Opinion of the Court. 335 U.S. in the social and legal position of women. The fact that women may now have achieved the virtues that men have long claimed as their prerogatives and now indulge in vices that men have long practiced, does not preclude the States from drawing a sharp line between the sexes, certainly in such matters as the regulation of the liquor traffic. See the Twenty-First Amendment and Carter v. Virginia, 321 U. S. 131. The Constitution does not require legislatures to reflect sociological insight, or shifting social standards, any more than it requires them to keep abreast of the latest scientific standards. While Michigan may deny to all women opportunities for bartending, Michigan cannot play favorites among women without rhyme or reason. The Constitution in enjoining the equal protection of the laws upon States precludes irrational discrimination as between persons or groups of persons in the incidence of a law. But the Constitution does not require situations "which are different in fact or opinion to be treated in law as though they were the same." Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147. Since bartending by women may, in the allowable legislative judgment, give rise to moral and social problems against which it may devise preventive measures, the legislature need not go to the full length of prohibition if it believes that as to a defined group of females other factors are operating which either eliminate or reduce the moral and social problems otherwise calling for prohibition. Michigan evidently believes that the oversight assured through ownership of a bar by a barmaid's husband or father minimizes hazards that may confront a barmaid without such protecting oversight. This Court is certainly not in a position to gainsay such belief by the Michigan legislature. If it is entertainable, as we think it is, Michigan has not violated its duty to afford equal protection of its laws. We cannot cross-examine either actually or argumentatively the mind of Michigan legis 464 RUTLEDGE, J., dissenting. lators nor question their motives. Since the line they have drawn is not without a basis in reason, we cannot give ear to the suggestion that the real impulse behind this legislation was an unchivalrous desire of male bartenders to try to monopolize the calling. It would be an idle parade of familiar learning to review the multitudinous cases in which the constitutional assurance of the equal protection of the laws has been applied. The generalities on this subject are not in dispute; their application turns peculiarly on the particular circumstances of a case. Thus, it would be a sterile inquiry to consider whether this case is nearer to the nepotic pilotage law of Louisiana, sustained in Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552, than it is to the Oklahoma sterilization law, which fell in Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535. Suffice it to say that "A statute is not invalid under the Constitution because it might have gone farther than it did, or because it may not succeed in bringing about the result that it tends to produce." Roschen v. Ward, 279 U. S. 337, 339. Nor is it unconstitutional for Michigan to withdraw from women the occupation of bartending because it allows women to serve as waitresses where liquor is dispensed. The District Court has sufficiently indicated the reasons that may have influenced the legislature in allowing women to be waitresses in a liquor establishment over which a man's ownership provides control. Nothing need be added to what was said below as to the other grounds on which the Michigan law was assailed. Judgment affirmed. MR. JUSTICE RUTLEDGE, with whom MR. JUSTICE DOUGLAS and MR. JUSTICE MURPHY join, dissenting. While the equal protection clause does not require a legislature to achieve "abstract symmetry"1 or to classify 1 Patsone v. Pennsylvania, 232 U. S. 138, 144. RUTLEDGE, J., dissenting. 335 U. S. with "mathematical nicety," that clause does require lawmakers to refrain from invidious distinctions of the sort drawn by the statute challenged in this case.3 The statute arbitrarily discriminates between male and female owners of liquor establishments. A male owner, although he himself is always absent from his bar, may employ his wife and daughter as barmaids. A female owner may neither work as a barmaid herself nor employ her daughter in that position, even if a man is always present in the establishment to keep order. This inevitable result of the classification belies the assumption that the statute was motivated by a legislative solicitude for the moral and physical well-being of women who, but for the law, would be employed as barmaids. Since there could be no other conceivable justification for such discrimination against women owners of liquor establishments, the statute should be held invalid as a denial of equal protection. 2 Lindsley v. Natural Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U. S. 61, 78-82; see also Tigner v. Texas, 310 U. S. 141, 147; Bain Peanut Co. v. Pinson, 282 U. S. 499, 501; Bryant v. Zimmerman, 278 U. S. 63, 73-77; Miller v. Wilson, 236 U. S. 373, 384. 3 Cf. Skinner v. Oklahoma, 316 U. S. 535; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337; McCabe v. Atchison, T. & S. F. R. Co., 235 U. S. 151; Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356. And see Kotch v. Pilot Commissioners, 330 U. S. 552, dissenting opinion 564. Syllabus. MICHELSON v. UNITED STATES. CERTIORARI TO THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT. No. 23. Argued October 14-15, 1948.-Decided December 20, 1948. 1. In a trial in a federal court for bribery of a federal officer, the defendant admitted the payment but claimed that it was induced by the officer, and the case hinged on whether the jury believed the defendant or the officer. The defendant's character witnesses testified that they had known the defendant for from 15 to 30 years and that he had a good reputation for "honesty and truthfulness" and for "being a law-abiding citizen." In cross-examining them, the prosecutor was permitted to ask whether they had heard that the accused had been arrested 27 years previously for receiving stolen goods. The trial judge had satisfied himself in the absence of the jury that the question related to an actual occurrence, and he carefully instructed the jury as to the limited purpose of this evidence. Held: In the circumstances of this case and in view of the care taken by the trial judge to protect the rights of the defendant, permitting the prosecutor to ask this question was not reversible error. Pp. 470-487. 2. The law does not invest the defendant with a presumption of good character; it simply closes the whole matter of character, disposition and reputation on the prosecution's case-in-chief. The defendant may introduce evidence tending to prove his good reputation; but, if he does so, it throws open the entire subject and the prosecution may then cross-examine defendant's witnesses to test their credibility and qualifications and may also introduce contradictory evidence. Pp. 475–479. 3. Both the propriety and abuse of hearsay reputation testimony, on both sides, depend on numerous and subtle considerations, difficult to detect or appraise from a cold record. Therefore, rarely and only on clear showing of prejudicial abuse of discretion, will appellate courts disturb rulings of trial courts on this subject. P. 480. 4. In this case, the trial judge was scrupulous to safeguard the practice against any misuse. P. 481. 5. A character witness may be cross-examined as to knowledge of rumors of defendant's prior arrest, whether or not it culminated in a conviction. Pp. 482-483. 798176 O-49- -35 Opinion of the Court. 335 U.S. 6. It is not only by comparison with the crime on trial but by comparison with the reputation asserted that a court may judge whether the prior arrest should be made the subject of inquiry. Pp. 483-484. 7. That the inquiry concerned an arrest 27 years before the trial did not make its admission an abuse of discretion in the circumstances of this case-especially since two of the witnesses had testified that they had known defendant for 30 years, defendant, on direct examination, had voluntarily called attention to his conviction of a misdemeanor 20 years before, and since no objection was made on this specific ground. P. 484. 8. Notwithstanding the difficulty which a jury might have in comprehending instructions as to the limited purpose of such evidence, a defendant who elects to introduce witnesses to prove his good reputation for honesty and truthfulness and for being a law-abiding citizen has no valid complaint about the latitude which existing law allows to the prosecution to meet this issue by cross-examination of his character witnesses. Pp. 484-485. 165 F. 2d 732, affirmed. Petitioner was convicted in a federal district court of bribing a federal officer. The Court of Appeals affirmed. 165 F. 2d 732. This Court granted certiorari. 333 U. S. 866. Affirmed, p. 487. Louis J. Castellano argued the cause for petitioner. With him on the brief was Daniel McNamara. Joseph M. Howard argued the cause for the United States. With him on the brief were Solicitor General Perlman and Robert S. Erdahl. MR. JUSTICE JACKSON delivered the opinion of the Court. In 1947 petitioner Michelson was convicted of bribing a federal revenue agent.' The Government proved a 1 The first count charged petitioner with bribing in violation of 18 U. S. C. § 91 (now 18 U. S. C. § 201) and the affirmance of his conviction on this count by the Court of Appeals, 165 F. 2d 732, is the |