Mr. JOHNSON. Did the President-he is the one you say authorized this construction in his message. Now, did he have any consultation -with them?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, not as to the Forrestal itself, as a single weapon, but definitely as to the carriers as a part of the force levels of the Navy to carry out their mission of controlling the seas.

Mr. JOHNSON. I would like to have you explain this briefly, if you

can.

Secretary THOMAS. I have a letter here that Mr.

Mr. JOHNSON. As I understand it, the drops now of the nuclear weapons have a very wide spread of radiation. Now, even this ship, if it were traveling 45 miles an hour, if they struck within 20 miles of it, would that radiation, with the most modern weapons, be sufficient to practically paralyze the people that operate that ship?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, it depends, of course, on the range. We have studies on that. Admiral Carney, before the Appropriations Committee, gave a lot of detailed information on that which we will be glad to give to you. It depends on the range.

Of course, our vessels now-we have some very advanced techniques of protecting against that, depending on range.

Do you have that?

Admiral LEGGETT. That is covered in my statement, yes, sir. Mr. JOHNSON. That is covered in your statement?

Admiral LEGGETT. Yes, sir.

Mr. JOHNSON. But it is a fact, isn't it, that now the weapon has a very much greater spread of damage to the target than before; isn't that correct?

Secretary THOMAS. Mr. Johnson, that applies to anything, I mean any fixed base or any moving base. But your moving base, of course, has a great advantage because it is maneuverable. It can maneuver out of the path of your fallout.

We have the new techniques which Admiral Leggett will give you here of our washdown. I would say they were a great deal less vulnerable—well, I don't think there is any question about that, they are less vulnerable than a target that is immobile.

There are techniques now at sea for washing them down which an immobile target doesn't have.

Mr. JOHNSON. That is all.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Secretary, in view of the question raised by Mr. Johnson, I would like for you to read this letter that the Secretary of Defense wrote to Mr. Mahon when a similar question was propounded in the Appropriations Committee.

Secretary THOMAS. That same question was asked. As I say, I want to point out before I read it, though, that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in setting out the force levels for the Navy, the force levels for their assignment to keep and maintain control of the seas, have assigned as a part of the force levels the carriers.

DEAR MR. CHAIRMAN: Reference is made to your query

The CHAIRMAN. This is to Mr. Mahon?

Secretary THOMAS. To Mr. Mahon.

Mr. NORBLAD. From Mr. Wilson; is that right?

Secretary THOMAS. From Secretary of Defense, Mr. Wilson.

Reference is made to your query, transmitted to me through General Moore, whether or not the Joint Chiefs of Staff had approved the program for an addi

tional carrier of the Forrestal type which is provided for in the fiscal year 1956 budget estimates now being considered. The technical answer to this question is they did not. The matter was not formally referred to them.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff as a matter of practice do not make formal recommendations in regard to the specific equipment deemed necessary by the services to carry out their assigned missions, whether it be a specific carrier or destroyer, for the Navy; a particular missile or specific tank, for the Army; or a specific fighter or bomber for the Air Force.

In the numerous discussion which take place in the formulation of our military program and the budget, such items are discussed at length with both civilian and military heads of the services. As a result of such discussions the carrier of the Forrestal class which is included in the budget for 1956 is considered necessary, and of high priority.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Hébert, any questions?
Mr. HÉBERT. Mr. Secretary-

Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman.

The CHAIRMAN. Mr. Durham.

Mr. DURHAM. On that point, do you have a change of policy, Mr. Secretary? You have a change of policy? Now, that Joint Chiefs of Staff have had to O. K. certain items of equipment.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. DURHAM. Yes; they did. They O. K.'d the Nautilus type. Secretary THOMAS. Only on force levels, Mr. Durham. They have never approved specific weapons as such.

Mr. DURHAM. What do you call weapons? This is not a weapon. This is equipment.

The Joint Chiefs of Staff, Mr. Secretary, did approve the reactor for the Nautilus submarine. It was before the Joint Chiefs of Staff for 5 weeks.

Secretary THOMAS. That is not a weapon. It is a powerplant.

Mr. DURHAM. It is part of your ship. What are you going to do when you put a reactor in your Forrestal?

Secretary THOMAS. I think that is more of a powerplant. That is propulsion rather than a weapon.

Mr. DURHAM. It wouldn't be any good without the propulsion. Secretary THOMAS. But the Joint Chiefs of Staff have never approved individual weapons as such. In other words, they don't, as I said

Mr. DURHAM. A weapon is different from a ship, I think.

Secretary THOMAS. Well, the B-52, for instance, and the B-47, they don't approve specifically that type.

The CHAIRMAN. I will call Mr. Durham's attention to the fact Mr. DURHAM. Anyway-one further question. Did the Secretary of Defense approve this for you?

Secretary THOMAS. Oh, yes; definitely. This is the letter. He says it is a high priority.

Mr. SHORT. Mr. Chairman, doesn't Congress have the intelligence to know that it would be very unwise for the Air Force to try to tell the Army what kind of a tank it should have or for the Army to tell the Navy what kind of a carrier it should have?

Mr. DURHAM. I would like to remind the gentleman

Mr. SHORT. Or for the Navy to tell either of the other servicesMr. DURHAM. I would like to remind the gentleman of the fight on the B-36.

Mr. NORBLAD. The B-36 fight.

The CHAIRMAN. We will read the conclusions of the committee at that time, which was unanimous

Mr. SHORT. Yes.

The CHAIRMAN. It was held by the committee that—

Each department has a military mission assigned, and then each department determines for itself—

Mr. SHORT. Why, of course.

Mr. DURHAM. I think that is much better.

The CHAIRMAN. "The type and character of the weapon that is needed."

Mr. DURHAM. I agree.

The CHAIRMAN. We agreed to that. And we fixed the policy ourselves. So it was never a question to properly lay before the Joint Chiefs of Staff as to this particular kind of ship.

They do at the present have the overall say that we need such amount of money, and they pass on those questions of defense in the broad way, but not in the particular characterization of some weapon. Mr. DURHAM. Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to call attention to the fact that this had been in the past policy.

The CHAIRMAN. No.

Mr. DURHAM. And we straightened it out.

The CHAIRMAN. I differ with you entirely. It never was the policy of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. But we emphasized most positively that it was not the function of the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

Now

Mr. JOHNSON. Mr. Chairman, you had a long hearing before you made up your decision.

The CHAIRMAN. Oh, yes. I read the hearings this morning. I have read the conclusion here. And I had Mr. Harlow, who was here this morning with us, and we have gone over this whole thing and we are on sound ground. And the Joint Chiefs of Staff is on sound ground.

Mr. Hébert-oh, Mr. Norblad. I wonder how come I got Mr. Hébert in my mind. [Laughter.]

Mr. HÉBERT. I might say that bodes no good, Mr. Chairman.

Mr. NORBLAD. Following up, the questions of Mr. Cole and Mr. Johnson with reference to the possibility of an atomic attack, Mr. Johnson used the matter of a few miles and you spoke of the ships being at a distance and being in a position where they could move off. You will recall the case of the Japanese fishermen out in the South Pacific last year who were quite a number of miles away from the ship.

Secretary THOMAS. That is right.

Mr. NORBLAD. So there is a possibility of a fallout injuring a carrier task force?

Secretary THOMAS. Yes, but a great deal less possibility because a carrier task force can move out of the line of the fallout. That is one of the advantages of it, a very definite advantage.

Mr. NORBLAD. Another thing is the question Mr. Cole asked about submarines and you answered with reference to Korea and other places. Isn't it a fact that there were no submarines in the Korean waters to bother our fleet or our carriers when they were there? Secretary THOMAS. Yes, I think that is basically right.

55066-55-No. 9- -3

Mr. NORBLAD. And isn't it a fact that Operation Main Brace held a couple of years ago off the Scandinavian coast, that theoretically submarines got through and theoretically did destroy our carriers?

Secretary THOMAS. I don't know about destroying them, but they did get through. And that is a possibility. As I said before, no target is completely invulnerable.

Mr. NORBLAD. Yes, sir.

Secretary THOMAS. And we don't claim that a carrier is. But the Forrestal type of carrier can take quite a few torpedoes on board and not do any real damage to it.

Mr. NORBLAD. Yes, but the fact of the matter is that a number of submarines did get through and did theoretically destroy the carriers when they were in a position to do so?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, there were no Forrestal type, of course, in that maneuver. Your antisubmarine warfare techniques are far advanced now over what they were.

Mr. NORBLAD. Submarines

Secretary THOMAS. I have to get back to the original statement, that any target can be hit under the right circumstances. But a mobile target, particularly one that moves as fast as this, is not nearly as vulnerable as an immobile target.

Mr. NORBLAD. In connection with the Operation Main Brace, isn't it also a fact that the Navy was completely immobile because of weather and they couldn't get a plane off their decks?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, I wasn't here at that time. Let Mr. Smith talk to that, because I was not in the Navy at that time.

Secretary SMITH. Well, I wasn't here at that time, either. What is the question again?

The

Mr. NORBLAD. During Operation Main Brace, which is the test of submarines and land-based planes against a carrier force, the submarine got through and theoretically destroyed the carriers. Navy was completely immobile because of weather and were not able to get a plane off their decks, whereas your land-based planes, your allweather fighters were able to come and go as they wished.

Secretary SMITH. Well, I wasn't here and am not directly familiar with the operation. I have paid a great deal of attention to the stories about it and I can say that the Navy has moved ahead tremendously in all-weather flight from carriers. That is one of the points on which we are putting a great deal of stress-our ability to take off, land, and complete an attack under all weather conditions.

Mr. NORBLAD. Well, would there be any possibility to getting the information on that Operation Main Brace?

Secretary SMITH. Yes; that information must be available. Mr. NORBLAD. From those who knew and were there. Apparently none of you gentlemen have the information on it.

Secretary THOMAS. But, Mr. Norblad, there is no reason why any kind-why the modern planes can't operate off of the new carriers, because they are all-weather planes. They can operate under any sort of circumstances. Now there is no condition that I can conceive of under your new type of carrier and your new type of planes that they can't operate under any conditions.

Mr. NORBLAD. That is very possible. I don't know. They didn't in that case.

Secretary THOMAS. Well, that could be-that was some time before. Your new carrier now is built around that. It is built around the allweather fighter, the all-weather attack plane.

Mr. NORBLAD. In connection with the cost figures you gave, Mr. Vinson, you didn't include therein all the necessary auxiliaries and destroyers and cruisers and oilers and the rest of that that have to go with and take care of a carrier, did you?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, of course, they are multipurpose ships. I mean they are used for a lot of other things besides the task force. If you didn't have your carriers, you would have those ships anyhow. So I mean we didn't include them because they are definitely multipurpose. And you have to have them if you are going to maintain control of the seas. If we don't control the seas in a war, we can't do any of the things that we are required to do. We can't keep our lines open to our allies. We can't move any troops overseas. We can't supply our airbases or other bases, our naval bases, and you can't control the seas today, in my opinion, unless you have the modern ships and the carrier task forces.

Mr. NORBLAD. My question you didn't answer, sir. My question is, What is the cost of all the ships that go with the carrier to protect it, and to service it, and the likes of that, both your primary and your secondary groups that have to be with it to keep it in operation?

Secretary THOMAS. I couldn't answer that specifically because it would depend on the size of your task force. Do you have 1 carrier, 2 carries, 4 carriers, and what are your complementary ships? But you are going to get into the future where you will have much fewer than you had in the past because you will have guided missile ships now we are perfecting very rapidly and you will have a carrier task force surrounded by a very few ships, mostly guided missiles. Mr. Smith has made some study on that, if you would like

Mr. NORBLAD. Mr. Smith, wouldn't that just about double the cost of the carrier when you consider all the vessels that go with it, all auxiliaries and destroyers and cruisers and tankers to oil and service these ships?

Secretary THOMAS. Well, even if you admit that it would, you can't maintain the control of the seas, in modern war, in my opinion, without them.

Mr. NORBLAD. I realize that. I appreciate that. I just want to know what the cost would be. It would be doubled, wouldn't it?

Secretary SMITH. Well, I don't think you can ask that question without going one step further and saying that if this is required, say, to support overseas bases, then shouldn't these costs be charged against the overseas bases also.

The CHAIRMAN. Now

Mr. NORBLAD. Just 1 or 2 more questions, and I will be through, Mr. Chairman.

You speak constantly of control of the seas. than the control of the seas and aren't you bombing?

Secretary THOMAS. No.

Doesn't this go further getting into strategic

Mr. NORBLAD. You are talking about hitting land-based targets all the time and you don't need a carrier this big, I don't think, for submarine warfare, certainly, do you?