OBSERVATIONS ON EQUIPMENTS, SUPPLIES, ETC., OF THE FOREIGN DETACHMENTS OF THE EXPEDITIONARY ARMY IN NORTH CHINA. BY MAJ. S. M. MILLS, SIXTH UNITED STATES ARTILLERY. HEADQUARTERS CHINA RELIEF EXPEDITION, TIENTSIN, CHINA, September 12, 1900. ASSISTANT ADJUTANT GENERAL, China Relief Expedition, Pekin, China. SIR: I have the honor to submit the following observations in connection with the equipment, supplies, etc., of the foreign detachments of troops that accompanied the expeditionary army in the forced march to Pekin, beginning August 4, 1900. I was attached to the staff of the major general commanding the forces in China, pursuant to telegraphic instructions to Major General Chaffee from the War Department dated July 17, 1900, and reported for duty at Nagasaki. Upon arrival at Tientsin, and as the column was about to take up the march, I was instructed by the major general commanding to report to Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee, commanding the British forces, for duty and observation, and as a medium of communication between the two generals during actual combats. I remained with the British staff during the march to Yangtsun and in the engagements at Peitsang and Yangtsun; after that and until the allied troops reached Pekin, as there was no expectation of serious resistance, I was on duty with the staff of the major general commanding. During the forced and hurried march to Pekin there was little opportunity to observe much in detail the foreign detachments, and afterwards in my duties, first as acting judge advocate of the American forces and later as chief ordnance officer at Tientsin, my time was occupied, so that I could make only cursory investigation as circumstances offered. Such as I have been able to gather under these circumstances is submitted in this report for such disposition as the commanding general may choose to make of it. The British force was composed entirely of troops from India, some of which had arrived at Tientsin but a few days before the arrival of our own Ninth Infantry, and others about the time of the arrival of the Fourteenth Infantry and Reilly's battery of artillery. I was impressed at once with the complete organization and fitness of this force as it was finally prepared for the field in the few days allotted it. It consisted of a part of an expeditionary force mobilized in India, completed in all details before leaving the point of embarkation, and preceded by officers of intelligence and transport department, to make provisions for the arriving troops. Maj. Gen. Sir Alfred Gaselee, its commanding general, and quartermaster general of India, was detached for this duty, and arrived with his trained and efficient staff, selected from the commands in India and not from the troops composing his own force, which would thereby have been weakened. His staff consisted of some seventeen officers, not counting transport officers and those on duty at the bases and on line of communication. These staff officers were all line officers who had been trained in their special duties (it must be remembered that there are no permanent staff officers in the Indian army), and for the time being some of them had increased rank. With the exception of the chief of staff and deputy adjutant general, Brig. Gen. E.G. Barrow, C. B., I. S. C., they were all young men under 40 years of age; General Barrow was a man perhaps 50, and the general commanding a man perhaps 57 years old. This staff performed the duties of deputy adjutant general, deputy quartermaster general, and assistants to these-intelligence officers, engineers, army signaling, ordnance, provost marshal, field paymaster, medical, commissary and transport, line of communication and base staff, etc. I mention the foregoing facts somewhat in detail to contrast for a moment, not in criticism, for I understand all the difficulties we labor under for want of proper legislation, organization, and preparedness, but to accentuate the fact that, notwithstanding all this lack of staff assistance on this occasion and in many other campaigns in our history we were able to overcome and carry to successful issue what seemed, for lack of preparation, very doubtful. In this remarkable short campaign the credit is entirely due to the splendid capacity, energy, and untiring endurance of the major general commanding, who, single-handed and practically alone so far as trained organized staff assistance was concerned (though the staff worked arduously) mobilizing himself and one aid-de-camp before leaving his country; picking up officers here and there en route for staff duty; supplying himself with a field desk and a few picks and shovels at San Francisco; finally arriving upon the scene of operations to find a few marines and the Ninth Infantry, the latter sadly decimated in numbers by recent operations, but fortunately fully equipped as a regiment (thanks to the judgment of the military authorities of the Philippines) with transportation, supplies, medical and other stores; and with this allowance, and under these circumstances, organized the American forces and doing fully his share of the fighting, carried to successful issue this historical campaign. Hongkong Artillery, 2 naval guns and 4 Maxims.. 120 No. 12 field battery, 6 field guns 150 Total combatant force 2,920 Total infantry. Two additional regiments joined after arrival at Pekin, and an entire division has since then joined; these are not included in these figures. The regimental organizations of the British and native Indian troops, I will assume, are well known, as they have frequently been reported upon. I, myself, as a military representative in India some years ago, reported much in detail on the subject of the native troops. I will note one change particularly, among others, which at that time was unfavorably commented upon, viz, the lack of British officers for duty with the native regiments; this has been changed and the number now increased to ten officers. The question of transportation in the field is the first important matter that presents itself, and on this march all varieties were used. The allied troops primarily depended upon the junks which were poled and dragged up the Peiho. This necessarily confined the march to the roads near the river, or so that they could reach the junks every few days. In addition to this, transportation for the daily needs of the troops had to be supplied. With the United States troops this was accomplished by the use of coolie bearers, 20 to a company, and with the usual four-mule escort wagons, the latter carrying rations only. The British used small pack mules, the other nations one-horse carts. The Russians used a pattern much larger than that used by the Japanese, as their horses were larger. Field transportation (pack mules) of the British is in the charge of the Indian coolie corps, an organization comprising 2 British officers, the senior with the rank of major, 2 British noncommissioned officers, and various native officers, sirdars, etc., in charge of subdivisions, and 1,000 coolies (natives) to each corps. Besides this corps a certain number of pack mules with their native drivers is told off to each unit or organization, about 20 linked together in threes, for each separate regiment, and to other separate units a number depending upon their strength. For the officers, one mule to each two throughout the entire command. These impedimenta of the British army in India, which have for so many years excited criticism of military experts from an European or American standpoint, proved most efficient in the present campaign, and altogether the best on account of the bad and difficult roads. A great many mules for the British and carts for the Japanese and Russians were required on this march, as they carried all the equipments of the soldier except his rifle, ammunition, and water-bottle or canteen, and one day's ration, whereas the American soldier had to carry four days' rations on the first march, blanket roll, meat can, and tin cup, which overweighted him in comparison with other troops. If we had met with the rainy weather which was confidently predicted for August, or if for any reason our heavily laden wagons could not have kept up with the column on account of the condition of the roads, it would have been a much more serious problem. As it happily turned out, except on one occasion, the wagons were always with us at night, and the transportation, though very limited, was on the whole satisfactory. The question of water supply for drinking purposes on the march was a serious matter. Our men had only the canteen, which it was difficult, if not impossible, to fill from buckets at the wells, and much inconvenience was caused during the excessive heat of the day for the want of water. The British have a canteen about the size of our own, which is carried on the person; besides, they have two mules for each regiment, which carry 25 or 30 gallons in sheep skins suspended across the backs of the animals, and in addition "bhistis" or water carriers, who carry in skins a smaller quantity on their backs for distributing to the men on the march and for filling their canteens. These accompany the troops on the march on all occasions. In addition to supplying the men with water, this system enables the selection of the best water in quantity to last until the next best supply is reached, and the troops are not forced to drink any and all kinds as they find them. For garrison purposes the British have numberless small, low, two-wheeled vehicles upon which is placed a barrel some 4 feet long and about 18 inches in diameter, covered with a woolen blanket; the barrel has a faucet in one end. This barrel is wheeled and drawn by two men and is used in carrying water from distant wells to troops in camp. The Russians, in addition to their canteens or water bottles, had a little copper or brass bucket with a hoop handle, which could be readily lowered into wells with rope attached. They also had one-horse carts following the column with distilling arrangements, large circular caldrons in which fires were kept nearly all the time on the march, preparing water for drinking and other purposes. The commanding general on one occasion called my attention to an ingenious and convenient arrangement he had observed in the Japanese column for carrying picks, shovels, etc., on the backs of Japanese ponies. I did not have an opportunity of seeing this myself, but I observed the matter especially in the British contingent. The pioneer corps in this service carries all the tools required for its work, including mining operations, on the pack saddles of three small mules for each company. On one mule are carried picks, shovels, hoes, and spare helves; all helves are short and of a uniform length. There is provided a strong wooden frame in which the implements are placed with the helve pointing downward, when the frame is on the mule's back. The helves are put through spaces |