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War Supplement to The History Teacher's Magazine, January, 1918
War Reprint, No. 1
The Study of the Great War
A TOPICAL OUTLINE
with Copious Quotations
PROFESSOR SAMUEL B. HARDING
Alliance and the Triple Entente; III. Three Diplomatic Crises; IV. Bagdad
Railroad and Mittel-Europa; V. Tripolitan and Balkan Wars.
German Army; III. Changed Attitude of the Kaiser; IV. German Public
Opinion; V. Extraordinary Military Measures of Germany; VI. Conclusion.
Assassination; III. Austrian Note to Serbia; IV. Serbian Reply; V. Austria
Declares War on Serbia; VI. Conclusions.
Preserving Peace; III. German Ultimatums and Declarations of War against
Russia and France; IV. German Responsibility for the War.
III. Innovations in Warfare; IV. Examples of German Ruthlessness and Vio-
lations of International Law; V. Summary and Explanation of German Policy.
III. Summary of Reasons for Entering the War.
III. Various Peace Proposals ; IV. Will This Be the Last Great War?
Topical Outline of the War
BY SAMUEL B. HARDING, PROFESSOR OF EUROPEAN HISTORY IN INDIANA UNIVERSITY.
PREPARED IN CO-OPERATION WITH THE NATIONAL BOARD FOR HISTORICAL SERVICE AND THE COMMITTEE
ON PUBLIC INFORMATION."
1. FUNDAMENTAL CAUSES OF THE WAR.
I. GENERAL FACTOBS. 1. The constitution of the German Empire permits its for.
oign policy to be determined by the Emperor alone, who is at the same time, by “divine right," King of Prussia—the State which possesses an overwhelming territorial, political, and military predominance in the Empire.
“The Emperor declares war with the consent of the Bundesrat, the assent of the Reichstag not being required. Not even the Bundesrat need be consulted if the war is defensive, and as the Hohenzollerns have always claimed to make defensive warfare it is not surprising that even the unrepresentative Bundesrat was officially informed about the present war three days after the Emperor declared it.” (Charles D. Hazen, The Government of Germany; Committee on Public Information publication.) (See War Cyclopedia, under "Autocracy,” “Kaiserism,"
“ William II.”) 2. Profit derived from war in the past by Prussia (Germany).
(a) Through increase of territory (cf. maps).
justification of the "blood and iron ” policy of
national industry” of Prussia. “ The Great Elector laid the foundations of Prussia's power by successful and deliberately incurred wars. Frederick the Great followed in the footsteps of his glorious ancestor. ... None of the wars which he fought had been forced upon him; none of them did he postpone as long as possible. ... The lessons of history thus confirm the view that wars which have been deliberately provoked by far-seeing statesmen have had the happiest results.” (Bernhardi,
Germany and the Next War, 1911.) 3. Gormany's demand for “a place in the sun.”
(a) Meaning of the Kaiser's phrase (" a place in the
sun”) not clear. It covers vaguely colonies, como merce, and influence in international affairs in proportion to Germany's population, industrial
importance, and military power. (b) Obstacles. The German Empire was & late
comer in the family of nations; the best regions for colonization and exploitation, especially in the temperate zones, were already occupied by
other Powers. (0) Examples of the demand. (See Conquest and
Kultur, secs. 6, 10; War Cyclopedia, under
“ Place in the Sun,” “ Pan-Germanism,” etc.) “We need colonies, and more colonies, than we have
already, to give vent to our surplus energies without losing them and to make the motherland economi. cally independent.” (Manifesto of the Colonial League.)
“We need a fleet strong enough not only to protect the colonies we now have, but to bring about the ac. quisition of others." (Manifesto of the Navy League.)
“A progressive nation like ours needs territory, and if this cannot be obtained by peaceful means, it must be obtained by war. It is the object of the Dofense Association (Wehrverein] to create this sontiment.” (Lieut.-General Wrochem in speech to tho Wehrverein in March, 1913.)
“Without doubt this acquisition of new lands will not take place without war. What world power was ever established without bloody struggles ?” (Albrecht Wirth, Volkstum und Weltmacht in der Geschichte, 1904. Quoted by Andler, Le Pangermanisme continentale, 1915, p. 308.)
"It is only by relying on our good German sword that we can hope to conquer that place in the sun which rightly belongs to us, and which no one will yield to us voluntarily. ... Till the world comes to an end, the ultimate decision must rest with the sword.” (German Crown Prince, in Introduction to
Germany in Arms, 1913.) 4. Biological argument for war.
(a) Darwin's theory of the “struggle for existence”
as a chief factor in the evolution of species. (b) Development in Germany of the theory that
States are of necessity engaged in such a “strug
gle for existence.” (c) Hence war is an “ordinance of God for the weed
ing out of weak and incompetent individuals and
States.” Corollary: “Might makes right.” (d) Examples of such arguments from Treitschke,
Bernhardi, etc. (See Conquest and Kultur, seo. 1, 2, 4; War Cyclopedia, under “ Bernhardi,” “ Treitschke," “ War, German View;" Vernon Kellogg, “ Headquarters' Nights," in Atlantic
Monthly for August, 1917.) “ War is a biological necessity of the first im. portance, a regulative element in the life of mankind which cannot be dispensed with, since without it an unhealthy development will follow, which excludos every advancement of the race, and thereforo all real civilization. ... 'To supplant or be supplanted is the essence of life,' says Goethe, and the strong life gains the upper hand. The law of the stronger holds good everywhere. Those forms survive which aro able to procure themselves tho most favorablo conditions of life, and to assert themselves in the uni. versal economy of Nature. The weakor SUBcumb. ...
“Might gives the right to occupy or to conquer. Might is at once the supreme right, and the dispute
Tuis outline was prepared with the active aid of the Committee on Tublic Information (Department of Civic and Educational Co-opera. top), 10 Jackson Place, Washington, D. 0. Frequent reference is made herein to the publications of this committee, which with a few arcoptions are distributed free upon application,
Copyright, 1917, McKinley Publishing Company.
as to what is right is decided by the arbitrament of war.” (Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 1911, pp. 18, 23.)
“They fight, not simply because they are forced to, but because, curiously enough, they believe much of their talk. That is one of the dangers of the Germans to which the world is exposed; they really believe much of what they say." (Vernon Kellogg, in
Atlantic Monthly, August, 1917.) Idea of the German mission in the world, and the Gorman demand for world influence and prestige (PanGermanism). (a) Ardent belief in the superiority of the German
race and German “Kultur” over all other races
and civilizations. (b) Hence the duty to promote the Germanization
of the world, and to oppose the absorption of
Germans by other nationalities. (c) Examples of these ideas in writings of Treit
schke, Rohrbach, Bernhardi, etc. (Seo Conquest and Kultur, secs. 1, 2; War Cyclopedia, under “ Bernhardi,” “Hegemony, German Ambition," “Kultur,” “Pan - Germanism," "Treitschko,"
“ William II.” “I hope that it will be granted to our German Fatherland to become in the future as closely united, as powerful, and as authoritative as once the Roman Empire was, and that just as in old times they said Civis Romanus sum, one may in the future need only to say, 'I am a German citizen.'"
“ God has called us to civilize the world; we are the missionaries of human progress.”
“ The ocean is indispensable for Germany's greatness, but the ocean also reminds us that neither on it nor across it in the distance can any great decision be again consummated without Germany and the German Emperor." (Speeches of Emperor William II.)
“The German race is called to bind the earth under its control, to exploit the natural resources and physical powers of man, to use the passivo races in subordinate capacity for the developmont of its Kultur." (Ludwig Woltmann, Politische Anthropologie, 1913.)
“If people should ask us whether we intend to become a world power that overtops the world powers so greatly that Germany would be the only real World Power, the reply must be that tho will to world power has no limit.” (Adolph Grabowsky, in Das neue Deutschland, Oct. 28, 1914.)
“ By German culture the world shall be healed, and from their experience those who have only heard lies about German culture will perceive, will feel in their own bodies what German means and how a nation must be made up, if it wishes to rule the world.” (Benedikt Haag, Deutschland und der Weltkrieg, 1914.)
“With the help of Turkey, India and China may be conquered. Having conquered these Germany should civilize and Germanize the world, and the German language would become the world language.” (Theodor Springman, Deutschland und der Orient, 1915.)
“Our next war will be fought for the highest interests of our country and of mankind. This will invest it with importance in the world's history. 'World power or downfalll' will be our rallying cry." (Bernhardi, Germany and the Next War, 1911, p. 154.)
II. MILITABISM AND ABMAMENTS. 1. Definition of militarism. It is a state of mind; not the
having of an army, no matter how large, but the exaltation of it to the chief place in the state, the subordination to it of the civil authorities. Joined to this is the reliance upon military force in every dispute. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Militarism," “ Prussian
ism," etc.) 2. Militarism and the military class dominant in Germany.
(a) Historical reasons for this: lack of defensible
frontiers; hostile neighbors, etc. Relation also
to topics under heading I. (b) Tho Zabern Incident (1913) as a practical ex.
ample of military domination. (See War Cyclo
pedia, under “ Zabern," “ Luxemburg, Rosa." (c) Quotations showing German exaltation of war
and army, etc. (See Conquest and Kultur, seca.
4, 5.) “Beciuse only in war all the virtues which militarism regards highly are given a chance to unfold, because only in war the truly heroic comes into play, for the realization of which on earth militarism is above all concerned; therefore it seems to us who are filled with the spirit of militarism that war is a holy thing, the holiest thing on earth; and this high estimato of war in its turn makes an essential ingredient of the military spirit. There is nothing that tradespeople complain of so much as that wo regard it us holy." (Werner Sombart, Händler und Helden, 1915.)
“War is the noblest and holiest expression of human activity. For us, too, the glad, great hour of battle will strike. Still and deep in the German heart must live the joy of battle and the longing for it. Let us ridicule to the utmost the old women in breeches who fear war and deplore it as cruel and revolting. No; war is beautiful. Its august sublimity elevates the human heart beyond the earthly and the common." (Jung-Deutschland, official organ of Young Germany, October, 1913.)
“War is for us only a means, the state of prepara. tion for war is more than a means, it is an end. If wo were not beset with the danger of war, it would be necessary to create it artificially, in order to strengthen our softened and weakened Germanism, to make bones and sinews." (Ernst Hasse, Die Zukunft des deutschen Volkstums, 1908.)
“ It is the soldier and the army, not parliamentary majorities and votes, that have wolded the Gorman Empire together. My confidence rests with the army." (Emperor William II.)
Otfried Nippold, a University professor and jurist, was shocked to observe, on his return to Europe from a residence of several years in Japan, the extraordinary growth in Germany of militarism and the “jingo” spirit. At the end of a book which he com. piled, made up of statements by prominent Germans in 1912-13 advocating war and conquest, he said: “The evidence submitted in this book amounts to an irrefutable proof that a systematic stimulation of the war spirit is going on, based on the one hand OD the wishes of the Pan-German League and on the other on the agitation of the Defense Association [Wehrverein). ... War is represented not merely as a possibility that might arise, but as a necessity that must come about, and the sooner the better. In the opinion of these instigators, the German nation needs a war; a long-continued peace seems regrettable to
them just because it is a peace, no matter whether there is any reason for war or not, and therefore, in case of need, one must simply strive to bring it about. . . The desire of the political visionaries in the Pan-German camp for the conquest of colonies suits the purpose of our warlike generals very well; but to them this is not an end, but only a means. War as such is what really matters to them. For if their theory holds good, Germany, even if she conquered ever so many colonies, would again be in need of war after a few decades, since otherwise the German nation would again be in danger of moral de generation. The truth is that, to them, war is a quite normal institution of international intercourse, and not in any way a means of settling great international conflicts-not a means to be resorted to only in case of great necessity.” (Der deutsche Chauvinismus, 1913, pp. 113-117; quoted in Conquest and
Kultur, 137-139.) 3. The competition in armaments. Europe an “armed
camp” following 1871, with universal military service, and constantly increasing military forces and expenditures. The trained forces at the beginning of the war were estimated approximately as follows: Russia, 4,100,000; Germany, 4,250,000; Austria, 3,600,000; France, 4,000,000; Great Britain (including its “ Terri.
torials” or trained militia), 707,000. Germany, already the first of military powers, planned a
Navy to rival that of England. Her first Naval Bill was introduced in 1898; Great Britain's reverses in the Boer War (1899-1902) greatly stimulated German
naval activities. III. FAILURE OF THE HAGUE PEACE CONFERENCES OF 1899 AND 1907, AND OF THE NAVAL CONFERENCE OF
LONDON (1908-9). 1. History of the Hague conferences. Agency of Russia
and the United States in calling them. Their positive results in formulating international law and establishing a tribunal at the Hague. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Hague Conferences,” “ Hague Conventions,"
“Hague Regulations,” “ Hague Tribunal.” 2. Plans therein for disarmament and compulsory arbitra
tion defeated by Germany and Austria. 3. General policy of Germany with reference to arbitration.
Refusal to enter into an arbitration treaty with the
tude,” “ Peace Treaties.") 4. British vs. German views of the “freedom of the seas,"
as revealed at the Hague Conferences and the Naval Conference of London. (See War Cyclopedia, under “Freedom of the Seas," “ Declaration of London,” etc.)
“ The German view of freedom of the seas in time of war was that a belligerent should have the right to make the seas dangerous to neutrals and enemies alike by the use of indiscriminating mines; and that neutral vessels should be liable to destruction or seizure without appeal to any judicial tribunal if in the opinion of the commander of a belligerent war. vessel any part of their cargo consisted of contraband. On the other hand, Germany was ever ready to place the belligerent vessels on the same footing as neutral vessels, and to forbid their seizure or dostruction except when they were carrying contraband or endeavoring to force a blockade. In this way she hoped to deprive the stronger naval power of its principal weapon of offense—the attack upon enemy commerce-while preserving for the weaker power
every possible means of doing harm alike to enemy or neutral ships. At the same time she was anxious to secure to belligerent merchant-ships the right of transforming themselves into warships on the high seas." (Ramsey Muir, Mare Liberum: The Freedom
of the Seas, pp. 8-13.) ". IV. SOME SPECIAL SUBJECTS OF INTERNATIONAL CONFLICT. 1. French desire to recover Alsace-Lorraine, taken by Ger.
many in 1871. (See War Cyclopedia, under “ Alsace
Lorraine,” “Franco-German Rivalry.”). 2. Desire of Italy to reclaim its "unredeemed ” lands held
by Austria. (See Ibid., “ Italia Irredenta.") 3. Colonial and commercial rivalry among the Great Pow.
ers over Central and Northern Africa (Morocco especially); Asia Minor, Mesopotamia, and Persia; China and the Far East; South America, etc. (See Ibid., un
der “Morocco Question," “ Franco-German Rivalry.”) 4. Increased gravity of questions concerning the Balkan
Peninsula after the Turkish Revolution of 1908. Plans for Austrian and German domination in these regions (Drang nach Osten) conflicted with Russia's desiro to secure Constantinople and an outlet to the Mediterranean, and threatened the security of Great Britain's communications with India. (See Ibid., “Balkan Prob
lem," “ Drang nach Osten," etc.) B Grouping of the Great Powers into the Triple Alliance
(1882) and the Triple Entente. Germany's fear of being “hemmed in" (alleged policy of “encirclement”). (See Ibid., “Encirclement, Policy of,"
“ Triple Alliance,” “Triple Entente.”) 6. The Anglo-German Problem. (See Sarolea, The Anglo
German Problem, 1911; Conquest and Kultur, 86.
time supremacy through Germany's rapid indus
trial development since 1870. (b) Colonial and trade rivalry in Africa, Asia Minor,
Mesopotamia, etc. (c) Hostility to Great Britain taught by Treitschko
and others. Doctrine that England was decrepit —"a colossus with feet of clay”—and that her empire would fall at the first hostile touch. Toasts of German officers to “the Day"-when war with Great Britain should come. (See War
Cyclopedia, under “Der Tag,” “ Treitschke,” etc.) “If our Empire has the courage to follow an independent colonial policy with determination, a collision of our interests with those of England is inevitable. It was natural and logical that the new Great Power in Central Europe should be compelled to settle affairs with all Great Powers. We have settled our accounts with Austria-Hungary, with Franco, with Russia. The last settlement, the settlemont with England, will probably be the lengthiest and the most difficult.” (Heinrich von Treitschke.) (d) Attitude of Great Britain on the whole one of
conciliation. (e) Failure of the two Powers to arrive at an agree
ment as to naval armaments and mutual relations. Great Britain proposed (in 1912) to siga
the following declaration: “ The two Powers being naturally desirous of socuring peace and friendship between them, England declares that she will neither make, nor join in, any unprovoked attack upon Germany. Aggressions upon Germany is not the subject, and forms no part, of any treaty, understanding, or combination to whiela