dictable offense-for two or more to combine together for the purpose of "cornering" the market, and contracts and agreements creating such combinations will not be enforced. The modern "corner" is therefore covered by the law governing conspiracies rather than by the ancient law and decisions concerning the offense of engrossing. 66 $72. A corner" defined.- Broadly defined a "corner" is the securing of such control of the immediate supply of any product as to enable those operating the "corner" to arbitrarily advance the price of the product.1 § 73. "Options" and "futures.”—Ordinarily a “corner” is created by operations upon boards of trade or stock exchanges, and by dealings in "options" and "futures." 874. Modern facilities for transportation are so great that it is no longer possible to corner a market by playing upon the necessities of the people; it is no longer possible to secure such control of any necessary of life that the wants of the people will quickly and sharply advance the price in the usual and ordinary course of trade. Notwithstanding the enormous consumption of staple food products, such as wheat, corn and pork, it would be impossible for any conceivable combination of individuals to secure such a control of the entire available supply of any one of these products as to arbitrarily advance prices under normal conditions. The facilities for transportation are such that the supplies of distant states, territories and even of foreign countries are available to fill any normal demand, and the capital that would be required for conducting a "corner" under normal conditions would be vastly beyond the resources of any combination of individuals. It is therefore necessary to not only secure control of the immediately available supply of the product that is to be cornered, but also at the same time to create an artificial demand. This artificial demand can be created only by buying from men who have nothing to deliver, and inducing them to agree to deliver by a certain day, under the rules of a stock exchange or a board of trade, something that they must go into the market to buy, 1"A corner is the monopolizing of the marketable supply of a stock or commodity through purchase for immediate or future delivery, generally by a secretly organized combination, for the purpose of raising the price." Century Dictionary. and then through the control of the immediate supply make it difficult or impossible for them to fill their contracts; the efforts of the latter to fill their contracts will run up the price of the product to whatever point the "corner," if successful, may dic tate. § 75. The combination that is operating the corner must be prepared to buy and pay for all the particular product that is actually offered by parties controlling and holding the same, and in addition thereto the combination must be prepared to contract for all of the product that may be offered by parties who at the time of making contracts to deliver actually hold and control none of the product, but who expect to buy in the market sufficient to fill their contracts before the day fixed for delivery. If the combination is strong enough to take all the product that is actually offered, and all the contracts for future delivery that are offered, it will make it impossible for the sellers of futures to fill their contracts, whereupon all who have contracted to deliver something that they cannot deliver will be obliged to settle on such terms as the "corner" dictates.' 1The machinery of a "corner" is detailed in the following from Ex parte Young (1874), 6 Biss. 58: "Blodgett, J.: It appears from the testimony submitted with the register's report that in the month of May, 1872, and for several years prior thereto, the bankrupts, Peyton R. Chandler and the firm of Chandler, Pomeroy & Co., were engaged in the business of buying and selling grain on the Chicago market, and as members of the board of trade of this city; that Chandler, Pomeroy & Co. were brokers and commission merchants, and Peyton R. Chandler dealt mainly on his own account as a capitalist through Chandler, Pomeroy & Co., who acted as his brokers; that about the middle of May, Peyton R. Chandler conceived the idea of making a corner in oats for the month of June then ensuing, and with that view he purchased all the 'cash oats' as they arrived in the market, and took all the 'options' offered him for June delivery,— his purpose The law governing "options" and "futures" will be discussed in the next chapter. 76. The gist of the offense of operating a "corner" is the conspiracy. The gist of the offense of creating a "corner" is the conspiracy - the combining together of two or chinery of this corner, Chandler also sold what are called 'puts,' or privileges of delivering to him oats during the month of June for forty-one cents a bushel. The proof shows conclusively that the plans of Chandler, and the fact that he was manipulating the market with express reference to a corner in oats for June, were well known and understood on the board of trade, while the number of these 'put' claims, about one hundred and twenty-five, all, or substantially all, in favor of members of the board, show that the struggle between Chandler, who was endeavoring to hold up prices, and the sellers of 'options' and holders of 'puts,' who were endeavoring to break the price, was quite generally participated in by members of the board. In other words, it was notorious that Chandler was endeavoring to keep the price at forty-one cents or upwards, while the sellers of 'options' and holders of 'puts' were endeavoring to break down the price. It is true that in this testimony some of the claimants say there was no 'corner,' or that they did not know that there was a corner; but the cross-examination shows that they knew Chandler was trying to make a corner, and they say he did not do it because he failed before the end of the month, so that by their own admission they knew what he was attempting- knew the reasons for his purchase of such large quantities of 'cash oats' and options, and knew he did not sustain his corner because the 'short interest broke him down;' and the moment a man bought a 'put,' he became identified with the short interest-his interests were antagonistic to Chandler. "It is as manifestly a bet upon the future price of the grain in question as any which could be made upon the speed of a horse or the turn of a card. The evidence in this case shows that in nearly all cases of settlements on 'put' or 'option' contracts the grain is never delivered, nor expected to be delivered, but the parties simply pay the difference as settled by the prices. But, if that were not so in all cases, it is clear that in this case no delivery of the grain was intended by these 'put' holders, because they knew that Chandler controlled all the oats in the market and fixed the price, and that their only expectation for success depended on their being able to break the market before their time for delivery expired. Some of them say that they intended to deliver the oats, but it is absurd to suppose that they intended to deliver, unless they could do so for less than forty-one cents. They intended to deliver if they could break Chandler, or prevent his 'corner' from culminating, as the jockey may intend to walk his own horse over the course after he has poisoned or lamed that of his competitor. They did not intend to deliver if Chandler succeeded. Thus, a struggle inevitably ensued between Chandler and the holders of this immense amount of 'puts' and 'options;' Chandler alone on one side attempting to hold up the price and all the rest seeking to put it down. The fact that the sellers of options and holders of puts more to do that which is fraudulent, or is injurious and oppressive to third parties or the public. An individual may buy or contract in good faith for as much of any product as his resources will permit, even though he secures the entire avail were able to get resolutions through the board of trade making new warehouses, where oats had never been stored before, 'regular' for the performance of these contracts, shows the intensity of the contest and the overwhelming influences with which Chandler had to contend. I do not mean to be understood as saying that the fact that Chandler sold 'puts' to so many as to create an overwhelming opposition makes the transaction any more or less a wager than if he had only sold one 'put,' but it shows the notoriety of the whole proceedings. "From the very nature of the transaction the interest of the holder of the 'put' is to break down the price, and that of the seller to maintain it. The number engaged in this transaction, and the quantities involved, demonstrate that neither party expected any grain to be delivered. Chandler expected to hold up the price, in which event no grain would be offered him, and the other parties must have known they could not get the grain to deliver unless they first broke Chandler, as he held all the grain, and then, although they might tender, he could not receive, so that in reality no actual delivery was anticipated. They made their tenders only as a method of establishing differences after he had failed, and was powerless. to public policy have always been held by the courts to be essentially void without statutory prohibition, and cannot be made the ground of an action. "And a high authority in the profession has stated the law on the subject of the validity of wagers with great force and clearness, when he says: "As the moral sense of the pres ent day regards all gaming or wagering contracts as inconsistent with the interests of the community, and at variance with the laws of morality, the exception necessarily becomes the rule.' "Indeed, any one rising from a full examination of the law applicable to wagers, as expounded by the courts, would undoubtedly testify that, while he has found in the books, and especially among the older textwriters and cases, general expressions to the effect that wagers were valid at common law, he has found the cases where they have been enforced to be extremely rare, and the courts have been astute to find reasons for not enforcing them. . "But even if not within the letter or spirit of the statute of this state, the common-law authorities quoted show that all wagers contrary to public policy are void without reference to any statute. And as the contracts under consideration are essentially nothing but bets upon the price of oats in this market within the time limited, and as it is obvious that the effect of such transactions is to beget wild speculations, to derange prices, to make prices artifi cially high or low, as the interests, "But wagers which are contrary strength and skill of the manipula "That transactions of this kind are only wagers is abundantly established by authorities. "There is no dispute that contracts of wager are valid at common law, unless affected with some special cause of invalidity. able supply and thereby creates in effect a "corner"-the law leaves him both the risk and the profit of his enterprise; but a combination between two or more to do exactly the same thing is held illegal.1 $77. Neither an individual nor a combination can enforce option contracts or contracts for futures which are gambling contracts. A "corner" operated by an individual may be illegal because founded upon gambling contracts; a "corner' operated by a combination is illegal because it is a conspiracy, but it may also operate illegally by making gambling contracts.2 tors shall dictate, thereby tending to destroy healthy business and unsettle legitimate commerce, there can be no doubt of the injurious tendency of such contracts, and that they should be held void as against public policy. As is most cogently said by the learned judge who delivered the opinion in the case cited from 55 Pa. St.: 666 'Anything which induces men to risk their money or property without any other hope of return than to get for nothing any given amount from another is gambling, and demoralizes the community, no matter by what name it may be called.' "The financial disaster and ruin which followed Black Friday' in New York, and the scarcely less damaging local consequences which followed the various 'corners' which have either succeeded or been attempted in this city, furnish conclusive proof, if proof were needed, that such gambling operations would be held void, as contrary to public policy." In Rex v. Hilbers, 2 Chitty, 163, it was held that there must be a combination of two or more persons before information will lie for enhancing the price of necessaries of life. In Rex v. De Berenger, 3 M. & S. 68, parties of high rank were convicted of conspiring to raise the price of stocks by false rumors. 2 The rule is stated by Greenhood as follows: "Combinations whose object is to create what are known as 'corners' in the market, or to control the traffic in any staple which is a popular necessity, or to enhance the price thereof, or to withhold the same from the market, or to prevent competition in the sale thereof, are void." Citing Kountz v. Kirkpatrick, 72 Pa. St. 376 (1872); Kountz v. Citizens' Oil Refining Co., id. 392 (1872), Sharswood and Williams, JJ., dissenting. (Greenhood on Public Policy, ch. IV, rule DXLI. p. 642.) See also Sampson v. Shaw, 101 Mass. 145; Rev. St. Ill., 1881, chs. 38, 130; Lyon v. Culbertson, 83 Ill. 33; Raymond v. Leavitt, 46 Mich. 447, 9 N. W. R. 525; Coal Co. v. Coal Co., 6< Pa. St. 173: Arnot v. Coal Co.. 69 N. Y. 558; Ex parte Young, 6 Biss. 53, 65. The case of Wells v. McGeoch (1888), 71 Wis. 196, 35 N. W. R. 769, turned in part upon a provision of the statutes of Wisconsin (see R. S. 4568), and it was urged in argument that "The agreement or conspiracy of Wells, McGeoch and others to corner the market in relation to wheat, and divide among them the profits which might be gained by means of such corner, being illegal, fraudulent and void, it follows that no action can be maintained by any party to such conspiracy against his as |