On January 24 Senator Chamberlain introduced his bill for a war cabinet. It was referred to the military and naval committees. After introducing his bill he made reply to the President's statement. He failed absolutely to make good his charges of inefficiency against "every bureau and department of the government;" and the evidence that he presented did not sustain his charges "that the military establishment of the country had broken down and had almost stopped functioning." His evidence did prove, what the secretary of war was willing to admit, that there had been some mistakes, which were being corrected as speedily as possible, and a few cases of neglect of sick soldiers which were exceptional and for which those responsible would be punished. The entire Chamberlain speech was unfair to the administration, and misleading to the public, in that it laid great stress on the few mistakes of the war department without giving it credit for the vast and difficult tasks that had been accomplished. Senator Chamberlain painted a very dark picture of the government's war work, because he tried to make the public see the occasional mistakes and failed to show the background of accomplishment before which the mistakes were insignificant.

The President's reply to his critics, especially those critics who demanded coördination through a war cabinet, was the Overman bill. On February 11 the President took personal charge of the movement for the passage of this measure. The bill brought forth much adverse criticism from senators who had been loudest in their claims that there was lack of coördination in the government and poor business management of the war. Some of the critics of the administration were placed in the position of demanding better business management of the war, but of objecting to President Wilson being the business manager. The active fight begun by the administration leaders for the passage of the Overman bill sounded the death knell of the abortive Chamberlain war cabinet measure.

On February 15 Senator Weeks of Massachusetts took up the argument for the war cabinet. In a carefully prepared speech he condemned the alleged rifle and powder shortage; attacked

Secretary Baker on the grounds of pacifism, because Mr. Baker had opposed universal military training; and urged the passage of the war cabinet bill. The most interesting part of this speech sheds much light on why those who are in favor of universal military service as a permanent policy have been so actively opposed to Secretary Baker. After a general criticism of the war department, Senator Weeks said:

"If I were to make a further criticism of Secretary Baker it would relate to his temperamental relationship to war. Doubtless he himself will admit that he is a pacifist by nature. For example, he is even now opposed to universal military training, one of the benefits we ought to get out of the great sacrifices we are making."

The real test of the sentiment of the senate regarding the Overman bill was not the final vote, for only 13 senators are recorded as voting against the measure. It was in attempting so to amend the bill as to make it unsatisfactory to President Wilson that those, who for various reasons opposed the bill, went on record. Two amendments to the Overman bill, offered by Senator Hoke Smith of Georgia, aimed to exempt the federal reserve board and the interstate commerce commission, respectively, from the operations of the measure. The vote on these amendments was taken April 27; and these two votes, substantially the same, were looked upon as the test of senatorial support of the administration. For the amendment exempting the federal reserve board, there voted ten Democrats-Chamberlain, Gore, Hardwick, Hitchcock, King, Reed, Smith of Georgia, Thomas, Underwood, and Vardaman-and twenty-seven Republicans-Borah, Brandegee, Cummins, Curtis, Dillingham, France, Frelinghuysen, Gallinger, Gronna, Hale, Harding, Johnson of California, Kellogg, Knox, Lenroot, Lodge, McCumber, New, Norris, Page, Poindexter, Sherman, Smoot, Sterling, Townsend, Wadsworth, and Watson. The vote on the other Smith amendment was practically the same. Seven Republicans-Baird, Colt, Jones of Washington, McLean, McNary, Nelson, and Warren-voted with the thirty-four Democrats supporting the administration to defeat the first Smith amend

ment. Borah of Idaho joined these seven in voting against the other amendment. This test vote on the first Smith amendment marks the high tide of senatorial opposition to the President.

When one contrasts the attitude of the house toward the administration during the present year with that of the senate during the same period, one is forced to the conclusion that the house of representatives is more truly representing the American people; and that a considerable element in the senate is seeking party advantage in the war. Strange to say the senators who have been most insistent in their demands for nonpartisanship in the executive branch of government have often been the most violently partisan in action and utterance.

Beginning even before the controversy in Congress over these measures, important alterations have been made to secure a more effective organization of the executive machinery. In the war department there have been significant changes in personnel, in the functions and organization of the general staff, and in the organization of the ordnance and quartermaster services. The most vital work of the council of national defense has been concentrated in the war industries board, the chairman of which has effective powers of control. Far-reaching changes have been made in the agencies dealing with shipping and aviation problems. Under the Overman Act, the President has made some transfers of functions and powers, as in placing the legal advisers of independent boards and commissions under the supervision of the attorney general. Moreover the President, independently of the Overman Act, has called together the heads of the military and naval departments, with those of a number of the new war agencies, into a council, meeting at intervals, which may prove a more satisfactory war cabinet than that proposed in the Chamberlain bill.

FEDERAL ASPECTS OF PREFERENTIAL TRADE IN

THE BRITISH EMPIRE

C. D. ALLIN

University of Minnesota

The battle over the Corn Laws was fought out in Great Britain as a domestic issue. But it had nevertheless a great imperial significance. During the mercantilistic régime the colonies had been regarded as a commercial appanage of the mother country. The victory of the free traders opened up a new era in the economic history of the empire. The colonies were released from the irksome restrictions of the Navigation Laws. They acquired the right to frame their own tariffs with a view to their own particular interests. In short, they ceased to be dependent communities and became self-governing states. But the emancipation of the colonies was by no means complete. The home government still claimed the right to control their tariff policies. The colonies were privileged, indeed, to arrange their tariff schedules according to local needs; but it was expected that their tariff systems would conform to the fiscal policy of the mother land. The free traders, no less than the mercantilists, were determined to maintain the fiscal unity of the empire. There was still an imperial commercial policy; its motif only had been changed from protection to free trade. The colonies were still bound to the fiscal apron strings of the mother country; but the strings were no longer so short, nor the knots so tight as they had formerly been.

INTERCOLONIAL PREFERENCE IN AUSTRALIA

In furtherance of the new imperial policy, the British government inserted a provision in the Australian Colonies Constitution Act prohibiting the local legislatures from levying discriminating duties. The natural economic unity of the Australian

group was sacrificed to further the interest of international free trade. At first the colonies did not protest. But with the growth of population and intercommunication, the colonial governments came to realize the necessity for closer political and economic relations. The executive council of New South Wales in 1866 petitioned the imperial Parliament to repel the constitutional provision in respect to discriminative duties. The Tasmanian government soon after took up the question of intercolonial reciprocity with earnestness and enthusiasm. At the same time the New Zealand executive demanded the right for the colonies to enter into reciprocity treaties with foreign states. But the Australian governments were not ready for such advanced action. Some of the Australian leaders were inclined to think that this demand encroached upon the sovereign treaty making power of the imperial government, and that it might be a step in the direction of independence. The Australian governments accordingly determined to restrict their efforts to intercolonial reciprocity only. At three successive conferences the colonies proclaimed their right to control their intercolonial fiscal policies without restriction or interference on the part of the mother country. The resolutions in 1871 ran as follows:

1. "That the Australian colonies claim to enter into arrangements with each other, through their respective legislatures, so as to provide for the reciprocal admission of their respective products and manufactures either duty free or on such terms as may be mutually agreed upon."

2. "That no treaty entered into by the Imperial Government with any foreign Power should in any way limit or impede the exercise of such right."

3. "That imperial interference with colonial fiscal legislation should finally and absolutely cease."

4. "That so much of any Act or Acts of the Imperial Parliament as may be considered to prohibit the full exercise of such right should be repealed."

The claims of the Australian colonies were greatly strengthened by the fact that the Canadian provinces and New Zealand were not subject to the same fiscal restrictions. For some un