewell FireAlarm Co. v. Crane, 160 Mass. 50 (1893) [55] ("To exclude a person from manufacturing or selling anywhere in the United States or in the world machinery designed for certain purposes, in which that person has acquired great skill, may operate to impair his means of earning a living.''); Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473 (1887) [59]; Leslie v. Lorillard, 110 N. Y. 519 (1888) [69]; Oakdale Manufacturing Co. v. Garst, 18 R. I. 484 (1894) [80]; National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn. 272 (1891) [96]; United States Chemical Co. v. Provident Chemical Co., 64 Fed. 946 (1894) [102].

11-Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 (1711) [4] ("Particular restraints are either, first, without consideration, all which are void by what sort of contract soever created.

. Or secondly, particular restraints are with consideration. Where a contract for restraint of trade appears to be made upon a good and adequate consideration, so as to make it a proper and useful contract, it is good.")

12-Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E., 438 (1837) [26] ("But if by adequacy of consideration more is intended, and that the court must weigh whether the consideration is equal in value to that which the party gives up or loses by the restraint under which he has placed himself, we feel ourselves bound to differ from that doctrine. A duty would thereby be imposed upon the court, in every particular case, which it has no means whatever to execute. It is impossible for the court, looking at the record, to say whether, in any particular case, the party restrained has made an improvident bargain or not. The receiving instruction in a particular trade might be of much greater value to a man in one condition of life than in another; and the same may be observed as to other considerations. It is enough, as it appears to us, that there actually is a consideration for the bargain; and that such consideration is a legal consideration, and of some value. Such appears to be the case in the present instance, where the defendant is retained and employed at an annual salary."); Lawrence v. Kidder, 10 Barb. (N. Y.) 641, 649 (1851) ("In many of the early cases the language of the courts would seem to imply that the adequacy or extent of the consideration

had something to do with the validity of the contract. They say that a mere pecuniary consideration is not sufficient; that there must be something, although it does not appear very clearly what, added to this to support the contract. This idea, however, of the necessity of any greater or other consideration for a contract of this description, than any other, was obviously unfounded, and has been exploded by the recent cases [Hitchcock Coker, supra, Green v. Price, 13 M. & W. 695 (1845)]''); Duffy v. Shockey, 11 Ind. 70, 73 (1858) ("As to the question of the adequacy of the consideration, we are inclined to view this as we would any other contract made by parties capable of contracting. They should, in the absence of fraud, be presumed to have determined that point for themselves. This presumption

V.

is peculiarly proper in this case, for the reason that we are left in doubt as to how much the consideration to be paid by the defendant was. In addition to the 300 dollars, he was to relieve the planitiffs from their contracts with agents-to what amount we are not informed-he was to take the marble, carved or not, remaining after the completion of the outstanding contracts of plaintiffs. The value of the marble thus disposed of is not given. He was also to buy of plaintiffs marble at fixed prices; but whether those prices were advantageous to the plaintiffs, or defendant, we are not appraised by the pleadings or evidence.''); Hubbard v. Miller, 27 Mich. 15, 21 (1873) ("The fact

that complainant paid no more than the cost of the articles at Grand Haven can make no difference. Where a consideration recognized by law as being valuable is paid, the law very properly allows the parties to judge for themselves of the sufficiency in value of such consideration for their contracts. We cannot, therefore, enter into the question whether the consideration was commensurate in value with the restraint imposed. See Hitchcock v. Coker, 6 A. & E. 438 (1837); Pilkington v. Scott, 15 M. & W. 657 (1846); Hartley v. Cummings, 5 C. B. 247 (1847). And there is no reason for holding that, without the restraint contracted for, complainant would have been willing to purchase for the price he gave, nor can we say that the vendors could have sold at that price without such stipulation. In fact, we must infer that, in their opinion they could not readily have done so without it, or they would not have given it. It is clear, at all events, that they thought the sale with the stipulation an advantageous one or they would not have made it. The contract must, therefore, be held fair, reasonable and valid, unless too general and unlimited as to place, as insisted under the second objection.") See also Holbrook v. Waters, 9 How. Pr. (N. Y.) 335 (1854); Pierce v. Fuller, 8 Mass. 222 (1811) (a consideration of one dollar deemed sufficient to support the restrictive covenant.)

In Chapin v. Brown, 83 Ia. 156 (1891) [138] it would seem that the court regarded the evidence con

cerning the particular transaction as failing to show any adequate consideration. This can hardly be supported, because the recitals of the contract itself showed plainly that the seller was parting with a losing branch of his business without having it fall into the hands of those who competed with him in his other lines of business. The consideration was legally sufficient to make a contract, and it was a business transaction on its face in which a consideration of value was given for the restriction.

13-Nordenfelt v. Maxim Nordenfelt Guns & Ammunition Co., [1894] A. C. 535 [33] (The fact that the seller had become a pauper in the particular case made no difference.); Anchor Electric Co. v. Hawkes, 171 Mass. 101, 105 (1898) ("The changes in the methods of doing business and the increased freedom of communication which have come in recent years have very materially modified the view to be taken of particular contracts in reference to trade. The comparative ease with which one engaged in business can turn his energies to a new occupation, if he contracts to give up his old one, makes the hardship of such a contract much less for the individual than formerly, and the commercial opportunities which open the markets of the world to the merchants of every country leave little danger to the community from an agreement of an individual to cease to work in a

as

particular field."); Herreshoff V. Boutineau, 17 R. I. 3, 6 (1890) ("In the days of the early English cases, one who could not work at his trade could hardly work at all. The avenues to occupation were not as open nor as numerous now, and one rarely got out of the path he started in. Contracting not to follow one's trade was about the same as contracting to be idle, or, to go abroad for employment. But this is not so now. It is an every-day occurrence to see men busy and prosperous in other pursuits than those to which they were trained in youth; as well as to see them change places and occupations without depriving themselves of the means of livelihood, or the state of the benefit of their industry. It would, therefore, be absurd, in the light of this common experience, now to say that a man shuts himself up to idleness or to expatriation, and thus injures the public, when he agrees, for a sufficient consideration, not to follow some one calling within the limits of a particular state. There is no expatriation in moving from one state to another; and from such removals a state would be likely to gain as many as it would lose.''); Kellogg v. Larkin, 3 Pinn. (Wis.) 123 (1851) [149] (The opportunities for employment are so abundant, and the demand for labor on all sides is so pressing and urgent and the supply so limited, that I much question, were we to consider the subject as

res integra, if we should feel authorized to hold that a man had endangered his own livelihood and the subsistence of his family, by an agreement which merely excluded him from exercising the trade of a blacksmith or a shoemaker, leaving all the other departments of mechanical, agricultural and commercial industry open to him."')

14-United States Chemical Co. v. Provident Chemical Co., 64 Fed. 946 (1894) [102] ("Among the potent reasons first assigned against such contracts was that the person restrained by thus surrendering his chosen occupation-one for which he has been especially prepared — might become a public charge, and the public be injured in being deprived of his personal skill in the avocation to which he had been brought up. Such reasons cannot be applied to artificial persons without absurdity.'')

15-Mitchel v. Reynolds, 1 P. Wms. 181 (1711) [7] ante §7 note 10.

16-Diamond Match Co. v. Roeber, 106 N. Y. 473 (1887) [59] ("He [Parker, C. J., in Mitchel v. Reynolds] refers to other reasons,

viz., the mischief which may arise (1) to the party by the loss by the obligor of his livelihood and the subsistence of his family, and (2) to the public by depriving it of a useful member, and by enabling corporations to gain control of the trade of the kingdom. It is quite obvious that some of these reasons are much less forcible now than when Mitchel v. Reynolds was decided. Steam and electricity have for the purposes of trade and commerce almost annihilated distance, and the whole world is now a mart for the distribution of the products of industry. The great diffusion of wealth, and the restless activity of mankind striving to better their condition, have greatly enlarged the field of human enterprise, and created a vast number of new industries, which give scope to ingenuity and employment for capital and labor."); National Benefit Co. v. Union Hospital Co., 45 Minn 272 (1891) [96] ("Moreover, as cheaper and more rapid facilities for travel and transportation gradually changed the manner of doing business, so as to enable parties to conduct it over a vastly greater territory than formerly, the