even though the state has a legitimate interest in limiting access to the ballot. Lubin v. Parish, 415 U.S. 709 (1974); Bullock v. Carter, 405 U.S. 134 (1972). And in Buckley v. Valeo, the Supreme Court invalidated the expenditure limits of the Act, noting that the government's interest in equalizing the financial resources of candidates, preventing corruption, and reducing the skyrocketing costs of political campaigns were all insufficient to justify governmental restriction on campaign expenditures. 44 U.S.L.W. at 4143-44. is not the government but the people It who must retain control over the quantity and range of debate on public issues in a political campaign." 44 U.S.L.W. at 4144 (footnote omitted). An exemption for government contributions stands this statement on its head by permitting the government to limit the spending of some candidates while contributing to the President's cause. Discriminatory restrictions have been upheld only when significant state intereste vere involved. For instance, in Storer v. Brown, 415 U.S. 724 (1974), the Court upheld a California Election Law restriction that independent candidates could not be members of political parties for 12 months prior to the election. it upheld the restriction only because it furthered the "compelling" goal of preventing the election from becoming a refuge for primary losers rather than a forum for major political struggles. 415 U.S. at 736. See also American Party v. White, 415 U.S. 767 (1974). In the instant case there is no comparable "compelling" interest being served by the discrimination; indeed, there is a noticeable lack of legitimate government interest in allowing the President more specch than other candidates. Finally, the expenditure limits which are presently circumvented by the political use of government employees were a major reason for upholding the public funding provisions of the Act against an equal protection challenge. In upholding the provisions which make available more money to major parties than to minor parties, the Court said: Any disadvantages suffered by operation of The expenditure ceilige were significant because the overall To exempt the President's use of government resources from the scope of the Act would raise again in practice the Constitutional 18 problem solved in theory in Bucklev v. Valeo. It would also raise the question of discriminacion against other major party candidates who must report all of their resources and who must charge all of their expenditures to the spending limits. The Act should be read to encompass the use of government resources so that it can be construed to avoid these Constitutional in firmities. See Buckley v. Valeo, 519 P.2d at 874. CONCLUSION First, the broad language of the The Federal Campaign Election Act of 1971 as amended should be read to embrace the use of government resources for campaign purposes for three reasons. Act indicates that it was meant to include every type of campaign funding. Second, such an interpretation is necessary to fulfill the purposes of the Act. Third, any other interpretation would make the Act unconstitutional. Thus, we ask that government paid salaries for employees working to influence the election be declared campaign contributions and expenditures. As such they should be reported and attributed to the candidate's expenditure limit. May 14, 1976 Alan B. Morrison* Suite 700 2000 P Street, N.W. Washington, D.C. 20036 (202) 785-3704 * The extensive assistance of David Galbraith, a third year law student at American University, is gratefully acknowledged. Senator SASSER. The next witness is Mr. Vincent L. Connery, National Treasury Employees Union. Mr. Connery, we welcome you before the committee this morning, and ask if you would, sir, for purposes of the record, identify your associates? TESTIMONY OF VINCENT L. CONNERY, NATIONAL TREASURY EMPLOYEES UNION; ACCOMPANIED BY MICHAEL GOLDMAN, LEGISLATIVE DIRECTOR; AND ROBERT TOBIAS, GENERAL COUNSEL Mr. CONNERY. Thank you, Mr. Chairman. On my far left is Michael Goldman, NTEU, legislative director, and on my immediate left, Mr. Robert Tobias, the NTEU general counsel. I am Vincent Connery, national president of National Treasury Employees Union. Our union is the exclusive representative of 97,000 employees in the Department of Treasury and the Federal Energy Administration, including over 70.000 employees in the Internal Revenue Service. For many years, NTEU has been the predominate union in the Internal Revenue Service, and today, represents over 97 percent of all IRS employees across the Nation. We wish to commend the distinguished chairman of this committee for his expeditious scheduling of hearings on legislation to reform the Hatch Act-H.R. 10, S. 80, and S. 980. Since 1939, Federal employees have been denied many of the basic freedoms upon which this country was founded because of the restrictive provisions of this law. The time is long overdue for a substantial revision of the Hatch Act, so that, once again, Federal workers will be able to exercise their right to fully participate in the democratic processes of our country. In light of the recent House passage of H.R. 10, and the progress of these hearings in the Senate, we are optimistic that the dream of political freedom for Federal workers can become a reality in the 95th Congress. During the last Congress, both the House and Senate Committees on Post Office and Civil Service heard extensive testimony on the fundamental justice of extending full political rights to Federal employees, while at the same time strengthening the protections against political coercion. Earlier this year, the House Subcommittee on Civil Service held similar hearings wherein we reaffirmed our strong support for Hatch Act reform. The current Hatch Act arbitrarily and needlessly prohibits Federal employees from exercising their rights to participate in every phase of the electoral process. This exclusion has been most keenly felt by those who, historically, have been among the most conscientious and best informed citizens and voters in the Nation. Both S. 80 and H.R. 10 would end this discriminatory treatment by bringing Federal employees out from the shadow of second-class citizenship imposed by the Hatch Act. While we strongly support efforts to modify the Hatch Act, we believe that the principle of political freedom inherent in such reform has been diluted by the continuing controversy over sensitive posi tions. Both S. 80 and H.R. 10 contain provisions that would continue to apply the unfair political restrictions of the present Hatch Act to a large segment of the Federal work force. In S. 80, sections 7324 and 7325 would preclude employees in sensitive positions in the Internal Revenue Service, Federal Bureau of Investigation and Central Intelligence Agency from enjoying the same political freedom that would be extended to all other Federal employees. This exclusion was the result of a compromise struck between the House and Senate conferees on Hatch Act reform legislation during the 94th Congress, and was carried over when S. 80 and H.R. 10 were introduced in the 95th Congress. As we stated in our testimony before the House Subcommittee on Civil Service earlier this year, NTEU opposed the continued exclusive-in whole or in part-of Internal Revenue Service workers from full political participation. Although the bill, S. 80, may not intend to prohibit all IRS employees from engaging in partisan political activity, it may, by the vague and ambiguous nature of its language, do just that. S. 80 does not contain a clear definition of a sensitive position, but relies instead on an outdated clause of an Executive order issued in 1953. Executive Order 10450 states: The head of any department or agency shall designate or cause to be designated any position within his department or agency, the occupant of which would bring about, by virtue of the nature of the position, a material adverse effect on the national security, as a sensitive position. It strikes us highly inconsistent that a bill which seeks to revise and clarify an unclear, archaic law should itself base an important provision on a vague relic of an unhappy time. This definition was part of an Executive order issued during the height of the McCarthy era when the term "national security" was the catch phrase used by a fanatical few to undermine the reputations and careers of many innocent people. Executive Order 10450 was never intended to serve as a guideline for determining the political freedom of Federal employees; its entire purpose was to identify individuals who, by virtue of their position in the Federal Government, could have a material adverse effect on the national security. To take this definition out of the context of the Executive order and impose it on Hatch Act reform legislation is both inappropriate and unwise. Furthermore, the broad nature of the definition renders it practically useless. The term "sensitive position" is so nebulous that it could be interpreted to include only high-level officials in the IRS headquarters or the rank and file employees in the Service centers. Because of its vagueness and inapplicability to Hatch Act reform, we sought to clarify this language when H.R. 10 was considered by the House. In its final deliberations on H.R. 10, the House deleted the references to sensitive positions contained in sections 7324 and 7325, but added a new section, 7322 (9), which defines a "restricted position." H.R. 10 requires that persons employed in these restricted positions would be barred from exercising their political rights. In our opinion, |