of abandoning Lucknow will be very serious, as turning against us the many well-disposed chiefs in Oude and Rohilcund who are now watching the turn of affairs, and would regard the loss of Lucknow as the forerunner of the extinction of our rule. Such a blow to our prestige may extend its influence to Nepaul, and will be felt all over India. The civil government of the city may be maintained without interfering with the province for the present.

Sir J. Outram to the Governor-General.

Cawnpore, 17th September, 1857. The information I have obtained from all sources, at Benares, Allahabad, and this place, as well as during my progress through the country, establishes the fact satisfactorily in my mind that there is a large and influential class in Oude and Rohilcund among the more powerful, and most of the middle class, of chiefs and zemindars, who really desire the re-establishment of our rule; while others well disposed to us have only been induced to turn against us because they believe that our Raj is gone. I am so deeply impressed, therefore, with the impolicy of abandoning Lucknow at this crisis, that I write to implore your Lordship to reconsider the resolution of your Government which at present binds me to that course.

The entire abandonment of Lucknow after withdrawing the present beleaguered garrison, will, I am convinced, be very seriously detrimental to our interests, and will be regarded by the classes above referred to as the first step towards the extinction of our rule in India- certainly as resigning Oude for ever. They would then of course be compelled to make common cause against us; and far more troops would be required

to secure the communication from Benares to Allahabad, and along the line of the Ganges to Furruckabad, than would be requisite to hold Lucknow ;-irrespective of the consideration of the cost we shall hereafter be put to in retaking that city. Whereas the occupation of Lucknow will encourage the well-affected or peaceably disposed to keep their followers from joining our enemies, and the ill disposed would do so in selfdefence; while our open foes would have to keep the field in the vicinity of the city, to hold our garrison in check, to guard against sallies, though not daring to assail the garrison in its commanding position. And thus the hostile elements in Oude would be in a great measure, if not entirely, paralyzed so far as regards offensive operations in our districts beyond the frontier of Oude.

I am satisfied that three regiments of European infantry can be placed in such commanding positions in Lucknow, having secure communication with each other, as would effectually command, not merely the submission, but also the resources, of the whole city. I have no doubt that the aid of the neighbouring chiefs can be secured for maintaining the communication between Lucknow and Cawnpore without the aid of European detachments stationed on the road. And, under General Neill's able command, aided by such civil functionaries as I would place at his disposal for the management of the city, I am convinced that our position there can be maintained with credit and with little opposition.

After selecting the troops to be left with General Neill at Lucknow, the remainder would escort the liberated garrison to this place. And then a very efficient force would remain to despatch to Agra or elsewhere. I have to-day telegraphed the substance

of these propositions to your Lordship, and beg that orders may be sent me by telegraph through Captain Bruce, cantonment magistrate at Cawnpore, who will secure their reaching me, to the effect-"Do as you propose," or "withdraw," as your Lordship may be pleased to decide.

I have not dwelt on the very obvious advantage to accrue from our districts bordering in Oude, through which our troops have to pass, being secured from molestation or disturbance; in ensuring the resources of those provinces for the supply of our advancing armies; nor, on what must be equally apparent to your Lordship, the severe blow to our prestige the abandonment of Lucknow would be, extending its evil influence probably to Nepaul, and certain to be severely felt throughout India.*

*It is to be recollected that, when the above was written, no rebel government had been organized in Oude, and that the city was domineered over by the mutineer soldiery, who had been joined by only a few of the chiefs. The principal chiefs and landholders still evaded joining in hostilities against us, and watched the turn of events. Had we succeeded in permanently expelling the sepoy mutineers from Lucknow, when General Havelock's force joined the garrison on the 25th September, there would have been a reaction in the city in our favour; for all the middle and higher classes were anxious for our protection, and longed to be relieved from the tyranny and exactions under which they had suffered during the previous three months of sepoy domination. About 2 P. M. the sepoys began to leave the city, accompanied by "armed men " and "large bodies of Irregular Cavalry." It is a fact that, on the night of the 25th, the sepoys entirely evacuated the city. Next morning, none but the city budmashes, the palace retainers, and Maun Sing's followers, remained to oppose us; and, had the whole of General Havelock's force been then united, the entire city would then have been completely under our control, and could have been held by our troops occupying those commanding positions they have occupied since the recapture of the city. For the majority of the inhabitants, and all the more wealthy of them, were equally interested with ourselves in preventing the return of the sepoys; and thus, the general defection throughout Oude, which took place when it was found that General Havelock's force were fairly shut up in Lucknow, would have been, in a great measure, averted. Instead, however, of waiting in the Chutter Munzil, where we had a safe position until joined by the rear guard-covering its advance by opening a heavy fire on those guns at the Kaiser Bagh from which it afterwards suffered so severely-and opening a safe communication with the Residency through the deserted palaces, the troops, unfortunately, left the rear guard to its own resources, and pushed on through the streets. The consequence was that the rear guard-one-third of the entire force-was cut off for two nights and a day, and suffered most severely ere it effected a junction on the morning of the 27th September; and, besides its heavy loss in killed, whose bodies could not be brought in, those who had been wounded in the earlier part of the day and had been sent to the rear

It is rumoured that the rebels propose to negotiate for the peaceable surrender of the garrison if we will not advance to the city, a proposition which of course cannot be received.

Mr. Secretary Beadon to the Secretary to the Government of Bengal.

(Extract.)

Calcutta, 17th September, 1857.

I am directed by the Right Honourable the Governor-General in Council to acknowledge the receipt of your letter, No. 1,673, dated the 12th instant, forwarding a correspondence with the Commissioner of the Patna Division, relative to the state of the division, and the means taken for its protection.

2. I am desired to state, that his Lordship in Council regrets the detention of the detachment of the 17th Regiment Madras Native Infantry by the Commissioner.

3. His Lordship in Council considers that the circumstances under which Mr. Samuells detained these troops were not of the extreme urgency contemplated by Sir James Outram, in Colonel Napier's letter of the 20th August; and no authority but that of the Supreme Government, or of the General in command, is sufficient to warrant the diversion of troops from their destination at the present time.

Sir J. Outram to the Military Secretary to the Governor-General.

Cawnpore, 17th September, 1857.

Lest the newspapers should misrepresent the fact of a body of troops, which Havelock had put in orders to

amounting to seventy-seven-fell into the enemy's hands, and were murdered. These losses, added to those sustained in advancing through the streets from the Chutter Munzil to the Residency, encouraged the remaining rebels, who despatched the heads of our slain (with exaggerated reports of the slaughter) after the flying sepoys, and thus induced them to return; and as, after its heavy losses, the relieving force was too weak to withdraw the garrison, the rebels, believing that the garrison commissariat had been almost exhausted before General Havelock's arrival, made sure of the entire and early destruction of the aggregate force by famine. Then it was-and only then-the conviction became general that British rule could not be re-established in Oude. Then was the boy-king proclaimed-a regular government was established; and all those chiefs, who had heretofore wavered or held aloof, were induced to embrace the rebel cause. Had the reaction in the city taken place-which, but for the abandonment of the rear guard, would certainly have taken place-we could, with the force proposed in this letter, have held the positions in Lucknow which we now hold, and all the advantages which the letter contemplates would have resulted. (See Letter to Sir Colin Campbell, in his Despatches.)

cross the river yesterday morning, having been countermanded after my arrival the evening before, as an interference on my part involving delay in our advance, I beg you will have the kindness to explain to Lord Canning and Sir Colin Campbell what are the real facts of the case.

On my arrival here on the evening of the 15th, General Havelock informed me that he purposed commencing to construct the boat bridge next morning, and that he had ordered troops and guns to be passed over in boats before daybreak, to occupy the sandy hillocks on the opposite side, and thus prevent obstruction to the bridge operation. On ascertaining from the General that his 24-pounders, planted on this side, had been proved to range as far as the position the enemy would occupy, if they wished to annoy us, and that he had not prepared to send any tents, the soldiers being intended to hold the post during the two days it was supposed the construction of the bridge, &c., would occupy, without shelter from the dews at night or sun by day, I represented that such exposure at this season, and in the midst of a swamp, would entail greater loss than an engagement with the enemy. And I recommended that no troops should be sent across, at least until the bridge was completed, to the island, where there was little chance of the enemy coming near enough to molest the work under the fire of our guns; adding that, if they did, it would be time enough then to send troops to repel them; and that, so soon as the bridge to the island was nearly ready, a detachment with guns could occupy the island to protect the workmen employed in making the road over the opposite muddy creek with fascines and planking, strongly urging that tents should be provided for this party. To this General Havelock consented, and, indeed, it had been