house before their publication in the parliamentary debates. There have accrued to the speakership at Ottawa most of the usages and traditions that since the middle years of the eighteenth century have attached to the great office of speaker of the house of commons at Westminster. As an office it approximates closely to the speakership of the house of commons of the imperial Parliament. At Westminster it is the usage that the speaker must not be nominated from the treasury bench. At Ottawa there is no such usage. The speaker is and always has been since the era of responsible government began the nominee of the government; and his election is proposed from the treasury bench. Thereafter his association or connection with the government is supposed to come to an end. He is not a partisan supporter of the government; and his position towards the house, and towards political parties in the house, becomes much the same as that of the speaker at Westminster.

But the resolution that was so long on the order paper at Ottawa disclosed one or other of two conditions, neither favorable to the dignity or position of the chair. It disclosed either that a relationship had been established between the government and the speaker that was adverse to all the honored traditions associated with the chair, and adverse to the good order and discipline of the house; or that the speaker, without being consulted by the government, was willing that the government should jeopardize the position of the chair in the estimation of the house of commons and also of the constituencies. The government for some reason or other did not press the resolution in the house. To have done so would have given the opposition a provoking and legitimate opportunity of driving a wedge deep into the coalition. From any point of view the episode was regrettable; and it was unfortunate that the speaker did not, so far as can be ascertained from the official reports of the proceedings of the house, dissociate himself from the obnoxious resolution, and the inferences as regards the chair which its presence so long on the order paper suggested.

It is to the interest of the Dominion, and also to the interest of the Allies, that the existing coalition at Ottawa should continue at least until the end of the war. But more tact will be needed than was evidenced in the framing of this resolution, if the coalition is to continue working smoothly and effectively until the world is again at peace. EDWARD PORRITT.

Hartford, Conn.

STATE ADMINISTRATION

EDITED BY J. M. MATHEWS

University of Illinois

State Councils of Defense. Even before the declaration of a state of war with Germany, councils of defense or similar bodies had been created in some states. Immediately upon the issuance of the declaration, the Council of National Defense established a department to coördinate the state defense activities throughout the nation. This department later developed into the section on coöperation with states. In May, 1917, a conference of the states called by the national council was held at Washington, attended by representatives from every state. Within two months after the conference, state councils of defense had been organized in every state. These councils have been of great assistance in promoting various activities incident to the prosecution of the war and in coöperating with the national council. In more than a dozen states "they have been established by formal legislative act, in the others they have been created by administrative act of the governor, or by the governor with the consent of the senate, and vary in size from six to more than 100 members. They are sometimes composed of ex officio state officers, the governor serving as chairman, but more frequently they are composed of prominent men in the state who hold no other public office. In the latter case, they ordinarily hold office at the pleasure of the governor. The broad purposes for which some of these councils are created are indicated by the preamble to the act creating the California Council:

"To make investigation into the effect of the occurrence of war upon civil and economical life of the people of the state, to recommend to the governor measures to provide for the public security, the better protection of the public health, a fuller development of the economic resources of the state and the encouragement of military training.1

"In endeavoring to attain these objects, the powers which the councils may exercise are usually advisory in character, but sometimes they have been vested with more and far-reaching powers. Thus, the West 1 Laws of 1917, ch. 32.

Virginia Council may regulate mines, factories, and railroads, fix prices and suppress disorders. In Wisconsin the council may control the distribution of the supply of food and fuel. In Minnesota,2 the Commission of Public Safety has been granted the broad power to do all acts and things, not inconsistent with the law, for the protection of life, property and public safety." These powers, however, are to be exercised in subordination to the superior control of national administrative authorities.

Work of Efficiency and Economy Commissions. The movement for reorganization of state administration in the interests of efficiency and economy continues to gather headway. Although the war has focused the attention of the people throughout the country upon international relations, it is nevertheless possible to discern certain by-products of the great conflict in the increased interest of the people in efficient government, both in nation and in state, and in their growing impatience with the results obtained from the cumbrous and antiquated forms of government with which we have hitherto been afflicted. Some positive improvements in state administration have recently been effected. An account has already been given in this REVIEW of the civil administrative code enacted by the legislature of Illinois in 1917. The enactment of this code was the direct result of the investigation made two years previously by the Efficiency and Economy Committee of that state. This code constitutes the most important advance yet made by any state in the direction of improved and simplified administration. In most states which have considered the matter at all, the development is still largely in the investigational stage.

Two official commissions appointed in Colorado and Virginia to investigate the state administration and make recommendations for reorganization in the direction of efficiency and economy have recently issued reports. The Survey Committee of State Affairs of Colorado was created by legislative act of 1915, and consisted of seven members-two appointed by the senate, two by the house of representatives, and three citizens appointed by the governor. It was given large powers of investigation and report, covering practically the whole field of state administration. It secured the assistance of experts from

* Laws of 1917, ch. 261.

J. M. Mathews in American Year Book, 1917, p. 174.

4 Vol. XI, No. 2, p. 310.

other states and from the United States bureaus to investigate specific phases of the general subject. The report has been issued in a series. of pamphlets, each devoted to a particular topic, concluding with a summary of the findings and recommendations of the committee, accompanied by two charts, one showing the existing organization of the executive branch of the state government and the other indicating tentative proposed changes in certain state departments. On account of lack of time the committee did not recommend a general plan for the complete reorganization of the state administration, but made a number of specific recommendations relating to the offices of governor, secretary of state, state auditor, state treasurer and other officers and boards, together with a number of miscellaneous recommendations relating to such matters as purchasing methods, state finances and budget procedure.

Apparently the Colorado committee is the only similar body which has made a comprehensive survey of the office of state governor. As a result of their investigation they found that, while the governor was ex officio member of a number of state boards, there was nothing in the laws nor in the nature of the duties performed to indicate why the governor was designated a member of some boards and not of others. In regard to the governor's power of appointment the committee found a similar lack of system. They found that, whereas the state engineer is appointed by the governor alone, the five division engineers serving under him cannot be appointed by the governor except with the advice and consent of the senate. The committee recommends that all administrative officers now appointed by the governor with the advice and consent of the senate should be appointed by the governor alone, who, as chief executive, is responsible for results. Further, they recommend that all subordinate employees now appointed by the governor alone or with the consent of the senate should be either under civil service rules and regulations or appointed by the respective administrative officers.

The Virginia Commission on Economy and Efficiency consisted of three members of the legislature and two citizens, appointed under an act of 1916, and "charged with the duty of making a careful and detailed study of the organization and methods of the state and local governments and with reporting to the next general assembly in what way the state and local government can be more efficiently and economically administered." The report of the commission, issued early in 1918, consists of a pamphlet of 67 pages, to which is appended three

charts giving a graphic representation of the three general departments of the state government. The report deals in the main, however, only with the executive department and points out the familiar defects of state administration which are illustrated in the experience of Virginia-such as the diffusion of authority and responsibility, the lack of official accountability for the administration of the state's affairs, the excessive number of petty elective officers, and the useless multiplication of boards, bureaus and other agencies without any attempt to coördinate functions, make readjustments, or establish proper executive control. The commission recommends that the power of appointment, control and removal of all administrative officers should be vested, as far as possible, in the governor. "The governor should be the business manager of the state in fact as well as in name. He should be held responsible for the proper management of all departments and agencies, and should be given the power to have his policies carried out and his orders promptly executed." A number of other miscellaneous suggestions are made, relating to the supervision of accounts, including expense accounts, uniform fiscal year, abolition of fees, uniform office hours, leaves of absence, collective purchasing of supplies, state insurance, civil service regulations and the reorganization of the public school system.

Both the Colorado and the Virginia commissions recommend the introduction of scientific budget systems, the main features of which are similar. The report of the Virginia commission contains a completely drafted bill designed to introduce without constitutional amendment the recommendations of the commission in this respect. The bill as drafted makes the governor the chief budget officer of the state and authorizes him to employ competent assistants in the preparation of the budget. The general assembly is allowed to increase or decrease items in the budget bill as it sees fit; but the proposed bill prohibits either house from considering further or special appropriations, except in the case of emergency, until the budget bill shall have been finally acted upon by both houses, and requires that all bills introduced in either house carrying appropriations be itemized in accordance with the classifications used in the budget.

The Colorado commission also recommends the plan of an executive budget and undertakes to disarm opposition to the proposal by pointing out that, while the legislature should control the purse strings, its handling of estimates, of expenditures and revenues is the assumption of an inherently executive function. "The purpose of the executive is