native collector, who does. Is it because Sir Thomas Munro's estimates were too high, or that the value of money is enhanced every where since the period of that settlement-is it because we carry away specie in the bulk to purchase our teas in China, our piece goods and other articles in England, and like the absentees of Ireland, send the revenues and the accumulations of individuals out of the country; whilst we do not allow the sugars and other products of India a fair competition in the English market with those of our slave colonies, that the Ryotwar system of India, to the great bulk of the people the most beneficent of all systems, and which might be extended with so much present advantage to more civilized countries, is to be condemned before the people have been heard in its defence? The Zumindaree settlement will last, according to the favorableness of its terms, through this unnatural state of things; but it too must sooner or later break down. Those who doubt the power of the Ryotwar settlement to last through centuries of good government with undoubted benefit to the people, may with advantage consult Mr. Sullivan's late evidence before the Select Committee of the House of Commons, the principles on which the Ryotwar assessment of Mulik Umber was framed in the Dekhan, that of the Polegar chiefs of Nuggur Bednor, and of the native chiefs in Canara and other parts of Southern India.

CUSTOMS.

This branch of revenue, exclusive of our salt monopoly, is said to yield returns very disproportioned to the expence incurred in the collection, the tax which it imposes on the people, and the obstructions which it offers to commerce. Mr. Mackenzie, I think, calculates the nett revenue in Bengal at 22 lakhs per annum, and the revenue throughout India is perhaps not double that amount. The additional cost to the people could only be estimated by discovering the charge of our custom-house establishments, and the amount which the officers of custom levy in fines, as bribes, and which they receive as douceurs. Mr. Elphinstone's scheme of levying a custom tax on exports by sea, (although apparently contrary to all principle,) and abolishing our inland customs with their thousand and one inflictions, would be hailed as the greatest blessing by the people; and might be made a relief to commerce without involving any sacrifice of revenue.

EXCISE.

I am not aware that any calculation has ever been made of the amount of excise revenue separate from the opium monopoly, or of the expence of collecting this tax. It has never, that I am aware of, been bade a matter of calculation in India, whether by reducing

the amount of our tax, we should increase consumption? For Governments have never so trifled with the morals of the people. In India every thing in the shape of spirits and intoxicating articles is of the worst description, injurious to the health of the people, and destructive to their morals; for the use of them in any degree is considered to degrade a person from his station in society, and is therefore calculated to render him a worthless or desperate character. There is neither the wholesome and invigorating ale of England, nor the generous wines of the other parts of Europe; nor would even these or any other stimulants of that nature be required by the inhabitants of this climate. The nearer therefore that our tax serves as a prohibition by checking consumption, the better.

OPIUM MONOPOLY.

In defence of this monopoly, except in so far as it may be necessary to our revenue, I am not aware that one word can be said. It seems to be on the eve of dying a natural death, for in spite of all our attempts to limit cultivation, in the fertile regions of Malwa and Rajpootana, or to get what is produced in the tributary states of that country into our own hands, production has there been so abundant, and the drug has found its way so extensively in the last few years to the China market; as to reduce its value to one-half the original standard, and pretty nearly to destroy our Patna and Benares monopoly price.

SALT MONOPOLY.

Nearly the same may be said of the defencelessness of this as of the opium monopoly; but what tax is not objectionable, and would not be resisted if Governments could not persuade the people that it was necessary for their defence, or for the administration of their affairs, or if they had not the power of enforcing it? It seems a question whether the revenues of India will suffer by the abolition of all the commercial speculations of the Company in that country; but there is no question that great loss will be sustained by the abolition of the monopoly in tea, and as both these events are now likely to happen, this is not the period for relinquishing the advantages of the salt monopoly; on the contrary, similar measures with those existing in Bengal might be extended, if likely to prove equally productive of revenue, to Madras and Bombay.

There is perhaps no other article on which the Government could derive an equal amount of revenue at so little cost to the people, provided the monopoly be well administered. Salt seems, to even the poorest class, to be generally cheap enough every where. But when one hears that there are places (Assam, Cachar), where the poor man cannot get salt to his rice, and sees that the fisherman is

not allowed to carry in his boat sufficient salt to cure the produce of his night's toil, one wishes tax-gatherers where salt comes from in the deep blue sea.

The stories of hardships inflicted on the Molungees or manufacturers are most probably very much overcharged; if those sufferings exist in any degree, they may very easily be removed, and the simple management of the monopoly in its present shape is certainly a less evil than a custom tax with its cloud of gatherers would inflict on the public. The defence of the system and the management of it may very safely be left in the hands of the talented Secretary to the Board of Customs, Salt and Opium.

JUDICIAL ADMINISTRATION.

It is a common observation that our laws and revenue regulations of the times of Hastings and Cornwallis were more applicable to the condition of native property and native society than those of a later period. The servants of those days had a superior acquaintance with the native character, they consulted more natives of intelligence and learning, they were altogether more thrown amongst and mixed up with natives; and therefore had advantages in legislating for them beyond servants of a later date. The science of jurisprudence has since those days made great progress throughout Europe, principally by simplifying the laws and suiting them to the understandings and the wants of the people. In India those most qualified for this great work lead such an official existence, they are so far above and so removed from the people, so little acquainted with them, except when trying them or taxing them, that the formation of a Code of Laws suited to their wants and condition by the officers that could be brought to work upon it, would seem a hopeless task. The nature of society in the different portions of so extensive a region must be supposed very dissimilar, and the laws which would be applicable in one portion might be very inapplicable in another.

Some progress was made in a Code of Laws under the enlightened administration of Mr. Elphinstone at Bombay. It is probable that Sir Thomas Munro was not inattentive to such a work at Madras; and that out of the various changes and attempts at legislation in Bengal, something that is good must be found.

Call together therefore these scattered laws, and those of the olden time; with the ablest of the Company's servants from the several presidencies; join with them the judges of the several Supreme Courts who may be most able and willing to assist in such a work; with them unite the most learned of the Mahommedan and Hindoo Law Officers of India; and a Code of Laws which the judges, the lawyers, and the people may understand, must, although lawyers are said not to be the best legislators, be the result. Years may be necessary to the fulfilment of this great work; but when completed, it would be a monument of our

wisdom to which we could appeal, and which the natives of India might respect through future ages. One system of Mahommedan Law prevails every where, and the laws of the Hindoos are too every where nearly the same. Our Government has however to legislate for both these great classes of society, and for Christians (European and Indian), who are already extensively settled throughout India, and who in the progress of time must hold a still more prominent place there. This Code of Laws must therefore not only be modified in conformity with the local interests of the people of the several portions of India, but it must extend to each class of our subjects its own laws, and blend those laws together so as in civil processes to embrace the conflicting interests of all. A more difficult undertaking never was submitted to the wisdom of legislators; those of Indian experience may be supposed more fitted for the task than those of European. But united, and with the experience of the present age in legislation before them, there is surely wisdom enough in the land for any undertaking. Much assistance may be expected from the able writer who has lately appeared in Bengal on this subject.

A Code of Laws which should bring home to the understandings of the various classes of our subjects a knowledge of their rights, and the decision which they might expect from an appeal to our tribunals, would necessarily be of the utmost importance to the people, as well as to those by whom the laws are administered. Those who are to administer our laws cannot much longer continue to have and to struggle with one another, and with Government, for separate and extended jurisdiction. It may be supposed that the whole of the law officers of India will be united for one purpose, and acting in concert for one great object. That instead of the anomaly of one set of judges calling themselves King's, and another calling themselves Company's, all will, in so far as it is right or necessary that judges should, in administering the laws, be subject to either legislative or other council, yield to one supreme and ruling authority.

Such a code in full operation, with a sufficient number of respectable and educated natives to administer its laws in all the minor concerns of life, civil and criminal, with European judges to appeal to in all cases from their decision, and we should have the best security that justice would be brought to every man's door-Supreme Courts at the presidencies, and whenever required in the provinces, a judge of circuit in each division of the country, and district judges, should be the whole of the European machinery. There might be as many grades of native judges as seemed necessary, and the whole, European and native, should be criminal as well as civil. One of the great advantages attending the employment of natives more extensively in a judicial capacity is, that they may so easily be multiplied to any degree that may be necessary to work off all arrears of business; the whole should be magistrates and justices of the peace, but no prosecution should originate against any person

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in the court of the authority by whom the accused was committed. There should be an appeal in all cases from the decision of native judges to an European judge; but, in any case, the decision of the Court of Appeal, confirming the award of the lower court, that decision should be final. In case of a reversal of decree, an appeal should be made to the next tribunal, until two uniform decisions were obtained, or until the appellant reached the Supreme Court, whose decision in all cases should be final. Plaints or prosecutions might be directed into the several courts, according to the amount of property or of crime involved. But the Supreme Court being reserved as a Court of Appeal, no prosecution should originate there; although the individual judges of that court, when the business there was not pressing, or when their services were required in the provinces, might be employed as judges of circuit. The great object being to open as wide as possible the door of justice to the people, and to render its stream pure, it would be necessary to increase or limit our checks and our instruments according to their demands. Advantage might be taken of Europeans or natives of respectability throughout the country as referees or arbitrators, at the option of the parties seeking redress, or they may be admitted to assist the judge as assessors. Europeans and natives not in the service might too be employed as justices of the peace, and on reference by the parties to them have powers conferred on them to decide in matters of trifling criminal offences or inferior civil suits. The Punchait, that instrument under native Governments which is as sacred in the eyes of their subjects as our juries are in ours, might be had recourse to with great advantage as an aid to our judicial institutions. The members of a Punchait having been elected by the plaintiff and defendant, each of course naming his own members, and a Sirpunch or head appointed either by their united voice, or by the judge who has the power of confirming their decree, its decision must be final, unless there be proof of corruption. It is the want of this support which has hitherto rendered the Punchait of so little avail, and so little calculated to live with our judicial system. The Punchait system after all may be found to flourish only when there is a denial of justice through courts instituted for its administration, or when these courts are corrupt, or so expensive as to amount to a denial of justice; yet arbitration amongst ourselves is not uncommon; and the native Punchait, though more subject to rules and better defined, does not differ materially from the system as known in our own civilized land. The remarkable instance of the most intelligent of all our native subjects, the Parsees of Bombay, withdrawing in a great degree from the Supreme Court there, and instituting Punchaits amongst themselves for the regulation of their own affairs in civil cases, may have its origin in the ruinous expence attending appeals to our laws.

The instruments which will thus be at work throughout India may be expected to bring us nearer to the people, to give them an