holes to contain two or three men; they were not covered in any way. Their trail resembled a writhing snake, which lessened the danger from enfilade fire. It would be easy enough to get men into such a trench, but a thundering big job if you wanted to get them out again to make a counterattack. They destroyed the power of offensive or aggressive action; and the lack of continuity, caused by the separated and distinct holes, made communication extremely uncertain and hazardous. Their only merit was to me their irregular trace; in all other respects they simply demonstrated how a trench should not be made, for from the moment they completely and comfortably got into them the Boers' chance or even thought of counter-attack or initiative was gone. The Boers are splendid on the defensive, but do not seem to consider offensive movements as part of their proper tactics; for example, the long line of communication of the British army, which finally reached from Bloemfontein to the railroad at Kimberley, a little over 100 miles, was only twice disturbed, once at Waterval Drift and once when a small convoy of 20 wagons was captured between Jacobsdal and Klip Drift. Had they been bolder and more aggressive, with their mobility, they could have caused the British endless anxiety and annoyance on their advance to Bloemfontein. Lord Roberts correctly appreciated this weakness on the part of the enemy and successfully advanced, simply turning every position he found defended and proceeded on his march, letting his rear practically take care of itself, knowing it would not be molested. The leaving of the convoy, which was the main supply park of the army, at Waterval Drift with an escort of only 200 mounted infantry betrays a weakness of organization and even ordinary precaution which might under other conditions prove fatal to the British. If ever a people or nation exemplified the phrase "brave to a fault" it is the British. If they were less brave there would have been many less faults and more victories in this war. When the army concentrated at Ramdam the supposition. might naturally have been that it would move southward from there along the Riet River and threaten the enemy's positions along Orange River, especially those at Norvals Pont and Bethulie which covered the bridges, thus opening up an entrance into Orange Free State for the forces along the northern border of Cape Colony and gaining possession of the railroad for a concentrated advance along it to Bloemfontein. On arriving at Jacobsdal, the army had moved from Modder River station on three sides of a square and menaced Magersfontein, which Cronje occupied, Bloemfontein, and the enemy's army around Kimberley. That the enemy was completely taken by surprise by this movement is amply testified to by the fact of their hastily abandoning wagons, stores, and immense quantities of ammunition at Magersfontein. The Boers had become so wedded to the conviction that the English could or would not leave the railroad, that Lord Roberts threw them into such a state of paralysis by his strategy, that they have not even yet fully recovered. Lord Roberts's decision to make no infantry attack across the open plain against the enemy in the river bed and trenches at Paardeberg, was, in my opinion, a wise one, as the fight of the 18th had proven that even if successful his forces would have been decimated. He had little to fear from the enemy's reenforcements, because he would then be on the defensive and have had an opportunity of showing them, which was done on a small scale on the 23d, what is meant to attack in the open an enemy armed with the modern magazine rifle and intrenched, a thing which the British have had to do throughout the war. The English artillery had such a tremendous preponderance in numbers over the Boers, who, in fact, rarely used theirs, that it is impossible to make a fair comparison on their respective efficiency. The Boer smaller Creusot and Krupp guns. are, I believe, rapid-firing ones; the English guns are not. The field and horse artillery use shrapnel only, with an extreme effective of not over 3,000 yards; they have no common shell, the wisdom of which I must leave to some one better qualified than I to comment upon. The lyddite shell has proven one of the distinct disappointments of the war. It has no effect whatever against intrenchments. On exploding, which it almost always does as far as I could judge, it makes only a small hole about a foot deep and 2 feet in circumference and breaks into few fragments. Against the armor of a battle-ship, for which use they are designed mainly, I have no doubt but that they would be very effective and the poisonous gases confined in a narrow and closed space would be destructive, but in the open air they are too quickly dissipated to do any injury. The Vickers-Nordenfelt automatic gun used by the Boers has a strangely demoralizing effect upon an enemy. It is an effective little weapon and the British soldier dreads it more than any other gun the Boers have. Its "pom, pom, pom in rapid succession and unknown number is a great strain on the nerves. It is very accurate. Until the 26th of February, when three of them joined Lord Roberts's command, none of the British forces had this gun. They opened fire on the enemy's laager early in the afternoon, the other guns having been practically silent during the day, and even when they did fire elicited no response of any kind from the enemy, but the moment the "pom, pom" began. the Boers woke up in the most astonishing manner, and from every part of their lines opened fire. It was as if an electric spark had been dropped into a magazine. This tickled the British soldiers immensely, for they had "been there" so often themselves. SMOKELESS POWDER. In sending my impressions upon the effect of smokeless powder in battle to the War Department is something, I fear, "like carrying coals to Newcastle," as it must have much data on file gathered from the Spanish and Philippine wars regarding the subject. Still I feel I must in duty risk repetition or contradiction and embody them in my report. The use of this powder by both belligerents has necessitated, I believe, a greater change in modern battle tactics than even the increased range of the small arms; one can locate the artillery by the flash, but infantry fire beyond 500 yards can only be heard and felt, not seen. This fact increases the difficulty of the attack far more than the defense, the latter being stationary and carefully hidden, while the former is of necessity continually in motion. The fact that the artillery of its own army can seldom support it so efficiently as formerly further increases the difficulties of the attacking infantry. The artillery, in fact, labors under precisely the same disadvantages as the infantry, but to perhaps a greater extent on account of the greater distance at which it is engaged, while it is in addition often impossible to tell how close the attack is to the defenders' line. To locate the enemy, balloons and powerful telescopes must be used, while to insure the harmonious working of the different arms extensive use of signaling must be made from all parts of the field, even, if possible, from the firing line itself. The balloon with the British army has been of inestimable value to it. It usually ascended about 2,500 yards from the enemy's line and secured valuable information, especially for the artillery. What it is made of I do not know and can not find out, but its practical workings have been a great success. The Boers fired on it constantly, but never injured it sufficiently to compel its descent. It was attached to a wagon drawn by oxen. Lord Roberts on the 14th of February issued the following order to the army: 23. FIELD ARMY ORDERS, SOUTH AFRICA. RIET RIVER, February 14, 1900. 2. FLAG OF TRUCE.-The sacredness of the white flag having been so frequently infringed by the enemy during the present war, the troops are reminded that they are not in any way bound to receive the bearer of a flag of truce during an engagement. The bearer of a flag of truce should be unarmed, the side from which he proceeds should have halted and ceased firing, and unless it is clear that the flag of truce is being used legitimately for the purpose of entering on an amicable arrangement, the bearer should be signaled to retire, and if he does not obey the signal he should be fired on. By order, W. F. KELLY, Colonel, CASUALTIES. The total British casualties from the 11th to the 27th of February, including those of the 18th already given, were: Killed: Officers, 17; men, 251. Wounded: Officers, 95; men, 1,272. Missing Officers, 11; men, 206. Prisoners: Officers, 2; men, 13. FEB. 28. The army remained inactive at Paardeberg Drift. The three batteries of the ninth division joined it, augmenting the artillery to 116 guns. MARCH 1.-The army moved to Osfontein, the cavalry going about a mile beyond. MARCH 2-6.-The army remained at Osfontein, the cavalry and mounted infantry reconnoitering the enemy's position about 3 miles in front. On the 6th the Guards Brigade arrived from Klip Drift. On the 3d the total horses numbered 12,995; mules, 9,900. On March 6 the army had the following rations: 1,100,000 three-quarter rations biscuit and 50,000 preserved meat and 700,000 groceries, but forage for only two days for its advance, though much was left at Osfontein and sent back for from time to time as wagons became available. The total number of the men on March 6 fed by the supply department, including rear guards, correspondents, etc., was, Europeans, 33,958; natives, 2,668. COMBATANTS. The combatants numbered 1,033 officers and 28,453 men, which does not include the fifteenth brigade, 85 officers, 2,909 men, which joined on the 9th. Total combatants on the 9th, 1,118 officers, 31,362 men. On March 4 the regular mounted infantry and colonials were redistributed as follows: Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Anderson, 2 regular and 5 colonial regiments. Lieutenant Colonel Martyr, 5 regular and 2 colonial regiments. Colonel Ridley, 2 regular and 4 colonial regiments. Brevet Lieutenant Colonel Le Gallais, 2 regular and 4 colonial regiments. About 850 colonials had joined since February 25. |