The total English forces engaged were 16,000 infantry, 1,000 mounted infantry, 36 field artillery guns, 6 naval guns, and 250 men naval brigade.

The 6 naval guns mentioned in concluding paragraph in General Clery's battle order do not seem to have advanced beyond Chieveley Ridge and are, therefore, not included in the fighting force on the actual field.

The total losses in this action were as follows:

A striking feature of the battle was the total invisibility of the enemy, not a Boer being seen during the fight.

The general positions of the English forces of to-day, December 25, along the entire front, from Modder River on the left to Chieveley on the right, is about as follows:

On the extreme left, the Kimberley relief force under Lord Methuen is at Modder River, upon which point he retired after the battle of Magersfontein, December 10, and consists of about 14,000 men and 38 guns. On his line of communication south are small forces at Witteputs station, Belmont, Enslin, Orange River, and De Aar; about 6,000 men and 9 guns.

CENTER.

At Naauw Poort General French has about 900 cavalry, 3,000 infantry, and two batteries of horse artillery. At Sterkstrom and immediate vicinity, General Gatacre has 2,500 infantry, 1,000 mounted infantry (volunteers), and 26 guns, 6 of which are howitzers, using lyddite shells.

Port Elizabeth and East London are held as bases of supply for Naauw Poort and Sterkstrom, and the lines of railroad guarded by about 2,000 men each, mostly volunteers.

The railroad between Rosmead Junction and Stormberg has been cut and can not therefore be used.

ON THE RIGHT, IN NATAL.

General Buller had at Chieveley, Frere, Estcourt, Mooi River, Pietermaritzburg, and Durban about 27,000 men,

including local volunteers, with twelve field batteries, one mountain battery, and 20 naval guns, using lyddite.

The above forces do not include the fifth division, whose destination, except two battalions, is Natal.

GENERAL SITUATION.

1. The leading features of the present situation are that at each extreme of the theater of war, separated by a distance of some 700 miles, operations are being carried on for the reopening of communications with invested places, Kimberley and Ladysmith, while in the center two weak forces, not yet in direct communication with each other, are holding the front of the southern frontier of the Orange Free State.

2. It will be necessary to carry out General Buller's original plan of campaign, to strengthen the center by troops drawn from the flanks, so as to prepare a concentrated attack from that direction.

3. The deficiency of regular cavalry everywhere is much felt. This is partly remedied by the raising of local mounted forces.

4. A fresh division, the fifth, about 11, 140 men of all corps, has arrived at Cape Town, and General Buller is supposed to be now awaiting it before resuming the offensive.

5. The country generally in Cape Colony and Natal, as far as I have seen it, is well adapted for operations of all arms; there are excellent country roads and no natural features, other than rivers, that could not readily be avoided by a mobile force not tied to a railroad. Here in Natal, though we are supposed to be now in the midst of the rainy season, there is infinitely more dust than mud.

The rivers are low and pontoons abundant with all forces which I have seen.

RAILROADS.

All are single-tracked, both in Cape Colony and Natal, gauge 3 feet 6 inches, and rolling stock, they say, sufficient for ordinary needs. These roads are owned by the two colonial governments.

The following lines of communication are at present forming the principal ones:

Cape Town-Modder River.

De Aar-Naauw Poort.

Port Elizabeth-Naauw Poort.

East London-Sterkstrom.

Durban-Chieveley.

I have inspected the hospitals in Cape Town and here. They are excellent in every way, and especially good is the field ambulance service.

I have also witnessed the disembarkation and entraining of troops and material; the result of which I will embody in my report at the close of the war, unless sooner desired by the War Department.

COMMENTS.

I consider the present situation, December 25, to be the most critical for the English forces since hostilities began.

They have been defeated all along the line, and should the Boers assume offensive operations, which is not probable, judging from the past, the English armies, with their long and thinly guarded lines of communication, would be placed in great jeopardy.

Even with the mobilization of three more divisions, of a little over 11,000 each, which would give a total of eight divisions, in my opinion the campaign can not succeed unless they abandon their flank offensive operations, letting Kimberley with its garrison of 1,500 men and Ladysmith with its 9,000 officers and men, go, if needs must, and advance, as was General Buller's original intention, from the center through Orange Free State.

This advance would, I believe compel the withdrawal of the investing forces from these places and carry the war into the enemy's country, which as yet has been only very slightly disturbed, by the operations of Colonel Plumer, who has invaded the northern part of the Transvaal from Rhodesia with a few hundred men.

I may be wrong in my rather pessimistic conclusions about the result of the flank movements. I hope so, I frankly admit; but a careful study of the situation compels my judgment to form the deductions given.

The Boer forces are all mounted on small, hardy ponies which are trained to stand where they are left; they are superb rifle shots; have undoubtedly expert foreign artillerymen behind their guns, and, finally, they are operating along interior lines.

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I do not doubt the ultimate success of the English arms if they advance in force from the center, but even then it will be a long and hard struggle before they reach Pretoria.

In Cape Colony there is a large element-Dutch-which is either in open or, what is worse, in secret sympathy with the Boers.

About 2,000 Cape Colony Dutch have already joined the Boers, and when it is remembered that the proportion of Dutch to English in that colony is about six to four the gravity of the situation may be appreciated.

Here in Natal the people are much more loyal.

An estimate of the Boer forces, which I have just seen and which is pronounced to be probably not far from correct, gives the Transvaal forces as 27,000 and the Orange Free State army as 21,000.

I also annex a copy of the orders given Lord Methuen when he began his advance for the relief of Kimberley.

In conclusion I will state that I have met with nothing but universal courtesy and good will from all Englishmen with whom I have come in contact, civil and military, and I can not but feel that this is due entirely to the fact of my being an American.

I am, sir, very respectfully,

S. L'H. SLOCUM,
Captain Eighth Cavalry,

Military Attaché, English South African Field Force.

ORDERS BY LIEUT. GEN. SIR FRANCIS CLERY, K. C. B., COMMANDING SOUTH NATAL FIELD FORCE.

CHIEVELEY, December 14, 1899, 10 P. M. 1. The eremy is intrenched in the kopjes north of Colenso Bridge. One large camp is reported to be near the Ladysmith Road about 5 miles northwest of Colenso. Another large camp is reported in the hills which lie north of the Tugela in a northerly direction from Hlangwane Hill.

2. It is the intention of the general officer commanding to force the passage of the Tugela to-morrow.

3. The fifth brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4.30 a. m. and march toward Bridle Drift immediately west of the junction of Dornkop Spruit and the Tugela. The brigade will cross at this point, and after crossing move along the left bank of the river toward the kopjes north of the Iron Bridge.

4. The second brigade will move from its present camping ground at 4.30 a. m., and passing south of the present camping ground of No. 2 divisional troops, will march in the direction of the Iron Bridge at Colenso. The brigade will cross at this point and gain possession of the kopjes north of the Iron Bridge.

5. The fourth brigade will advance at 4.30 a. m. to a point between Bridle Drift and the railway so that it can support either the fifth or the second brigade.

6. The sixth brigade (less a half battalion escort to baggage) will move at 4 a. m. east of the railway in the direction of Hlangwane Hill to a position where it can protect the right flank of the second brigade and, if necessary, support it or the mounted troops referred to later as moving toward Hlangwane Hill.

7. The officer commanding mounted brigade will move at 4 a. m. with a force of 1,000 men and one battery of No. 1 brigade division in the direction of Hlangwane Hill; he will cover the right flank of the general movement and will endeavor to take up a position on Hlangwane Hill, whence he will enfilade the kopjes north of the Iron Bridge.

The officer commanding mounted troops will also detail two forces of 300 and 500 men to cover the right and left flanks, respectively, and protect the baggage.

8. The second brigade division R. F. A. will move at 4.30 a. m., follow. ing the fourth brigade, and will take up a position whence it can enfilade the kopjes north of the Iron Bridge. This brigade division will act on any orders it receives from Major General Hart.

The six naval guns (two 4.7 and four 12-pounders) now in position north of the fourth brigade will advance on the right of the second brigade division R. F. A.

No. 1 brigade division R. 'F. A. (less one battery detached with mounted brigade) will move at 3.30 a. m. east of the railway and proceed under cover of the sixth brigade to a point from which it can prepare the crossing for the second brigade.

The six naval guns now encamped with No. 2 divisional troops will accompany and act with this brigade division.

9. As soon as the troops mentioned in the preceding paragraphs have moved to their positions the remaining units and the baggage will be parked in deep formation, facing north, in five separate lines in rear of to-day's artillery positions, the right of each line resting on the railway, but leaving a space of 100 yards between the railway and the right flank of the lines.

In first line (counting from the right):

Ammunition column No. 1 divisional troops.

Sixth brigade field hospital.

Fourth brigade field hospital.

Pontoon troop R. E.

Fifth brigade field hospital.

Second brigade field hospital.

Ammunition column No. 2 divisional troops.