the way, for reform, Mayor Swift appointed an excellent commission and thereafter cordially supported it. This seeming inconsistency on his part is perhaps traceable to a desire to mark the introduction of the merit system by a conversion as dramatic as that of St. Paul. Possibly he sought at the outset of his administration to put temptation behind him, or to create a sort of solitude in which the new commission might learn its duties and formulate the rules required by law. Whatever the truth, the mayor thereafter sustained the commission while it worked out a thorough classification of the service, prepared adequate rules, held many examinations and certified a few eligibles for appointment. Under such conditions came the change from republican to democratic rule in the election of Mayor Harrison last spring and a clean sweep of Mayor Swift's personal appointees.

The Illinois statute is based on the national, New York and Massachusetts acts. It differs from the earlier legislation in that it is more inclusive and stringent in its provisions. The excluded "head or heads of any department" of the New York act gives place to the "heads of any principal department" in the statute of Illinois. Unrestricted removals under all prior legislation give way in Illinois to removals only for cause, to be ascertained upon written charges after opportunity to the person charged to be heard. The Illinois act also provides that vacancies shall be filled by promotion where it is practicable, that promotions shall be "on the basis of merit and seniority of service and examination," and that "all examinations for promotion shall be competitive.

The commissions under the Illinois statute are continuous and independent bodies. Mayor Harrison, however, assumed the Chicago commissioners to be his subordinates, and that a majority of them should be in political and personal accord with himself. Upon the refusal of the majority of the old commission (the other member having been appointed comptroller) to accept his construction of the words, "heads of any principal

department," used in naming the excluded officials, to include some fifty heads of bureaus in the departments, inspectors and captains of police and various foremen and others, the mayor removed the two remaining members on frivolous charges afterwards trumped up to comply with a provision of the statute requiring him to file his reasons for such removals. The new commission promptly published an opinion construing the words, "heads of any principal department," so as to exclude from the classified service most of the desirable positions claimed by the mayor as spoils, thus giving him (to use their words) "the benefit of the doubt" as to the positions which "should be taken out of the classified service." The mayor was thus enabled to fill the higher places in the service with avowed and active enemies of the merit system, an opportunity which he promptly improved. His appointees, with some honorable exceptions, in co-operation with the council, are doing what may be done to place the civil service law in a false light before the public, and-so far as practicable to render it inoperative.

The statute excludes from the classified service "officers. . . . whose appointment is subject to confirmation by the city council." When the act was adopted but few officials, some of them of minor importance, were subject to such confirmation. Upon the accession of Mayor Harrison, it was feared by some of the best friends of the law that it is especially vulnerable at this point. Its enemies quickly sought to avail themselves of their apparent opportunity. The council promptly created a considerable number of new positions, making them all subject to confirmation by itself. The committee on civil service, on June 14, 1897, reported forms for four ordinances, recommending their passage. By these measures it was gravely proposed to designate as "heads of principal departments,' as said term is used in section eleven" of the civil service act, numerous "public officials" and "all employees of the City of Chicago, receiving $3 or less per day, as compensation for work;" to make "the head of each

and every department, bureau or division of work in the public service of Chicago," and certain experts, private secretaries, head assistants and others, subject to confirmation by the council; and to make "all transfers, appointments, discharges and promotions in the fire and police departments" subject to the order of the mayor and approval of the council. These extraordinary proposals were opposed by the administration which was not prepared to attempt the complete nullification of the statute. Two weeks later the council passed, as an administration measure, an ordinance which provides that a considerable list of "officials" named "shall be designated as 'heads of principal departments,' as said term is used in section eleven" of the civil service act.

Some of the friends of the law, fearing these attacks were aimed at a vital point, deemed it wise to endeavor to save something by acquiescence. Others, and notably the Citizens' Association, held that the way to save the law was to defend it against all comers. The Citizens' Association retained special counsel and procured the Attorney-General to file petitions, on behalf of the people, in the Supreme Court for writs of mandamus, to obtain an authoritative and final interpretation of the law and of the power of the city council in respect to it. These cases were fully presented to the court in October last, and early decisions are expected. The new commission only contended for a liberal construction of the words, "heads of any principal department." The corporation counsel boldly attacked the constitutionality of the act, and defended the ordinance which seeks to make subordinate officials "heads of principal departments" merely by thus designating them. The writer's relation to these cases renders improper here any prophecy in regard to the result. It must suffice here to say, that we hope for a judgment by the court strongly sustaining the act, with a finding that the ordinance is void as unreasonable and in conflict with

*

the statute. The law is supported by public opinion. The penalties for its violation are severe. If fully sustained by the court, it will be at least reasonably enforced.

The President, by his executive order of July 27, 1897, directing that removals shall be made only for just cause, upon written charges and opportunity to be heard, has raised the question whether removals should be controlled by law. Civil service reformers have hesitated to place any legal restraint upon the power of removal by the appointing officer for any cause satisfactory to him. They have assumed that such officers will not be apt to remove efficient subordinates to make way for unknown successors to be taken from the eligible list. As early as 1881, in his address before The American Science Association, Mr. Curtis said:

"Removals for cause alone means, of course, removal for legitimate cause, such as dishonesty, negligence, or incapacity. But who shall decide that such cause exists? This must be determined either by the responsible superior officer or by some other authority. But if left to some other authority the right of counsel and the forms of a court would be invoked; the whole legal machinery of mandamuses, injunctions, certioreris, and the rules of evidence would be put in play to keep an incompetent clerk at his desk or a sleepy watchman on his beat. Cause for removal of a letter-carrier in the post office or of an accountant in the custom house would be presented with all the pomp of impeachment and establised like a high crime and misdemeanor." (II Orations and Addresses p. 190).

Mr. Curtis, in his second annual address as President of the League in 1883, also said: "We do not plead for fixed permanency in public place, nor assert

* The Supreme Court of Illinois on December 22, 1897, handed down a strong opinion in these cases, holding the Statute to be constitutional and the ordinance in question void for unreasonableness. The court, in effect, holds that the Council has no power to add to the list of exclusions from the act. This decision places the Illinois act on a firm basis.

a vested right in public employment. Due subordination and discipline are essential to all effective organized service, and, therefore, dismissal for proper cause should be prompt and sure. To this end the power of removal should be left as free as possible, provided that motives for its illegitimate exercise are destroyed. Such a provision secures both proper discipline and a just tenure." (Id. p. 248.) Again, in his sixth annual address, he said: "The power of removal no less than that of appointment is a public trust, and it cannot be rightly used arbitrarily or for any other cause than the public interest. Such cause should be publicly assigned and recorded, that the people may clearly understand the reason of the change in service." (Id. p. 340.)

These passages indicate what has been the generally accepted view of reformers. Aside from the prohibition of removals for political reasons, there was no attempt until recently to limit the power of removal by appointing officers. The framers of the Illinois act took the first step in advance by providing that "no officer or employee in the classified service

shall be removed or discharged except for cause, upon written charges and after an opportunity to be heard." From this provision laborers and "persons having the custody of public money, for the safe keeping of which another has given bond," are excepted. "Such charges shall be investigated by or before said civil service commission, or some officer or board appointed by said commission to conduct such investigation. The finding and decision of such commission, or investigating officer or board when approved by such commission, shall be certified to the appointing officer, and shall be forthwith enforced by such officer. (Act 1895, Sec. 12.)

These provisions, it will be observed, make no attempt to define what causes shall be sufficient to justify removals. It is not believed that the act confers upon those in the classified service any vested right to continue in public employment, or to call upon the courts to determine whether any alleged cause of