late Calcutta papers noticing our proceedings? I would not risk letters; but they sometimes manage to bring papers, &c., concealed in bundles of grass.

I wrote you on the 26th, but as the bearer has not returned, I send duplicate. If you have any opportunity of writing to Cawnpore before the relieving column leaves, urge that persons be sent with it who are well acquainted with the Martinière.

(Enclosure to the above.)

To the Officer Commanding the Relieving Force, [Along with the following important and deeply interesting letter, Sir James Outram forwarded a plan of the ground intervening between the Alum Bâgh and the Residency, together with minute descriptions of every position and building capable of being held by the enemy. The plan was based on the surveys made by the late Captain Morrison prior to the outbreak, the only surveys that had been made of Lucknow. The copy of this plan, which will be found at the end of the volume, should be consulted in the perusal of the following letter. It is Plan No. I.]

My communication of the 14th instant informed you I consider your first operation should be the occupation of the "Dil Khoosha" house and park, by a direct movement to that place from the Alum Bâgh. The Fort of Jellalabad, which is situated a mile or a mile and a half to the right of that route, is said to be occupied by the enemy, with two guns; but it is too distant to interrupt that line of communication, and it is not likely to be maintained after the Dil Khoosha, in addition to Alum Bâgh, has been occupied in its rear. I think it hardly worth while, therefore, to waste time against that place, which at the commencement of the outbreak was little capable of defence, and is not likely since to have been repaired or stored sufficiently to admit of its

retention. The guns now there appear to have been sent merely to interrupt the forage parties from Alum Bâgh. (A description of Jellalabad, as it was just before the outbreak, is appended.) Yet it will be prudent, in afterwards communicating with Alum Bâgh, to afford strong escort until it is known whether or not Jellalabad is evacuated.

The direct advance from Alum Bâgh via Char Bâgh, and the main street marked (1) (1) (1) on the plan, should not be attempted, very formidable opposition being prepared on the other side of the Char Bâgh bridge, the bridge itself being destroyed, and the passage strongly fortified; besides which there are two miles of street to pass through, in which every means of obstruction have been prepared, the houses loopholed, and guns in position at various points, with ditches, mines, and other obstacles. For the same reason I would deprecate any attempt to force the street which runs from the junction of the Dil Khoosha and Martinière roads to the Kaiser Bâgh, marked (2) (2) (2).

At Dil Khoosha, it is stated, there are at present only some Rajwarra matchlockmen, with cavalry at Beebeeapore village perhaps, and at the Martinière; but these are almost certain to decamp when you approach, and may perhaps suffer considerably ere they get across the canal, if followed up sharply by cavalry and horse artillery. Two guns were said to be at Dil Khoosha some days ago, probably those now at Jellalabad. If still there, they would have to be abandoned ere they could be crossed over the canal, if followed up.

It is possible that some of the so-called Regular Infantry may be sent over to the Dil Khoosha when they hear of your approach. If so, they will but add to their own confusion and panic flight when you attack, for never by any chance do they stand in the open. Two

regiments of infantry and one of cavalry, sent out to oppose Major Barston's convoy, fled at his approach without firing a shot; and on every occasion where whole hosts of them were opposed to ourselves it was just the same. The Dil Khoosha palace cannot be maintained under fire of our artillery, having large windows on every side. If any force of the enemy is assembled there, they must suffer awfully from your guns in escaping across the canal. Or should they fly to the Martinière, they will be in a similar predicament when you follow them up.

On seeing the Dil Khoosha occupied by your troops, the enemy would most probably evacuate the Martinière. After lodging your baggage in the garden to the rear of, and commanded by, the Dil Khoosha house (and surrounded by walls without houses, something like Alum Bâgh, and easily defensible), you would proceed against the Martinière through the road marked (3) (3) (3). But it would be well, ere getting within musket range of the building, to throw a few shells and round shot into it, in case it should be occupied by the enemy, whose fire from the terraced roof might cause much loss ere you get near enough to rush up and blow open doors for entry. It would be well for you to have some one with you well acquainted with the Martinière building. And it may be a matter for your consideration whether it would not be better, if the place appears strongly fortified, to mask it by encamping your troops between the road (3) (3) and the canal, contenting yourself by bombarding the Martinière during the day and night, which will almost ensure its evacuation before morning. The mound marked (4)* would be a favourable site for

* Sir J. Outram afterwards availed himself of this mound to plant a 24-pounder battery of the Shannon Brigade, which effectually kept down the enemy's fire opened on the rear division under his command, when he finally retired to the Alum Bagh.

a 24-pounder battery, which would command the opposite bank of the canal, where you purpose effecting your passage to protect the sappers in making a road for

your guns.

It is possible the bridge leading to the Martinière may not be destroyed, and that you may prefer advancing over it. But, on reconnoitring, you will, I believe, find places where the cannal may be crossed without much difficulty farther down, towards (6), which would enable you to turn any defensive works the enemy may prepare on the main road (2) (2) (2). If you cross the bridge, therefore, I would recommend your turning to the right after passing it, and making your way through the mud huts (indicated by the brown colour on the plan) until you get into the road running from (6) to (W) (W) (W)—W denotes some deserted and destroyed infantry lines, leaving the houses, marked D D D, on your left, and thus making your way into the road (7) (7), which passes the open front of the enclosure in which the barracks are situated. Should the barrack buildings be occupied (they were precipitately abandoned when we advanced from the same quarter), it may prudent to throw a few shot and shell ere the infantry advances to the attack. Having large doors, open on both sides, as is customary in European barracks in India, I anticipate little difficulty in your effecting an entry. Staircases lead to the terrace roof from the interior of the centre room. The terrace is considerably raised above, and therefore commands, the houses of the Huzrutgunge, and a few rifles placed there could keep down any musketry fire from thence (Huzrutgunge), which alone could disturb the party left in occupation of the barracks when you advance farther. But it would be necessary to throw up a parapet of sand-bags, or screens of shutters, to protect the riflemen on the

be

roof, as it has no parapet. The south wall of the enclosure is, however, sufficiently high to afford some protection against direct fire.

Should you cross by the bridge, your whole force would, I presume, come that way. And your next operation, after leaving an adequate guard for the barracks (say 300 or 400 infantry, some cavalry, and a couple of guns; or, probably, you might secure a gun, or two guns, which the enemy are said to have there), would be to proceed by the road (7) (7) to the Secundra Bâgh (G), which, if held, could easily be breached by 24- or 18-pounders-the wall being only about 2 feet thick-vide enclosed description.* It is said to be occupied by Maun Sing, with some 200 or 300 Rajwarras and two guns; the former are pretty sure to bolt when your guns open upon the place, and two or three shells are thrown into it.

If you cross the canal at (6), the main body of your force should proceed by the road from (6) to (W). A regiment and portion of artillery might, perhaps, make their way by the road which leads direct to the Secundra Bâgh (8). (8); but as it is not well defined, it may be more prudent to keep all together till you occupy the barracks.†

Should you have met with opposition, or been delayed much in crossing the canal, the day will be pretty far advanced ere you have occupied the barracks and

* The Commander-in-Chief's force met with serious opposition at the Secundra Bâgh, owing to their having approached it by a cross-road from the rear, whence their breaching guns could not be brought up until the troops had been exposed for some time to a heavy fire. Had they come by the broad pucka road leading from the barracks, as suggested, their heavy guns could have opened upon the place while the infantry remained out of musketry fire. A practicable breach would then have been made, or the shelling would have driven the enemy out. As it was, however, the occupants, greatly more numerous than reported, had no means of egress, and were destroyed to a man; but our own troops also suffered severely in taking the place.

† Neither the roads (7) (7) or (8) (8) were followed by Sir Colin Campbell's force, which was taken by a more circuitous and intricate road than either, and suffered greatly before its guns could be brought to the front.