Florida, unlawfully and knowingly engage in a certain combination and conspiracy in restraint of commerce among several of the States of the United States; that is to say, the said Haines, Jones, McClen, Barber, and McFirst, on the day aforesaid and within the district aforesaid, did engage in a certain combination and conspiracy among the said named persons and with divers other persons to the grand jurors unknown, under the name the Longshoremen's Association, Local No. 652, otherwise called Longshoremen Association Local No. 625, whereby the said named persons and the said other persons, under the name aforesaid, did combine, conspire, and agree to unlawfully levy and extort a certain fine by said conspirators unlawfully imposed or pretended to be imposed upon Mason Forwarding Co., a corporation organized under the laws of Florida and engaged in the business of loading vessels with lumber in transit from points in the State of Florida to points in other States of the United States and between points in the State of Florida and points in foreign countries; that is to say, the said conspirators did impose or pretend to impose upon said Mason Forwarding Co. a fine of $50, which the said conspirators did pretend to impose upon said Mason Forwarding Co. on account of said Mason Forwarding Co's. lawfully failing to declining to recognize a pretended and unlawful authority on the part of one of the said conspirators, known as the walking delegate, whose other proper name is to said grand jurors unknown, to fix the time when said Mason Forwarding Co. should pay the workmen by said Mason Forwarding Co. employing in loading vessels with lumber in transit between points in the State of Florida and points in other States of the United States, or between points in the State of Florida and points in foreign countries, the wages of said workmen for their labor in loading vessels with lumber in transit between points in the State of Florida and points in other States of the United States, or between points in the State of Florida and points in foreign countries, the more precise nature of which said pretended authority is to the said grand jurors unknown, and to coerce the payment of said pretended fine the said conspirators did combine and conspire to withdraw and persuade and induce to withdraw from the loading of a certain vessel-that is to say, the schooner Methebesec-with lumber then in transit from a point in the State of Florida-that is to say, Jacksonville-to a point in the State of Maine that is to say. Portland-certain workmen then employed by said Mason Forwarding Co. in the loading of said vessel with said lumber; and in pursuance and execution of the said conspiracy, the said conspirators did persuade and induce divers of said workmen to discontinue the loading of the said vessel with said lumber for a period of, to wit, two days, contrary to the form of the statute in such case made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the said United States

RICHARD P. MARKS, Assistant United States Attorney.

Mr. GOMPERS. In addition to the suits and cases which have been brought against labor organizations and labor men which I have already enumerated, I desire to call your attention to a suit brought some time last September, under the Sherman antitrust law, by Mr. C. W. Post, of Washington and Battle Creek, against the officers of the American Federation of Labor and against the Buck Stove & Range Co., claiming that the Buck Stove & Range Co. had suffered a loss of $250,000, and as a minority stockholder he brought this suit against the company and the American Federation of Labor in threefold damages. The basis of that suit is that the company suffered that loss in trade by reason of its dispute with the men of labor; that he suffered correspondingly; and that the company could and should have instituted a suit against the American Federation of Labor for these damages; and that inasmuch as the company and our labor organizations had come to an agreement, we had jointly jeopardized his interests. In other words, the fact that we ended our dispute and came to an agreement was sufficient cause for him to institute his suit for these triple damages.

Reverting for a moment to the letter of Mr. Stripling and the indictments to which his letter refers and the purpose he indicates for which these indictments were sought, the suggestion is made by Mr. Stripling that the case is of such a character that it will require, or should commend itself to, the judgment of the men in the labor organizations to defend the suits before the court. And I am not prepared to say that we shall not do so or try to do so; but supposing we do, where is the remedy? If the defense of these men before the court would settle once and for all the status in regard to such indictments in regard to such cases, we should have no hesitancy in contributing our few pennies in order to present an ample defense before the court; but should these indicted men be acquitted, it settles nothing except these men and in this case. There is nothing to prevent a new indictment being presented against them or against others in the Florida district or in any other district of the United States. The whole purpose of these indictments and of the judicial interpretations of existing law, and the assumption of jurisdiction by many men of the bench has back of it nothing more or less than to harrass the men and women in the organizations of the working people, to engage them in constant litigation, that by the gradual development of judicial procedure and precedents, established one upon the other, there shall all the time hang over the heads of the working people the sword that threatens their decapitation.

May I call your attention to some parts of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, rendered on February 3, 1908, in the case of Loewe v. The Hatters (that is the short name) in which the court cites the fact that out of 82 fur-hat manufacturers in the United States, 70 of them were "forced against their will" to enter into the arrangements which the court designates as unionizing their establishments, and against their will.

Senator OLIVER. Is that the case known as the Danbury hatters' case?

Mr. GOMPERS. Yes, sir. And which, indeed, was the establishment of the standard of wages and hours and conditions of the employment of the trade. The very fact that agreements had been entered into between these hat manufacturers with the organized hatters was cited as the proof of the widespread "conspiracy." Of course, it is not necessary to submit any argument in support of the fact that if there be no agreement between the workers and employers of a collective character there must be some sort of an agreement of an individual character; and the whole history of industry demonstrates that as a result of these individual bargains of the employer, with his power of wealth and his ability to dictate terms on the one hand, and the individual workingman, without any support of his fellow workers or the support of any other person or institution on earth on the other, chaos and industrial anarchy obtain, particularly in so far as the conditions of the workingman are concerned. And it may not be amiss to call attention to the fact that, following the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States, adverse to the hatters, and, logically, adverse to the organizations of the working people, a large number of the hat manufacturers, with whom the organized hatters had agreements among the 70 cited by the Supreme Court in its opinion, declared a lockout against the hatters

with whom they had had an agreement, creating some pretense in order to break away from the conditions which had obtained between them and the hatters for a long period of years. In other words, the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States had for its effect the creation of a cause by which the hat manufacturers undertook to impose new conditions, and that was understood by the journeymen hatters to be the ultimate purpose of getting down to the conditions which prevailed in the hat-manufacturing establishment of Loewe & Co. This is the language of the Supreme Court in reference to the matter in which I have just called attention.

The CHAIRMAN. Do you happen to have the citation there of the United States Supreme Court decision?

Senator TOWNSEND. Does your paper show what report the opinion was published in?

Mr. GOMPERS. No; it does not. I have in my hand a copy of the March, 1908, issue of the American Federationist, in which I quoted the decision in full.

Senator TOWNSEND. You will find that decision, Mr. Chairman, in United States, 208. page 283.

Mr. GOMPERS. May I have the opportunity of deferring the citation of this case to which I have referred until later?

The CHAIRMAN. Take your own course in the matter.

Mr. GOMPERS. In the editorial, to which I have just now made reference, which I wrote in the January, 1908, issue of the American Federationist, the official monthly magazine of the American Federation of Labor, I gave a résumé of the legislative history which resulted in the enactment of the antitrust law in 1890.

I was rather an active man then in the labor movement and in public affairs, and I think that I knew as well and as favorably and was at least well known to and by the Senators who drafted that measure as probably any other man now living. It was my duty. as well as it was my desire, to learn the views of these Senators. I had been very intimately associated with one of the Senators at that time, Senator Henry W. Blair, of New Hampshire, who was the chairman of the Committee on Education and Labor. This committee, under his chairmanship, undertook in 1883 and 1884 an investigation into the causes of depression and trade disputes and to seek a remedy. Having been before the Senate committee, and with the Senate committee, I had the opportunity of meeting these men and talking with them, as well as with Senator George, of Mississippi, who was then a member of the Senate Committee on Education and Labor. And these men, and Senator Hoar and others, who participated in the debate when the bill was before the Senate, as to the purposes of the bill and as to its nonapplication to the organizations of labor, all expressed themselves favorably toward the exclusion of the labor and farmer organizations from the provisions of the bill. Indeed, the bill at that stage of the procedure before the Senate contained a provision directly excluding the organizations of labor. And after that amendment was adopted, and the bill then pending before the Senate, I think it was Senator Stewart who made the remark: “ I imagine that the Senators who favored these amendments are now satisfied with the condition of the bill before the Senate." To which an affirmative reply was made.

The bill was then referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, which framed a bill and presented it to the Senate. There was no direct exclusion, not in affirmative terms, of the labor organizations or the organizations of farmers engaged in the selling of their own products, or of horticulturists engaged in the same work At the time, speaking with the Senators in charge of the measure, and speaking with Senators Blair and George and others, but particularly my memory serves me well in regard to these two men, they gave me the actual assurance, and gave my associates the actual assurance, that although the bill did not contain the language directly excluding the organizations of working people, yet by no means of construction could it be made to apply to voluntary associations of labor.

My editorial review of the decision of the Supreme Court of the United States contains quotations from the remarks of Senators upon the subject, and to which I have but faintly referred. I submit it for incorporation in the record.

The CHAIRMAN. It will be made a part of the record-any of those that you desire to offer.

[Editorial from American Federationist, by Samuel Gompers.]

LABOR ORGANIZATIONS MUST NOT BE OUTLAWED THE SUPREME COURT'S DECISION IN THE HATTERS' CASE.

On February 3, 1908, the Supreme Court issued the most drastic and far-reaching decision which it has ever handed down. This decision directly affects all labor and hence the whole people. The case was that of the Loewe Co. against The United Hatters of North America. The court invokes the Sherman antitrust law and under it decides that the hatters are liable in damages according to the complaint of the Loewe Co This action was first brought in the United States circuit court in the district of Connecticut under section 7 of the Sherman antitrust law. The lower court sustained the contention of the hatters that they were not liable under the Sherman law.

The Loewe Co. then carried the case by writ of error to the circuit court of appeals. The circuit court, desiring the instruction of the Supreme Court on the writ of error, put the question thus:

"Upon this state of facts can the plaintiffs (Loewe & Co.) maintain an action against the defendants (hatters) under section 7 of the Sherman antitrust law of July 2, 1890?"

The plaintiffs and defendants then poined in the application to the Supreme Court to require the whole record and cause to be sent up for its consideration. This application was granted.

The Supreme Court invoked not only section 7, but sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Antitrust Act, and declared that: "In our opinion the combination described in the declaration (United Hatters) was a combination in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States in the sense in which those words are used in the act, and the action can be maintained accordingly."

The decree also states:

"And that conclusion rests on many judgments of this court to the effect that the act (Sherman antitrust) prohibits any combination whatever to secure action which essentially obstructs the free flow of commerce between the States or restricts in that regard the liberty of a trader to engage in business.

"The combination charged (boycott by hatters) falls within the class of restraints of trade aimed at compelling third parties and strangers involuntarily not to engage in the course of trade except on conditions that the combination (hatters) imposes."

The sections of the Sherman antitrust law upon which the decision is based are as follows:

1 Parentheses and italics are ours in this editorial.

"SECTION 1. Every contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations is hereby declared to be illegal. Every person who shall make any such contract or engage in any such combination or conspiracy shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments in the discretion of the court.

"SEC. 2. Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any other person or persons to monoplize any part of trade or commerce among the several States or with foreign nations shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor and, on conviction thereof, shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five thousand dollars, or by imprisonment not exceeding one year, or by both said punishments in the discretion of the court."

"SEC. 7. Any person who shall be injured in his business or property by any other person or corporation by reason of anything forbidden or declared to be unlawful by this act may sue therefor in any circuit court of the United States in the district in which the defendant resides or is found, without respect to the amount in controversy, and shall recover threefold the damages by him sustained and the costs of suit, including a reasonable attorney's fee."

We publish elsewhere in this issue the Supreme Court decision in full. The court attached the complaint of the plaintiffs in the margin of the decision, and it also quotes from their complaint in the body of the decision.

No more sweeping, far-reaching, and important decision has ever been issued by the Supreme Court. The Dred Scott decision did not approach this in scope and importance, for it only decreed that any runaway slave could be pursued if he made his escape into a free State and his return compelled, by all the powers of the Government, to his owner to a slave State. Any person who assisted in the escape of a slave or who harbored him could be prosecuted before the courts for a criminal offense. That decision involved the few negro slaves who could make good their escape from a slave-holding State. The Civil War annulled the decision of the Supreme Court and freed the slaves. It cost the lives of hundreds of thousands of brave men on both sides and emancipated from chattel slavery 4,000,000 slaves. No man now proudly points to that famous Dred Scott Supreme Court decision.

The decision of the Supreme Court in the hatters' case involves every worker and every sympathizer with the ennobling work of the labor movement of our land. A study of this momentous decision reveals some strange peculiarities. Outside of the opening paragraphs quoted above, the decision has very little other than the citation of cases which are held to illustrate and support it. There are references to injunctions granted under the Sherman Antitrust Act and brief comment upon the citations; the decision gives an outline of the complaint incorrect in many particulars, especially in its summary of boycott proceedings by the hatters. It quotes directly and at great length from the complaint (Loewe & Co.). The decision concludes thus:

"And then follows the averments (in Loewe complaint) that the defendants (hatters) proceeded to carry out their combination to restrain and destroy interstate trade and commerce between the plaintiffs and their customers in other States by employing the identical means contrived for that purpose, and that by reason of those acts plaintiffs were damaged in their business and property in some $80,000.

"We think a case within the statute was set up and that the demurrer should have been overruled.

"Judgment (of lower court) reversed, and cause remanded with a direction to proceed accordingly."

Reference to the decision itself will show what precedents are quoted and what comments the court makes on them to show their alleged bearing on this case; but, in truth, not one of them in any degree parallels this case or sets any precedent that the layman can discover.

The hatters' defense of the boycott, their explanation, and justification-for the boycott is admitted-appears nowhere in the decision.

As the complaint of the plaintiffs (the Loewe Co.) is published in full with decision, it would seem only fair that the reply of the defendants (hatters) should also have been reproduced.

As it is, the complaint of the plaintiffs is apparently taken by the court as a true and correct account of what happened, though it is in reality full of the most glaring inaccuracies and misstatements. We have not the space here to quote the complaint and point out its fallacies, but may do so in the future.