ance of the purpose of their combination take possession of and obstruct the movement of cars and engines of such company, and at the same time, in the contest with their own company, obstruct the operation of engines and cars of a company which is in the hands of the court, and which engine and cars are being operated by receivers of the court, such acts are contempt of court.1 1 In re Doolittle, 23 Fed. R. 544. This case was heard before Brewer and Treat, JJ. Judge Brewer in his opinion said: "It does not appear that these defendants in the first instance started out to obstruct the receivers in their management of the road. In some way they had ascertained that the road was in possession of the receivers appointed by this court, and that it was not prudent to interfere with them. But it is clear that, while engaged in a strike against the Missouri Pacific Railroad, they did interfere with the management of the engine and freight cars under the control of such receivers, and did obstruct such receivers in carrying on the business of the road placed in their charge by this court. Now, while in one sense they cannot be charged with contempt in that they intended to obstruct this court and its officers in the discharge of its and their duty, yet they placed themselves in this attitude: They engaged in an unlawful enterprise, and while so engaged they did interfere with the officers of this court in the management of the road which was in their hands as receivers. Now, if a party engaged in a lawful undertaking unintentionally interferes with some of the officers of this court, and obstructs them in the discharge of their duties, this court is not tenacious of any mere prerogative, and would let such action pass almost without notice, but where parties are engaged in that which is of itself unlawful, in doing that which they have no right to do, and in so doing obstruct the officers of this court, although intending no contempt, that is a very different thing. Suppose a party of menand I state this merely as an illustration-combine to commit an assault and battery upon one person, and, without intending so to injure, do, through mistake, actually seize and beat a third person. Although such beating was unintentional, perhaps accidental, yet, as they were engaged in an unlawful enterprise, it is just the same as though they intended that unlawful attack upon the person actually receiving the injury. And so, here, though these defendants did not set out to obstruct the officers of this court, and the receivers of the Wabash Company, in their administration of that property, yet they did set out to obstruct some persons in the exercise of their legal rights; they did set out to do that which they had no right to do; and this court is justified, indeed, it is its duty, inasmuch as they did obstruct the officers of this court, to regard it just the same, or nearly the same, as though they started out to obstruct the officers of this court, the receivers of the Wabash Railway Company. "Mr. Charles C. Allen: Do I understand your honor to say that the act of striking - merely carrying out the strike was unlawful? "The court (Judge Brewer): It is not the mere stopping of work themselves, but it is preventing the owners of the road from managing their own engines and running their own Parties to an unlawful combination, the object of which is to prevent the operation of a road in the hands of a receiver and thereby injure its business and maliciously incite the employees of the receiver to strike, are guilty of contempt of court. Parties who know that a railroad is in the hands of a court, and who with that knowledge attempt to interfere with cars. That is where the wrong comes in. Anybody has a right to quit work, but in interfering with other persons working, and preventing the owners of railroad trains from managing those trains as they see fitthere is where the wrong comes in." Judge Treat in his opinion said: "If there was any just ground of complaint, so far as the so-called strikers were concerned, this tribunal was open to have them present their matters here, and the court would have instructed the receivers with regard to it; and one of the prominent reasons why courts are so prompt to punish men who interfere with receivers in the custody and control of the property committed to them by law is the fact that any one engaged in employment under them can have ample redress by applying to the court with respect thereto. Now, instead of coming to this court to make application, as some other parties have done - other employees, they choose to engage in a lawless enterprise whereby were involved, not only the stoppage of commerce, but perhaps a loss of millions of dollars, and merchants and private individuals and all classes were injured by this lawless proceeding. And now the party comes and says, what? Evasively, 'I did not know that I was interfering with the officers of this court;' but he did know that he was interfering with property that he had no right to interfere with, and 'perchance he overstepped the limit, and involved himself within the jurisdiction of this court.' Further, 'We did not directly by physical force do sundry and divers things; we merely requested other persons to do it.' A specious pretense! The court must be supposed to know, as everybody else does, what the object was; it was the threatening intimidation which lay behind the whole matter, and hence they are within the rule. 'A request,' under such circumstances, was a threat. The court cannot be blinded by such mere specious language. The fact is there-the positive fact that here was a direct threat and an intimidation. The form of language amounts to nothing. Courts do not stick to the letter; they look at the fact — the act itself,-and that was the case here. Parties determined lawlessly to stop the commerce of the country, so far as these roads were concerned, and to do it by force, by threats, and by intimidation; and in doing it they interfered with the property of this company under the charge of the court, and, instead of coming to this court, if they had any wrong to be redressed, and asking the court to adjust their cause, they took the law into their own hands, and they must suffer the consequences of doing it. Of course I assent, as I must do, to the lenient punishment prescribed by the circuit judge; but if it had been left to me alone, it would have been much severer." There is an interesting note to this case by Mr. Francis Wharton. 1 Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., 62 Fed. R. 803. the receiver in the operation of the road, are guilty of contempt of court.1 § 462. Receiver's employees may organize unions.-Employees of a receiver have a right to organize labor unions and to join labor unions for the purpose of bettering their condition and securing more favorable terms of employment, and such associations, unions and combinations are entirely lawful until either as a means or an end they do that which is unlawful, injurious or oppressive. In this connection Judge Taft said: "Now, it may be conceded in the outset that the employees of the receiver had the right to organize into or to join a labor union which should take joint action as to their terms of employment. It is of benefit to them and to the public that laborers should unite in their common interest and for lawful purposes. They have labor to sell. If they stand together, they are often able, all of them, to command better prices for their labor than when dealing singly with rich employers, because the necessities of the single employee may compel him to accept any terms offered him. The accumulation of a fund for the support of those who feel that the wages offered are below market prices is one of the legitimate objects of such an organization. They have the right to appoint officers who shall advise them as to the course to be taken by them in their relations with their employer. They may unite with other unions. The officers they appoint, or any other person to whom they choose to listen, may advise them as to the proper course to be taken by them in regard to their employment, or, if they choose to repose such authority in any one, may order them, on pain of expulsion from their union, peaceably to leave the employ of their employer because any of the terms of their employment are unsatisfactory." Regarding the right of free speech Judge Taft said: "Something has been said about the right of assembly and free speech secured by the constitution of Ohio. It would be strange, indeed, if that right could be used to sustain the carrying out of such an unlawful and criminal conspiracy as we have seen this to be. It never has been supposed to protect one from prosecution or suits for slander, or for any of the many malicious 1 Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., supra. 2 Thomas v. Cincinnati, N. O. & T. P. Ry. Co., supra. and tortious injuries which the agency of the tongue has been so often employed to inflict. If the obstruction to the operation of the road by the receiver was unlawful and malicious, it is not less a contempt because the instrument which he used to effect it was his tongue rather than his hand." § 463. Any unlawful interference with the operation of a road in the hands of a receiver is a contempt of court, it being in the nature of a direct resistance to the mandates of the court. Receivers are officers of the court, and by their agents and employees are pro hac vice officers of the court. As such officers they are responsible to the court for their conduct; and if they wilfully or maliciously injure the property in the hands of the court, or seek to embarrass the receivers in the performance of their duties, they are guilty of contempt. 2 "Labor organizations are lawful and generally laudable associations, but they have no legal status or authority, and stand before men and the law on no better footing than other social organizations, and it is preposterous that they should attempt to issue orders that free men are bound to obey; and no man can stand in a court of justice and shelter himself behind any such organization from the consequences of his own unlawful acts." If, however, any employee of a receiver is improperly 1 Secor v. Railroad Co., 7 Biss. 513, Fed. Cas. No. 12,605; United States v. Kane et al., 23 Fed. R. 544; In re Higgins, 27 Fed. R. 443. 2 In re Higgins et al., 27 Fed. R. 443. In this case Judge Pardee said: "It is well-settled law that whoever interferes with property in the possession of a court is guilty of contempt of that court, and I regard it as equally well settled that whoever unlawfully interferes with officers and agents of the court, in the full and complete possession and management of property in the custody of the court, is guilty of a contempt of court; and it is immaterial whether this unlawful interference comes in the way of actual violence or by intimidation and threats. The employees of the receivers, although pro hac vice officers of the court, may quit their employment, as can employees of private parties or corporations, provided they do not thereby intentionally disable the property; but they must quit peaceably and decently. Where they combine and conspire to quit with or without notice, with the object and intent of crippling the property or its operation, I have no doubt that they thereby commit a contempt; and all those who combine and conspire with employees to thus quit, or as officials of labor organizations issue printed orders to quit or to strike, with an intent to embarrass the court in administering the prop erty, render themselves liable for contempt of court." 3 From the opinion of the court, In re Higgins, supra. discharged by a receiver or any of the receiver's agents, the court is open to hear his complaint and see that justice is done. Where the property of a railway company is in the hands of the court's receiver the party is guilty of contempt of court who as chairman of a combination sends to various foremen working for the receiver the following notice: "OFFICE OF LOCAL COMMITTEE, June 17, 1885. Foreman: You are requested to stay away from the shop until the present difficulty is settled. Your compliance with this will command the protection of the Wabash. employees. But in no case are you to consider this an intimidation." 1 1 In re Wabash R. Co., 24 Fed. R. 217. In holding defendants guilty of contempt of court Judge Krekel said: "It will be recollected that the property of the Wabash Railroad is in the hands of the court, and that receivers have been appointed by it for its management. The owners have been deprived of possession and control, and with it the ability to protect it. The court, through its officers, has undertaken to do the ordinary business of the company, the running of regular, speedy and safe trains for the conveyance of mails, passengers and merchandise; and, moreover, the management of the property so as to make it valuable to those who have claims against it. All these great public and private interests demand that no unnecessary interferences with the property and its management should take place. If any one has grievances, be they employees or others, they can have easy and ready redress for their actual or supposed wrongs by bringing them to the attention of the court. Both receivers and managers are subject to its control. The court will not permit its officers to wrong any one, and is always ready to redress grievances. Such a thing as taking the law into their own hands, be they employees of the company or officers of the court, will not be tolerated. Stress has been laid in the argument for defendants upon the promise made in the circular issued by the managers during the early strike, that notice should be given to the chairman of the committee of the employees of any intended reduction, and that the committee should be consulted about any reduction or suspension. These promises, heretofore more fully set out, though not applicable here, were well calculated to mislead, and no doubt had their influence in the proceedings afterwards had by the committee and strikers. The wholesome law of the state of Missouri, requiring companies to give thirty days' notice to employees before reducing their wages, which went into effect on the 23d day of June, has no application, because not in force when these occurrences took place. The provisions of this law no doubt emanated from the same sense of justice which induced the promise of the managers to give notice of any reduction, in the circular spoken of. It moreover indicates the true source where the remedy for grievances of the kind under consideration is to be sought. Differences between employers and employees, if not settled by compromise, must be settled by law and the courts. The community |