DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. 335 U.S. gress but by the administrative agency in charge of the deportation proceeding. We stated, p. 154: "We are dealing here with procedural requirements prescribed for the protection of the alien. Though deportation is not technically a criminal proceeding, it visits a great hardship on the individual and deprives him of the right to stay and live and work in this land of freedom. That deportation is a penalty at times a most serious one cannot be doubted. Meticulous care must be exercised lest the procedure by which he is deprived of that liberty not meet the essential standards of fairness." The same principles are applicable here. The President has classified alien enemies by regulations of general applicability and has authorized deportation only of those deemed dangerous because they have adhered to an enemy government, or the principles thereof. Petitioner was in fact given a hearing in 1945 before the Repatriation Hearing Board in addition to one in 1942 before the Alien Enemy Hearing Board. The order for his deportation recites that "upon consideration of the evidence presented" before those Boards, the Attorney General, in the words of the Proclamation, deems petitioner "to be dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States because he has adhered to a government with which the United States is at war or to the principle thereof." Those findings and conclusions and the procedure by which they were reached must conform with the requirements of due process. And habeas corpus is the time-honored procedure to put them to the test. The inquiry in this type of case need be no greater an intrusion in the affairs of the Executive branch of government than inquiries by habeas corpus in times of peace into a determination that the alien is considered to be an "undesirable resident of the United States." See 160 DOUGLAS, J., dissenting. Mahler v. Eby, 264 U. S. 32. Both involve only a determination that procedural due process is satisfied, that there be a fair hearing, and that the order be based upon some evidence. The needs of the hour may well require summary apprehension and detention of alien enemies. A nation at war need not be detained by time-consuming procedures while the enemy bores from within. But with an alien enemy behind bars, that danger has passed. If he is to be deported only after a hearing, our constitutional requirements are that the hearing be a fair one. It is foreign to our thought to defend a mock hearing on the ground that in any event it was a mere gratuity. Hearings that are arbitrary and unfair are no hearings at all under our system of government. Against them habeas corpus provides in this case the only protection. The notion that the discretion of any officer of government can override due process is foreign to our system. Due process does not perish when war comes. It is well established that the war power does not remove constitutional limitations safeguarding essential liberties. Home Bldg. & Loan Assn. v. Blaisdell, 290 U. S. 398, 426. AHRENS ET AL. v. CLARK, ATTORNEY GENERAL. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA. No. 446. Argued March 29, 1948.-Decided June 21, 1948. 1. A federal district court is without jurisdiction to issue a writ of habeas corpus if the person detained is not within the territorial jurisdiction of the court when the petition is filed. Pp. 189-193. 2. The history of the statute (28 U. S. C. § 452) conferring power on the district courts, "within their respective jurisdictions," to grant writs of habeas corpus, indicates that conclusion. Pp. 191-193. 3. Considerations of policy which might warrant giving the district courts discretion in this matter are for Congress, not the courts. Pp. 192-193. 4. The jurisdictional requirement that the person for whose relief a petition for a writ of habeas corpus is intended must be within the territorial jurisdiction of the district court is one which Congress has imposed on the power of the district court to act, and it may not be waived by the parties. P. 193. 5. Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, distinguished. P. 193. Affirmed. The District Court dismissed petitioners' applications for writs of habeas corpus to secure their release from detention under removal orders issued by the Attorney General under a Presidental Proclamation pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act. The United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia dismissed on appeal. This Court granted certiorari. 333 U. S. 826. Affirmed, p. 193. James J. Laughlin argued the cause and filed a brief for petitioners. Solicitor General Perlman argued the cause for respondent. With him on the brief were Assistant Attorney General Morison, Stanley M. Silverberg and Samuel D. Slade. 188 Opinion of the Court. Opinion of the Court by MR. JUSTICE Douglas, announced by MR. JUSTICE REED. The initial question presented in this case is the one we reserved in Ex parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283, 305, viz. whether the presence within the territorial jurisdiction of the District Court of the person detained is prerequisite to filing a petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioners are some 120 Germans who are being held at Ellis Island, New York, for deportation to Germany. Their deportation has been directed under removal orders issued by the Attorney General who has found that each of them is dangerous to the public peace and safety of the United States because he has adhered to a government with which the United States is at war or to the principles thereof. These removal orders were issued under Presidential Proclamation 2655 of July 14, 1945 (10 Fed. Reg. 8947) pursuant to the Alien Enemy Act of 1798, R. S. § 4067, 50 U. S. C. § 21. The orders are challenged by these petitions for writs of habeas corpus on several grounds, the principal one being that all of them exceed the statutory authority in that they were issued after actual hostilities with Germany ceased. The petitions were filed in the District Court for the District of Columbia and alleged that petitioners were confined at Ellis Island, New York, and are "subject to the custody and control" of the Attorney General. Respondent moved to dismiss because, inter alia, petitioners were outside the territorial confines of the District of Columbia. The Court of Appeals dismissed an appeal from the order of the District Court granting the motion. The statute, 28 U. S. C. § 452, provides: "The several justices of the Supreme Court and the several judges of the circuit courts of appeal and of the district courts, within their respective jurisdictions, shall have power to grant writs of habeas Opinion of the Court. 335 U.S. corpus for the purpose of an inquiry into the cause of restraint of liberty. A circuit judge shall have the same power to grant writs of habeas corpus within his circuit, that a district judge has within his district; and the order of the circuit judge shall be entered in the records of the district court of the district wherein the restraint complained of is had." The question at the threshold of the case is whether the words "within their respective jurisdictions" limit the district courts to inquiries into the causes of restraints of liberty of those confined or restrained within the territorial jurisdictions of those courts. There are few cases on all fours with the present one, the precise question not having frequently arisen in the lower federal courts. But the general view is that their jurisdiction is so confined. McGowan v. Moody, 22 App. D. C. 148, 158 et seq.; In re Bickley, 3 Fed. Cas. 332. And see In re Boles, 48 F. 75; Ex parte Gouyet, 175 F. 230, 233; United States v. Day, 50 F. 2d 816, 817; Jones v. Biddle, 131 F. 2d 853, 854; United States v. Schlotfeldt, 136 F. 2d 935, 940.1 Cf. Sanders v. Allen, 69 App. D. C. 307, 100 F. 2d 717; Tippitt v. Wood, 78 U. S. App. D. C. 332, 140 F. 2d 689. That is our view. We start from the accepted premise that apart from specific exceptions created by Congress the jurisdiction of the district courts is territorial. See Georgia v. Pennsylvania R. Co., 324 U. S. 439, 467-468, and cases cited. It is not sufficient in our view that the jailer or custodian alone be found in the jurisdiction. Although the writ is directed to the person in whose custody the party is detained, 28 U. S. C. § 455, the statutory scheme contemplates a procedure which may bring the prisoner before the court. For § 458 provides 1 But see Ex parte Fong Yim, 134 F. 938; Ex parte Ng Quong Ming, 135 F. 378. |